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This study examines how a critical high technology industry in China, the 
semiconductor industry, advanced from being an isolated, centrally planned industry in the 
mid 1980s to being an important participant in the competitive global semiconductor industry 
after 2000.  The research examines the most important trends, projects, and enterprises in 
China, with attention to China’s global partners and China’s rapidly growing role in the global 
economy.  In the 1990s, semiconductor enterprises in China proactively made key structural 
changes and global linkages that set the stage for the industry’s growth after 2000.  The study 
thus provides an industry level view of gradual industry reforms and technological upgrading 
in contemporary China, including examining the degree and character of so-called state led 
development.  Finally, the study shows that the development of this high technology industry 
had direct and positive effects on China’s larger policy and operating environment. 
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Integrated Circuit  (I.C. or chip) 集成电路 jichengdianlu 
Microelectronics (the field of study) 微电子 weidianzi  
 
Discrete Devices: the electronic components that are integrated on a chip, i.e., 
transistors, capacitors, resistors. 
 
Primary Semiconductor Industry Sectors: 
 
1. Design, done in design houses 
2. Manufacturing, called fabrication and done at foundries 
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The evolution of China’s economy since 1978 is one of the most fascinating 
phenomena in contemporary economic history, especially considering the diverse range of 
industries in China that have engaged with global trade and moved into higher value added 
activities.  The opening of China’s centrally planned economy, reforms to China’s state 
owned industries, and China’s opening to foreign trade have resulted in rapid advances in 
commerce, industry, and technology, raising the living standards of hundreds of millions of 
people in the world’s most populous nation.  China’s late 20th century economic growth 
occurred on the heels of rapid growth in a number of East Asians, notably Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, and in the context of the electronics-based Information Revolution.  How 
China’s domestic economy transformed and how this transformation was linked to global 
economic trends are questions of both Chinese history and global economic history. 
This study examines how one particular high-tech and capital-intensive industry in 
China, the semiconductor industry, advanced from being an isolated, centrally planned 
industry in the mid 1980s to being an important participant in the global semiconductor 
industry after 2000.  The semiconductor industry is a globalized industry with ramifications 
for commerce, industry, and national security, because semiconductors are the “brains” in all 
electronic products and systems.1  Using industry sources and interviews, this study assesses: 
reforms to China’s centrally planned semiconductor industry in the 1980s (Chapter Two); 
major state supported projects and Sino-foreign partnerships in the 1990s (Chapters Three and 
                                                        
1 The global semiconductor industry is described later in the Introduction, but generally, the semiconductor 
industry originated with the development of the transistor at Bell Labs in the U.S. in 1947.  By the late 1950s, 
both Texas Instruments and Fairchild had developed “integrated circuits” (semiconductors), the first of which 
had only about twelve transistors integrated on a circuit.  Semiconductors are thus called integrated circuits or 
chips, and the field is generally called micro-electronics.  Over the years, the number of electrical components 
(called “discrete devices,” e.g., transistors, capacitors, etc.) that can be integrated on a single chip has grown, 
and now billions of devices can be integrated on one chip.  With more discrete devices integrated on a chip, a 




Four); China’s integration with the global semiconductor value chain (Chapter Five); China’s 
changing institutional and policy environment from the 1980s to the early 2000s (Chapters 
Two and Five); and the trajectory of this industry in China compared to its trajectory in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan (Chapter Six.) 
The primary finding is that, just after reforms to China’s centrally planned 
semiconductor industry in the 1980s, there was a period of approximately twelve years (1988 
to 2000) when a combination of “state led development” (that is, state supported enterprises, 
programs, and policies) and what this study terms “enterprise led development” worked in 
tandem to enable the semiconductor industry in China to advance.  In terms of state led 
development, from the late 1980s and through the 1990s, Chinese officials and semiconductor 
industry leaders established (or re-established) a handful of large semiconductor production 
enterprises, most of which were Sino-foreign joint ventures, as well as establishing new 
semiconductor design organizations.  Officials formed these few large production enterprises 
not to create a new Chinese “national” semiconductor industry, but rather, officials hoped that 
the existence of even just one relatively advanced semiconductor enterprise would 
demonstrate to the global industry that such an enterprise could operate in China’s admittedly 
difficult business environment.  Chinese leaders hoped to attract and foster a full 
semiconductor industry chain in China, including domestic firms, foreign firms, state-
affiliated firms, and private firms.  Thus, Chinese leaders’ state led development efforts in the 
semiconductor industry were not significantly domestic favoring nor nationalistic, relative to 
common conceptions of “state led development” in other nations. 
In the latter half of the 20th century, industry and government leaders in Japan, South 




national economic and technological upgrading, and Chinese leaders certainly took lessons 
from their East Asian neighbors.  Yet, China’s domestic context and its timing and approach 
differed.  In the mid to late 1990s, China was increasingly the site of global manufacturing 
and assembly for electronic products, and this created a huge and growing domestic market 
for semiconductors in China.  At the same time, advances in electronic communication and 
standardization in the late 1990s led to vertical dis-integration in the electronics and 
semiconductor industries.  With these trends, Chinese semiconductor enterprises were able to 
take the approach of entering the industry by sector and providing low-end and mid-range 
products for the ever-expanding (and increasingly China-based) electronics industry. 
In the 1990s, China’s state led development efforts were limited mainly to supporting 
a few production enterprises and R&D programs, and thus much progress in the 1990s 
occurred through what this study terms “enterprise led development.”  The few semiconductor 
enterprises in China in the 1990s faced many difficulties owing to China’s still-reforming 
economy, weak institutions, and inconsistent and disadvantageous trade and investment 
policies.  In particular, this capital-intensive industry suffered for lack of access to capital.  
Further, China’s managers and engineers were stymied by their background in inefficient and 
low-tech state owned enterprises.  For all these reasons, attracting foreign partners was 
difficult.  Nevertheless, the difficulties that China’s new enterprises faced in the 1990s led 
them to undertake organizational, technical, and managerial advances.  At the same time, 
these enterprises did manage to forge partnerships with global firms, thereby integrating the 
industry in China with the global industry.  After about twelve years of this “enterprise led” 




address some of the obstacles that enterprises had faced in the 1990s.  These policies fostered 
a new era of growth for both Chinese and foreign semiconductor firms in China after 2000.   
Accounts of the semiconductor industry in China in the 1990s mostly cite its under-
developed status and its ineffective state led projects and state owned enterprises.  And yet, 
this study shows that between 1995 and 2000, enterprises made significant organizational 
changes and semiconductor production took off.  Indeed, the pioneer enterprises of the 1990s 
retained their position as leading Chinese enterprises in the early 21st century, joined by a host 
of foreign and private firms, as was envisioned by Chinese leaders.  How should the 
enterprises and major projects of the 1990s be judged?  If judged on profitability, technology, 
or market share, then certainly they were not global leaders.  But if we want to understand the 
complex process of industrial development in China in the late 20th century, then these 
enterprises merit our attention.  Thus, this longitudinal study is mostly concerned with how a 
particular global, high technology industry evolved in China in the decades immediately after 
China’s “reform and opening” in 1978, but the study also has broader implications for China’s 
contemporary economic evolution and economic development more generally. 
1. Economic Development in Modern Chinese History 
 
In considering China’s economic achievements since reform and opening in 1978, we 
must recognize that the late 20th century is not the first period in China’s modern history when 
Chinese leaders have pursued specific plans for economic change and technological advance.  
Indeed, these were explicit goals of Chinese officials in different eras.  In only the last 150 
years, Chinese leaders have made several pushes for industrialization.  These include: the 




Western technology to “strengthen” China; the Chinese Nationalist government’s efforts in 
the early to mid 20th century to develop foreign partnerships and build industrial capacity in 
China; the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.)-led industrialization after 1949, with Soviet 
organizational and technical assistance; and since 1978, the C.C.P.’s pursuit of the “four 
modernizations” including the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and 
science & technology.  Thus, China’s push for industrial development via foreign assistance 
since 1978 is not entirely new in Chinese history. 
In earlier periods of industrialization, however, Chinese leaders sought to enhance 
China’s self-sufficiency and independence vis-à-vis other world powers, despite China’s need 
for foreign technology, and Chinese leaders were keenly aware of potential dependence on 
foreigners.  In contrast, in the contemporary period, Chinese leaders have sought greater 
integration with other world powers, and while economic self-sufficiency is still a 
consideration, it has not been an overriding goal. 
2. China’s Contemporary Economic History and the Scholarly Literature 
 
China’s late 20th century push for economic development has been particularly 
effective, garnering much attention from scholars.  China has moved from being the world’s 
tenth largest economy in 1978 to being the world’s second largest economy in 2010, and 
median per capita income in China has risen dramatically.  The 1980s and 1990s were a 
foundational period in China’s transition from central planning to its “socialist market 
economy,”2 and these decades set the stage for China’s rapid economic advance, especially 
                                                        
2 The concept of the socialist market economy was articulated by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping after 1978.  It 




after 2000.  Broadly, China’s contemporary economic history from the 1980s to the early 
2000s includes central planning, state ownership of enterprises, and state led development, as 
well as the emergence of private and foreign invested firms and international trade.   Scholars 
have addressed all these diverse topics as well as many other issues that relate to China’s 
contemporary economy.  Most of the research on China’s contemporary era has been the work 
of economists, political scientists, and others.  Historians are only just beginning to study 
China’s economic evolution since 1978, but this is an opportune time for historians to 
investigate events, trends, and issues during those decades while records are accessible and 
memories are still fresh.3  Before assessing how the existing research informs this study, let us 
first consider the broad outlines of China’s history of central planning and China’s general 
approach to economic reforms after 1978. 
China’s economy was under central planning for only a limited period of years, yet the 
era of central planning and state ownership of industries greatly influenced China’s economic 
reforms and economy in the 1980s and 1990s.  The C.C.P. came to power in 1949, but China 
initiated central planning under its first “five year plan” for industry in 1953.4  However, just 
twelve years later, China’s tumultuous Cultural Revolution disrupted China’s economy from 
1965 to 1975.  Then, from 1978 through the 1980s, Chinese leaders were gradually 
dismantling central planning.  Thus, China’s period of central planning was inconsistent and 
totaled less than thirty years.  (In contrast, the U.S.S.R. was under central planning for about 
sixty years, from 1928 to 1990.)  Nonetheless, China’s relatively short and inconsistent period 
                                                        
3 Sources for this study are discussed at the end of the Introduction. 
4 From 1953, the C.C.P. used five year plans for macro-level planning and for setting priorities and goals for 
China’s economy.  Since 2006, the C.C.P. has used “five year guidelines,” e.g., 2011-2015 falls under the 
twelfth five year guideline.  However, the central government no longer engages in central planning in terms 




of central planning deeply affected China’s economy, institutions, and industries.  As Chinese 
leaders pursued economic and technological advances in the 1980s and 1990s, they had to 
reform deeply entrenched economic structures, while also fostering new structures and 
entering into new global processes, i.e., foreign trade and technology transfer. 
In the 1990s, Chinese leaders were able to observe the experiences of former Soviet 
economies that were transitioning away from central planning but they were also able to learn 
from neighboring economies in East Asia, several of which had experienced rapid economic 
growth after World War II largely through trade globalization and “state led development.”5  
C.C.P. officials opted not to follow the path of Soviet economies, as these economies had 
attempted relatively rapid privatization of the state owned sector before the necessary 
supportive institutions (e.g., law, finance) and services (e.g., marketing, distribution) were in 
place.  Instead, Chinese leaders experimented with some of the development tactics of their 
East Asian neighbors.  Yet, given China’s history of central planning and state ownership of 
industries, China’s domestic context was different than that of Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan when those nations initiated state supported industrialization programs and increased 
global trade in the decades after World War II.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese leaders faced 
the difficult task of having to both reform a vast state owned sector while initiating some of 
the tactics that had been successful elsewhere in East Asia, such as levering low wage labor to 
produce goods for export markets and providing state support to large industrial enterprises.  
                                                        
5 State led development refers to various government policies and programs to foster economic growth, often 
through trade related policies and often with the goal of strengthening domestic industries relative to foreign 
competitors.  The post World War II economic histories of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are discussed more fully 




As a further complication in the 1980s and 1990s, China’s institutional and policy 
environment did not fully support market-based economic activity and international trade. 
The following section surveys three areas of existing research that are most relevant to 
this study of the semiconductor industry in China.  First, literature on the reforms to China’s 
state owned sector helps us to understand China’s transition from central planning and the 
ongoing role of state ownership and state support for industrial enterprises.  Second, the 
research on China’s weak institutional and policy environment reveals the constraints in 
China to, for example, firm formation, trade, and technological innovation.  This literature 
shows why many industries in China in the 1980s and 1990s were not operating under 
neoclassical dynamics, i.e., many for-profit firms in competition balancing supply and 
demand through price equilibrium.  Finally, the field of evolutionary economics offers a 
rationale for this type of “on the ground” study of a particular industry in China.  In particular, 
the economist Richard Nelson has argued that investigating actual activities, forces, learning, 
and changes in a particular industry or realm elucidates the evolutionary nature of economic, 
technological, and institutional advance.6 
1.1. Extant Literature on China’s State Owned Sector 
 
Given China’s efforts to reform the state sector and the simultaneous growth of non-
state sectors, a number of scholars have addressed different ownership sectors within China’s 
economy.  These include the state owned sector, the foreign invested sector, China’s 
                                                        
6 Richard Nelson, Understanding Technological Change as an Evolutionary Process (Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science Publishers, 1987), page 8; Richard Nelson, The Sources of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), pages 6, 292-294; Richard Nelson, editor, National Innovation Systems (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993); Richard Nelson, Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Cambridge: 




“township and village enterprises,” the informal sector, and the private sector.7  A majority of 
these studies have addressed China’s state owned sector, which is reasonable given the 
prevalence of state ownership in China since 1949 and the complexity of dismantling central 
planning and reforming China’s vast state sector after 1978.  The state sector was the largest 
sector in China’s economy in 1978, but from the 1980s to the early 2000s, the sector’s share 
of China’s gross domestic product decreased relative to other ownership sectors.8  In 1980, 
the state owned sector accounted for approximately 75 percent of China’s gross domestic 
product of 306 billion.  By 2010, China’s economy was about 20 times larger than it was in 
1980, and the state sector may have accounted for 35 to over 40 percent of China’s gross 
domestic product of 6 trillion.9  The sector was (and remains) dominant in China’s so-called 
“strategic” industries, such as infrastructure and banking, and it has significant government 
influence.  The structure and role of this sector has continued to evolve up to the present, thus 
garnering the ongoing attention of researchers. 
The literature on reforms to China’s state sector is directly relevant to this study 
because the electronics and semiconductor industries in China were centrally planned and 
                                                        
7 Just of few of these include: Hongyi Chen, The Institutional Transition of China's Township and Village 
Enterprises (Ashgate: 2000); Yasheng Huang, Foreign Direct Investment in China (Hong Kong: Chinese 
University Press, 1998); Kelley Tsai, Back-alley Banking (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Peter Nolan, 
China and the Global Economy (New York: Palgrave, 2001.) 
8 Since perhaps 2009, the state sector may have grown in terms of its contribution to China’s GDP.  China’s 
stimulus package for the financial crisis of 2008-2009 went mostly to state owned enterprises.  Since that time, 
the notion that “the state sector advances, the private sector recedes” (guo jin min tui 国进民退) has become 
increasingly popular.  Here, the state sector refers to both state owned enterprises, enterprises in which the 
state is the largest shareholder, and “collective” enterprises.  For an analysis of the size of China’s state sector, 
see the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “An Analysis of Stateowned Enterprises 
and State Capitalism in China,” October 26, 2011. 
9 Gross domestic products figures are from the United Nations and World Bank.  The share of the state owned 
sector is difficult to determine, but these estimates are from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 




state owned prior to 1978,10 and the semiconductor industry was designated as a “strategic” 
industry in China.  Thus, this study uses existing cross industry research on China’s state 
owned sector as well as sources specific to the semiconductor industry to analyze how 
Chinese officials dismantled central planning in China’s semiconductor industry and reformed 
the structure and guidance mechanisms of the national semiconductor industry in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
Existing research on China’s state owned sector has addressed the sector’s overall 
organization as well as the governance and ownership structures of state owned enterprises 
and enterprise management.11  In the 1970s, China’s state owned enterprises and research 
institutes were organized into vast vertical hierarchies under various industrial ministries.  
China’s state sector has been through several rounds of reform and restructuring since 1978, 
including re-organizations within industries, ownership restructurings, mergers, and the 
“releasing” (de-funding) of certain state factories and institutes.12  Most studies of China’s 
state sector do not differentiate between industries, but rather they identify general structures, 
practices, and problems in China’s state owned sector across industries.  In the 1990s and 
2000s, scholars noted progress in China’s state owned enterprises in terms of product 
diversity and quality, managerial independence, technical skills, assets held, and international 
                                                        
10 Denis Simon, Technological Innovation in China (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1988.) 
11 See Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy (Houndsmill: Palgrave, 2001); Dyland Sutherland, China’s 
Large Enterprises (New York: Routledge, 2003); Edward Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Chen Derong, Chinese Firms Between Hierarchy and Market (Britian: 
Macmillan Press, 1995.) 
12 Chapter Two details reforms to the state owned electronics and semiconductor industries in China in the 1980s. 
Chapter Four, Section 4.42, further addresses China’s state owned sector in the 1990s.  At this writing, China 
now has over 100 large state owned “enterprise groups” under the State Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), under China’s State Council.  The SASAC is the controlling 
shareholder in the large enterprise groups.  Each large enterprise group has a number of state owned or state 
invested enterprises “under” it in a vertical hierarchy, usually within an industry, resulting in tens of thousands 




cooperation and expansion.  Nonetheless, significant problems endured, e.g., ongoing political 
interference, deficiencies in governance structures, operational inefficiencies, “soft” budgets, 
and corruption, among other problems.  Studies of state owned enterprises in China from the 
1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s often suggested that this colossal and troubled sector was a 
hindrance to China’s economy.13 
And yet, economic growth in China was rapid.  How do we reconcile the studies of 
China’s state owned sector with the rapid growth of China’s overall economy in the 1980s, 
1990s, and beyond?  Studies of China’s state sector identified the broad elements of reform 
and ongoing problems, yet in a number of industries, China’s state owned sector gradually 
evolved from being a dominant and self-contained sector to being integrated with other 
ownership sectors.  Studies of the state sector, several of which are set in the state dominated 
iron and steel industries, do not necessarily show how reforms to the state sector were 
executed in other industries or how other industries evolved from state ownership to mixed 
ownership in the 1990s and beyond.  The dominance of the state sector varied by industry.  
Heavy industries, infrastructure, and banking, for example, were (and remain) dominated by 
the state sector, but other industries, e.g., light industries, certain service industries, and high 
technology industries, either were not dominated by the state sector or the dominance of the 
state sector decreased significantly during the 1980s and 1990s.  Differences in state sector 
dominance by industry (i.e., steel versus textiles) and the state sector’s increasing integration 
with other ownership sectors (i.e., the foreign invested sector, the private sector) have 
rendered cross-industry generalizations about the state sector less useful for understanding the 
                                                        
13 Steinfeld, Forging Reform; Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995); Nicholas Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington D.C.: Brookings 




trajectory of China’s overall economy and specific industries.  An article from 2010 is worth 
quoting at length: 
“It is no longer possible to characterize China’s state owned enterprises in the 
simple bifurcated terms of decades past.  …The distinctions between state owned 
and private sector firms in China have blurred significantly.  The “traditional “ or 
“pessimistic” view of China’s SOEs …[as]… dinosaurs … stands in stark contrast 
to the profile of those state enterprises that have engaged in global partnerships 
and acquisitions.  … In the foreseeable future the traditional distinctions between 
[ownership sectors] of the Chinese economy will bleed even more, as state owned 
enterprises’ ownership structures become of secondary importance to the level of 
flexibility and receptivity displayed in [their] corporate management and business 
practice…. given the progressive ability of state owned enterprises to attract 
managerial talent and develop innovative products and processes…  There are of 
course relativities here in terms of [different industries]  … For example, political 
influence in …[utility or oil companies]…would be far greater than in say the 
appliance giant Haier or computer maker Lenovo.”14 
 
 
Thus, while studies of China’s state owned sector have identified significant problems and 
changes in the sector, these studies alone do not identify the factors and processes that have 
contributed to China’s economic and technological advances.  In this study of the 
semiconductor industry, we see that in the 1990s a few new state supported semiconductor 
enterprises played an important role in integrating the industry in China with the global 
industry and in training a pool of semiconductor personnel that would eventually populate 
new (non-state) semiconductor-related firms.  While these state supported semiconductor 
enterprises had some of the problems endemic to state owned enterprises across industries in 
China (operational inefficiencies, “soft” budgets, etc.), nonetheless, they did not stifle the 
development of the semiconductor industry.  Rather, their particular activities and influences 
                                                        
14 John Hassard, Jonathan Morris, Jackie Sheehan, and Xiao Yuxin, “China’s State-owned Enterprises: 
Economic Reform and Organizational Restructuring,” Journal of Organizational Change Management, 23.5, 




from the broader global industry moved the industry forward, as we will see in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five. 
1.2. Extant Literature on China’s Institutions and Policy Environment 
 
In addition to dismantling central planning and reforming the state owned sector, 
China’s contemporary economic history also includes the emergence of non-state and foreign 
invested firms and international trade.  With these developments, scholars have rightly turned 
their attention to China’s institutions and policy environment, especially in terms of China’s 
legal and regulatory systems, financial system, educational system, and China’s science and 
technology “system,”15 as scholars widely agree on the importance of institutions for 
economic growth.16  China’s institutions have undergone significant change and development 
since the 1980s, but scholars such as Yasheng Huang, Edward Steinfeld, and Nicholas Lardy 
have shown that during the 1990s China’s institutions were quite weak by Western 
standards.17  During that decade, China’s weak legal protections, financial regulations, and 
trade policies indeed created obstacles for Chinese and foreign semiconductor firms. 
                                                        
15 On higher education, see Denis Simon and Cao Cong, China’s Emerging Technological Edge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); on science and technology, see Tony Saich, China’s Science Policy in the 
1980s (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1989); on banking and finance, see 
James Barth (editor), Financial Restructuring and Reform in Post-WTO China, 2007; on China’s legal system, 
see Guanghua Yu (editor), The Development of the Chinese Legal System (New York: Routledge, 2011.) 
16 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 and 2001); Richard Posner, 
The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); William 
Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997); Richard Nelson (editor), Sources of Industrial Leadership (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Barth (editor), Financial Restructuring; Yu (editor), The Development of the Chinese 
Legal System; Simon and Cao Cong, China’s Emerging Technological Edge; Saich, China’s Science Policy. 
17 See Yasheng Huang, Steinfeld, and Saich, Financial Sector Reforms in China (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004); Huang, “An Institutional and Policy Approach to the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment in 




In the 1990s, China’s legal and regulatory systems were still developing.  For foreign 
firms attempting to do business in China, there were regulations in place for establishing 
Sino-foreign joint ventures, Sino-foreign partnerships, and distributorships in China, but 
foreign firms had to negotiate with Chinese officials from an array of governmental 
organizations to establish such operations.  In setting up operations in China, foreign firms 
were concerned about due diligence and transparency, contract development and negotiations, 
and contract enforcement in China.  Further, China did not offer adequate protection for 
intellectual property, and foreign firms were reluctant to share intellectual property or trade 
secrets with Chinese partners or to manufacture higher end products in China.  Uncertainties 
about property protection and contract enforcement and the need to negotiate agreements with 
multiple governmental bodies served to reduce foreign firms’ activity in China in the 1990s.18 
Yet, foreign firms’ participation in China was important in the 1990s because China’s 
lack of capital markets at that time meant that many industries in China sought foreign capital 
and foreign investment.  Foreign firms, however, faced investment restrictions in China as 
well as restrictions on moving money out of China.  As for Chinese firms, state supported 
enterprises could get capital infusions from Chinese government organs or state owned banks, 
but new, non-state firms in China (newly allowed under China’s 1994 Company Law)19 
                                                        
18 Semiconductor Industry Association prepared by Dewey Ballantine LLP, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor 
Industry,” October 2003; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, statement by Semiconductor 
Industry Association’s Daryl Hatano, “Is China Playing by the Rules?,” September 24, 2003. 
19 China enacted a new “Company Law” in July of 1994.  This law established new forms of ownership as well 
as new corporate governance mechanisms.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese officials experimented 
with a number of reforms aimed at establishing some legal basis for corporate forms.  Prior to the 1994 law, 
China’s state owned enterprises were not independent legal entities and they lacked property rights commonly 
attributed to “property” in the West, such as the right of ownership, the right to use, the right of returns on 
property, and the right to transfer property (“alienation.”)   The Company Law of 1994 established the legal 
basis of joint stock companies and limited liability companies.  For limited liability companies and joint stock 




mostly did not have access to capital through options that are common in the West, i.e., 
vendor financing, lease financing for capital equipment, government-backed small business 
loans, bank loans, or venture capital.20  In the capital-intensive semiconductor industry, 
particularly in the production sector, non-state firms’ lack of access to capital ensured that 
such firms would not emerge nor play a significant role in the industry during the 1990s. 
 In the 1990s and into the 2000s, scholars and industry personnel expressed valid 
concerns that China’s economy would eventually be stalled by inadequate institutions.21  As 
just one example, in 1999 the Chief Financial Officer of a Fortune 500 commented “China 
has had a good run until now, but China’s economy will never really go anywhere without the 
rule of law and protection of property rights.”22   And yet, economic growth continued apace, 
despite China’s less than robust legal system.  Of course, China’s economy may still falter in 
some significant way, but since 1999, China has gone from being the world’s seventh largest 
economy to being the world’s second largest, with approximately ten percent annual growth. 
Notably, in his 1995 book Growing Out of the Plan, China scholar Barry Naughton 
wrote that in China “institutional change has consistently lagged behind the changes in the 
economy.”23  Naughton suggested that as China’s economy was growing in the 1980s and 
1990s, Chinese officials came under increasing pressure to gradually develop the legal and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
governance, i.e., the roles and duties of corporate boards and directors and the requirements for disclosure, 
transparency, and monitoring of company records. 
20 Stock markets and private equity are less relevant for start up companies in the West. 
21 Steinfeld, Forging Reform, pages 24, 254, and 258.  Steinfeld concluded that ownership restructuring within 
China’s state owned enterprises would be ineffective if undertaken before reforms to China’s institutional and 
regulatory environmental.  He argued the legal basis for ownership itself had to be established in China, 
regardless of whether the state or other actors were the owners.  Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic 
Revolution, pages 124-127, 183-186, and 202-209 on structural problems in China’s financial institutions. 
22 Thomas Bindley, Chief Financial Officer of Whitman Corporation, 1999. 




financial systems that global industries needed.24  More recently, a 2011 article by legal 
scholars asked “How is [China’s] system, without a plethora of formal institutions deemed 
important to Western firms, producing a rapidly expanding list of Fortune 500 companies and 
supporting high and sustained levels of economic development?”25  Indeed, how?  It seems 
Barry Naughton’s 1995 observation about institutional development following economic 
development may have held true in 2011.  Corporate governance in China’s state owned 
enterprises has evolved over the years, but the authors of the 2011 article show significant 
enterprise growth prior to the establishment of formal institutions presumed to be important.  
Economic growth might have been more rapid in China’s emerging economy from the 1980s 
if presumably important institutions and policies had been in place, but China’s institutional 
weaknesses did not totally thwart growth.  In the semiconductor industry, this study shows 
that the industry’s development ultimately prompted improvements in China’s institutional 
and policy environment.  That is, Chinese officials saw that certain institutional and policy 
weaknesses were a hindrance to the semiconductor industry, and they responded by enacting 
new and more supportive policies. 
The preceding discussion addressed formal institutions, mainly China’s legal, 
regulatory, and financial systems, however, a number of scholars have also studied state led 
development in China and elsewhere, where state led development itself can create a type of 
institutional environment.26  The literature on state led development is discussed more fully in 
                                                        
24 Similarly, William Roy has shown that during the second industrial revolution large U.S. enterprises 
influenced national institutions.24   
25 Lin and Milhaupt, “We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in 
China,” Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper, Number 409, November, 2011. 
26 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrial 




Chapter Four, Section 4.4, but here, suffice it to say that for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and other nations scholars have argued that state policies 
designed to promote economic development created a supportive context in which certain 
industries were able to develop.27  State led development may include industrial policies for: 
protecting infant industries; achieving import substitution; promoting exports; funding 
technology transfers from abroad; providing capital to domestic enterprises; supporting 
“national champion” enterprises; or funding education, research, and industrial parks.  With 
this literature in mind, this study indeed examines state policies and programs for the 
semiconductor industry in China, which were undoubtedly influential, whether or not they 
were optimal. 
1.3. Extent Literature on Industries in China and Evolutionary Economics 
 
How did China’s economy transform from being relatively isolated and centrally 
planned in the early 1980s to being globally integrated and of mixed ownership after 2000, 
given China’s weak institutions and problematic state sector?  Could we learn something 
about China’s post 1978 economic growth and change by looking at events and trends in 
particular industries, rather than by looking at certain ownership sectors across industries, as 
has been the more common approach?  Industry-specific, longitudinal studies seem 
appropriate given that much of China’s “take off” is located in particular industries or groups 
                                                                                                                                                                             
University Press, 1989); Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Dylan Sutherland, China’s Large Enterprises and the 
Challenge of Late Industrialization (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
27 Not everyone is convinced that state led development was the primary cause of rapid growth in East Asia.  The 
neoliberal, orthodox view challenges the results of industrial policies in East Asia, arguing instead that the 
rapidly developing nations of East Asia in the latter half of the 20th century “got the fundamentals right” and 
relied largely on market orientation and trade liberalization.  For a further explanation of the neoliberal, 




of industries.  China’s economy has expanded through growth in agriculture, various light 
manufacturing industries, electronics, and raw materials and natural resources.  Further, 
China’s five year plans (now called “five year guidelines”) are largely organized by industry, 
with each five year plan proffering policies, goals, and support mechanisms for specific 
industries and technologies.  Thus, it seems that China’s government has viewed industry-
specific development as germane to China’s overall economy.  Finally, business historians of 
modern China have chosen to study specific industries, including the salt industry, 
pharmaceutical industry, tobacco industry, and others, and their studies elucidate 
organizational structures, mechanisms, and practices in China’s economic history.28 
There are just a few book length studies of specific industries in contemporary China, 
and three such studies that relate to the electronics industry were influential to this study, 
either in approach or content.  This study in effect picks up where Denis Simon and Detlef 
Rehn left off in their 1988 book Technological Innovation in China: The Case of the 
Shanghai Semiconductor Industry.  Actually, Simon and Rehn’s book concludes that until the 
mid to late 1980s there was little actual technological innovation in the semiconductor 
industry in China because of the rigid and still fairly isolated nature of China’s centrally 
planned and state owned semiconductor industry.  In the mid 1980s, China’s semiconductor 
                                                        
28 See Madeleine Zelin, Merchants of Zigong (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), Sherman Cochran, 
Big Business in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), and Robert Gardella, Harvesting 
Mountains (Berkeley: University of California, 1984.)  These studies address particular industries and their 
contexts during the Qing Dynasty and Republican Era.   Beyond China, prominent business and economic 
historians including Alfred Chandler have used industry case studies to understand economic history.  See 
Alfred Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (1962) and The 
Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 
and Scale and Scope (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Naomi Lamoreaux and Daniel Raff 
(editors), Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); 
Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (editors), World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in 
Western Industrialization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Louis Galambos, Networks of 
Innovation: Vaccine Development at Merck, Sharp, and Dohme, and Mulford, 1895-1995 (New York: 




industry officials were just beginning to plan significant organizational reforms, so Simon and 
Rehn’s study is mostly a very detailed study of China’s policy-making processes and China’s 
semiconductor bureaucracy, rather than actual technological innovation.  The difference 
between their study and this research is stark.  This research builds on Simon and Rehn’s 
exposition of the semiconductor industry’s institutional structure, and it describes and 
analyzes the dynamic and uncertain period that followed initial introduction of reforms in the 
mid 1980s.  Another study that was directly helpful to this research was Anthony Saich’s 
1989 China’s Science Policy in the 1980s.  Saich’s study addresses the structure and intended 
reforms to China’s scientific and research organizations during the 1980s.  Finally, a study 
that was similar in approach to this one is Lu Qiwen’s 1999 China’s Leap into the 
Information Age: Innovation and Organization in the Computer Industry, which identifies the 
institutions, human capital, and key enterprises in China’s growing computer industry in the 
1980s and 1990s.29  Lu was a former engineer who worked for several years in technical 
organizations in China.  Lu later researched the evolution of China’s computer industry as a 
sociology Ph.D. candidate at Harvard.  Lu’s study and this study are quite similar in approach, 
                                                        
29 Saich, China’s Science Policy in the 1980s provides excellent background on the organization and policies of 
China’s research activities.  Qiwen Lu, China’s Leap into the Information Age (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000.)  Lu argues that China’s computer industry was able to advance rapidly in the 1990s due to the 
existing domestic market demand and the domestic knowledge base (science and R&D base) already in place 
from the central planning era.  Lu died young, and an advisor, William Lazonick, had his dissertation 
published as a book after his death.  Lu’s wonderful book served in part as a model for this research.  Further, 
Adam Segal, Digital Dragon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) focuses on different government policies 
by region in China for a diverse group of high technologies industries.  Finally, two dissertations have in part 
addressed China’s semiconductor industry.  A political science dissertation from MIT in 2005 dealt with the 
financing of semiconductor firms in China.  Its purpose was to identify whether firms in China had better 
technological outcomes if they used foreign financing rather than Chinese state financing.  The research also 
sought to show the futility of Chinese industrial policy.  Another dissertation, from University of Wisconsin’s 
sociology department in 2005, attempted to make a “sweeping analysis of the commodity chains of different 
sectors” across what the author called the “information industries” in China.  The semiconductor industry fell 
into this broad sweep.  The author analyzed why the “information industries” are moving to China and 




except that Lu’s writing was contemporaneous with events, leaving less time to assess 
transitions in the industry.  A second difference between Lu’s study and this one has to do 
with industry characteristics.  Sectors of the computer industry are far less capital intensive 
than the semiconductor industry, leading to the two industries having different approaches and 
timing in their development in China in the 1980s and 1990s. 
There are other studies that ostensibly focus on particular industries in China, but 
these studies are actually about broader issues such as the efficacy of different ownership 
sectors in China, China’s institutional environment, or state led development in China.  These 
studies use case studies of particular industries to support theses on broader topics or to 
support proposals for future policies, and so the studies are not primarily concerned with how 
particular industries evolved in China.  A good example of this type of study is Edward 
Steinfeld’s 1998 Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State Owned Industry.  Steinfeld 
studied state owned enterprises in the steel industry in China, and he identified “soft” budgets 
and the lack of institutional and regulatory support for ownership as problems in China’s state 
owned sector as well as in China’s broader economy.  His study does indeed trace the 
evolution of the steel industry, but Steinfeld’s real contribution is his critique of China’s legal 
and regulatory environment and the functioning of the state owned sector across industries in 
China.  Steinfeld called China’s state dominated steel industry a “bellweather” for state 
owned enterprise reform and governance across China, and he concluded in 1998 that China’s 
“modern industrial sector [is] on the verge of collapse, and [China]… is contemplating.… 
industrial stagnation.”  With the benefit of fifteen years of hindsight, Steinfeld’s research 




but it told us less about the overall trajectory of diverse industries in China, many of which 
were not dominated by the state sector and advanced significantly in the 1990s and beyond.30 
What do we hope to learn from an industry specific study?  The start of this section 
mentioned that China’s five year plans are in part organized by industry and that China has 
made notable progress in certain industries.  These tangibles hint that perhaps we should look 
at particular industries to understand China’s recent economic history, and the field of 
evolutionary economics offers a further rationale for undertaking a multi-faceted, longitudinal, 
industry-specific study.   
Evolutionary economics is concerned with how economic structures, processes, and 
factors interact to mutually change one another over time.  In the view of evolutionary 
economics, organizations, firms, industries, institutions, trade, and other economic loci 
gradually evolve through small changes in routines, technologies, or processes.  Economists 
from various fields, including evolutionary economics, broadly agree that technological 
advance is a primary driver of productivity increases, economic growth, and improved living 
standards around the world.  Other factors contributing to economic development are 
accumulation of physical and human capital, firm and industry organization, resource 
allocation, and various “institutions,” although quantifying each of these components is 
difficult.  Here, “institutions” includes formal institutions such as legal and financial systems, 
but cultural constructs and norms can also create “small i” institutions, and new industry-
specific institutions can emerge which might include new technical standards, new ways of 
interacting or organizing, new technical societies, new intellectual property issues, and the 
                                                        




like.31  Thus, the term institution can be used to mean different things, but in all these 
meanings, institutions constitute the “rules of the game” and contribute to economic and 
technological evolution.32  In evolutionary economics, technological and institutional 
innovation is seen as an evolutionary process in which different mechanisms, organizational 
forms, etc. are developed, tested, and selected leading to gradual change.  In this way, 
economic development is seen as “path dependent;” history matters because, through time, a 
number of tangible economic inputs as well as formal and informal institutions, routine 
behaviors, and culture all are constantly interacting while new approaches are tested and 
selected.  This leads to institutional and technological learning and ultimately to economic 
development.  In this view, “the qualitative historical record and description matter,” 
according to Nelson.33 
In light of this, Nelson has proposed that scholars analyze economic evolution through 
a “bottom up” approach.  That is, to understand economic growth, scholars should look at the 
“activities involved, the forces bearing down on them, and the key institutions,” perhaps by 
industry, identifying the important “learning by doing” that occurs.  Nelson notes that there 
are significant differences between industries and sectors and that “the birth and death of 
industries are an essential part of the economic growth story.”34  Thus, like other scholars that 
                                                        
31 Nelson, Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth, pages 106-108. 
32 Regarding institutions, see http://money.163.com/special/coase/ for a series of Chinese interviews with Ronald 
Coase on how his ideas about institutions, laws, property rights, transaction costs, etc., have influenced 
economists in China.  Also, see Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: 
Free Press, 1985); Ronald Coase, "The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, May 1998. 
33 Nelson, Understanding Technological Change as an Evolutionary Process, pages 1-3, and Sources of 
Economic Growth, page 6. 
34 Nelson, Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth, page 43, and Understanding Technological Change 




have analyzed changes in particular industries to understand economic growth,35 Nelson 
seems to suggest an industry-specific approach, as he argues that many economic forces are 
linked by industry, i.e., university research programs align with particular industries, 
intellectual property issues vary by industry, professional and technical organizations are 
industry-specific, government programs target specific industries, etc.  A qualitative account 
of an industry’s history would include these factors, and where possible, the standard 
neoclassical factors, i.e., prices, quantities, etc., would also be analyzed.36   
Further, within industries, Nelson argues that the mere accumulation of physical and 
human capital and access to more advanced technological designs are not enough to ensure 
advance, especially if an industry or technology is new to a country.  “Assimilation” is also 
necessary; that is, people, organizations, and industries must assimilate to: 
“new sets of skills, new ways of organizing economic activity, and familiarity 
with and competency with new markets.  To do [so is] far from a routine matter… 
the assimilation account stresses learning about, risking to operate, and coming to 
master technologies and other practices that are new to a country.  ….. 
Controlling a complex technology often involve[s] knowing how to manage a 
very complex division of labor as much as it involves knowing the relevant 
physics and chemistry.  …The marshaling of inputs is part of the story, but the 
emphasis is on … learning.  ….. Accumulationists [in contrasts to 
‘assimilationists’] seem to believe that the state of technological knowledge at any 
time is largely codified in blueprints and associated documents.  ….. In contrast 
assimilationists argue that only a small portion of what one needs to know to 
employ a technology is codified in the form of blueprints; much of it is tacit, and 
learning is achieved as much by doing and using as by reading and studying.”37 
                                                        
35 Amsdem, Asia’s Next Giant, 1989; Michael Hobday, Innovation in East Asia (1995); Linsu Kim, Imitation to 
Innovation (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), mentioned in Nelson, Technology, Institutions, 
and Economic Growth, pages 54-57. 
36 Nelson, The Sources of Economic Growth, pages 3-6 and 278 and Technology, Institutions, and Economic 
Growth, pages 2-5 and 154-155. 




In light of this, Nelson proposes that scholars not begin with institutions to see how 
institutions (either formal or informal) affect activities, but rather he proposes that scholars 
begin by empirically examining activities within industries and see how activities and 
interactions foment learning and how this learning gradually changes technologies and 
institutions.  Here, institutions and technologies are not static, but are always evolving 
through learning. 
3. Approach to this Study 
 
This study investigates the key events, trends, influences, and issues in the 
semiconductor industry in China from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, and the detailed 
description and analysis of this one industry may suggest how advanced, global industries 
have developed in contemporary China.  For the semiconductor industry, this research 
addresses how the industry evolved from being isolated and backward in China in the late 
1980s to China being an important site for the global semiconductor industry in the early 
2000s.  The approach is to focus mostly on what did happen, while also acknowledging what 
was missing during this period.  That is, the semiconductor industry in China was 
undeveloped in the late 1980s and was still relatively small and lower-tech in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, as compared to the industry in, say, the U.S. or Japan.  To explain the relative 
status of the industry in China during this time, observers rightly note a number of missing 
factors: access to capital; intellectual property protection; transparent and consistent business 
environment; openness to foreign investment, trade, and ownership; and finally a dominant 
role for private (versus state supported) enterprises.   Indeed, these were all constraints, and 




constraints, industry revenues in China grew by a multiple of 68 times from 1990 to 2005 
(US$0.56 billion to US$38.1 billion), by which time China was an important site for the 
global industry.  Thus, in addition to acknowledging all that was missing in China, this study 
looks closely at what actually did happen in China to create this growth.  In this way, we can 
understand the gradual – yet phenomenal – changes in a critical high technology industry. 
The research focuses on three periods: 1) the mid to late 1980s, when China’s 
semiconductor industry was centrally planned and state owned but in the midst of significant 
and complex reforms, 2) the 1990s when the industry faced many difficulties and “learned” in 
the course of establishing and operating several “key” and “national champion” 
semiconductor enterprises, all of which had global partners, and 3) the late 1990s and early 
2000s when Chinese officials established new policies for the industry, ushering in more rapid 
development for both Chinese and foreign semiconductor firms in China.  During these 
periods, the study covers the industry’s evolving structure and key policies as well as the 
largest enterprises and projects in China (sources are discussed at the end of the Introduction.)  
For the large enterprises and projects, the research identifies the goals, activities, lessons 
learned, outcomes, and resultant changes in the industry, an approach inspired by the works of 
other business historians and the field of evolutionary economics.  In describing and 
analyzing the industry’s history, as much notice is given to challenges and failures as to 
progress.  
Because of China’s history of central planning and state ownership in the 
semiconductor industry and because of extremely high capital requirements in this industry, 
semiconductor firms in China in the 1990s were not operating in a neoclassical paradigm of 




equilibrium.  During that decade, China had a large and growing market for semiconductors, 
but this market demand was largely supplied by foreign-made, imported semiconductors.  
Certainly, the global semiconductor industry in the 1990s consisted of for-profit firms in a 
highly competitive environment.  In China, however, the industry was in a period of 
technological “catching up,” and it had just a few state supported Sino-foreign production 
enterprises and (Chinese) research and design programs, although the industry was moving 
toward mixed ownership.  Thus, this study covers not only firms but also various actors in the 
industry including government funded programs, research and design organizations, and 
university programs.   The approach to this study therefore is an evolutionary economics 
approach (that is, it includes all influences in the industry); the approach is not to 
quantitatively analyze neoclassical factors, i.e., the output, pricing, productivity, etc., of 
competitive firms. 
This study is ultimately about the development of the globalized “semiconductor 
industry in China,” as opposed to being about “China’s semiconductor industry.”  The 
research necessarily addresses China’s state-affiliated enterprises, projects, and plans as these 
were important in the contemporary history of the industry in China.  However, unlike some 
other studies, the primary purpose of this study is not to assess the efficacy of China’s state 
owned enterprises or state led development in China.38   Rather, this study of the global 
semiconductor industry in China is a window on how China’s contemporary economy has 
evolved and in particular how global high technology and capital intensive industries may 
have developed in China. 
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4. Primary Findings in the Semiconductor Industry 
 
In examining how the semiconductor industry developed from the mid 1980s and 
through the 1990s, we find that immediately on the heals of the “divestiture”39 of China’s 
centrally planned semiconductor industry (1985-1987) there was a period of about twelve 
years during which the experiences of individual enterprises resulted in significant industry 
learning.  This learning phase was critical in the industry’s transition from central planning to 
global integration.  Ultimately, lessons learned in enterprises during 1990s led Chinese 
officials to announce industry-wide policy changes in 2000-2001.  Here, “enterprises” refers 
to state owned enterprises, but also Sino-foreign joint ventures, foreign firms, and Chinese 
non-state firms.  Some of the enterprises’ experiences were based in state supported 
enterprises (see Chapters Three and Four) while other experiences were predicated on China’s 
opening to global trade (see Chapters Four and Five.) 
For the semiconductor industry, this critical twelve-year period from the late 1980s 
and through the 1990s was a time of what this study calls “enterprise led development” 
working in conjunction with state led development.  In the 1990s, state led development in 
this industry consisted of targeted state supports, i.e., one-off state supported technology 
transfer agreements, research investments, state supported Sino-foreign joint ventures, etc., 
executed through government-led mechanisms common in China.  (However, state led 
development in the 1990s did not include semiconductor industry-wide policies or production 
planning.)  Notably, the goal of state led development efforts was to foster the emergence of a 
diverse semiconductor industry value chain in China, including firms of various ownership 
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types.  The goal of state led development was not to enable Chinese firms to dominate the 
industry in China or to attain self-sufficiency in semiconductor production.40 
Chinese semiconductor officials and enterprise leaders commenced operations for 
several large enterprises and projects in the 1990s, and these individual enterprises were 
ultimately sites for enterprise led development.  In both start up and operations, these 
enterprises and their foreign partners met many obstacles, such as slow government approvals, 
inability to effectively use imported equipment, restrictions on foreign investment, foreign 
reticence regarding China’s intellectual property protection, among other obstacles, as shown 
in the following chapters.  In working through these obstacles, the enterprises underwent 
significant learning.  By tracing the history of the major enterprises and projects, this research 
identifies clear shifts in: 
• Industry structure: toward de-verticalization by industry sector (a global trend)41 
• Enterprise ownership: from state owned, to Sino-foreign joint ventures, to wholly-
foreign owned enterprises 
• Enterprise organization: toward standard accounting units, linkages between 
design and production, etc. 
• Technologies utilized: from 6 inch to 12 inch wafers, among other technological 
upgrades 
• Markets served: from serving the low end Chinese market toward the low-to-
medium global market 
• Talent base: from Chinese to Chinese plus global personnel 
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(P.A.T.) are three key sectors that previously were commonly done within one firm.  In the 1990s, however, it 
was increasingly common to have stand-alone design firms (called design houses), foundries (for fabrication), 




Enterprise leaders were closely associated with government officials, and thus officials 
were well aware of the obstacles faced and lessons learned.  Ultimately, Chinese officials 
announced new semiconductor industry-wide policies in 2000 that benefited both Chinese and 
foreign firms in China, as a result of lessons learned in the 1990s.  Indeed, there was a kind of 
virtuous cycle between top down (state) programs and bottom up learning in the 
semiconductor industry during this period from the late 1980s and through the 1990s.  The 
enterprises’ experiences in the 1990s were made possible by the top down reforms to the 
(state owned) industry in the 1980s, and they were directly related to state supports in the 
1990s.  But ultimately, bottom up learning from the enterprise level in the 1990s influenced 
future (top down) semiconductor industry-wide policies.  Enterprise leaders often had dual 
roles as government officials, and this enabled bottom up and top down feedback concerning 
capital needs, ownership structures, and market development in the industry. 
Thus, this industry’s development in the 1990s in China was not driven by “cowboy 
science” (i.e., entrepreneurial or technological breakthroughs), nor by coordinated 
institutional change (e.g., an optimally restructured [state] semiconductor industry, 
coordinated semiconductor trade policies, or new national research institutions), nor by 
“market led development,” in the sense of new, competitive firms emerging to serve a 
market.42  Rather, this study shows that the industry’s development in the 1990s was driven 
by enterprise led development in conjunction with tactics of state led development.  
                                                        
42 Much of the growth in light industries in China from the 1990s has been linked to the globalization of trade.  
Generally, the notion of “market led development” would suggest that global markets prompted the emergence 
of manufacturing and assembling firms in China in light industries, due to China’s low wage labor pool.  Yet, 
this research suggests that the growing market for semiconductors in China in the 1990s was not sufficient to 
prompt the emergence of semiconductor producing firms in China.  The main semiconductor enterprises in the 
1990s in China did seek to supply the market, but given that semiconductor firms are capital intensive and 




Despite advances, the late 1980s to the early 2000s was a difficult period in the 
industry.  This research does not find technological or commercial achievements in the 
industry in China that global industry personnel would recognize as successes.  Indeed, 
China’s progress during the 1990s was “behind the vanguard.”  That is, enterprises in China 
did not become technological nor commercial leaders in the global industry but they made 
improvements in skills, organization, technology, and management that were significant in 
China.  Innovation was incremental not step-function, and innovation was organization and 
process-based, rather than technological.  But indeed, the semiconductor industry in China 
moved from being isolated in the late 1980s to being a global destination in the early 2000s 
for the fabrication (that is, production) sector and the packaging/assembly/testing (P.A.T.)43 
sectors of the industry, both of which are highly technical relative to manufacturing and 
assembly in many other industries.  After 2000, the design sector in China also rapidly 
advanced.  The following figure shows the growth in each sector in the early 2000s. 
5. Broader Implications 
 
This research has implications for economic development generally and for China’s 
contemporary economic development, specifically.  This section highlights four broad areas 
of inquiry for which this study’s finding are relevant. 
1.  Demonstrating “Gradual” and “Experimental” Reform in China.  Since 1978, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
emerge in China in the 1990s to meet China’s growing semiconductor market.   While some industries in 
China may have been “market led,” the capital and skill intensive semiconductor industry was not, at least in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
43 This study uses the acronym P.A.T., however, this sector is sometime called S.P.A.&T. (semiconductor 





Semiconductor Production Revenues in China, by Sector (RMB100 million), excluding Discrete Devices (Figure 17 
in Appendix) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Design 9.8 14.8 21.6 44.9 81.8 124.3
• Percent of industry 5 7 7 13 15 18
Fabrication (manufacturing) 48 27.7 33.6 60.5 180 232.9
• Percent of industry 26 14 14 17 33 33
Packaging, Assembly, Testing (P.A.T.) 128.4 161.1 213.3 246 283.5 344.9
• Percent of industry 69 79 79 70 52 49
Total 186.2 203.6 268.5 3051.4 545.3 702.1
Source: National Burea of Statistics, 2001-2005, shown in Chen Ling and Xue Lan, "Global Production Networks," China and the World Economy, 













China’s economic reforms have broadly – and correctly – been referred to as “gradual” and 
“experimental.”  This refers to the fact that Chinese officials did not opt for rapid privatization 
of China’s state owned enterprises nor did they enact sweeping policy changes across 
industries or regions.  And yet, how exactly did gradual and experimental reforms transpire in 
China?  This study is explicit in detailing how one industry experienced this gradualism and 
experimentation, in this case through a period of about twelve years of industry learning, 
through simultaneous enterprise led and state led development.  This study reveals the actual 
events, mechanisms, and processes by which a critical industry in China moved from central 
planning and state ownership to mixed ownership and global integration.  The field of 
evolutionary economics suggests that, especially for developing countries, technological and 
economic development is not just a straight-forward matter of technology transfer or studying 
foreign designs.  Rather, industry personnel have to experiment and learn and gradually 
change through various mechanisms and processes.  Industry personnel have to “learn by 
doing….[and] develop new sets of skills, new ways of organizing economic activity, and 
familiarity with new markets.  To do this [is] far from a routine matter.”44  For the 
semiconductor industry, this research reveals the actual means by which industry learning 
transpired, and this may suggest how other industries in China have evolved, in particular 
state dominated or national security-related industries, for which information is not readily 
available.  
This study further suggests that Chinese officials did not overtly coordinate the 
gradual and experimental reforms across industries.  At least for the semiconductor industry, 
                                                        
44 On evolutionary economics, see Nelson, The Sources of Economic Growth; Nelson (editor), National 
Innovation Systems; and Nelson, Understanding Technological Change as an Evolutionary Process.  This 




Chinese officials’ decisions do not appear to have been directly linked to experiments in other 
industries, in terms of methods or timing, according to available sources.45  As just one 
example, in Chapter Four we see that the origins, methods, and goals of a major state 
supported semiconductor project (Project 909) are based on the specific needs of the 
semiconductor industry.  The project was not, for example, modeled on similar projects or 
approaches in other industries.  Likewise, there is no evidence that the timing, pace, or 
sequence of events and changes in the semiconductor industry were directly coordinated with 
other industries.  At a high level, Chinese leaders were surely aware of and influenced by 
what was happening in other industries across China, but they were not coordinating reforms 
across industries.46  
2. The Nature of State Led Development in China.  The research also looks in depth at 
the goals and methods of state led development and national champion enterprises in the 
semiconductor industry in China and finds surprising differences with state led development, 
as it is commonly conceived.  These insights may suggest how and why Chinese leaders 
utilized (and continue to utilize) state led development in other industries.  State led 
development is often understood to be the enactment of structured industrial policies, often 
                                                        
45 That said, each of China’s five year plans prioritize certain industries.  Under the five year plans, the 
semiconductor industry was prioritized along with other critical industries, at least from the sixth five year 
plan (1981-1985.)  Beyond these high level plans, however, actions to reform and develop the semiconductor 
industry do not appear to have been coordinated with other industries. 
46 There are, however, three broad caveats to this general finding.  First, the timing and mechanisms of the 
semiconductor industry’s “divestiture” in 1985 were generally similar to reforms in other state owned 
industries in that timeframe (this is discussed further in Chapter Two.)  Second, Chinese leaders’ attempt to 
concentrate semiconductor activity by geographic region was an approach that officials used in a number of 
industries in China.  This approach was modeled on “industry clusters” in southern China, Taiwan, Silicon 
Valley, and elsewhere.  In these clusters, close spatial proximity of organizations in similar industries led to 
synergies in terms of knowledge-sharing, human capital and supply chain optimization, inter-firm alliances, 
state subsidy allocations, etc.  Third, China’s changes to its trade policies in the years immediately before and 





trade related, that protect domestic “infant” industries and domestic markets to enable 
domestic enterprises to strengthen their position relative to foreign competitors.  This study, 
however, shows that state led development in the semiconductor industry in China in the 
1990s was not practiced through comprehensive, industry-wide policies, but rather it was 
initially practiced through one-off projects and individual investments.  This recalls similar 
findings from a 1993 study of so-called national innovation systems.  In that study, all the 
low-income countries surveyed used industrial policies to promote industries, but the policies 
were not centralized, industry-wide policies, but rather they were ad-hoc and as needed.47  In 
the semiconductor industry in China, there was a ten to fifteen year period in which certain 
key and national champion semiconductor enterprises benefitted from targeted government 
help, and ultimately these enterprises learned and progressed.  Then, then in response to 
obstacles that these enterprises and their foreign partners had faced over the years, Chinese 
officials later enacted industry-wide supportive policies.  Thus, in this industry, state led 
development was not a case of knowledgeable officials (first) enacting industry-wide, sage 
policies and thus enabling the industry to prosper.  Rather, officials first learned from 
enterprises and then enacted helpful policies. 
Further, in the semiconductor industry in China, the goals of state led development 
and national champion enterprises were geared toward technological upgrading and global 
integration more so than ensuring domestic industry strength or manipulating trade.  Again, 
this aligns with the aforementioned study of national innovation systems, which found that 
                                                        




industrial policies were most effective in developing countries when the goals were to 
advance an industry toward global standards and practices.48 
Finally, in the semiconductor industry in China, coordinated, industry-wide policies 
were announced in 2000, but the new policies may or may not fall under the rubric of state led 
development.  That is, the new policies were put in place by the government with the goal of 
fostering the industry (which conjures state led development), but the new policies were 
beneficial to both foreign and domestic firms and they lacked many of the domestic-favoring 
characteristics commonly associated with state led development.  
Generally, in examining state policies and programs for the semiconductor industry in 
the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, we can see significant changes in the industry over time, 
even though state policies and state supported projects and enterprises had mixed outcomes in 
their time.  If these state led efforts were judged on implementation, global technological 
standards, or profits, then one would conclude that the state led development efforts of the 
1990s were ineffective.  Yet, given China’s unique context (weak legal system, nearly non-
existent capital markets) and the semiconductor industry’s high capital requirements, Chinese 
officials likely believed that using certain state led development tactics was the only option 
for developing the industry at that time.  With a longer-term view, we can see that even the 
difficulties and failures of the state led projects resulted in industry learning and significant 
changes in the industry. 
3. Economic and Institutional Development as Evolutionary Processes.  The 
semiconductor industry in China the 1990s provides a window on China’s evolving “small i” 
institutions; that is, we see gradual change in certain socially or culturally routinized ways of 
                                                        




doing things that are common to China’s contemporary and modern history.  In the 1990s, as 
Chinese officials and semiconductor industry leaders were attempting to advance the industry, 
we see these individuals using methods that are not necessarily unique to China but have 
certainly been common in China.  As just a few specific examples, the leaders utilized: five 
year plans; government “leading groups;” state organized technology transfer agreements; 
state organized industry delegations for overseas learning trips; state supported projects for 
large scale manufacturing; government officials as enterprise leaders; among other methods 
common in China.  Interestingly, although these methods recall the days of central planning 
and state ownership, these “old” methods were used to pursue “new” technologies, 
organizational structures, and industry relationships for the semiconductor industry.  Other 
methods could have been tried.  Nonetheless, Chinese leaders chose methods that were 
common in China, not only under the C.C.P., but also in the early periods of China’s modern 
history mentioned earlier in the Introduction.  The methods mentioned are top down, and this 
may reflect the importance of hierarchy in Chinese society as well as the belief (or reality) 
that only a top down approach could marshal the resources necessary for an economic or 
technological “catch up” program. 
In evolutionary economics, Richard Nelson calls this tendency to do things the same 
way “routinized social technologies.”  While foreign observers might question the methods 
utilized in China, Chinese leaders may have seen these methods as obvious or as their only 
options.  Nelson explains that “absent an effective social technology for doing something, it 
may be very costly to do that thing or doing it may be impossible.”  Chinese leaders, acting in 
China’s context, likely did not have “effective social technologies” to do things differently, in 




using known methods, enterprise and government leaders in China indeed learned and 
ultimately changed methods.  For example, by the late 1990s, we see Chinese officials asking 
foreigners to lead projects and allowing an industry association to set industry guidelines.  In 
the terminology of evolutionary economics, these changes to “routine social technologies” 
constitute innovation, though the innovation was organizational or process-based rather than 
technological.49 
Writing on evolutionary economics in 1996, Nelson noted that, in particular, the 
electronics industries of different nations would necessarily evolve toward global norms of 
organization, processes, standards, etc., minimizing differences originating from “national 
policies, history, and culture.”  In the highly globalized electronics industry, firms would 
increasingly be aware of how firms in other nations are organized and inter-firm connections, 
foreign branch operations, and the like would spur a high degree of standardization.50  Indeed, 
this research shows that the semiconductor industry in China experienced these effects of 
globalization.  For firms in China, foreign partnerships, foreign trade, and the de-
verticalization of the semiconductor industry (examined in Chapters Three through Five) led 
to industry and organizational restructuring, new firm formation, and new managerial 
approaches in firms operating in China, all of which increasingly approximated global 
industry standards.  These innovations could aptly be described as arising from gradual 
changes to routine social technologies. 
4. Industrial Development and Policy Effects.  Finally, this research shows that 
industrial development can foster institutional and policy development in an emerging 
                                                        
49 Nelson, Technology, Institutions, and Economic Growth, pages 154-155. 




economy.  The semiconductor industry gradually advanced in China’s emerging economy of 
the 1990s despite China’s weak legal system and lack of capital markets and despite China’s 
not yet having broad based supportive policies for the semiconductor industry.  And, 
ultimately we see (in Chapter Five) that the semiconductor industry’s evolution contributed to 
an improved institutional and policy environment after 2000, at least for the semiconductor 
industry.  New policies included improved tax and tariff policies, increased commitment to 
intellectual capital protection, and consistent subsidies for the industry.  In this case, robust 
formal, national institutions were not a necessary precursor to industry development.  
Generally, strong institutions and supportive policies do foster economic development, but 
this study suggests that, when such institutions are weak, as is often the case in emerging 
economies, industry development might still occur and might serve to strengthen institutions 
and policies.  
6. The Global Electronics and Semiconductor Industries: A Brief Background 
 
The electronics industry has arguably been a leading site, if not the leading site, of 
technological innovation and globalization since the mid 20th century.  Business historian 
Alfred Chandler has compared the revolution in electronics from the mid 20th century with the 
first and second industrial revolutions in terms of social and technological impacts.  Chandler 
calls the post-World War II period the “electronic era,” due to the rise of computers and 
consumer electronics, both of which are dependent on semiconductors as their “brains” for 
memory and processing.51 
                                                        




The first semiconductors, invented in the late 1950s, integrated only about twelve 
transistors on a chip, but semiconductors now integrate billions of electrical components, i.e., 
transistors, resistors, and capacitors, on a single chip.52  To make semiconductors, also called 
integrated circuits or I.C.s, a producer grows a cylindrical silicon crystal, which is then sliced 
into thin wafers.  A number of chips are patterned onto each wafer through lithography, called 
masking.  Masks are layered, so a chip may have, for example, thirty layers of masking.   
Larger wafers are more technologically complex to manufacture, but yield better scale 
economies, that is, a twelve inch wafer can provide 2.4 times as many chips as an eight inch 
wafer, given its larger surface area.  In semiconductor fabrication (that is, production), the 
production technology is often described by wafer size, so “an eight inch line” produces eight 
inch wafers.  Production technology is also defined by the distance between line etchings on a 
chip, for example, “0.25 microns,” where smaller line widths are more advanced, as they 
allow more transistors to fit on a chip.  The capital required to establish a semiconductor 
fabrication facility (called a “fab” or a “foundry”) is extremely high; in 2010, the cost was 
approximately US$1billion to US$4 billion for a single fab.53  After fabrication, chips are 
packaged/assembled/tested (P.A.T.), which is also a relatively high tech process.  This entails 
encasing the chip to prevent corrosion or other damage.  The encasement process is called 
“packaging” or “assembly.”  Electrical contacts are then connected the semiconductor’s 
packaging, and the final step is testing.  In general, semiconductors account for between 
                                                        
52 The industry moved from small scale integration (SSI) to medium scale integration (MSI) to large scale 
integration (LSI) to very large scale integration (VLSI) to ultra large scale integration (ULSI).  VLSI indicates 
at least 1000s of devices on a single chip, and today there are commonly billions of devices on a single chip.  
Moore’s Law, by Gordon Moore (co-founder of Intel, the world’s largest semiconductor company), says that 
the number of discrete devices on a chip will double every 18 to 24 months.   
53 TSMC of Taiwan, the world’s largest foundry, spent over US$9 billion in 2010 on a new fab, see Jack Clark 




fifteen and twenty-five percent of the value of consumer electronics, computers, and 
communications products.  These semiconductors can be commodity chips or specialty chips.  
For example, memory chips are commodity chips, so one computer can have chips from 
multiple suppliers.  Specialty chips are for logic processing.   
In the early years of the electronics era, large vertically integrated firms such as 
Fairchild and IBM commercialized new technologies.  Their products and services essentially 
allowed the electronic manipulation, storage, and distribution of information.  These products 
and services thus enabled a new ease of electronic communication between firms, which by 
the 1980s led to vertical dis-integration and outsourcing in the electronics industry as well as 
other industries.  In the latter half of the 20th century, the semiconductor industry evolved to 
be a stand-alone industry in its own right, not merely a sector of the broader electronics 
industry, yet the semiconductor and electronics industries were and remain closely tied.54 
The rapidly growing electronics and semiconductor industries globalized from as early 
as the 1960s, when leading firms including Fairchild, Philips, General Instruments, and RCA 
began to internationally outsource component production and electronic assembly (that is, 
mounting and connecting semiconductors to circuit boards), which were labor intensive.  In 
his 1998 study of Taiwan, Robert Wade noted that in 1961 foreign semiconductor firms began 
to outsource labor intensive aspects of semiconductor production to Taiwan, giving Taiwan a 
role in this valuable industry, and for this reason alone, Wade declared 1961 nothing less than 
                                                        
54 Also, there is not one “electronics industry.”  There a number of electronics-related industries, some examples 
include: telecomm, software, hardware, consumer electronics, storage, IT services, and many others.  Further, 
within all the electronics-related industries, there are sectors that operate as discrete industries.  That said, for 




“a landmark year in the history of East Asia.”55  By the 1980s, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore were all active participants in the global electronics industry.  In 
the semiconductor industry, U.S. firms had led the industry from its origins in the late 1950s, 
but the industry saw new competitors over the years, first from Japan in the 1970s, then from 
South Korea in the 1980s, and finally from Taiwan in the 1990s.  Today, the largest 
semiconductor companies in the world are Intel, Samsung, and Texas Instruments.56  Of 
course, semiconductor capability is important for information and defense systems, so 
governmental support for the industry has been common in most of these countries.  The size 
and growth of the semiconductor industry are striking: global semiconductor revenues were 
about US$50 billion in 1990, about US$200 billion in 2000, and about US$300 billion in 
2010. 
7. The Semiconductor Industry in China: An Overview of this Study 
The semiconductor industry in contemporary China entered a period of significant 
                                                        
55 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), page 94. 
56 Texas Instruments’ role in the global industry is significant.  Texas Instruments (TI) and Fairchild were the 
earliest producers of semiconductors, and TI was an early and prominent U.S. defense contractor.  Texas 
Instruments was one of the first foreign entrants in both Taiwan and Mainland China’s semiconductor 
industries.  Two Taiwanese semiconductor leaders, Morris Chang and Richard Chang (no relation), both 
worked in the U.S. at Texas Instruments for twenty or more years before returning to Taiwan and starting 
semiconductor companies there, TSMC and WSMC, respectively.  Chang and Chang worked in TI’s 
Semiconductor Group.  (I happened to be a student engineer in TI’s Defense Systems and Electronics Group 
for three years during the time that Richard Chang was in the Semiconductor Group.)  Morris Chang’s TSMC 
in Taiwan was the first semiconductor company to operate on the industry-changing “foundry model” from 
1987; the “foundry model” enables design companies to outsource their production.  TSMC’s advent of the 
foundry model de-verticalized the industry, allowing design entrepreneurs to start semiconductor firms 
without all the capital required for production.  At Texas Instruments, Richard Chang built and commenced 
fabrication facilities around the world, including in Asia.  He left TI to start WSMC in Taiwan in 1998, which 
was quickly bought by TSMC.  Richard Chang then founded Mainland China’s largest semiconductor 
company, SMIC, which also operates on the foundry model. These events are discussed further in Chapters 




development right on the heels of the industry’s growth in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  
From early in China’s reform era, Chinese leaders recognized that electronics was a rapidly 
evolving, global industry and that improvements in electronics would support China’s 
infrastructure, military, and other industries, while electronics itself was an important 
consumer industry.  Determined to foster the industry, Chinese leaders set out from the early 
1980s to reform, develop, and open the industry.  The events and changes that followed are 
described and analyzed in the following chapters.  
Chapter Two begins this study by situating the semiconductor industry within China’s 
centrally planned economy of the 1980s and identifying how the industry changed (or not) 
amid various reforms and new policies and programs from the mid to late 1980s.57  That is, 
Chinese officials sought to restructure and “divest” China’s centrally planned electronics and 
semiconductor industries in the 1980s.  Many production and research units were “released” 
(de-funded) from the national industry from 1985.  Around this time, both released and even 
unreleased enterprises had increasing opportunities to produce for the market rather than only 
for the central plan.  Yet, we learn that by the late 1980s and early 1990s much of the national, 
hierarchal structure of the semiconductor industry remained in place because Chinese leaders 
considered the industry a national strategic priority.58 
In the midst of the industry’s divestiture from the mid 1980s, top central officials 
including Premier Li Peng formed an electronics “leading group” to set new strategies and 
                                                        
57 Denis Simon covered China’s centrally planned electronics industry and semiconductor industry from 1949 to 
1987 in his book Technological Innovation in China, published in 1988.   
58 China’s top central leaders were close to the electronics industry and understood its importance.  President 
Jiang Zemin had initially studied and worked as an electrical engineer and later was head of China’s Ministry 
of the Electronics Industry.  Premier Li Peng was also an engineer and led major national engineering projects 




guidelines for the industry.  This was part of a broader push to develop the electronics, 
computer, and semiconductor industries in China.  From these strategies and guidelines and a 
few high-level “working conferences,” an important strategy emerged.  Officials decided to 
decrease the number of semiconductor enterprises receiving funding from the government for 
technical upgrades.  In the 1980s, officials had imported foreign semiconductor equipment in 
an effort to upgrade some thirty-three different semiconductor-related facilities, but the effort 
had proved ineffective.  The new approach was to focus effort and investment on just a few 
semiconductor sites.  In particular, officials decided to form two regional “bases” of 
semiconductor activity,59 five “key” enterprises, and to undertake a major semiconductor 
project called Project 908 which was in large part intended to create a new semiconductor 
enterprise which would be China’s most advanced. 
Chapter Three examines the long and difficult road through Project 908 at the new 
Huajing semiconductor enterprise, one of China’s five “key” semiconductor enterprises and 
also a “national champion” enterprise.  Project 908 is rarely mentioned in Chinese or foreign 
sources, and when it is referenced, it is only mentioned briefly and usually with allusions to 
“failure.”  Yet, Project 908 shows in concrete terms how China’s leading state owned 
semiconductor enterprise, in the midst of reforms to the centrally planned industry, attempted 
to undertake a capital-intensive, significant technological upgrading through an agreement 
with U.S.-based AT&T-Lucent.  We first see this state owned enterprise making relatively 
successful technical upgrades and product decisions in the 1980s, and then we see the 
enterprise managers attempting to execute the much more ambitious Project 908 in the 1990s.  
                                                        
59 The “South Base” would cover Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, while the “North Base” would cover Beijing, 




Ultimately, a lack of funding due to bureaucratic delays caused Project 908 to be incomplete 
(actually, to have not even begun) by its planned 1995 endpoint, and thus the perceived 
“failure” of Huajing and Project 908. 
Yet, in struggling to bring Project 908 to an acceptable conclusion in the mid to late 
1990s, Huajing’s managers enacted a number of critical changes that essentially served as 
lessons for the industry in the late 1990s and beyond.60  Had this research only examined 
Huajing on financial or technical results, it would have summarily dismissed the enterprise 
and Project 908 as failures.  However, effectively operationalizing a new enterprise with new 
technology is complex, and this was especially true in China’s context.  Even if Huajing’s 
early financial and technical results did not demonstrate “success,” Huajing’s path and 
experiences demonstrate how a Chinese high technology enterprise made significant 
organizational, managerial, and operational advances.  The changes at Huajing in the latter 
half of the 1990s merit mention here.  Huajing managers: 
• Re-organized the enterprise by accounting units to hold each unit accountable for 
its results 
 
• Aligned research units with particular production lines 
 
• Formed part of Huajing into a joint venture with Hong Kong-based but 
Taiwanese-led CSMC, bringing Taiwanese semiconductor experts to Wuxi to 
manage the joint venture and provide new sales channels before the mainland’s 
semiconductor industry was officially open to Taiwan 
 
• Adopted the “foundry model” for the joint venture, which was an important new 
operational trend in the global industry, which de-verticalized the industry by 
enabling design companies to essentially outsource production to foundries. 
 
                                                        
60 Huajing, now called China Resources Microelectronics, remained one of the two largest Chinese 




• Restructured Huajing into separate sector-based companies (i.e., a design 
company, a fabrication company, etc.), as was becoming more common as the 
global industry de-verticalized 
 
• For financial relief, Huajing joined the larger Huarun enterprise group which was 
able to alleviate some of Huajing’s Project 908-related debt  
 
 
In Chapter Four, we see lessons from Huajing utilized as other Chinese 
semiconductor enterprises form significant global partnerships in the 1990s.  These 
enterprises face obstacles of their own, and like Huajing, their results were not always what 
would typically be identified as success.  Yet their experiences proved valuable both as 
learning opportunities for the enterprises as well as for shaping post 2000 semiconductor 
industry policies in China.  Chapter Four looks at the establishment of China’s “key” 
semiconductor enterprises, most of which were actually Sino-foreign joint ventures from the 
outset.  It also examines China’s largest ever electronics project, Project 909, which was 
instigated in 1995 when Project 908 appeared to be a failure.  Project 909 established a major, 
new Sino-Japanese semiconductor enterprise called Huahong-NEC, as well as a number of 
design organizations.  Finally, Chapter Four looks at a new Shanghai-based, but wholly 
foreign owned, enterprise called Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation 
(SMIC.)  Despite being foreign owned, SMIC was supported by the Chinese government and 
considered a “Chinese” enterprise, and even a kind of national champion. 
By looking at the history of the key enterprises, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC, we see 
significant enterprise-based learning in the industry.  The semiconductor enterprises and the 
Chinese officials with whom they coordinated evolved in each of the following areas: political 
prioritization of the industry, industry and enterprise structure, management and technical 




obstacles.  For example, relative to Huajing, Huahong-NEC and SMIC had improved political 
prioritization and sponsorship and therefore more timely government funding.  Also, from 
their inception, Huahong-NEC and SMIC were organized with ownership forms different than 
Huajing’s.  Huajing was a state owned enterprise that eventually formed a part of its 
organization into a Sino-foreign joint venture.  Huahong-NEC, however, was formed from its 
inception as Sino-foreign joint venture, including partial funding from Japan’s NEC.  SMIC 
was founded as a wholly foreign owned enterprises with Taiwanese management and 
international funding, but also with loans from Chinese state owned banks.  Huahong-NEC 
and SMIC both had a clearer view of the markets they would serve from their inception 
(relative to Huajing), and both used foreign (Taiwanese and Japanese) managers for 
production as well as sales.  Huajing eventually adopted the foundry model, but SMIC 
operated on the foundry model from its start, and Huahong-NEC adopted the foundry model 
in 2002.  Both Huahong-NEC and SMIC brought significant technical upgrades to the 
semiconductor industry in China through various foreign technical partnerships as well as by 
serving international markets.  Finally, these enterprises, along with Huajing, served as 
training grounds for thousands of Chinese semiconductor personnel, and the existence of each 
of these large enterprises fostered the emergence of additional jobs throughout the industry 
chain in China.  In all cases, these enterprises and their foreign partners dealt with obstacles 
based in China’s unique policy and institutional environment, i.e, high official import tariffs 
that had to be negotiated on a one-off basis, concerns about intellectual property protection in 
China, the need to negotiate with Chinese officials for subsidies and preferences for land, 
utilities, and taxation.  All this enterprise-based learning helped to shape new policies for the 




Chapter Four also addresses the nature of “national champion” enterprises and state 
led development in the semiconductor industry in China.  Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC 
were all considered national champions.  By revealing the actual origins, goals, and roles of 
these national champions, we are able to compare national champion enterprises and state led 
development in this industry with general notions about state led development in East Asia 
and in China itself.  There are similarities.  This was a strategic, capital-intensive industry for 
which the central government selected and supported specific large enterprises as national 
champions.   
Yet, there were also some surprising aspects of China’s semiconductor national 
champion enterprises.  Chinese officials established Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC with 
the primary goal of fostering the development of a diverse semiconductor industry value chain 
in China, including both domestic and foreign firms.  In each case, the hope was that if one 
advanced enterprise could effectively operate in China’s admittedly imperfect environment, 
then that enterprise would serve as a beacon to attract other firms throughout the industry 
chain.  Notably, these national champions and key enterprises had a significant degree of 
foreign ownership and management.  These enterprises contrasted with general notions about 
national champions in several ways.  This research suggests that China’s semiconductor 
national champions were not established to dominate the national industry, to attain self-
sufficiency in semiconductor production, to preclude foreign ownership of semiconductor 
enterprises in China, to create oligopolistic competition in China, nor to dominate and serve 
protected domestic market segments.   
These enterprises introduce a unique definition of “national champion.”  These 




SMIC’s production capabilities, which were high) nor were they expected to attain high 
revenues or profits, at least in the short and medium term.  Rather, Chinese officials primarily 
wanted these large enterprises to utilize more advanced technology, to produce for the global 
market including the market in China, and to foster the whole industry chain in China.   
Chinese officials did not establish these enterprises in the 1990s as part of uniform, 
industry-wide policies for all firms in the industry.  These enterprises were instigated and 
supported by the state, but each was supported on a one-off basis.  The industry thus 
experienced both “enterprise led” and “state led” development for a period of about 12 years 
from the late 1980s and through the 1990s.  That is, the state supported enterprises in various 
ways, but then the experiences of individual enterprises provided bottom up feedback to 
officials and influenced industry-wide policies after 2000.  Further research could address 
whether other high technology industries in China also experienced a mix of enterprise led 
and state led development in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Foreign and Chinese observers have criticized Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC as 
inefficient state supported enterprises, yet these were the major enterprises that bridged 
China’s centrally planned era in this industry with the globally integrated era after 2000.  The 
enterprises brought much needed technology and management transfer from abroad and 
contributed to human resource development at a time when large semiconductor enterprises 
could not emerge in China due mainly to lack of capital and legal restrictions on foreign 
investment.  Of course, Chapter Four’s focus on state supported projects and enterprises does 
not suggest that the state support and tactics were optimally effective; we have no means to 
compare actual events with counterfactual scenarios of, for example, less or different state 




Chapter Five connects the experiences and trends in the industry through the late 
1990s with the era of faster growth after 2000.  The chapter begins by considering the growth 
of the market for semiconductors in China, which was spurred by the global relocation of 
electronics manufacturing and assembly work to China in the 1990s and 2000s.  Due to this 
broad geographic shift in the electronics industry, global semiconductor firms wanted to 
establish operations in China to be near their customers.  In addition to the global 
semiconductor firms that entered into major partnerships with Chinese enterprises in the 
1990s (covered primarily in Chapter Four), a number of other global semiconductor firms 
began to establish contracts or facilities in China in the 1990s.  These were mostly sales 
offices, equipment contracts, and low-end manufacturing sites, so they did not contribute 
substantially to the size of the industry in China, however these activities opened additional 
dialogue between global firms and Chinese officials in the 1990s. 
In light of the increased global integration in the 1990s, Chapter Five addresses two 
areas of policy that are often cited in connection with the development of the semiconductor 
industry in Mainland China.  First, this study finds that Western (mainly U.S.) export controls 
on dual use technology to China did not significantly stifle the industry, as Chinese 
enterprises could purchase semiconductor equipment from non-U.S. sources.  Second, this 
study shows that Taiwan’s easing of semiconductor investment restrictions in the Mainland in 
2002 augmented industry growth in China, but Taiwan’s 2002 policy change was not the 
major driver of development. 
An area of policy that did create a turning point in the industry was the Chinese 
government’s new polices for the semiconductor industry, enacted in 2000.  By 2000, Chinese 




enterprises faced in China, and they attempted to address many of these concerns in new 
policies enacted in 2000 under “Document 18.”61  Importantly, the new policies applied to 
firms of any ownership form operating in China.  Reflecting the impact of Document 18’s 
policies, a 2003 study by the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association said: “With the 
exception of the auto industry – another Chinese government priority – no comparable 
[industry] specific measure has been issued by the [Chinese] government, a fact duly noted by 
national, regional, and local government officials.”62  Through Document 18, Chinese 
officials demonstrated a clear commitment to the semiconductor industry.  The new policies 
were geared toward: easing firm formation; clarifying and decreasing taxation; encouraging 
foreign investment with preferential policies; opening capital channels including new sources 
of domestic venture capital and increased access to foreign capital; supportive policies for the 
high-end design sector of the industry; and a stated commitment to intellectual property 
protection.  Then, China’s entry to the W.T.O. in late 2001 created more impetus for 
implementing the policies of Document 18, and China’s tenth five year plan (2001-2005) 
prioritized and provided significant funding for the semiconductor industry. 
From 2000-2001, the industry in China entered a period of more rapid growth, 
building on the foundation developed through the late 1990s and enhanced by new policies.  
The market for semiconductors continued to grow, and thus global semiconductor firms in the 
                                                        
61 “18 Hao Wenjian: Guli Ruanjian Chanye he Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan de Ruogan Zhengce 18 号文件：
鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发展的若干政策  (Document 18: Some Policies to Encourage the Software 
and Integrated Circuit Industries).”  This document is available from the Chinese Electronics Standardization 
Institute (Zhongguo Dianzi Jishu Biaojunhua Yanjiusuo 中国电子技术标准化研究所) at 
www.chinasoftware.com.cn/calling_info_detail.asp?id=47. 
62 U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association, prepared by Dewey Ballantine LLP, by T. Howell, B. Bartlett, W. 




fabrication (manufacturing) sector and the lower-end P.A.T. (packaging-assembly-testing) 
sector sought to locate in China to be near their customers, contributing to the notion of China 
as “the world’s factory floor.”63  On the other end of the value chain, the high-end 
semiconductor design sector also flourished in China after 2000 under supportive new 
policies.  New firms relied on China’s relatively small pool of designers that had been 
nurtured by government programs in the 1990s as well as overseas Chinese and foreign talent.  
By 2010, design sector revenues in China as a percentage of total industry revenues were only 
slightly lower than the global average.64  Thus, in the early 2000s, the semiconductor industry 
in China fully integrated with the global semiconductor value chain, from the high-end design 
sector to the low-end P.A.T. sector.  By 2005, the semiconductor industry in China was still 
generally viewed as “behind” by global industry standards, yet it was far less behind than it 
had been in 1990.  
This study shows that a high technology industry in China was able to advance in the 
1990s despite China's still reforming economy, inconsistent policy environment, and 
immature institutions.   Ultimately, the experiences and lessons of individual enterprises 
(including state supported enterprises and others) contributed to new and effective 
semiconductor industry-wide policies after 2000.  By examining the difficult period of 
transition from central planning to global integration, this study reveals how a critical high 
technology industry advanced in contemporary China. 
                                                        
63 Within the semiconductor industry the P.A.T. sector is “low-end,” but relative to other industries, this sector is 
quite technical. 
64 In the global semiconductor industry in 2010, the design sector constituted 16.6 percent of revenues.  In China, 




Finally, China was not the first country in Asia to become an important global player 
in the semiconductor industry in the last half of the 20th century.  The final chapter 
(Conclusions) compares the history of the industry in China to its history in Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. 
8. Sources for this Study 
 
The host organization for this research was the Wuxi National Integrated Circuit Base 
Company (WXICC), one of China’s “seven + one” national semiconductor bases (these bases 
are covered in Chapter Five.)  Wuxi, a city about eighty-five miles west of Shanghai in 
Jiangsu province, was the site of Project 908, and today, Wuxi still has the highest 
concentration of semiconductor industry activity in China, along with Shanghai.  WXICC and 
China’s seven other national semiconductor bases are charged with attracting new 
semiconductor firms to their respective regions and supporting firms with subsidies (offering 
incentives on tax, electricity, land, etc.), inter-firm introductions, legal and accounting support, 
office and lab space, and technical infrastructure for start-up firms. 
The Director of WXICC, Chen Tianbao, offered me office space to work with his 
group, but more importantly he and his staff, in particular Mr. Yang Long, introduced me to 
semiconductor leaders in Wuxi, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, and elsewhere in China, thus 
facilitating a number of interviews with enterprise leaders and national semiconductor 
officials that, without the WXICC introduction, may not have been possible.  The study 
included over fifty interviews, and a list of all interviewees is included with the Figures at the 
end of the study.  The interview list indicates interviewees’ ties to various organizations and 




engineers of different companies within the China Resources Microelectronics enterprise 
group (the group that took over Huajing); the C.E.O. of China’s largest state owned package-
assembly-test semiconductor enterprise; the General Managers of several firms that spun off 
from Huajing; the President of China’s Semiconductor Industry Association; and others.  
While in China, I was also able to interview the C.E.O. and General Manager of two of 
China’s “key” semiconductor enterprises, the Director of the Institute of Microelectronics at 
the Chinese Academy of Science (the top semiconductor-related institute in China), and two 
of three of China’s leading scholars on the semiconductor industry. 
The staff at WXICC also directed me to important written documents, and the 
bibliography includes a full list of sources.  One important written source was a newly 
available set of records on Project 909 published by the Electronics Industry.  This was very 
helpful because Huahong (the major enterprise of Project 909) was the one enterprise that was 
not responsive to interview requests.   For SMIC, a national champion enterprise covered in 
this study, there are many available written sources because of its status as a publicly listed, 
foreign company.  Further, during my time in Wuxi, a co-founder and former Chairman of 
SMIC, Professor Wang Yangyuan, published a lengthy book that, in part, recounted the 
founding and early experiences of SMIC.  The book is mostly about semiconductor 
technology, but it includes SMIC’s role in the industry in China and other important 
developments in the industry.  The C.E.O. of SMIC, Richard Chang, agreed to an interview 
for this study, but he cancelled on short notice.  Because I left China shortly thereafter, we 
were not able to reschedule.  2009 was a difficult year for Mr. Chang; he resigned later that 
year.  The staff at WXICC also directed me to semiconductor industry reports published by 




be a research group under the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, and it is now a research 
and consulting “company” that specializes in Chinese government data.  CSIA and CCID are 
the two official Chinese sources for semiconductor industry data.  For Project 908, I had to 
rely mostly on articles written in the 1990s by Huajing’s General Manager, Su Guangping, or 
other authors affiliated with Huajing.  I found other articles that mentioned Huajing and 
Project 908, but I did not use articles that were general or repetitive or seemed to be written 
by people not affiliated with the enterprise.  Fortunately, I was able to interview Teng Jingxin 
and Xu Juyan, two (elder) leading Huajing engineers, and they were able to discuss events, 
decisions, and outcomes in the history of the enterprise going back to Project 908.  Chinese 
written sources do not say a lot about Huajing and Project 908 likely because of their 
perceived failure and because of Huajing’s military associations.  Indeed, Huajing’s former 
General Manager during Project 908, Su Guangping, was never mentioned in interviews. 
When I was planning this study, Prof. Denis Simon advised me that it would be 
impossible to get enterprise documents from state owned semiconductor enterprises in China, 
due to the national sensitivity of the industry.  Prof. Simon was correct, and Huajing’s elder 
Chief Engineer, Teng Jingxin, also made this clear during our first meeting.  The relatively 
younger Huajing C.E.O. (who was Huajing’s General Manager in late 1990s) had a more 
forthcoming attitude.  Generally, the more senior personnel in state affiliated organizations 
were more reserved, while somewhat younger personnel were more open.  Mr. Chen at 
WXICC and all the Huajing personnel were surprised that a foreigner would be interested in 
the history of Huajing and Project 908.  That said, 2009 seemed to have been an opportune 
time for this research, especially considering the newly published Project 909 records.  More 




defensiveness about the 1990s and a cautious willingness to talk about the obstacles and set 
backs that enterprises encountered during that time on the road to development. 
Still, how reliable are the sources?  Admittedly, the interviews and available written 
sources are from Chinese industry leaders and officials, and thus they represent an official 
Chinese version of the history of this industry.  Yet, it does not seem to be a white washed 
version.  Chinese sources consistently refer to the backwardness of the industry, the lack 
technical skills, the wasted money, the immobility of the system, the difficulty in finding 
foreign partners, the difficult decisions about what products to make, the low production 
yields, etc.  There is widespread acknowledgement that the industry was beset with problems 
in the 1990s, but we do not know the financial results.  The products and revenues speak for 
themselves, but for example, in the early years of Huajing and Huahong-NEC (two enterprises 
covered in Chapters Three and Four), we do not know their results in terms of profits and 
losses, and losses may have been very substantial.   
Finally, because semiconductors are critical to a nation’s defense capabilities, we can 
assume that there were – and are – confidential semiconductor-related activities in China.  
Beyond Project 908 and Huajing (which were military related), I did not attempt to explore 
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In the 1980s, China’s state-owned semiconductor industry operated in a unique and 
dynamic context, as this was the era when Chinese officials were reforming China’s centrally 
planned economy.  Because of the complexity of the era, this chapter identifies the structure 
and key reforms to China’s semiconductor industry in the 1980s and how these reforms led to 
new strategic priorities for the industry in the 1990s.  In the 1980s, China’s over 30 
semiconductor enterprises were all state-owned.65  Thus, the state-owned semiconductor 
industry was the arena in which all Chinese semiconductor officials and professionals were 
working prior to the 1990s, and many personnel continued to work in these enterprises -- or 
restructured versions of these enterprises -- in the 1990s and beyond.  For this reason, the 
origins of China’s contemporary semiconductor-related policies, strategic priorities, 
enterprises, and talent pool are found in China’s state-owned industry of the 1980s.  Further, 
many of the challenges that the industry faced in the 1990s and beyond (see Chapters Three 
through Five) were legacies of China’s centrally planned economy.  Thus, this chapter 
examines: the development of China’s semiconductor industry prior to 1978 (Section 2.2); the 
structure of China’s centrally planned electronics and semiconductor industries in the 1980s 
(Section 2.3); the various reform policies that affected the industry in the 1980s (Section 2.4); 
and finally an introduction to the major state-led semiconductor projects of the 1990s (Section 
2.5), which bridged the centrally planned era with the post-2000, globally-integrated era. 
In the 1980s, China’s semiconductor industry was indeed a state-owned industry, but 
in the 1990s, the industry began to have a mix of ownership forms including state-ownership, 
Sino-foreign joint ventures, foreign firms, and new domestic private firms.  In this dissertation, 
                                                        
65 In the 1980s, because Chinese semiconductor enterprises were relatively low-tech, most of the demand for 




the phrase “China’s semiconductor industry” refers to Chinese owned semiconductor 
enterprises, which in the 1980s were state-owned.  In the 1990s and beyond, China’s 
semiconductor industry still had state-owned enterprises, but the number of firms with other 
ownership forms was increasing.66  This dissertation uses the phrase “the semiconductor 
industry in China” to refer to all semiconductor-related firms operating in China.  From the 
1990s and forward, the semiconductor industry in China included Sino-foreign joint ventures 
and foreign firms, as well as Chinese firms, both state-owned and private. 
Reforms to China’s state-owned semiconductor industry in the 1980s were important 
in the industry’s history, but it is important to note at the outset that these reforms were not 
the primary driver of the industry’s development in the 1990s and beyond.  Industry reforms 
in the 1980s were certainly necessary.  They freed up and re-directed resources, and they were 
critical in creating a more open environment in the industry.  However, later chapters will 
show that other forces were equally or more important for the technological advances and 
global integration of the semiconductor industry in China.  These factors included: vertical 
dis-integration in the global semiconductor industry, Chinese enterprises’ foreign partnering 
and adoption of foreign technology and management practices, China’s growing talent pool, 
and new Chinese laws and policies encouraging private business and foreign trade, including 
new policies specific to the semiconductor industry.  Nonetheless, to understand the context 
of the semiconductor industry in China in the 1990s and beyond, we must first look at the 
industry’s organization and reforms in the 1980s. 
From 1978, China entered its era of “reform and opening” and pursued the “four 
modernizations,” which included the modernization of agriculture, industry, the military, and 
                                                        




science & technology.  China’s economic reform and opening was complex because of the 
broad and deep scope of China’s centrally planned economy.  Reforms had to address the 
most trenchant problems of the centrally planned economy: hierarchal and bureaucratic 
industry structures; lack of appropriate pricing mechanisms within supply chains; inefficient 
use of resources by state-owned enterprises in which management lacked incentives for profit 
and innovation; the organizational separation of research and production; and rigid career 
paths for individuals, among other problems.67  Because of the scope and complexity of 
reforming industries across China, Chinese leaders began economic reforms “gradually,” to 
use Barry Naughton’s term,68 often experimenting with new methods in one area before 
attempting broad-based implementation and allowing “out-of-plan” economic activity to 
emerge alongside the planned economy.69  
In the semiconductor industry, officials indeed took what could be generally 
characterized as a gradual and experimental approach, allowing out-of-plan trade to emerge 
while the state sector was being reformed.  That said, to understand the actual events, this 
chapter examines three areas of reform that affected the semiconductor industry.  These 
include overall industrial reform (Section 2.41), reforms to the science & technology (S&T) 
                                                        
67 For more on the problems of centrally planned economies, also called command economies, see: Andrew 
Walder, The Waning of the Communist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Harry Harding, 
Organizing China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995); Janos Kornai, The Socialist System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992); Nicholas Lardy, China’s Unfinished Revolution (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1998); Barry 
Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Thomas Rawski, 
“Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8-2, 1994. 
68 Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan. 
69 Industry reforms continue today, in 2012.  The Chinese government still controls banking, energy, 
telecommunications, and other key industries.  As of 2012, about 150 state-owned enterprises report directly to 
China’s central government through the State Council’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, but these enterprises also have thousands of subsidiary enterprises.  Further, China’s many 
provincial and municipal governments own enterprises, and enterprises can be partially state-owned, with the 




system (Section 2.42), and reforms to the electronics industry, including new strategies 
specific to the semiconductor industry (Section 2.43).70 
The reforms, however, did not result in immediate, tangible changes to China’s state-
owned industries and enterprises. Yu Zhongyu, the President of China’s Semiconductor 
Industry Association, explained that “1978 to 1989 was really a period of just identifying 
methods [of reform and new practices] and identifying resources, and we met many 
obstacles.”71  In the 1980s, industry hierarchies with their many layers of bureaucracy 
remained largely in place and state ownership of enterprises continued across industries.  
Reforms in the 1980s largely sought to change the environment in which state-owned 
enterprises operated.  For example, new policies changed the funding mechanisms for state-
owned electronics enterprises and encouraged these enterprises to seek revenue through 
China’s new “technology markets,” discussed in Section 2.4.  In the literature on China’s 
economic reforms, one sees terms such as “restructuring,” “decentralization,” and 
“divestiture,” and a reader might assume that this means that China’s state-owned enterprises 
were “restructured” in the contemporary, Western sense of the term.  In today’s advanced 
economies, if a firm is restructured, this usually means that the firm’s ownership, 
organizational structure, and operations are changed in clearly defined, tangible ways within a 
fairly rapid timeframe.  This was not the experience of most state-owned enterprises in China 
in the 1980s.  For example, although the central Ministry of the Electronics Industry “divested” 
its many electronics enterprises in 1985, the organizational structure of the national 
                                                        
70 In China’s centrally-planned economy, the semiconductor industry was embedded in the electronics industry, 
but internationally, the semiconductor industry is recognized as a specific industry. 
71 Interview with Yu Zhongyu, July 2, 2009, at China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) headquarters 




electronics industry remained largely in place into the 1990s.72  
That said, reforms did result in certain changes to the centrally planned electronics and 
semiconductor industries in the 1980s and 1990s.  Identifying precise organizational changes, 
however, is difficult because of China’s generally closed posture in terms of revealing internal 
political and economic structures.  Further, the semiconductor industry was, and still is, 
considered a sensitive, national-security-related industry.  Most of the Chinese sources from 
the 1980s and 1990s on the semiconductor industry are entirely technical.  Industry articles 
focus on the progression of semiconductor technology, not on organizational or political 
structures in China’s domestic semiconductor industry.  The authors of technical articles 
likely wrote less about the industry’s structure because of the sensitivities mentioned above, 
but it is also possible that, like their counterparts in more advanced economies, these 
semiconductor industry professionals were mostly concerned with learning and applying 
rapidly evolving semiconductor technologies.  With the passage of time, however, key 
Chinese semiconductor industry leaders have written about the period, discussing the most 
important changes in this critical high technology industry.73  These authors emphasize new 
and constructive developments such as the acquisition of new technology, improved 
production outcomes, new foreign partnerships, etc.  They rarely address the reforms to the 
“old” industry structure, such as when and how particular factories were “released,” but. 
                                                        
72 The national electronics industry remained in place, but some electronics factories were indeed “released” 
from the national industry structure during the 1980s.  See more in section 2.43. 
73 These sources are cited throughout this and other chapters.  These authors include current and former officials 
from leading production enterprises such as Huahong (Hu Qili) and SMIC (Wang Yangyuan) as well as from 
the Institute of Microelectronics of the Chinese Academy of Science (Ye Tianchun) and the China 




through their written accounts as well as interviews in 2008 and 2009, we can discern the 
major structural shifts and new priorities that emerged in the 1980s 
The best source on the organization of China’s semiconductor industry until 1987 is 
Denis Simon’s 1988 book, Technological Innovation in China: The Case of the Shanghai 
Semiconductor Industry.  Simon addresses both organizational structure and policy-making in 
the electronics and semiconductor industries in the midst of China’s 1980s economic reforms, 
as well as technological advances and production outcomes.  Late in his book, Simon 
essentially concludes that innovation in China’s semiconductor industry in the 1980s was not 
really about technological innovation; rather, the industry was still so hampered by 
bureaucracy that the real need was for organizational innovation.  Chinese enterprises might 
have begun to “catch up” technologically in the 1980s, but they were not yet capable of true 
technological innovation, at least in the high technology semiconductor industry.  Simon’s 
study has much to say about electronics-oriented and semiconductor-oriented governmental 
committees, the policy-making process, and policies until 1987, all of which aimed to 
technologically upgrade China’s semiconductor industry.  Yet, despite intentions, by the late 
1980s, China’s semiconductor industry was still enmeshed in its bureaucracy and woefully 
behind global technical standards.74  
As for the geographic locus of innovation in China’s semiconductor industry, Simon 
was partially correct in identifying Shanghai.  In the 1980s, Shanghai was home to more 
electronics organizations than any other area in China, and after 2000, Shanghai and the 
larger Changjiang Triangle were indeed home to more semiconductor enterprises than any 
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other region in China.  That said, in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, the city of Wuxi, also 
located in the Changjiang Triangle about 85 miles west of Shanghai,75 was home to China’s 
most advanced semiconductor enterprise and was the largest recipient of the central 
government’s semiconductor investments, as detailed in Chapter Three.  At the time of 
Simon’s research, however, information about Wuxi’s leading role in the industry was likely 
not publicly available, due to the strategic and security-related nature of the industry. 
Today, with some twenty-five years of hindsight, we can identify the actual outcomes 
and important trends in China’s semiconductor industry from the late 1970s through the early 
2000s.  One important trend, covered in Section 2.4, is that industry officials narrowed and 
deepened state-led semiconductor efforts, for example, they shifted from attempting to 
simultaneously upgrade equipment in more than 30 state-owned semiconductor enterprises in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s to deciding in 1989 to attempt to create just five “key” 
semiconductor enterprises, one of which would be a highly-advanced semiconductor 
enterprise.  This enterprise was called Huajing, and it originated in Wuxi’s #742 Factory, a 
state owned enterprise.  Officials hoped that if Huajing could operate successfully in China’s 
still-reforming environment, then Huajing would serve as a kind of beacon to attract foreign 
firms as well as spur the emergence of new domestic semiconductor firms.  This chapter 
addresses reforms to the state owned sector in the 1980s but also this “narrowing” trend and 
other important changes in China’s state-owned semiconductor industry. 
 
                                                        
75 The Changjiang Triangle refers to Shanghai, southern Jiangsu province and northern Zhejiang province, along 




2.2 The Early Foundations of China’s Semiconductor Industry, 1956-1978 
Prior to Reform and Opening in 1978, China’s domestic semiconductor industry was 
at a very low technological level by global standards.76    There may have been over 40 
factories engaged in semiconductor-related manufacturing in the early 1970s, but these 
factories were mostly producing simple diodes and transistors, which are the “discrete devices” 
used in many electronic products and which are the building blocks of semiconductors.  Only 
a few factories were making actual semiconductors, and under China’s planned economy, 
these factories were producing only low levels of output.  “Cost was high and efficiency was 
low, but price was high,”77 according to a Chinese engineer who worked at several of these 
factories in the early 1970s.  Of course, in the 1960s and 1970s, even leading Western firms 
such as Texas Instruments and Fairchild had only recently begun to mass-produce 
semiconductors. 
Despite the generally low level of China’s semiconductor industry in the early 
1970s, the years between 1956 and 1978 were formative.  In 1956, a group of leading 
scientists was organized by China’s State Council -- China’s highest state body78 -- to develop 
                                                        
76 Semiconductors (半导体) are also called integrated circuits (IC or 集成电路), and they are the core of the 
field of microelectronics (微电子).  These terms will be used repeatedly in this and other chapters. 
77 Yu Xiekang 于燮康 (General Manager of Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Technology, called JCET, and 
former General Manager of Huajing), “Gongtong de Lixiang, Gongtong de Fendou, Gongtong de Shouhuo—
Jiangsusheng  Jichengdianlu Chanye Kechixu Fazhan de Licheng yu Tansuo 共同的理想，共同的奋斗，共
同的收获 --- 江苏省集成电路产业可持续发展的历程与探索 (Common Ideal, Common Striving, Common 
Achievement – The History of Sustainable Development in the Jiangsu Province IC Industry),” Baodaoti 
Hangye 半导体行业 (Semiconductor Industry), December 7, 2008. 
78 The State Council has been and remains China’s highest state body.  In 2012, there were 65 organizations 
reporting directly to the State Council.  These included ministries, commissions, institutes, offices and other 
organizations.  The Chinese government has a website with a complete listing of organizations under the State 




a plan for China’s overall scientific and technological development.  The outcome was a 
document called “Outline for Science and Technology Development, 1956-1967”.  According 
to Wang Yangyuan, this document identified semiconductor technology as a “key priority” 
for China’s future.79  Following this, in the late 1950s, the Applied Physics Institute of the 
Chinese Academy of Science80 held a seminar for overseas returned scholars to discuss 
semiconductor theory and manufacturing.  Following this seminar, five major universities 
began offering a major called “Semiconductors and Physics.”  These universities included: 
Peking University, Fudan University, Jilin University, Xiamen University, and Nanjing 
University.  Soon, other semiconductor-related educational and degree programs were 
established.  As early as 1957, Peking University’s first class of Semiconductor and Physics 
majors graduated.81  
The policy emphasis and the university programs outlined above created a foundation 
of technical knowledge for the industry from 1956 to 1965, but progress was interrupted by 
the chaos of China’s Cultural Revolution from 1965 to 1975.  During the Cultural Revolution, 
industry slowed, many universities were closed, and the Chinese Communist Party disparaged 
and purged “elites,” including scientific elites.  Thus, semiconductor industry personnel were 
stymied in their studies and research.  In interviews with Fudan University alumni who 
                                                        
79 Wang Yangyuan and Wang Yongwen 王阳元, 王永文, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhilu: cong 
Xiaofei Daguo Zouxiang Chanye Qiangguo 我国集成电路产业发展之路：从消费大国走向产业强国 
(China’s IC Industry Development Path: From a Big, Consuming Nation to a Strong, Industrial Nation),  
Kexue Chubanshe Science Press 科学出版社 (Science Press), 2008, page 291.  Wang Yangyuan is an industry 
elder and founder and Chairman of SMIC, a major semiconductor enterprise in China.   
80 Headquartered in Beijing, the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) is China’s most prominent national-level 
scientific academy.  CAS has institutes and branches throughout China.     
81 Several of the 1957 class from Peking University are still active leaders in the industry today, e.g., Yu 
Zhongyu as President of CSIA, Wang Yangyuan as Chairman of SMIC, and Xu Juyan, CAS Academician, 
Honorary Chief Engineer at CRM and CETC 58.  Each of these individuals were interviewed for this study.  




studied semiconductors-related majors during this period, the alumni stated that they had not 
really studied from about 1966, but rather they were made to either work in factories or 
undertake so-called political study.   Each of these men expressed great frustration at China’s 
ten-year retreat from scientific and technological progress, and each had been eager to return 
to university in the late 1970s to continue their studies, as the field of semiconductors was 
widely recognized as critical at that time.82   
Despite an overall slow-down during the Cultural Revolution, China’s state-owned 
and centrally planned semiconductor industry made some technological advances between 
1965 and 1978, both in knowledge and small-scale production.  In the early 1970s, Chinese 
semiconductor organizations began to import foreign equipment to expand and upgrade 
production.  However, funds were limited and equipment acquisition was price-based and 
piecemeal, with the result that Chinese personnel often could not implement, use and maintain 
the imported production equipment.  Nonetheless, in this period under central planning, 
knowledge was shared among factories and research institutes.  Yu Xiekang, who was 
formerly a General Manager of Huajing and who is now an executive at one of China’s 
largest semiconductor enterprises,83 described the work environment in the 1970s as follows: 
                                                        
82 Interviews with four Fudan University alumni, May 30, June 4 and June 8, 2009, in Shanghai.  These four men 
finished their educations in semiconductor-related fields in the late 1970s after the Cultural Revolution.  Each 
initially entered a state research institute.  One eventually became a professor at a Fudan University institute 
and later formed a technology company with foreigners.  Another spent his career in the state semiconductor 
industry and is currently Director of the Shanghai IC Industry Association.  Another went from an institute to 
a state-owned enterprise and later started two technology companies.  The fourth migrated to New Zealand in 
the mid 1980s and returned to China in the early 2000s, where he now has his own industrial consulting 
company, serving Chinese and foreign companies.  Despite no longer working in state-owned semiconductor 
enterprises or institutes, these men still closely follow the events and politics of China’s largest semiconductor 
enterprises. 
83 Yu is with Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Technology (JCET), which does packaging/assembly/testing 
(P.A.T.) of semiconductors.  The three major sectors of the semiconductor industry value chain are: design, 




“I graduated in 1968…, so I have seen the whole Jiangsu semiconductor 
industry begin and grow and [become] strong…  Although conditions were 
really bad [in the early 1970s], the spirit of coordination between companies was 
very good, and technology was shared freely.  I myself participated in the R&D 
for 3DA93, [which we] learned from the Shanghai #5 Component Factory.  I 
also participated in making the 3DK2 transistor and in R&D for the 3DK7, 
which I learned from the Chengdu #970 Factory.  At the same time, the #742 
Factory [later called Huajing] trained people from the Nanjing Industrial 
Academy, Chengdu Telecomm and Engineering Academy, Xinjiang 
Semiconductor Factory, Gansu #871 Factory, Wuxi Transistor Company, 
Jiangyin Transistor Company, Changshu Transistor Company, etc.  At that time, 
[many supplies were] made by ourselves at #742 Factory…[and] were also 
designed by ourselves.  I ate and lived in the factory.  I was not only a technical 
person but also a task person, so I had to do everything.”84  
After the Cultural Revolution, China’s pool of semiconductor talent grew each year.  
In the late 1970s, China established comprehensive research universities, including 88 “key” 
universities each of which offered electronics-related programs.  Also in the 1980s, new 
policies enabled Chinese students to study abroad, and many students pursued engineering 
and science degrees at foreign institutions.  These educational opportunities in China and 
abroad created a growing cohort of electronics professionals, and by 1985, China’s 
semiconductor enterprises employed approximately 5,000 technical staff.85 
 
2.3 China’s Centrally Planned Semiconductor Industry in the 1980s 
In the early 1980s, industry officials continued to try to develop China’s 
semiconductor knowledge base and production.  According to the China Semiconductor 
                                                        
84 Yu Xiekang 于燮康 (General Manager of JCET, former General Manager of Huajing), “Gongtong de Lixiang, 
Gongtong de Fendou, Gongtong de Shouhuo—Jiangsusheng  Jichengdianlu Chanye Kechixu Fazhan de 
Licheng yu Tansuo 共同的理想，共同的奋斗，共同的收获 --- 江苏省集成电路产业可持续发展的历程与
探索 (Common Ideal, Common Striving, Common Achieve – History of Sustainable Development in the 
Jiangsu IC Industry),” Baodaoti Hangye 半导体行业 (Semiconductor Industry), December 7, 2008. 
85 Yu Zhongyu, “China’s IC Industry, the Status Quo and Future,” a presentation delivered at Stanford 




Industry Association, in the early 1980s, China had 33 semiconductor enterprises, which were 
in the process of being updated through imported equipment, because China did not yet have 
the capability to self-produce such equipment.86  See Figure One for a list of China’s key 
semiconductor facilities in the mid 1980s.87  With funds from the central government, these 
enterprises spent RMB 1.3 billion to import 24 production lines.  Most of these lines were 
outdated 3 inch lines, but a few were 4 inch lines.88  As in the early 1970s, equipment was 
purchased piecemeal and second-hand, and Chinese personnel did not know how to use or 
maintain the equipment, nor did they know what products to produce.  Thus, this RMB 1.3 
billion investment was widely dispersed across enterprises, and ultimately only a few of the 
production lines were functional.89 
                                                        
86 Former engineers gave examples of the factories’ need to import production lines in the 1980s.  In one case, Chinese 
engineers claim to have “tricked” Philips (a leading equipment company based in the Netherlands) into selling them a 
production line at half price, claiming that they could make it themselves, when in fact they could not.  In another case, a 
Chinese research institute offered to give production equipment to a factory at no cost, but the factory responded by saying 
that they had already applied for permission to import equipment, and they would rather have the far-more-expensive 
imported equipment.  Interviews, June 4 and June 8, 2009, Shanghai. 
87 In his 1988 study, Denis Simon identified 13 key semiconductor production facilities and 7 key research institutes.  In the 
2000s, Chinese sources identified 33 to 40 semiconductor facilities from the 1980s, and these sources include all the key 
facilities identified by Simon, see Simon, Innovation, 67. 
88 In the semiconductor industry, a production line’s size in inches, e.g., “a 3 inch line” refers to the diameter of the silicon 
wafer, from which semiconductors are cut.  Larger diameter wafers provide more semiconductors per wafer and thus better 
economies of scale, but they are more expensive and complex to manufacture (manufacturing is called “fabricating” in the 
semiconductor industry).  Thus, an 8 inch line is more technologically advanced than a 6 inch line.  Semiconductor process 
technology is also commonly measured by the micron level, abbreviated as µm, which is one-millionth of a meter.  The 
microns (or nanos), e.g., “5µm,” refers to the width of the line etchings on a semiconductor.  In the case of microns and 
nanos, smaller represents more advanced technology. 
89 Sources: China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA), “Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye de Huigu yu Zhanwang 中
国集成电路产业的回顾与展望 (Review and Prospects of China’s IC Industry),” a document provided by WXICC in 
January of 2009.  Also, Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 291-293.   Also, Yu Xiekang 于燮康 
(General Manager of JCET, former General Manager of Huajing), “Shenhua he Wanshan Jichengdianlu Chanye Zhengce, 
Tuijin Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Chixu Wending Fazhan 深化和完善集成电路产业政策, 推进我国集成电路产业
持续稳定发展 (Deepen and Perfect Policies for IC Industry, Promote the Sustainable Development of China’s IC 
Industry),” Bandaoti Hangye 半导体行业 (Semiconductor Industry),  August, 2008.  Yu Xiekang said that of the many 






Figure 1: China's Largest Semiconductor Production Facilities in the 1980s 
 
Facility Location 
Jiangnan Semiconductor Factory Jiangsu, Wuxi 
Tianguang Electronics Factory Gansu, Qinan 
Dongguang 878 Factory Beijing 
Changzhou Semiconductor Factory Beijing 
Beijing Semiconductor #2 Zhejiang, Shaoxing 
Shaoxing Electronics Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #5 Components Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #14 Radio Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #19 Radio Factory Shanghai 
CAS Factory #109 Beijing 
Lishan Microelectronics Corporation Xian 
Tianjin Semiconductor Factory Tianjin 




Industry observers often suggest that export controls on semiconductor equipment by 
Western countries hindered or blocked China’s technological progress during the Cold War 
era, but export controls likely did not hinder the development of China’s semiconductor 
industry.   During that time, the NATO organization CoCom (the COordinating COMmittee 
for Multilateral Export Controls, established in 1949) indeed limited high technology and dual 
use technology exports to China, the Soviet Union, and other Warsaw Pact countries.  The 
role of CoCom was to set acceptable “technical specifications for dual-use items that were 
being considered for export” to China and Warsaw Pact countries.90  Several Chinese 
semiconductor industry leaders with broad knowledge of the industry mentioned that CoCom 
restrictions did not really affect China’s ability to import production equipment in 1980s and 
1990s, discussing specific cases where the foreign equipment they sought was available for 
import.  Although CoCom would have blocked cutting-edge semiconductor technology 
exports to China in the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese semiconductor leaders usually were not 
seeking production equipment that rose to the level of being export-controlled.91  The 
technical knowledge of semiconductor production in China was such that, even when Chinese 
organizations imported outdated equipment, the technicians and production staff often were 
not able to use and maintain the equipment.  Thus, according to these interviews, CoCom 
restrictions had little real effect on China’s efforts to upgrade technology in the 1980s and 
earlier.  The semiconductor production technology that Chinese enterprises sought in the 
                                                        
90 Hanns-D. Jacobsen, “CoCom-The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (1st Draft),” 
The Economics of the Cold War, a conference at the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, September 2-4, 
2009. 
91 These interviewees included: Teng Jingxin, Chief Engineer of Huarun, and Wang Guoping, CEO of Huarun, 
July 16, 2009, Wuxi, Huarun headquarters;  Yu Zhongyu, President of China Semiconductor Industry 
Association, July 2, 2009, CSIA headquarters in Beijing; Yu Xiekang, General Manager of Jiangsu 




1970s and 1980s was available for purchase, if not from the United States, then from 
equipment suppliers in Europe, such as ASML in the Netherlands.  And, if a CoCom country 
wanted to sell a restricted item to China, they sometimes were able to sell to a “neutral” 
Chinese university research institute rather than a Chinese enterprise.92  As will be discussed 
in Chapter Three, Wuxi’s #742 Factory got China’s first full 3 inch semiconductor production 
line from Toshiba of Japan, a CoCom member country, during China’s 6th five year plan 
(1981-1985).  By 1986, Huajing was China’s most advanced semiconductor enterprise, based 
on the 5 micron technology that Huajing had gotten from Japan.  However, 5 micron 
technology had been in use in the US and Japan since the early 1970s and thus was not 
considered leading edge technology by CoCom.93  Similarly, Simon (1988) wrote that from 
1981 to 1985 “China’s electronics industry imported over 1,000 items of technology; one-
third of the country’s major electronics factories [were] at least partially renovated thru 
[foreign importation]” from Japan and other countries, although these importations and 
renovations were limited by funding, approvals, and technical knowledge.94  When writing 
about or discussing the era, Chinese semiconductor industry leaders frequently mention the 
CoCom export controls, but the equipment that they actually needed and sought was not at a 
high-enough technological level to be prohibited and was indeed available.95  According to 
                                                        
92 Interview with Joseph Chen, ASML (a leading global semiconductor equipment company), Wuxi, June 29, 
2009. 
93 Writing in 1987-88, Denis Simon said “claims have been made that the manufacturing technologies for ICs in 
the 5 micron range have been mastered during the 6th five year plan…”  These claims were likely about 
Huajing, then called #742 Factory and considered a sensitive site in the industry due to its military ties.  See 
Simon, Innovation, 66. 
94 Simon, Innovation, 129-130. 
95 In a 1985 Rand report based on interviews with Chinese electronics enterprise managers, Jonathan Pollack 
summarized the situation by writing “Despite frequent complaints from Chinese officials and end users and 




interviews with Chinese semiconductor industry leaders, the main obstacles to foreign 
equipment acquisition in the 1970s and 1980s was China’s shortage of foreign exchange and 
the cumbersome process of getting government approval to import equipment.96  Figure Two 
compares China’s technological level with global leading levels from the 1970s. 
Along with these technological limitations, China’s semiconductor industry was also 
beset with structural limitations in the 1980s.  In his 1988 study, Denis Simon used 
information from China’s Ministry of the Electronics Industry and the Chinese Electronics 
Yearbook (1986) to develop a useful summary chart of the structure of China’s national 
civilian electronics industry in 1987.97  Simon shows a vast national bureaucracy, organized 
into a vertical hierarchy.  Figure Three is based on the chart that Simon developed (Simon, 
Technological Innovation, Figure 3.1, page 54), with additions.  As Figure Three shows, a 
number of ministries – in addition to the Ministry of the Electronics Industry – had 
electronics-related institutes and factories.98  Further, each ministry oversaw a number of 
bureaus, each of which had both institutes and factories.  Simon notes that in 1985 the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
electronics items from the US, Japan, and Western Europe (including advanced microcomputers) are widely, if 
unevenly, prevalent in Chinese laboratories and factories.  The intensely competitive nature of the 
semiconductor and computer industry – and the easy proximity of Hong Kong to enterprising Chinese factory 
and laboratory personnel – virtually guarantees a steady flow of these products to China, regardless of U.S. 
Policy.”  Pollack, The Chinese Electronics Industry. 
96 Interview with Yu Zhongyu, President of China Semiconductor Industry Association, July 2, 2009, CSIA 
headquarters in Beijing.  Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye 我国集成电路产业 (China’s IC 
Industry), 341-342.  Wang and Wang cite the meager investment in China’s semiconductor industry as RMB 
880 million from 1986 to 1990, RMB 11 billion from 1991 to 1995, and RMB 14 billion from 1996 to 2000, 
for a 15 year total of approximately US$3.2 billion, which they describes as less than Intel’s annual investment 
in the early 2000s.  For details on the complex approval process for foreign equipment importation, see Simon, 
Innovation, 130-133. 
97 Ibid., pages 52-55, chart on page 54. 
98 In 1988, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry was merged with the State Machine Building Commission to 





Figure 2: Gap Between China and Global Leading Technology (year attained) 
 
  Wafer Size in Inches (larger is more advanced)   
Year Global China 
1970 2 1.5 
1975 4 1.5 
1980 5 2 
1985 6 3-4 
1990 6-8 3-4 
1995 8 6 < Shougang-NEC 
2000 12 6-8 < Huahong-NEC and CSMC-Huajing 
2005 12 12 < SMIC 
2010 12-18 12 
 
 
       





Very Large Scale 
Integration 
Ultra Large Scale 
Integration  
Global 1958 1964 1966 1976 1986 
China* 1965 1972 1972 1986 1999 
The years indicated for China seem optimistic.  They may reflect technological understanding more than actual production capabilities. 
Source: Zhu Yiwei 朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji 中国集成电路产业发展:  (China’s IC Industry Development: Collected 




Ministry of the Electronics Industry alone was overseeing some “2600 factories…along with 
over 130 research institutes and 6 dedicated universities.”99   
As for the semiconductor industry, apart from the larger electronics industry shown in 
Figure Three, according to the China Semiconductor Industry Association, there were about 
5,000 technical staff and 40,000 total staff in China’s 33 semiconductor enterprises in 1985,100 
many of which likely worked under the Bureau of Microelectronics, shown under the 
Ministry of the Electronics Industry in Figure Three.  Extending the vertical hierarchy 
represented in Figure Three, each semiconductor enterprise had additional associated units.  
For example, in 1989, Huajing had a total of 72 associated units, consisting of three groups: 1) 
core units, meaning research institutes, factories and educational units, 2) close units, meaning 
units that supported or supplied Huajing, and 3) independent units, meaning units that were 
not officially part of Huajing but cooperated or supported Huajing in some way.101  In this 
way, the national industry structure was even larger than Figure Three suggests. Of course, 
China’s 1980s electronics research and production capacity also included military-oriented 
organizations.  Military-oriented electronics facilities were organized and located separately 
from civilian electronics.  Barry Naughton has shown that many military-related facilities 
were located in China’s remote “Third Front” areas, away from China’s 
                                                        
99 Simon, Innovation, 52.  Simon also has charts and Figures showing the complexity of Shanghai’s municipal 
electronics industry and its electronics research and development system in the mid 1980s.  See pages 100 and 
105 of his book, Figures 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.  As a municipality, Shanghai had its own set of industrial 
bureaus outside of the bureaus that were under the national-level industrial ministries. 
100 Yu Zhongyu, “China’s IC Industry, the Status Quo and Future,” a presentation delivered at Stanford 
University, 2005. 
101 Interview Yu Xiekang, June 2, 2009, at JCET headquarters.  Yu Xiekang was General Manager of JCET and 
an official of the China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) in 2009.  JCET is a large, state-affiliated 





Figure 3: China's Electronics Industry, Circa 1986 
** Simon notes that in 1985, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry oversaw some 2600 production units and 130 research institutes. 
*   In 1988, the State Machine Building Commission and the Ministry of the Electronics Industry merged to form the Ministry of Machine Building and 
Electronics Industry. 
Source: Denis Simon, Technological Innovation, page 54, from China's Ministry of the Electronics Industry, Beijing, July 1987. 
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eastern seaboard.102  China’s 3rd Front included outlying provinces such as Sichuan, Guizhou, 
and Yunnan.  According to Naughton, from 1964 to 1971, Chinese officials established 
important industrial and military enterprises in these areas in order that China’s facilities 
would be geographically dispersed and thus safer from foreign attacks that might target the 
eastern part of the country.103  Further, China’s many military-related electronics facilities 
were not part of the Ministry of the Electronics Industry.  Rather, from 1982, China’s 
National Defense Science, Technology and Industries Commission oversaw military work.  
Until the late 1980s, military electronics and civilian electronics remained largely separate, 
with the exception that, at times, civilian organizations, such as CAS institutes, would support 
military-related projects.104  However, by the mid to late 1980s, military-oriented electronics 
factories attempted to shift part of their production to civilian electronics in order to serve the 
growing market for electronics.105  (Section 2.43 under Implementation of Reforms addresses 
state-owned enterprises’ shift from producing only for central and local plans to also 
producing for China’s growing electronics market.)  Both military and civilian semiconductor 
facilities sought to supply the semiconductors and discrete electronic components, e.g., diodes, 
transistors, and switches, that were required for electronic products. 
                                                        
102 See Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” The China 
Quarterly, September, 1988.  Naughton argues that industrial and military development of the Third Front 
“dominated” China’s industrialization between 1964 and 1971.  For more on China’s military, see Richard 
Bitzinger, “Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World,” International Security, Volume 17, Number 
2, pages 84-111; Litai Xue and John Lewis, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1988); and various works by James Mulvenon, Robert Ross, and David Shambaugh. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Simon, Innovation, 39. 
105 For more on China’s military industry and its reforms, see works by Tai Ming-cheung, James Mulvenon, 




Despite China’s many research institutes and civilian and military electronics factories 
and despite the push to import more modern equipment, by the mid to late 1980s, China’s 
electronics industry was not advancing as hoped and as needed.  Industry officials recognized 
that there were too many projects and not enough capital.  Further, investments by the central 
government in enterprises became debts, e.g., if the Ministry of the Electronics Industry 
provided funds to an enterprise to procure foreign equipment, then the enterprise would later 
have to repay the Ministry.  China’s semiconductor enterprises did not have independent 
ability to source capital, nor did they have the capacity to develop their products or their 
human resources.106  Further, Simon’s study detailed the many bureaucratic and decision-
making obstacles within the national industry.  This research and Simon’s research both show 
several overriding problems in China’s state-owned semiconductor industry in the 1980s: the 
complex and bureaucratic national industry structure, limited funds for capital intensive 
semiconductor equipment, and the level of skills and knowledge among Chinese production 
personnel.  Thus, as in many other industries in China, Chinese officials pursued distinct 
reforms and strategic projects for the semiconductor industry, with the goal of strengthening 
this critical high-technology industry.  
                                                        
106 At that time, state-owned enterprises did not have access to capital outside of their ministry or the state-
owned banks.  At that time in China, capital was not available through private channels, as China’s banking 
and financial system had been nationalized in the 1950s.  Yu Xiekang 于燮康 (General Manager of JCET, 
former General Manager of Huajing), “Shenhua he Wanshan Jichengdianlu Chanye Zhengce, Tuijin Wo Guo 
Jichengdianlu Chanye Chixu Wending Fazhan 深化和完善集成电路产业政策, 推进我国集成电路产业持续
稳定发展 (Deepen and Perfect Policies for IC Industry, Promote the Sustainable Development of China’s IC 




2.4 New Policies Affecting China’s Semiconductor Industry from the mid 1980s 
After reform and opening in 1978, but mainly from the mid 1980s, Chinese central 
government officials pursued a number of new policies and reforms that directly or indirectly 
supported the semiconductor industry.   Most of these reforms flowed from China’s “four 
modernizations.”  In the mid 1980s, while government officials remained committed to 
maintaining control of China’s military-related electronics organizations, officials also sought 
to reform the centrally planned and state-owned civilian electronics industry. 
Chinese officials were well award that developed countries had been rapidly 
innovating while also commercializing electronic technology throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  
Through the 1960s, the main uses globally for semiconductors had been military equipment 
and mainframe computers, but in the 1970s and early 1980s, a wave of new consumer 
applications that required semiconductors emerged including calculators, video games, and 
the Mac and IBM personal computers.  From the mid-1980s, the speed and memory of 
computers continuously improved. For example, Intel’s 386, 486, and 586 “chips” (i.e., 
integrated circuits) were ever-advancing versions of Intel’s microprocessors, which served as 
the central processing units (CPUs) of computers.107 
As semiconductor technology quickly evolved in the 1980s, Chinese policy makers 
pursued a number of new policies to help China’s semiconductor industry “catch up” 
technologically with the global industry.  These policies are addressed as follows: Section 
2.41, general industrial reform policies; Section 2.42, science and technology (S&T) reform 
policies; and Section 2.43, electronics and semiconductor industry reform policies.  The 
                                                        
107 From the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the 386, 486 and 585 improved personal computers.  Then, from the 
mid 1990s, Microsoft’s “Windows” software improved the user-interface of personal computers.  Also in the 




important point to bear in mind, however, is that although these new policies were indeed 
important, the policies were not always immediately and fully implemented.  As we will see 
in Chapters Three through Five, many of the problems plaguing China’s centrally planned 
economy continued to affect the electronics and semiconductor industries long after the 1980s.  
 
2.41 An Overview of China’s Industrial Reform Policies and Intentions 
Prior to 1978, China’s government planning authorities had control over most of 
China’s industrial resources in terms of investment, production, pricing and consumption.  
The central planning authority set production targets for enterprises and provided the 
enterprises with the inputs to achieve their targets.  Prices were also set by central planning 
authorities and did not reflect a “market value.”  Under this system, China’s central 
government, as well as China’s provincial, municipal and local governments, controlled 
thousands of enterprises, both large to small.  
From 1978, Chinese leaders had reformed China’s agricultural sector and had allowed 
the growth of the non-state sector with notable success.  Following this, in the 1980s, the 
Chinese government announced its intention to reform China’s vast industrial sector.  
However, progress in reforming the industrial sector was limited in the following years, and 
thus in 1984, China’s 12th Central Committee issued its “Central Committee Decision on 
Reform of the Economic System.”108  This “decision” sought to fundamentally reform 
China’s centrally planned economy, across industries.  According to Barry Naughton and 
                                                        
108 Also, in 1982, China’s State Council formed a new group called the “State Commission for Restructuring the 




other scholars,109 key elements of the 1984 decision included: price reform to allow prices to 
reflect supply and demand; reducing the scope of central planning, although not abolishing 
central planning; allowing enterprise managers to have more decision-making control in terms 
of investment, resources, personnel, profits, and trade; and developing a new taxation system 
wherein enterprises would pay a portion of their profits in taxes.  In addition, the 1984 
decision encouraged trade including foreign trade, regional specialization, rather than regional 
self-sufficiency, and the growth of collective and private enterprises, alongside the state-
owned enterprises. 
The challenges to carrying out such fundamental change across China’s major 
industries were many.  There were political as well as operational challenges.  Some officials 
continued to believe strongly in government control of economic resources, while other 
officials simply did not want to give up their base of power.  Obviously, to implement such 
broad-based reforms across industries, many new systems had to be developed and old 
systems had to be reformed, including such key economic levers as pricing.  At the enterprise 
level, managers’ experience and skills were based in the existing centrally planned system, 
and thus their ability to implement new practices was limited.110  Further, China did not have 
a functioning legal system nor capital markets to support and protect industries and 
enterprises, as is available in advanced economies.  Nonetheless, the 1984 decision 
                                                        
109 For more, Gregory Chow, “Development of a More Market-Oriented Economy in China, Econometric 
Research Program,” Research Memorandum Number 326, Princeton University’s Econometric Research 
Program, August 1986; Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan; Dwight Perkins, China: Asia's Next Economic 
Giant? (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1990); Justin Yifu Lin, “Fiscal Decentralization and 





summarized above reveals that officials at the highest levels of China’s government hoped to 
implement broad and deep industrial reforms in the latter half of the 1980s. 
 
2.42 Reform Policies for the Science and Technology (S&T) System 
Under China’s centrally planned economy, in addition to a hierarchal national 
structure for each industry, there was also a national science and technology “system.”  This 
system mainly consisted of five different types of organizations.  These included: 1) the 
Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and its institutes and branches throughout China, 2) 
research institutes under the State Council’s various industrial ministries, 3) university 
research institutes, 4) military-related research institutes, and 5) provincial and municipal 
research institutes.  Semiconductor-related research was conducted in each of these types of 
organizations.  As part of China’s four modernizations, Chinese officials sought to reform the 
S&T system to ensure that science and technology supported China’s overall economic 
growth and technological progress.111   
 
2.42a  Problems in China’s S&T System  
In his research on China’s S&T system in the 1980s,112 Tony Saich argued that 
China’s S&T system was beset with a number of problems.  These included insufficient 
funding, little to no individual financial incentive, and bureaucratic and rigid organizations 
that did not foster individual mobility and knowledge sharing.   
                                                        
111 For China’s early reforms in science and technology, see Richard Suttmeier, Science, Technology, and 
China’s Drive for Modernization (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980). 





Another major problem with the vertical structure of China’s industries as well as its 
S&T system was the separation of research organizations from production organizations.  
Scientists and production personnel largely worked in their own vertical silos, and thus 
scientists and production staff did not readily communicate their problems, findings, or goals 
to one another.113  Saich identifies this separation of research and production based on the 
structure of China’s S&T system and based on Chinese reform proposals, which explicitly 
sought to forge closer links between research and production.114  In China’s S&T system, 
scientists could gain advanced knowledge and possibly produce a prototype of a new 
technology product, but their goal was to serve their research organization.  Their tendency 
was to concentrate on “basic” research, which advances scientific knowledge without 
necessarily applying that knowledge to enhance products.  The goal of many scientists was 
not to design products for mass production, nor to design products to meet a market demand.  
Chinese scientists focused less on “applied” research, which is directed toward functional 
innovations such as consumer, industrial or military applications.  Like elsewhere in the world, 
basic research was -- and is -- considered more prestigious in China.  Meanwhile in China’s 
factories, factory managers sought to meet their production quota from the central plan, not to 
innovate or improve their products.  Industry managers around the world and across industries 
have long known that close working relationships and proximity between research and 
production personnel are invaluable.  Typically, a group of engineers works directly with the 
                                                        
113 Ibid., page 24.  Saich cites a document called the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party on Reform of the Science and Technology Management System (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
guanyu Kexue Jishu Tizhi Gaige Jueding  中共中央 于科学技术体制改革的决定),” from the People’s 
Daily (Renmin Ribao 人民日报), March 20, 1985, pages 1 and 3.   




production team for a product or product line.  These relationships enable scientists and 
engineers to coordinate with production personnel in making ongoing, incremental 
improvements to product designs and production processes.  
This cross-fertilization, however, was often missing in China’s planned economy, and 
indeed was largely missing in China’s electronics and semiconductor industries.115  This was 
the drawback of China’s S&T system that most tangibly affected China’s ability to produce  
semiconductors,116 but reforms to the S&T system were critical for the semiconductor 
industry for two other important reasons.  China’s research institutes were far behind the 
global industry in applied research and design for semiconductors, and semiconductor 
research was conducted in widely dispersed organizations throughout the S&T system and 
thus there was a belief that knowledge was not being effectively shared.117 
 
2.42b  New S&T Policies  
In March of 1978, Beijing hosted a “National Science Conference,” and at this 
conference, electronics was named a key national priority.  According to Denis Simon, there 
was “special emphasis on semiconductors and computers…  [and shortly thereafter] the 
‘National Development Plan for Science and Technology (1978-1985)’ set very ambitious 
                                                        
115 Ibid., pages 34-35, Chapter Two, pages 148-151.  Also, Simon, Innovation, pages 32 and 39-41.  As an 
example, Chapter Three will show that Huajing joined with Institute 1424 to gain research support as well as 
coordination between research and production. 
116 Tony Saich, China’s Science Policy in the 80s (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press 
International, 1989), pages 34-35, Chapter Two, pages 148-151. 
117 Jiang Chenqi 蒋臣琦, “Pinbo Chuangye, Fazhan Pandeng: 24 Suo Chengli Ershi Zhounian Huigu yu 
Zhanwang 拼搏创业, 发展攀登: 24 所成立 20 周年回顾与展望 (A Difficult Business, the Development 
Climb: Institute 24’s 20th Anniversary Review and Prospect),”  Weidianzi Xue 微电子学 (Microelectronics), 




goals for electronics…[including] a massive influx of foreign technology.”118  The State 
Council eventually established a Special Leading Group for Science and Technology in 
January 1983; this leading group was led by Premier Zhao Ziyang119 and had representatives 
from State Science and Technology, State Planning, and State Economic Commissions.  The 
State Council occasionally establishes such “leading groups” (lingdao xiaozu 领导小组); 
these are special groups of high level officials that can coordinate across China’s many 
ministries and other government organizations.  Leading groups can consider problems, make 
policy recommendations to the State Council, and coordinate policy implementation across 
various governmental organizations.  To implement the ambitious goals of S&T reform, Saich 
and Simon argue that the Special Leading Group for Science and Technology was necessary 
in order to forge working relationships and decision-making for S&T across the highest 
organs of government.120  The group aimed to reform the S&T system while also coordinating 
these reforms with the needs of the economy.121  In March of 1985, this leading group 
published a document with more detailed plans for reforming the S&T sector.  This document 
was called “The Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on the Reform of the 
                                                        
118 Simon, Innovation, 59. 
119 Zhao’s participation signals the importance of this work at the highest levels of government; Zhao was 
Premier of China from 1980 to 1987 and General Secretary of the CCP from 1987 to 1989. 
120 Saich, China’s Science Policy, page 22 and Chapter One.  Simon, Innovation, pages 29-32. 
121 Tony Saich, “Reform of China’s Science and Technology Organizational System,” Science and Technology 
in Post Mao China, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989); Simon, Innovation, 1988, pages 28-32.  
According to these accounts, in the early 1980s, both the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and China’s 
State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC, established in the late 1950s) – China’s two top bodies for 
science and technology -- proved unable to make headway with reforms.  The two groups had been in conflict 
for decades.  Also, from the era of the Cultural Revolution (1965-1975), political elites had been suspicious of 
technical elites.  Finally, in the mid 1980s, technically-qualified personnel were (re)appointed to S&T 




Scientific and Technological System.”122  Major priorities of this decision were to: reform the 
funding mechanisms for S&T; develop markets for trade in technology and intellectual 
property; and increase the professional mobility of science personnel.123 
Funding changes had the most immediate impact on the structure of the S&T 
system.124  The plan was not to immediately decrease overall S&T funding, yet the plan 
entailed “releasing” many of the existing institutes in the coming years.  For institutes that 
were ultimately released, funding was reduced over time, perhaps initially reduced by half and 
later all funding would cease.  Even in the retained institutes, funding was often reduced.125  
For these organizations, their funding would no longer be allocated through central 
government grants, but rather the institutes would have to place competitive bids to try to win 
funding for specific projects.  The plan also called for allocating funds for new state-
sponsored S&T initiatives.  These included: major S&T projects and programs across 
industries,126 a national science foundation, and various “sites” such as technology parks and 
incubators.  
                                                        
122 Ibid., pages 36 and 54.  Saich’s source is the Renmin Ribao 人民日报(Peoples Daily), March 20, 1985, pages 
1 and 3.  The document is called the “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu Kexue Jishu Tizhi Gaige Jueding  中共
中央 于科学技术体制改革的决定”. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid.  Also interviews with former research staff: Xu Guochang, June 17, 2009, Shanghai IC Industry 
Association; Prof. Yang, Fudan University, June 8, 2009; Yin Guohai, Huarun-Anst, June 19, 2009. 
125 Interview with Fudan alumni group, May 30, 2009, in Shanghai. 
126 Important programs also included: The 863 program (a.k.a. The National High Technology R&D Program), 
established in March of 1986 and the TORCH program, established in August, 1988.  In the 863 program, an 
expert committee in Beijing established research priorities in a number of high technology fields.  
Organizations could apply (compete) for funding from the 863 Program.  If awarded funding, the expert 
committee would check project milestones.  The purpose of the TORCH program was to commercialize, 
industrialize and internationalize high technology, mainly through small and medium size enterprises in China.  
Working with a US organization, TORCH program leaders organized many overseas delegations and 
eventually developed “policies, laws and regulations,…financing policies and sources,…and domestic and 




In addition to the programs above, research personnel -- whether still with an institute 
or recently released -- were encouraged to seek additional funding or income by pursuing 
customers, contracts, and partnerships with other “enterprises and [in] the market”127 on their 
own.  That said, the market for technology products was only then being developed: from 
1984 the government sponsored “technology fairs” to enable research institutes and 
production enterprises to begin to trade with one another using such mechanisms as contracts, 
joint ventures, one-time sales, and other transactions.128 
 
2.42c  S&T Outcomes 
In the second half of the 1980s, the actual outcomes of these reforms of the S&T 
system were mixed for the semiconductor industry.  In the microelectronics field, basic 
research may have suffered because there was little demand and funding for it from central-
level ministries, but markets for applied technology, e.g., consumer electronics, began to 
flourish.129  Institutes still received some funding and projects for basic research from the 
government, but institute personnel increasingly had to seek funding and projects in China’s 
emerging technology market.  Yet, when an institute got a contract or project with a factory, it 
was often for applied, derivative research.  Basic research slowed relative to applied research 
because factory requests were low-tech, as factories sought to produce low-end consumer 
                                                                                                                                                                             
many industrial parks, incubation centers, and innovation parks for returned scholars.  See Shi Dinghuan, 
Exectuive Director of Torch, “Torch Program,” The 21st Public Conference Journal (The Texas Lyceum), 
November 2006.   
127 Simon, Innovation, 32-33.  Also interviews with former research staff: Xu Guochang, June 17, 2009, 
Shanghai IC Industry Association; Prof. Yang, Fudan University, June 8, 2009; Yin Guohai, Huarun-Anst, 
June 19, 2009. 
128 Ibid. 
129 These technology markets were supported by China’s 1985 Patent Law, but most transactions at that time did 




electronic goods.130  Further, market-based contracts with factories could be risky because, in 
some cases, research personnel did not get paid unless a factory had success with a product.131  
In 1987-88, Denis Simon found a “rapid expansion” of China’s new technology markets.  
Simon noted hundreds of research contracts, technology service organizations, consulting 
contracts, etc., although Simon’s findings only reflected conditions in Shanghai.132    
A related outcome of the new S&T policies was that some scientists, either while still 
working for an institute or after departing, were able to form entirely new organizations 
outside of the planned economy.  These new enterprises were referred to as private companies 
(minban gongsi 民办公司), non-governmental enterprises (minying qiye 民营企业), S&T 
enterprises (keji qiye 科技企业) or privately-owned and operated S&T enterprises (minyou 
minban keji qiye 民有民办科技企业).  Such enterprises were newly allowed under 
government policies that aimed to promote high technology industries and high technology 
zones.  Although these firms were privately or collectively owned, they could sometimes get 
start-up loans from state-owned banks or other state-owned organizations.133  At that time, 
other sources of capital, such as private banks, private equity or venture capital, were not yet 
available in China, as China’s banking and financial system had been nationalized since the 
                                                        
130 Interview with Li Weide, June 4, 2009, Shanghai.  Li was formerly a semiconductor scientist with a state 
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131 Interview with Fudan alumni group, May 30, 2009, Shanghai. 
132 Simon, Innovation, page 148. 
133 For more on these new S&T firms, see Adam Segal, Digitial Dragon: High Technology Enterprises in China 




1950s.  The intention was for these new technology enterprises to directly support China’s 
economic needs by being active in China’s new markets for technology.134 
A famous example of institute staff forming a successful, so-called private company 
occurred at the Beijing Software Institute.  Scientists in the institute formed a company in 
1984 with the English name Legend Computer Group Corporation (later called Lenovo), and 
Legend became successful in China’s software and computer markets.  Later Legend bought 
the Beijing Software Institute, and the institute became Legend’s internal research unit.  In his 
2000 book, China’s Leap into the Information Age, Lu Qiwen details the history of China’s 
four most prominent computer companies of the 1990s: Legend (established 1984), Stone 
(established 1984), Founder (established 1986) and Great Wall (established 1986).  In each of 
these four cases, research staff left their state-owned research institute to form a new, 
(ostensibly) non-governmental computer company.135  Despite these success stories, however, 
Simon concluded that most new S&T organizations in the mid to late 1980s were “far from” 
effectively balancing quality, customer needs, competition, and profits when determining 
which new products to produce,136 due to their lack of experience with market-based decision-
                                                        
134 For more on the policies around new science and technology enterprises in the 1980s, see Richard Suttmeier, 
“Laying Corporate Foundations for China’s High Tech Future,” The China Business Review, July-August, 
1988, pages 22-26.  Also, Tony Saich, China’s Science Policy, 1989.  Also, Lu, China’s Leap, 2000. 
135 Qiwen Lu, China’s Leap into the Information Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  “Non-
governmental” and “privately-owned” (minying 民营 and minyou minban 民有民办) are somewhat 
misleading terms for the four enterprises covered in Lu’s book.  According to Lu, Stone was initially 
established as a collectively-owned township and village enterprise.  Legend initially formed as a state-owned, 
but non-government-run enterprise (guoyou minying qiye 国有民营企业).  Founder, originally established as 
the New Technology Development Company of Beijing University, was state-owned by Beijing University, 
but it operated autonomously and was not compelled to follow the regulations for state-owned enterprises 
regarding wages, benefits, etc.  Lu shows that the ownership structure of each of these enterprises evolved 
over the years.   
136 Simon, Innovation, 146-149.  From the late 1990s, Chinese semiconductor technical staff began to have more 




making.  Nonetheless, in the mid to late 1980s, new market-oriented S&T enterprises were 
emerging, and these enterprises sought to meet the technology needs of China’s reforming 
industries. 
 
2.43 Reform Policies for the Electronics and Semiconductor Industries 
 
2.43a  Electronics Industry Reform 
From early in the reform era, officials sought to reform China’s electronics industry, 
recognizing that electronics was a rapidly evolving global industry and that improvements in 
electronics would support China’s infrastructure, military, and other industries, while 
electronics was itself an important consumer and civilian industry.  Ultimately, a newly 
formed electronics leading group issued key strategies and guidelines for the electronics 
industry in 1985 and 1986, and the Ministry of the Electronics Industry137 “divested” its 
enterprises in 1985.  Despite the divestiture, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry’s new 
strategies and guidelines for the industry issued in 1985 and 1986 included ongoing roles for 
the Ministry as well as centrally-led investment and projects for the industry.   
In 1982, the State Council funded a permanent leading group called the Leading 
Group for Electronics, Computers, and LSI (dianzi jisuanji he daguimo jichengdianlu lingdao 
                                                        
137 In 1988, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry merged with the State Machine-Building Commission to 
form the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry.  Later, this ministry was again called the 
Ministry of the Electronics Industry.  Then, in 1998, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry was subsumed 
under the Ministry of Information Industry (MII).  In 2008, the MII was subsumed under the new Ministry of 




xiaozu电子计算机和大规模集成电路领导小组),138 in order to determine plans and 
priorities for the electronics industry and to cut through the overlap and rivalries common to 
China’s industries.139 Headed initially by top central government officials including Vice-
Premier Wan Li and later by Premier Li Peng, the group consisted of three tiers of officials 
and experts.  The leading group was charged with creating a plan to develop China’s 
semiconductor industry starting from that period of the 6th five year plan (1981-1985).140  In 
1984, the group’s name was changed to the “State Council Leading Group for the 
Revitalization of Electronics [Industry]” (guowuyuan dianzi zhenxing lingdao xiaozu 国务院
电子振兴领导小组).141  The following year, the leading group published a document called 
“The Strategy for the Development of China’s Electronics and Information Industries” which 
had strategies for 1986, the start of the 7th five year plan, and forward.  According to Simon, 
the document was followed in 1986 by the Ministry of the Electronics Industrys 7th five year 
plan for the electronics industry which echoed the 1985 document but included more detailed 
goals, measures and guidelines. Simon summarized the 1985 strategies as follows. 
                                                        
138 LSI refers to large-scale integration, versus medium or small-scale integration, for integrated circuits, i.e., 
semiconductors.  The formation of the leading group is covered in Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu 
Chanye, page 331. 
139 Simon, Innovation, 56-57 and 138.  Simon details the structure and participation of this leading group, 
showing that it included members from all China’s key commissions and ministries as well as subject matter 
experts, such as leading engineers and scientists working in the various subfields of electronics. 
140 China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA), “Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye de Huigu yu 
Zhanwang 中国集成电路产业的回顾与展望 (Review and Prospects of China’s IC Industry),” document 
provided by WXICC in January of 2009.   




Note that numbers 4 through 6 below indicate ongoing central involvement in industry 
planning.142  Each of these strategies indeed came to fruition in the electronics and 
semiconductor industries in the 1980s and 1990s (italics added). 
1. Increase electronic applications including, for example, Chinese character 
programs and microcomputers. 
 
2. Use foreign technology to advance China’s technology, including engaging in 
joint ventures with foreign firms. 
 
3. Create an integrated electronics supply chain -- equipment to final products -- 
with emphasis on quality mass production and large-scale integrated circuits. 
 
4. Allow markets and competition to play a greater role in the industry while 
relying on unified, national-level plans for projects that required very large 
investments。 
 
5. Coordinate the development of the electronics, communications and 
telecommunications industries. 
 
6. Design a system to allocate central funding through competitive bids (versus 
grants) and leverage foreign capital.   
In terms of the existing industry structure, in late 1985, the Ministry of the Electronics 
Industry officially divested its enterprises and “relinquished control over the day-to-day 
management.”143  This resulted in the central government and the ministry having less direct 
control.  Around this same time, enterprises were encouraged to engage in the newly 
emerging technology markets, as discussed in Section 2.42 under New S&T Policies and S&T 
Outcomes.  Then, in early 1987, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry undertook another 
major reform that effectively separated industry planning and policy-making from enterprise 
management.  Under this reform, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry established five 
                                                        
142 Simon, Innovation, 62-65. 




product-related bureaus to set macro-level policies.  Each bureau was responsible for a 
number of research institutes and factories, but the bureaus would not directly manage the 
activities of their units, see Figure Three.144  The Leading Group for the Revitalization of the 
Electronics Industry, its proposed strategies, and the Ministry of the Electronics Industry’s 
divestiture all had direct effects on the semiconductor industry 
2.43b  Semiconductor Industry Reform 
 
From its formation in 1982, State Council Leading Group for the Revitalization of 
Electronics [Industry] discussed strategies and reforms specific to the semiconductor industry.  
Wang Yangyuan recalls a policy called “Control Fragmentation and Control Chaos” (zhi san, 
zhi luan 治散, 治乱).  This strategy referred to the prevailing sense among semiconductor 
industry leaders that the industry was “fragmented” due to having too many organizations and 
“chaotic” because the organizations were not effectively coordinating nor technologically 
upgrading.  The “Control Fragmentation and Control Chaos” strategy was discussed while 
semiconductor investment funds for upgraded equipment were being dispersed to 33 different 
factories with few results.  In the ensuing years, the leading group would propose and fund 
semiconductor strategies and projects that were increasingly focused on technologically 
upgrading just a few enterprises or sites, rather than dispersing funds across thirty plus 
enterprises.  As a start, in 1983 the leading group proposed the policy of “Build Two Bases 
(North and South) and One Point” (jianli nan bei liang ge jidi he yi ge dian 建立南北两个基地和一
个点).145  
                                                        
144 Ibid., 52-55, 152.   The bureaus were: 1) communication, broadcast, and television, 2) microelectronics, 3) 
systems engineering, 4) electronic devices and components, and 5) computer and information industry. 
145 China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA), “Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye de Huigu yu 
Zhanwang 中国集成电路产业的回顾与展望 (Review and Prospects of China’s IC Industry),” document 





Figure 3: China's Electronics Industry, Circa 1986 
** Simon notes that in 1985, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry oversaw some 2600 production units and 130 research institutes. 
*   In 1988, the State Machine Building Commission and the Ministry of the Electronics Industry merged to form the Ministry of Machine Building and 
Electronics Industry. 
Source: Denis Simon, Technological Innovation, page 54, from China's Ministry of the Electronics Industry, Beijing, July 1987. 
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The South Base would cover Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, while the North Base 
would cover Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenyang.  The Point was to be the city of Xian, which 
would be devoted to aerospace-related work.  The idea was that the bases would be 
concentrated geographic areas wherein enterprises could more effectively share human and 
material resources and could develop semiconductor industry chains, i.e., supply chains, thus 
ultimately upgrading the whole industry’s capabilities. 
Indeed, the leading group’s 1985 document, “The Strategy for the Development of 
China’s Electronics and Information Industries,” prioritized the semiconductor industry due to 
its importance in military products, computers, and infrastructure.  The group also put special 
emphasis on increasing China’s production of consumer-oriented electronic products.  This 
emphasis furthered the need for electrical components and semiconductors, which are needed 
to produce consumer electronics products such as radios and televisions.  In the mid 1980s, 
however, China’s components and semiconductors were low quality relative to imported 
semiconductors.  Thus, the leading group was doubly committed to improving the production 
quality of Chinese components and semiconductors,146 as semiconductors were needed for the 
military and infrastructure but also for consumer products. 
From 1985, the leading group held two conferences specifically for defining strategies 
for China’s semiconductor industry.  The first conference was held in November of 1986 in 
Xiamen.  One major outcome of this conference was the official agreement on the “2 Bases, 1 
Point” strategy discussed above.  Industry leaders were increasingly aware of the benefits of 
industry spatial concentration, such as was occurring in Silicon Valley in the United States but 
also in Japan and Taiwan.  The old view was that spatial concentration of industrial activity 
                                                        




was dangerous for China’s national security.  More generally, Chinese officials were 
emphasizing the development of China’s east coast, so the 2 Bases, 1 Point strategy aligned 
with the new acceptance of industry spatial concentration as well as the priority on east coast 
development.147  The other significant outcome of this first conference was the “5-3-1” 
strategy which suggested that many of China’s state-owned semiconductor enterprises should 
be using 5 micron technology, a few leading enterprises should begin using 3 micron 
technology, and a “technical attack” should be launched to pursue 1 micron technology.148 
Shortly thereafter, in 1986, the State Council also adopted four preferential policies 
specifically for the semiconductor industry, which according to Yu Xiekang,149 stimulated the 
industry until the early 1990s.  These included: 1) the government would extract less capital 
from enterprises, 2) imported equipment would be exempt from tariffs for major, approved 
projects, 3) enterprises would be exempt from value-added tax, and 4) enterprises would pay 
only half of their income tax.  However, general industry tax reforms in the early 1990s 
overrode and essentially de-activated these semiconductor-friendly tax policies. 
In 1989, the leading group held a second strategic conference in Wuxi.  The outcome 
of this conference was a multi-pronged strategy for 1989-1995, which included: 1) accelerate 
the establishment of the 2 Bases, 2) achieve scale production, and 3) enhance R&D and 
                                                        
147 Simon, Innovation, 133-134.  Simon mentions that officials discussed developing four semiconductor 
industry bases in China, but it seems that the ultimate decision was to develop two bases. 
148 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 292 and 331.  Also, Yu Zhongyu, “China’s IC 
Industry, the Status Quo and Future,” a presentation delivered at Stanford University, 2005. 
149 Yu Xiekang 于燮康 (General Manager of JCET, former General Manager of Huajing), “Shenhua he Wanshan 
Jichengdianlu Chanye Zhengce, Tuijin Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Chixu Wending Fazhan 深化和完善集
成电路产业政策, 推进我国集成电路产业持续稳定发展 (Deepen and Perfect Policies for IC Industry, 
Promote the Sustainable Development of China’s IC Industry),” Bandaoti Hangye 半导体行业 




develop special-purpose semiconductors.  Perhaps most importantly, the conference also 
resulted in the agreement to allocate RMB 5 billion (about US$600 million) for the 2 Bases 
and for five “key” semiconductor enterprises, to augment their capabilities with foreign 
equipment.150  The goal was for the five key enterprises to produce high enough quality 
components and semiconductors to meet more than 60 percent of China’s domestic sales 
volume by 1995.   The key semiconductor enterprises were formed in 1988 and 1989 from 
existing factories and institutes; in some cases several existing factories were combined into a 
new key enterprise.  Each of these five enterprises had significant scale, and all still exist 
today in 2012.   (See Chapter Four for more details on these key enterprises.)  Figure Four 
shows the five key enterprises and their capabilities.151   
Finally, in October of 1990, as an outgrowth of the second strategy conference in 
Wuxi, the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry152 together with the State 
Planning Commission held a symposium in Beijing with leading semiconductor experts.  
Ultimately, this group sent a report to China’s Central Party Committee advocating Project 
908, which sought to establish China’s first world-class I.D.M. at Wuxi’s #742 Factory, soon 
to be renamed Huajing.153  Huajing would in effect be the site for launching the 
                                                        
150 Yu Zhongyu, “China’s IC Industry, the Status Quo and Future,” a presentation delivered at Stanford 
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阶段 (The Industry’s Formative Stage),” Qinghua University paper, circa 2005.  Chen notes that RMB 2.5 
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 “technical attack” for 1 micron technology, per the 5-3-1 strategy. 
2.43c  Implementation of Reforms 
 
“There was a peaceful transformation of the industry, not a war.  Just reform 
the structure piece by piece.  Some pieces were closed, some went with a (Sino-
foreign) joint venture, and some went private.  The emphasis was on 
transforming from government orientation to market orientation, following the 
ideas of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.”154 
Xu Guochang, 
Director of the Shanghai IC Industry Association, recalling the 1980s. 
 
The electronics industry moved away from central planning and toward increased market 
activity in the same timeframe as other industries in China.  Barry Naughton’s Growing Out 
of the Plan (1995) shows that, from 1979, China’s State Council increasingly allowed certain 
industries and enterprises to produce for China’s emerging markets after meeting their 
assigned -- and declining -- production quotas per central and local plans.  During this time, 
Chinese authorities allowed “dual-track pricing” in a number of industries.  Under dual-track 
pricing, prices for inputs and outputs under the plan were set by the planning authorities, and 
prices for inputs and outputs in the still-developing markets could fluctuate,155 
with market prices usually being higher than “plan” prices.  That said, at that time, China’s 
new market prices were not like the market prices of fully developed market economies, due 
to non-market input pricing and other (non-market) economic policies and practices.156 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
headquarters in Wuxi.  ETEK was founded by a former Vice General Manager at Huajing and other former 
Huajing personnel.   
154 Interview with Xu Guochang, June 17, 2009, at the Shanghai IC Industry Association. 
155 Qimao Fan, “State-owned Enterprise Reform in China: Incentives and Environment” in China’s Economic 
Reforms, editors Qimao Fan and Peter Nolan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pages 140-145.  Until 
1985, market prices were only allowed to fluctuate within a given range. 





Figure 4: China's Five Key Semiconductor Enterprises
Five Key Enterprises Founded Prior Enterprises Joining 






Production in 1995 Staff in 2000* 
Products and 
Market* 
Huajing/CSMC           
(Project 908) 




CSMC of Hong Kong, with 
Taiwan Mgmt 
Jiangsu, Wuxi  2, 3, 5 micron           
4 inch line: 140,000 
units/yr          5 inch 






bipolar and CMOS ICs, 
primarily for TVs and 
audio equip, per IEEE 
1995 
Huayue 1988 #871 Factory 
(Gansu and 
Shaoxing branch) 




 3, 5 micron             
3 inch line: 120,000 
units/yr          4 inch 
line: 60,000 units/yr 
 a candidate for Project 
908 in 1990; analog 
devices and bipolar ICs 
for TVs and phones 











Shanghai Bell Telephone 
Equipment Mfg Co, which was a 
joint venture with Alcatel Bell of 
Belgium 
Shanghai US$82.4 m 2.4, 5 micron           







ICs for Shanghai Bell 
Telephone, the first 
switch-maker to use 
locally made circuits, 





name Shanghai Xianjin, 
formerly known as 
Shanghai-Philips. 
1988 #5 and #7 and #19 
Factories 
(Shanghai) 
Philips of the Netherlands (Also 
Nortal of Canada from appprox 
1995-2000) 
Shanghai  3 micron               




began as a foundry; 
Philips transferred 
older tech and 
producing for export 
Shougang-NEC 1991 Beijing Shougang 
Gongtie (Capital 
Steel) 
NEC (Nippon Electric Company) 
of Japan 
Beijing US$240 m 1.2, 1.5 micron          




color TVs, air 
conditioners, VCDs, IC 
cards, clocks, palm PCs
This chart is compiled from the following sources: 
1) Interview with Zhou Weiping, July 15, 2009, at ASMC headquarters in Shanghai.  Zhou is C.E.O. of ASMC and a former General Manager of Shanghai Belling. 
2) Zhu Yiwei 朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji 中国集成电路产业发展:  (China’s IC Industry Development: Collected Works), Beijing: Xinshidai 新时代出版社 (New Times Press), 2006, 
pages 162 and 164. 
3) Wang Yangyuan and Wang Yongwen 王阳元 and 王永文, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhilu: cong Xiaofei Daguo Zouxiang Chanye Qiangguo 我国集成电路产业发展之路：从消费大国走向产业强国 
(China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development Path: From a Big, Consuming Nation to a Strong, Industrial Nation),  Kexue Chubanshe 科学出版社 (Science Press), 2008, page 294. 
4) iSupply, “Semiconductor Wafer Manufacturing in China: A Panacea or a Global Investment Trap?,” Q3, 2002, page 11. 





  Nonetheless, according to Qimao Fan’s research in the late 1980s, dual-track pricing 
“brought about a substantial reduction in the scope of central planning and expansion in the 
role of market mechanisms,” and the timing of this national trend away from central planning 
and toward market activity accords with changes in the electronics industry.  
After the Ministry of the Electronics Industry’s divestment in 1985, enterprise 
managers in the electronics industry were entrusted with day-to-day management, and 
research suggests that managers were making more decisions for out-of-plan production.  As 
Chapter Three will detail, managers at Wuxi’s 742 Factory, an officially favored site, faced 
new decisions about which products to produce in the 1980s, as they sought to meet China’s 
growing market for consumer electronics products.  In 1986, the managers at Wuxi’s #742 
Factory were “serving the market (zai wei shichang fuwu de guocheng zhong 在为市场服务
的过程中)…by “fully organizing and using all aspects of information (chongfen de cuoqu 
zuzhi he liyong cong ge fangmian xinxi qingbao 充分地措取, 组织和利用从各方面信息情
报)”…to decide what to produce for the…“competitive market (shichang jingzheng 市场竞
争)”.157  Also, interviews with electronics enterprise managers by Jonathan Pollack in 1984 
and 1985 suggest that enterprises had the discretion to produce for the market, after meeting 
plan quotas, although electronics enterprises varied widely in their ability and willingness to 
                                                        
157 Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying 
Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan 




enter the market.158  Similarly, Simon (1988) interviewed a source at a leading Shanghai 
semiconductor factory in 1985, and this interviewee explained that in 1984 about half of the 
factory’s work was “received…from the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, the State S&T 
Commission, and the Shanghai Bureau for Electronics and Instrumentation.”  However, the 
source said that by 1985, about ninety percent of this factory’s work was “self-initiated.”159  
Thus by the mid to late 1980s, electronics enterprises seem to have indeed been making 
production decisions outside the dictates of central and local planning authorities, with the 
more advanced and favored factories being more likely to produce for the market.160   
The transition away from central planning was gradual, but it presented a number of 
difficulties for the both “retained” and the “released” factories.  Retained factories attempted 
to adopt China’s new and evolving “contract management responsibility system” (CMRS), 
which had been implemented in state-owned enterprises across industries since the early 
1980s.  By late 1988, some version of the CMRS covered about seventy percent of China’s 
state-owned enterprises.161  The intention of this system was to remove central-level ministry 
officials from daily enterprise management and to make enterprises more market oriented and 
responsible for their profits and losses.  Enterprises could keep their profits, but they had to 
                                                        
158 Pollack, The Chinese Electronics Industry, pages 40-53.  Pollack categorized factories by their level of 
technology, productivity and market-orientation.  He identified five categories: 1) the “dinosaurs,” with very 
low productivity, 2) the “whatever-ists” which conservatively follow “whatever” policy makers say, 3) the 
“incremental-ists” that cautiously adopt new practices and technology, 4) the “favored few” showcase 
factories with more resources, newer organizations, and younger managers, and 5) the “entrepreneurs,” 
favored factories that were also quickly creating and seizing new technical and market opportunities. 
159 Simon, Innovation, 148.  
160 Central planning was being phased out, but local authorities also had input to production decisions through 
“guidance planning,” which ostensibly did not entail compulsory production targets.  See Barry Naughton, 
Growing Out of the Plan, page 221. 
161 Derong Chen, Chinese Firms Between Hierarchy and Market: the Contract Management Responsibility 
System in China (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).  The system was originally called the “economic 




remit a portion of profits to the state as tax.  Under the CMRS, an enterprise would negotiate 
and sign a contract with its central ministry (or municipal ministry, etc.); the contract would 
specify how much profit (i.e., revenue or tax) the enterprise would remit as well as other 
enterprise performance measures, such as dividends paid, total wage costs, and technological 
upgrades.  However, according to DeRong Chen and Barry Naughton,162 China’s CMRS had 
serious structural problems, and it was ultimately phased out in 1995.  Under the CMRS, the 
government’s central-level ministries still owned the enterprises, but at the same time, the 
government was the tax collector and regulator of these enterprises.  If an enterprise’s profit 
was lower than anticipated, then the government might not hold the enterprise accountable for 
its contracted tax bill or the enterprise might re-negotiate its contract.  This system, thus, was 
in contrast to a uniform, non-negotiable, modern income tax system.163  As a result of the 
CMRS, enterprises still had so-called soft budgets, and government revenues were lower than 
expected under the often re-negotiated contracts.  Perhaps most importantly, although 
enterprises adopted the CMRS, China’s hierarchal and complex industry structures remained 
in place.164  
For retained semiconductor enterprises, the intention of the CRMS was ostensibly to 
devolve control from the central to the enterprise level, but Simon (1988) suggests that in the 
                                                        
162 For more on CMRS and other enterprise reform measures, see Chen, Chinese Firms, and Naughton, Growing 
Out of the Plan. 
163 In the mid 1980s, in addition to the CMRS, the government also began collecting revenue from state-owned 
enterprises through a new income tax system.  This system evolved during the 1980s.  See Nicholas Lardy, 
China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), pages 22-24 and 
183-184; Fan, “State-owned Enterprise Reform,” pages 145-149; and Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li , 
The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
1996), pages 138-144.                                                                                                                                                                             
164 For more on this system, see Derong Chen, Chinese Firms Between Hierarchy and Market: the Contract 




semiconductor industry in the 1980s “dual leadership” (shuangzhong lingdao 双重领导) of 
factories by central and local officials was still in play.165  The adage of “your old boss is still 
your boss” remained relevant; individuals still sought to retain their professional relationships 
and networks for organizational and political reasons.   Enterprise managers were stymied in 
their decision-making and progress by multiple and unclear lines of authority.  The problem 
of tiao-tiao, kuai-kuai (条条块块) remained; tiao referred to the vertical authority of the 
central ministries, and kuai referred to the horizontal authority of provincial or local officials.  
At the time, Simon reported that “It is often difficult for Chinese as well as foreigners to know 
who has authority or responsibility for making various decisions about setting priorities, 
sourcing and pricing inputs, managing particular projects, or initiating relationships between 
R&D units and potential end-users.”  From his study of electronics enterprises in Shanghai in 
the mid 1980s, Simon noted that only about half of the enterprises were making any decisions 
locally, and, of these enterprises, only about half of their decisions were made locally.166  
Finally, the effort to place enterprise management at the enterprise level was likely stymied in 
part because enterprise managers genuinely did not understand new practices and expectations, 
including the CMRS.167  Certainly, the CMRS was not a cure-all for the low productivity and 
lack of market orientation of state-owned enterprises. 168 
                                                        
165 Simon, Innovation, 55. 
166 Ibid., 56 and 153-154.  
167 Ibid., 52-53 and 154. 
168 Pollack, The Chinese Electronics Industry.  In 1984/5 before CMRS was widely implemented, Jonathan 
Pollack interviewed electronics enterprise managers in China, and -- not surprisingly -- he found Chinese 
mangers to still have attitudes and practices that reflected of a central planning environment.  For example, he 
cites one interview in which an enterprise manager explained that his factory met its annual “quota” by 




Factories that were released faced their own difficulties.  Ministries and commissions 
released a number of their electronics and semiconductor factories over a period of years in 
the 1980s and into the 1990s.  While in the process of being released, factories often operated 
in an ambiguous zone because release was usually gradual, e.g., funding would be reduced 
over time, and releasing could affect part but not all of an enterprise.  For example, at 
Shanghai’s #14 Factory, an important electronics component factory, part of the organization 
was merged into the new Shanghai Belling, one of China’s new “key” semiconductor 
enterprises (see Section 2.43 under Semiconductor Industry Reform).  Meanwhile, another 
part of Shanghai’s #14 Factory was fully released.169  In addition, both officials and enterprise 
managers had reasons to resist the process of releasing.  Some managers and officials did not 
want to lose their best personnel to outside organizations, and some feared the influence of 
newly released, roving technical personnel.  After all, the loss of technical personnel might 
diminish an organization’s ability to achieve its goals, and technical personnel working in 
new organizations might in some way hinder the state’s goals.170 
Although the Ministry of the Electronics Industry’s divested its enterprises in 1985, 
even into the 1990s after divestiture and other reforms were well underway, the national 
electronics and semiconductor industry structures remained in place under the Ministry of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
manager replied that he meant to say “orders.”  Yet, after having fulfilled his orders in October, the manager 
had no plans to use the remainder of the year for more production nor to experiment with new products.  
Pollack generally found many electronics enterprise managers at that time to be attuned to the industry 
hierarchy, uninformed about their cost structure (and thus cost/price differentials), risk averse, and lacking a 
sense of urgency. 
169 Interview with Professor Yang, June 8, 2009, Shanghai.  Prof. Yang worked in a Fudan University 
semiconductor-related research institute and later started a technology company with foreign partners. 




Machine Building and Electronics Industry.171  Why?  As this chapter has shown, Chinese 
officials viewed the semiconductor industry as a high-tech national imperative, and their plans 
for the semiconductor industry demonstrate that they believed that continued oversight, 
planning and careful use of resources was the best path, at least at that time, to quickly 
upgrade the industry’s technical capabilities.  None of the stated plans for the semiconductor 
industry rebuked state ownership and state planning.  Officials opted to release many 
institutes and factories, but they retained much of the national industry structure and sought to 
upgrade the industry’s technological capability through plans such as 5-3-1 Strategy discussed 
above, Project 908 (detailed in Chapter Three), and New Industry Guidance Mechanisms 
discussed below. 
The national industry hierarchy continued to influence both retained and released 
semiconductor enterprises in the 1990s.  For example, in the 1990s, mangers of retained 
enterprises had to get multiple permissions for actions such as establishing foreign 
partnerships,172 and in Chapters Three and Four, we will see that even the highest priority 
state sponsored semiconductor project of China’s eighth five year plan encountered funding 
delays, permission and approval delays and other problems that were endemic to China’s 
state-owned enterprises.173  On the positive side, however, in the 1990s, the Chinese 
                                                        
171 The Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry was formed in 1988 as the result of a merger 
between the Ministry of the Electronics Industry and the State Machine Building Commission. 
172 Interview with Yu Xiekang, June 2, 2009, JCET headquarters in Jiangsu province.  Yu talked about Huajing’s 
experience trying to develop a partnership with Intel to no avail, due to permission delays and disputes.  Also, 
see Zhong Fu 中福, “Huajing Xingban Hezi Gongsi Jinjun Nanfang Shichang华晶兴办合资公司进军南方
市 (Huajing Establishes a Joint Venture to Expand into the Southern Market),” Weidianzi Jishu 微电子技术
(Microelectronics Technology), May, 1994.  This article says that Huajing did establish several joint ventures 
in southern China in the early 1990s to make and distribute semiconductor products with Hong Kong entities.  
These joint ventures served both the domestic and foreign markets. 




government was able to provide funding to establish China’s five key semiconductor 
enterprises, providing the high level of capital to build and operate semiconductor facilities.   
And capital costs were indeed high: from 1980 to 1990, the cost to build a semiconductor 
fabrication facility174 increased fourfold, and this rate of cost increase continued between 
1990 and 2000.175  In the 1980s and into the 1990s, China’s emerging private and non-
governmental semiconductor-related enterprises did not have access to this level of capital.176  
Finally, the national industry hierarchy continued to influence even nominally released 
enterprises.  These enterprises operated in China’s still-reforming economy, and thus faced 
various government dictates such as what portion of their production could be exported versus 
sold in the domestic market.177  
Further, the wave of releasing had little real effect on semiconductor professionals’ 
career options in the 1980s.  For new college graduates, the state assigned jobs through the 
early 1980s, and by the mid 1980s, the state still assigned jobs for many graduates, although 
graduates could try to find jobs on their own by using their relationships (guanxi关系), 
usually with their university professors or family.  In the electronics and semiconductor 
industries, it was not until the 1990s that new graduates largely found jobs on their own, most 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Forging Reform in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Naughton, Growing Out of the 
Plan; Lin, Cai, and Li , The China Miracle; Pollack, The Chinese Electronics Industry. 
174 A “fab” is a fabrication facility, also called a foundry, which is a manufacturing facility for semiconductors. 
175 KLA Tencor Corporation for the US-Taiwan Business Council, “Addressing the Rising Challenges of 
Semiconductor Manufacturing,” presented at the Taiwan-China Semiconductor Industry Outlook Conference, 
see www.us-taiwan.org. 
176 As noted in Section 2.42 under S&T Outcomes, China nationalized its banking and finance system in the 
1950s, and thus in the 1980s, new private and non-governmental enterprises in China did not have formal, 
private financial institutions and markets from which to seek investment capital. 
177 Interview with Yu Zhongyu, July 2, 2009, at China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) headquarters 




relying on guanxi.  Networks of alumni from China’s leading science and engineering 
universities could be found in both state-owned enterprises and in the new so-called private 
and non-governmental enterprises, (defined in Section 2.42 under S&T Outcomes), due to the 
prevalent use of guanxi for job placements.  For example, in semiconductor enterprises in and 
around Wuxi, many personnel are alumni of the University of Electronic Science and 
Technology in Chengdu (dianzi keji daxue电子科技大学)178 or Southeast University 
(dongnan daxue东南大学) in Nanjing.179  In the 1990s, most new graduates still sought jobs 
with state-owned enterprises, although increasingly new graduates could also find positions in 
Sino-foreign joint ventures and in the new private and non-governmental enterprises. 
A main goal of releasing institutes was to free up mid-career scientific staff to join 
production enterprises and thus to bridge the historical gap between research and production.  
For scientists and engineers who were released and thus had to involuntarily change jobs, 
important destinations were China’s new key state-owned semiconductor enterprises,180 Sino-
foreign joint ventures, and the new private and non-governmental enterprises.  However, for 
these job seekers, there was little financial benefit in changing jobs in the 1980s and even into 
the 1990s, as the pay was usually the same across different types of organizations.  Only from 
perhaps the late 1990s could science and engineering personnel find meaningful pay 
                                                        
178 The University of Electronic Science and Technology in Chengdu offers degrees in all the key disciplines in 
electronic and information sciences.  It was formerly called the Chengdu Institute of Telecommunication 
Engineering (chengdu dianxun gongcheng xueyuan 成都电讯工程学院). 
179 Southeast University is currently a comprehensive university with leading engineering and science programs.  
It was called the Nanjing Institute of Technology from 1952 until it was renamed Southeast University in 
1988. 
180 The five key enterprises were Huajing, Huayue, Shanghai Belling, ASMC-Philips, and Shougang-NEC; see 





differentials between different organizations and between the growing number of ownership 
categories available by the late 1990s, e.g., state-owned, joint venture, multi-national 
company, Chinese private, etc.181 
The implementation of reforms to China’s state-owned semiconductor industry was 
indeed, as Xu Guochang put it, “piece by piece…from government orientation to market 
orientation.”182  This section covered key aspects of implementation, i.e., the transition from 
central planning to market activity, new management practices for state-owned enterprises 
(such as the CMRS), the continued role of the national industry structure, and gradual changes 
in semiconductor professionals career patterns.  In each of these areas, this section has shown 
that, despite changes, aspects of the centrally planned, state-owned industry continued.  Thus, 
the following section examines the particular new state-sponsored mechanisms that officials 
devised to guide the semiconductor industry’s ongoing technological upgrading.    
 
New Industry Guidance Mechanisms 
While reforming the centrally planned semiconductor industry, officials at the 
Ministry of the Electronics Industry established several new mechanisms to support and guide 
the industry.  Importantly, almost all of these mechanisms aimed to advance specific 
semiconductor-related technologies.  The following outline highlights the new industry 
guidance methods, all of which remained in place as of 2009, except for two (noted below), 
which had by 2009 been restructured or disbanded. 
                                                        
181 The rise of these ownership categories is covered in more detail in Chapters Five. 




• Circa 1980: the Ministry of the Electronics Industry set up the Office of 5 Micron 
Technology Promotion to assist the whole industry in adopting 5 micron process 
technology.183 (Restructured by 2009.) 
• 1984: Shanghai officials identified the Caohejing area as a site for high technology 
zone that would center on microelectronics.  In the mid 1980s, there was some 
dispute whether this zone was to be funded by Shanghai or the central 
government,184 and meanwhile the Ministry of the Electronics Industry was 
investing in Wuxi’s #742 Factory.  Nonetheless, from 1995, the Caohejing High 
Technology Park would be the site for Project 909 and SMIC (see Section 2.5.)185 
• From 1985: National Engineering Research Centers were established with over 70 
established by 1995.  Of those, RMB 1.7 billion was invested in 34 centers that 
focused on microelectronics, software, telecommunications, automation, and other 
electronic technologies.186  These centers were under the Chinese Academy of 
Science. 
• 1986: The State Council decided to provide funds each year to the Ministry of the 
Electronics Industry in order for the Ministry to establish the Electronic Industry 
Development Fund (dianzi fazhan zhuanyong zijin电子发展专用资金).  In its 
first 20 years, the fund awarded almost RMB 4 billion to improve existing 
enterprises’ R&D capabilities in targeted technologies.187 
• 1986: The 863 I.C. Specialist Project was established as part of the broader, 
national 863 Program, a.k.a. The National High Technology R&D Program, which 
is still in place today.  In the 863 Program, expert committees in Beijing establish 
research priorities, and organizations apply (compete) for funding from the 863 
Program to pursue advances in specific technological area, such as SoC.188 If 
awarded funding, the expert committee periodically checks project milestones.189  
The 863 Program is under the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
                                                        
183 Yu Xiekang 于燮康 (General Manager of JCET, former General Manager of Huajing), “Shenhua he Wanshan 
Jichengdianlu Chanye Zhengce, Tuijin Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Chixu Wending Fazhan 深化和完善
集成电路产业政策, 推进我国集成电路产业持续稳定发展 (Deepen and Perfect Policies for IC Industry, 
Promote the Sustainable Development of China’s IC Industry), Bandaoti Hangye 半导体行业 
(Semiconductor Industry),  August, 2008 
184 Simon, Innovation, 136-138. 
185 In 1985, Jiang Zemin, future President of the PRC (1993 to 2003) and Minister of the Electronics Industry 
from 1983, was appointed as mayor of Shanghai. 
186 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 332. 
187 Ibid., 333. 
188 SoC is “system on a chip,” which refers to an important technological advance in integrated circuits.  In SoC, 
all the components of a computer are integrated onto a single chip. 




• From 1985-1995: Central-level I.C.C.A.D. and I.C.C.A.T. specialist committees 
were established as part of the national science and technology R&D program to 
guide semiconductor-related R&D programs and projects.  From 1990, these 
committees introduced a new “rolling” mechanism for project proposals, 
investment, and testing.  In this system, every four months, new projects are 
proposed and potentially funded.  The progress of funded projects is checked at 
regular intervals.190   
• Late 1980s: the Ministry of the Electronics Industry established the “Import Check 
Office” to ensure that semiconductor products that could be made with acceptable 
quality in China were not being imported.191  (Restructured by 2009.) 
 
Also, in 1990, a new national organization was formed that would play a leading role 
in supporting the semiconductor industry in the years to come.  In December of 1990, Chinese 
semiconductor industry leaders established the China Semiconductor Industry Association 
(CSIA).  A few industry leaders had been talking about forming some kind of industry 
leadership group since 1987, and by 1989 they formed an association.192  Once officially 
recognized in late 1990, the CSIA sought to function similarly to existing semiconductor 
industry associations in other countries, such as the SIA in the United States and TSIA in 
Taiwan.  The CSIA would also serve in China as an important national organization to guide, 
support, and unify existing and emerging actors in the semiconductor industry.  The CSIA’s 
leadership consisted of senior industry executives and industry (government) officials.  From 
                                                        
190 Ibid., 331-332. 
191 Yu Xiekang 于燮康 (General Manager of JCET, former General Manager of Huajing), “Gongtong de Lixiang, 
Gongtong de Fendou, Gongtong de Shouhuo—Jiangsusheng  Jichengdianlu Chanye Kechixu Fazhan de 
Licheng yu Tansuo 共同的理想，共同的奋斗，共同的收获 --- 江苏省集成电路产业可持续发展的历程
与探索 (Common Ideal, Common Striving, Common Achievement – The History of Sustainable 
Development in the Jiangsu Province IC Industry),” Baodaoti Hangye 半导体行业 (Semiconductor Industry), 
December 7, 2008. 
192 Yu Xiekang interview.  According to Yu, the original group that sought to form an association consisted of 
individuals from several groups including: 中国电子器件总公司 (China Electronic Device Company), 微电
子发展研究中心 (Microelectronics Industry Development Research Center), 集成电路联合组成半导体情




its inception, the CSIA sought to recruit voluntary membership from semiconductor 
organizations in China, regardless of ownership type.193  According to the CSIA, the 
organization’s role was (and still is) to: 
• Help government officials to formulate policies and to communicate 
 policies to enterprises 
• “Build bridges” between enterprises and government 
• Regularly collect and publish industry data and statistics 
• Sponsor conferences, seminars, and exhibitions 
• Provide advisory services to semiconductor enterprises 
• Promote global integration 
• Protect and advise member firms on legal matters including intellectual 
property and trade issues 
Indeed, by the 2000s, the CSIA was taking the lead in all these areas, and was the 
most common Chinese source, along with CCID,194 for semiconductor industry data.  
Semiconductor industry conferences, exhibits, and the like were sponsored and run by CSIA 
branches.  For example, at conferences, the Ministry of Information Industries (formerly 
called the Ministry of the Electronics Industry) would typically be one of several sponsoring 
organizations, but the CSIA seemed to take the lead role in organizing such activities.  Many 
top executives in the industry have served in leadership roles in the CSIA, as the CSIA 
formed numerous branch organizations and committees, giving industry leaders many 
opportunities to participate.  CSIA sub-organizations included the “Semiconductor Integrated 
Circuit Design Branch,” “Semiconductor Supporting Sector Branch,”  “Intellectual Property 
                                                        
193 CSIA, “History of the CSIA,” a paper provided by Yu Zhongyu (President of the CSIA) at the CSIA 
headquarters on July 2, 2009.  The date of the paper’s origin is not shown. 
194 CCID was established in 1986 as the information research group for the Ministry of Electronics 
Industry. From 2002 known as CCID Consulting, CCID Consulting is a publicly listed research and 




and Product Innovation Working Committee,” and the “Environment, Safety, and Health 
Working Committee,” among others.195 
From the mid 1980s, each of the new mechanisms outlined above began to 
significantly augment the national industry hierarchy in terms of setting priorities and policies, 
channeling funding, and generally supporting technological as well as commercial advances 
in the industry.  While these mechanisms show the state’s ongoing role in technologically 
upgrading industry, it is interesting to note that none of the newly defined guidance 
mechanisms in the mid to late 1980s sought to guide trade or further state ownership of new 
enterprises.   
 
Decision Making: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
A key component of central planning and state-owned industries is the seeming top-
down, centralized nature of decision making.  However, even under central planning, local 
enterprise managers supplied central planning authorities with estimates of their input needs 
and output capabilities, and central and local economic plans were based on this bottom-up 
input.  As China’s electronics and semiconductor industries were reformed in the 1980s, input 
and decision-making at the enterprise level became ever more apparent and influential.  
Reflecting on the reforms of China’s semiconductor industry presented thus far, this section 
highlights processes that -- while still centralized -- made use of input from the enterprise 
level.  
In the 1980s the Ministry of the Electronics Industry made funds available to 33 
enterprises to import foreign equipment.  During this period, funding was allocated when 
                                                        




enterprise managers themselves made requests for funds in order to import equipment that 
they themselves identified.  Funds were not distributed to all factories nor were funds 
distributed equally, rather the distribution of funding was based on enterprise-level initiative.  
Through the allocation of this funding, certain enterprises began to emerge as more capable 
and favored.196   
Further, as several of the new industry guidance mechanisms outlined above suggest, 
enterprise level managers and scientists began to make requests to central level committees to 
get funding to pursue particular technical projects.  The national 863 Project, the Electronic 
Industry Development Fund, and the I.C.C.A.D. and I.C.C.A.T. specialist committees were all 
central organizations that published catalogs or lists of desired projects.  However, expert 
committees developed these catalogs, and the expert committees were made up of technical 
experts from around the country, not central officials.197  In addition to these mechanisms, 
enterprises could also appeal to their respective ministry, bureau or commission to seek funds 
and approval for self-initiated projects.  Writing in 1988, Simon found that “Over the last 
several years, the locus of project initiation has increasingly shifted from the central to the 
local level” and “the market has come to play a more critical role in stimulating locally 
                                                        
196 For more on these dynamics, see the interviews in Pollack’s The Chinese Electronics Industry.  Also, see 
Simon page 130-133.  Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing 
Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit 
of Huajing: Jiangnan State-owned Radio Equipment Factory),”  Liaowang 瞭望 (Outlook), Period 22, 1986.  
Also, as a later example from around 1999, according several interviewees, when state-owned enterprise 
Huajing was going through its restructuring (see Chapter Three), central government officials gave more 
power over Huajing to Jiangsu provincial officials.  However, Jiangsu officials “did not know what to do,” so 
they asked Wuxi city officials for help with decision making.  When Wuxi officials also “did not know what 
to do,” they asked Huajing’s managers to make decisions. 
197 Interview with Prof. Yang, June 8, 2009, Shanghai.  Prof. Yang worked in a Fudan University (semiconductor) 




initiated projects,”198 in addition to central strategies and priorities.   For example, one 
researcher who worked at a state-owned institute in the 1980s explained that his institute had 
its own expert committee of eleven individuals (including himself), and this group would 
approve projects.  This expert committee reported to the Shanghai Science and Technology 
Commission, which occasionally checked their progress on projects but otherwise “did not 
really interfere.”199 
Perhaps an even more important example of input and decision making coming from 
lower levels is found in the State Council Leading Group for the Revitalization of Electronics 
(guowuyuan dianzi zhenxing lingdao xiaozu 国务院电子振兴领导小组), which was 
introduced early in Section 2.33.  Recall, this group originated in 1982 and was led by Vice 
Premier Wan Li and later Premier Li Peng.  According to Simon (1988), this leading group 
consisted of three tiers.  The first tier had officials from five of China’s top ministries and 
commissions, while the second tier had fifteen members from leading electronics-related 
organizations.  The third and lowest tier consisted of twenty permanent members divided into 
four specialties (integrated circuits, software, etc.), with a ten to fifteen person advisory group 
(in effect, a fourth tier) for each specialty.  The advisory groups were made up of technical 
experts from all over China, and it was these “lowest” groups who actually developed the 
policy recommendations.200  
                                                        
198 Simon, Innovation, 124.   
199 Interview with Li Weide, June 4, 2009, Shanghai.  Li was formerly a semiconductor scientist with a state 
institute. 




This Section 2.43 has assessed the extensive reforms to China’s centrally planned 
electronics and semiconductor industries, including new industry guidance mechanisms and 
shifts in the loci of decision-making.  At the end of the 1980s, the national industry structure 
remained in place, but semiconductor industry officials began to use the new semiconductor 
industry strategies and the new guidance mechanisms to promote technological advances in 
the industry. 
 
2.5  1990s: Major State-sponsored Projects (908, 909, and SMIC) and Global Integration 
In the 1970s through most of the 1990s, the global semiconductor industry was 
characterized by vertical integration, that is, the growing demand for semiconductors was met 
by integrated device manufacturers (I.D.M.s) such as Texas Instruments of the United States, 
Toshiba of Japan, and Samsung of Korea.  I.D.M.s do design, fabrication (production), and 
packaging/assembly/testing (P.A.T.), which are the three major steps in the creation of 
semiconductors.201  As China pursued reforms to its state-owned semiconductor industry in 
the 1980s, Chinese officials hoped to establish a successful, high technology I.D.M. in 
China.202  
Section 2.43, Semiconductor Industry Reforms, noted that the final major 
semiconductor reform proposal coming out of the 1980s was a report by semiconductor 
experts to the Central Party Committee in 1990.  The report advocated that the central 
                                                        
201 The major exception to the I.D.M. norm was the advent in 1987 of the “foundry model” by the Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC).  China’s adoption of the foundry model is covered in 
Chapters Three and Four.   
202 Here is an example of how semiconductor I.D.M.s and other types of technologies companies work together.  
In the case of a personal computer, IBM designs a computer, buying the semiconductors for the computer 





government sponsor Project 908, which sought to establish China’s first world-class I.D.M. at 
Wuxi’s #742 Factory, recently renamed Huajing.203  Huajing would launch China’s “technical 
attack” for 1micron technology, per the 5-3-1 strategy.  Ultimately, from the early 1990s 
through the early 2000s, the central Chinese government sponsored three major 
semiconductor projects in succession, beginning with Project 908 in Wuxi, followed by 
Project 909 and SMIC.  In each project, the government sponsored a particular enterprise with 
the goal of establishing a successful semiconductor enterprise in China that matched global 
technological standards for semiconductor production.  These projects are detailed in 
Chapters Three and Four.  Officials believed that establishing even one enterprise that was 
effectively using sophisticated production technologies would foster human resource 
development in China and spur the growth of other sectors in the semiconductor value chain, 
such as materials suppliers and equipment manufacturers.  Officials believed that such an 
enterprise would also allow global semiconductor executives to be confident about 
establishing advanced operations in China.  According to Yu Zhongyu,204 the enterprises that 
were part of these three projects (Huajing, Huahong of Project 909, and SMIC) were not 
meant to be “models” for future Chinese enterprises nor were they part of a grand, long-term 
plan to build a better state-led industry.  Rather they were just to be symbols or examples that 
advanced technologies and organizations could actually operate in China, despite China’s less 
than ideal environment, including a weak legal system and evolving trade policies.  China’s 
                                                        
203 China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA), “Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye de Huigu yu 
Zhanwang 中国集成电路产业的回顾与展望 (Review and Prospects of China’s IC Industry),” a document 
provided by WXICC in January of 2009. 
204 Interview with Yu Zhongyu, July 2, 2009 at CSIA headquarters in Beijing.  Yu is President of China 




market, i.e., the demand, for semiconductors was growing rapidly with the growth of China’s 
whole economy, and hopefully these enterprises would be able to partially supply this market, 
rather than having to rely almost entirely on imported semiconductors.   
The major semiconductor projects were also motivated by national defense.  In the 
Gulf War in 1991, the Chinese government saw the gap between Western defense technology, 
particularly in precision-guided weapons, and China’s capabilities.  The technology for such 
weapons was fundamentally at the level of the chip.  That said, the actual goals and 
technology of the projects were still far behind Western leading-edge technology, so the 
projects were not a direct or immediate attempt to catch-up in defense technology. 
 
Historical Ramifications of Projects 908, 909, and SMIC 
Despite the high hopes for these projects, industry personnel, both Chinese and foreign, 
point to their ineffectiveness, often commenting on wasted resources and lack of results.  If 
Project 908 is mentioned in written sources at all, it is mentioned only briefly and 
disparagingly.  Authors describe Project 908 as a loss-making, delayed, troubled project, 
saying other projects should “seek to avoid” its path.205  As one former Huajing employee 
                                                        
205 Gao Gaifang, "Project 908 Finale: Huarun’s Fat Hand Grabs Wuxi’s Huajing (908 gongcheng zhongjie pian: 
huarun fei zhang juequ wuxi huajing 908 工程终结篇: 华润肥掌攫取无锡华晶),” 21st Century Business 
Herald, September 4, 2003, wrote that Project 908 was a “deformed, malnourished child (shi yingyang 
buliang de jixinger 是营养不良的畸形儿)” and that the next big project, Project 909, sought to “avoid 
following Huajing’s path (bimian zou huajing de lu 避免走华晶的路),” noting that Huajing “in desperation 
had leased part of their equipment to Hong Kong CSMC semiconductor company (huajing jiang bufen shebei 
zu gei xianggang shanghua bandaoti gongsi华晶将部分设备租给香港上华半导体公司).”   In the article 
“Zaibao Huajing: Wuxi Gongye San Da Chongzu Jiedu zhi Yi 再造华晶: 无锡工业三大重组解读之一 
(Recycling Huajing: Three Interpretations of Wuxi’s Industrial Reorganization),” Wuxi Ribao 无锡日报 




explained “In the 1990s, …Huajing was the product of the planned economy [and].…it 
failed.”206  As for Project 909 and SMIC, Project 909 is often faulted for its long path to 
profitability, and SMIC was charged with intellectual property and trade secret theft as well as 
being suspected of inefficient operations and opaque business-government relationships.  
Yet, these projects and enterprises were the bridge between China’s former centrally 
planned, isolated, and technologically outdated semiconductor industry of the 1980s and 
China’s post-2000, globally linked industry.  These projects were sites for organizational and 
technological learning and change, despite operating in China’s not-entirely-open market and 
operating in China’s relatively un-reformed institutional environment of the 1990s.   Today, 
after significant change and growth in the industry, the three enterprises associated with these 
projects remain three of China’s five largest semiconductor enterprises.  Further, many 
                                                                                                                                                                             
了其中的苦涩)” …and that Huajing “got into trouble (xianru le kunjing陷入了困境)”…and had “huge 
losses (ju kui巨亏).”  In the article “The Nation’s Capital Investment, the Case of the Chip Industry: 
Huajing’s Silent Ending (guojia ziben touru xinpianye de gean: huajing de wuyan jieju 国家资本投入芯片
业的个案: 华晶的无言结局), 21st Century Business Herald, May 23, 2003, the author explained the 
outcome of Project 908 by writing that after “this line was built, all the contracted products were outdated, 
and none could be put into production (zhe tiao xian jiancheng, suoyoude hetong chanpin dou guoshi le, 
meiyou yi yang neng touru shengchan这条线建成，所有的合同产品都过时了，没有一样能投入生产).”  
The author was referring to the long approval and implementation timeline for Project 908, noting that, by the 
time the line was ready to run, 6 inch technology was no longer leading edge technology, although the author 
was apparently incorrect to write that “none could be put into production.”  Wen Yi, “The Pain of China’s 
Chip Manufacturing (zhongguo de xinpian zhizao zhi tong 中国的芯片制造之痛),” EEWorld (dianzi 
gongcheng shijie电子工程世界), September 9, 2008, begins with “Mention Project 908 and it will cause 
people to feel even more the pain of China’s chip industry.  This project was meant to bring an end to the 
difficulties of China’s chip industry from 1965 to 1990, but its result is that everyone is hopeless (tiji 
gongcheng, rang ren gengduo de gandao de shi zhongguo bandaoti chanye de tong. zhe xiang zhongguo 
weile dapo 1965 nian dao 1990 nian yilai zhongguo xinpian chanye kunjing de guojiaji gongcheng, qi jieguo 
que shi suoyou ren bu xiwang de提及工程， 让人更多的感到的是中国半导体产业的痛。这项中国为了
打破 1965年到 1990年以来中国芯片产业困境的国家级工程， 其结果却是所有人不希望的.)” 
206 Interview with Mao Chenglie, May 19, 2009, at ETEK headquarters in Wuxi.  ETEK was founded by a 





engineers and managers of the post 2000 era got their early technical and managerial training 
in these enterprises.  Chinese semiconductor personnel call Huajing the “Huangpo Military 
Academy,” in reference to the military academy where so many Chinese military officers 
were trained in the early 20th century.  Indeed, Huajing served as a training ground for many 
semiconductor personnel in China.  A group of Fudan engineering alumni educated in the 
1960s and 1970s expressed that “Project 908 and 909 not only educated a lot of talent, but 
they made factories that are still going today!”207  In the 1990s and into the 2000s, many of 
China’s leading semiconductor personnel worked in one or more of Huajing, Huahong-NEC, 
and SMIC. 
The history of these projects and other government policies from the 1990s 
reverberate today.  Much of the structure of China’s 1980s state-owned electronics and 
semiconductor industries had been dismantled by the late 2000s, but government investment, 
policies, and some government ownership was still in play in the semiconductor industry in 
China by 2010.  Many interviewees commented that China’s former industry structure and 
government policies are still in the minds of semiconductor personnel, certainly of anyone 
who began his or her career prior to 2000.  When industry executives have problems or need 
capital, even by the late 2000s, they often still sought assistance from the government, and 
this applied to executives in firms of all ownership types.208  Indeed, central and local annual 
funding and operating plans for the semiconductor industry remained in place as of 2009.209  
                                                        
207 Interview with Fudan alumni group, May 30, 2009 in Shanghai. 
208 Almost all company executives interviewed for this study either talked about attempts to get government 
funding or expressed frustration at the lack of government funding in the post 2000 era. 
209 Interview with Xu Juyan, July 22, 2009, at CETC 58 in Wuxi.  Xu Juyan was former Chief Engineer of 




As one example, research organizations still get funding through the 863 and 973 Programs, 
as they did in the 1990s.210  
With hindsight, Project 908’s Huajing, Project 909’s Huahong-NEC, and SMIC 
suggest that Chinese officials sought increased openness and decreased state-ownership with 
each of these three new projects.  The initial ownership forms of the participating enterprises 
were:  
1) State-Owned Enterprise: Project 908, Huajing, initiated in 1990-1992 
2) Joint Venture: Project 909, Huahong-NEC, initiated in 1995-1997 
3) Wholly Foreign Owned: SMIC (Semiconductor Manufacturing International 
Company), initiated in 2000-2002 
In terms of ownership, Project 908 was based in China’s state-owned enterprise, Huajing, 
while Project 909 primary enterprise was a joint venture between China’s state-owned 
Huahong and Japan’s NEC.  Finally, SMIC was headquartered in Shanghai as a wholly 
foreign owned enterprise, but it was registered in the Cayman Islands.  While these different 
ownership forms may reflect the industry’s gradual opening, industry leaders including Yu 
Zhongyu and Dr. Ye Tianchun of China’s Microelectronics Institute say that there was no 
original master plan to have three chronological projects of these varying ownership types.  
Indeed, Yu said, “From the beginning with Huajing, we invited foreign investors, but they 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with Yu Zhongyu, July 2, 2009 at CSIA headquarters in Beijing.  Yu is President of China Semiconductor 
Industry Association.  
210 Interviews with Yu Zhongyu (CSIA), July 2, 2009, and Dr. Ye Tianchun (CAS), July 3, 2009.  For the 863 
and 973 Programs, the government develops a roadmap of favored technologies and products, based on input 
from industry and research personnel.  Then, organizations make technology or project specific applications 
to vie for state funding.  However, according to Yu and Ye, the “roadmap-application-funding” process is 
faulty because the application-approval process is too slow to enable funding recipients to keep pace with 




said ‘No, we can’t make money in China.’”211  Originally, Chinese leaders only planned 
Project 908.  Their hope was that Project 908 would achieve the necessary technological 
advances.  When that project did not attain the expected results by the mid 1990s, Project 909 
was instigated.  Later, when Project 909 did not achieve its expected financial results in a 
timely manner, Chinese officials supported the establishment of SMIC in China, offering 
favorable preferences and eventually bank loans.  Foreign observers might view the shift from 
state owned enterprise to joint venture to wholly foreign owned enterprise as evidence of 
planned, gradual opening, but Chinese industry people describe this sequence of events as 
contingent.  Dr. Ye summarized by saying, “There was no plan [for 909 to follow 908, etc.]  It 
was a complicated time.”212  
To identify the methods and challenges of moving from state ownership and central 
planning to global integration, this study details the travails (and lessons) of China first major 
state-sponsored project, Project 908 (Chapter Three), other major state supported enterprises 
and their global partners (Chapter Four), and global forces in the semiconductor industry in 
China (Chapter Five.)  Chinese industry leaders seem to agree with Dr. Ye Tianchun’s 
statement that, despite the challenges, “Huajing and Project 908 in the late 1980s and 1990s 
were the foundation of the post-2000 industry,”213 despite the perceived failures.  In Huajing’s 
history, we see a state-owned enterprise undertake a long-term, high-profile, but very 
challenging project in the 1990s, and finally we see Huajing’s growth and critical 
                                                        
211 Interview with Yu Zhongyu, July 2, 2009 at CSIA headquarters in Beijing.  Yu is President of China 
Semiconductor Industry Association. 
212 Interview with Ye Tianchun, July 3, 2009, at the CAS Institute of Microelectronics in Beijing.  Ye is the 





organizational changes in the late 1990s, a period that broadly marked the takeoff of the 
semiconductor industry in China.  Leaders of the latter two projects, Project 909 (a Sino-
Japanese joint venture) and SMIC (a wholly foreign owned enterprise), benefited from lessons 
learned during Project 908, and they also benefitted from a further re-formed environment and 
an enlarged market for semiconductors in China.  In this post 2000 period, Huajing (now 
called Huarun), Huahong (home of Project 909), and SMIC remain active, along with China’s 
other “key” semiconductor enterprises including: Huayue, Shanghai Belling, ASMC, and 
Shougang-NEC, most of which formed as joint ventures with global partners.  Alongside 
these major state-sponsored enterprises, Chapter Five traces the emergence and challenges of 
other semiconductor organizations, both foreign and domestic, operating in China in the 
1990s and into the 2000s.  To indicate the takeoff of this industry, from 1995 to 2005 the 
semiconductor market in China as a share of the global market grew from two percent to 
twenty-five percent, and semiconductor production in China as a share of global production 
grew from less than one percent to seven percent, and (see Figures Ten and Nineteen.)214 
                                                        
214  PricewaterhouseCoopers, “China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2006 Update,” 2006, pages 7 and 
19, data from CCID, CSIA and company information.  In the post 2000 period, the largest semiconductor 
manufacturers in China were split about evenly between Chinese and foreign firms, including a number of 
Chinese-foreign joint ventures, per PricewaterhouseCoopers, “China’s Impact on the Semiconductor 




















 Impact on the Sem
nalysis. 
an and Wang Yong
成电路产业发展之




wen 王阳元 and 王
路：从消费大国
strial Nation),  Ke
2
and Global, in 
ry, 2004, 2006, 20










 sources include C
e Fazhan Zhilu: c
Circuit Industry D





e 123, per CSIA 
or Industry Associ
 Zouxiang Chanye





























's Impact on the Se
s. 
an and Wang Yon
成电路产业发展











try, 2004, 2006, an














ye Fazhan Zhilu: 
 Circuit Industry D















































Huajing and Project 908: The Origins of China’s 






















       





                   









    
                   
















































From 1990 to 1998, the Chinese state-owned semiconductor enterprise Huajing, based 
in Jiangsu Wuxi, undertook a major modernization program called Project 908.  This singular 
and influential project would ultimately introduce new technology and organizational changes 
in both Huajing and China’s larger semiconductor industry.  Prior to the 1990s and Project 
908, the industry remained largely enmeshed in its pre-reform structures, discussed in Chapter 
Two, although semiconductor-related enterprises were in the process of upgrading their 
capabilities, in large part through attempting to use imported equipment.215  Despite its 
founding role in China’s contemporary semiconductor industry, Project 908 suffered delays 
and financial and technical challenges.  Both Chinese and foreign sources refer to the project 
only briefly, if at all, usually labeling it a failure.  Perhaps because of the lack of 
documentation and discussion, written references to the project have conflicting 
information.216  This chapter attempts to construct a narrative of the project as well as analyze 
the project’s key obstacles through interviews and selected industry articles from the era.217  
Despite Project 908’s many problems, the project prompted precedent-setting enterprise and 
industry changes. 
Today, the former Huajing (now called Huarun, 华润, English name China Resources 
Microelectronics or CRM) is integrated with the global semiconductor industry and is China’s 
                                                        
215 Simon 129.  For example, Simon writes “between 1983 and 1985, Shanghai signed 168 contracts [for foreign 
electronics equipment] valued at RMB144 million...  While this equipment has made a substantial 
contribution…it tends to be seriously underutilized.” 
216 Secondary references to Project 908 have conflicting information about what technology was sought and the 
timing and financing of the project.       
217 Most of the selected articles are written by industry personnel with direct knowledge of events, such as 
Huajing managers or staff, or they are articles containing interviews with key industry personnel.  There are 




second largest domestic semiconductor enterprise group.218  Former Huajing employees work 
in a spectrum of semiconductor and semiconductor-related firms in China and abroad.  In 
effect, the history of Huajing and Project 908 shows the connections between the pre-reform 
industry and the early 21st century industry, and it shows the often difficult process of 
reforming, upgrading, and globalizing a formerly state-led, high-tech industry. 
3.1 Huajing’s Origins and Wuxi as the “Cradle” of China’s Semiconductor Industry 
 
Huajing’s history as an industry leader extends deep into the pre-reform era.  The 
organization was founded on September 1, 1960 in Wuxi as the local Jiangnan Radio 
Equipment Factory (江南无锡电器材厂).  At that time, the radio factory had less than 300 
employees, and its products, based on Soviet diodes, were for military use.  On December 24, 
1962, the factory was upgraded and renamed the 742 Factory, becoming a state-owned 
enterprise under central control.  Then, on December 20, 1968, the 742 Factory merged with 
the Wuxi Radio Industry School (无锡电工业学校).219   
Despite being a state-owned enterprise in a relatively isolated and centrally-planned 
economy, in the early 1970s, the 742 Factory’s managers faced several competitive and 
strategic choices.  The 742 Factory’s Director, Wang Hongjin, was struck by the increasing 
                                                        
218 CRM is an enterprise group in that it encompasses several companies, each of which focus on a particular 
sector of the semiconductor value chain.  CRM’s companies include: Semico (design), Huajing (discreet 
devices), CSMC (I.C. foundry), and Anst (P.A.T.).  CRM’s parent, China Resources, is one of China’s largest 
enterprise groups and is a member of China’s national team of 100 plus large enterprise groups.  For more on 
China’s large enterprise groups, see Chapter Four, Section 4.42. 
219 Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying 
Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan 




interest among industry leaders in integrated circuits, due to advances in the global electronics 
industry and in particular advances in consumer-oriented electronics.  (An integrated circuit, 
also called an IC, is a semiconductor).  Yet Wang was afraid that the 742 Factory might fail if 
it tried to compete with other Chinese enterprises in producing integrated circuits, due to the 
742 Factory’s lack of experience with high volume production of ICs.  With this in mind, he 
ordered the factory to “give up producing circuits” and to focus instead on discrete devices,220 
which soon were in very high demand in China’s expanding electronics market.  In this same 
period, the 742 Factory was extending beyond military production to also begin making 
civilian products such as radios and recorders.221   
The 742 Factory’s decision to provide the relatively simple, high volume discrete 
devices proved successful and ultimately led central officials to select the factory for more 
advanced operations.  In 1982, the 742 Factory was chosen as the site for an important new 
military project, called the 742 Jiangnan Project,222 and indeed, the 742 Factory was named 
one of China’s so-called “key” enterprises from 1981-1995 under China’s 6th, 7th, and 8th five 
year plans, under the control of the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry 
(Chapter Four covers China’s “key” semiconductor enterprises in more detail.)  During this 
time, the 742 Factory was also selected for two projects that resulted in it being China’s first  
                                                        
220 Discrete devices are the simple components, such as transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors, which are 
used in integrated circuits.   
221 Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying 
Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan 
State-owned Radio Equipment Factory),”  Liaowang 瞭望 (Outlook), Period 22, 1986. 
222 The 742 Jiangnan (military) Project was mentioned by Chinese industry elders as evidence of Wuxi’s and 
Huajing’s importance.  The project is also mentioned in an exhibit in the Wuxi Museum’s technology section 
(Wuxi Museum, in Taihu Square, Qingyang Road, Nanchang District , Wuxi) and in the Wuxi New District’s 





Figure 2: Gap Between China and Global Leading Technology (year attained) 
  Wafer Size in Inches (larger is more advanced)   
Year Global China 
1970 2 1.5 
1975 4 1.5 
1980 5 2 
1985 6 3-4 
1990 6-8 3-4 
1995 8 6 < Shougang-NEC 
2000 12 6-8 < Huahong-NEC and CSMC-Huajing 
2005 12 12 < SMIC 
2010 12-18 12 
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The years indicated for China seem optimistic.  They may reflect technological understanding more than actual production capabilities. 
Source: Zhu Yiwei 朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji 中国集成电路产业发展:  (China’s IC Industry Development: Collected 




true producer of integrated circuits.  These projects were named Project 65 and Project 75, for 
being part of China’s 6th and 7th five year plans (1981-1990).  The 742 Factory’s work on 
Projects 65 and 75 then led to its selection for Project 908,223 so named because the project 
was approved in August of 1990.   
In undertaking Project 65, the 742 Factory ultimately spent RMB270 million224 to 
import a 3 inch, 5µm bipolar225 production line as well as a 4 inch line from Toshiba.226  At 
that time, the line represented China’s highest technology and most comprehensive 
semiconductor capability.  Figure Two (previous page) compares China technological level in 
the semiconductor industry with global leading technology, from the 1970s.  In 1980 and 
1981, the 742 Factory had sent staff to Toshiba in Japan to learn bipolar linear integrated 
circuit design and manufacturing technology.  The line that the 742 Factory later imported 
from Toshiba was a comprehensive and brand-new line for television circuits.  Its installation 
was completed in 1982.   Importantly, the import agreement with Toshiba included supporting 
                                                        
223 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO of CRM in 2008 
and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s.  Wang discussed projects 65 and 75. 
224 Document on Institute 24 and industry milestones provided by Wuxi National IC Design Base Company, 
accessed on July 14, 2009.  The document did not have a title or author listed.  
225 This type of production line could produce bipolar transistors.  In semiconductor industry history, bipolar 
transistors were the first mass produced transistors.  A transistor is a discrete device used to amplify or 
redirect electronic signals and/or power.  Note: some English language sources say that Huajing imported 
“two used lines from the United States” during this period.  These sources may be repeating Michael Pecht’s 
assertion about production lines being imported from the United States.  (Pecht has written several books on 
the electronics industry.)  I, however, did not find any mention of complete production lines from the United 
States in Chinese sources; possibly the equipment was from Japan, not the United States. 
226 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO of CRM in 2008 
and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s.  In the semiconductor industry, a production 
line’s size in inches, e.g., “a 3 inch line,” refers to the diameter of the silicon wafer, from which 
semiconductors are cut.  Larger diameter wafers provide more semiconductors per wafer (so better economies 
of scale), but they are more expensive and complex to manufacture (manufacturing is called “fabricating” in 
the semiconductor industry).  Thus, an 8 inch line is more technologically advanced than a 6 inch line.  
Semiconductor process technology is also commonly measured by the micron level, abbreviated as µm, 
which is one-millionth of a meter.  The microns (or nanos), e.g. “5µm,” refer to the width of the line etchings 




equipment, tools and software, as well as ongoing training for the 742 Factory’s staff.227  
Indeed, in 1985, Teng Jingxin (later Huajing’s Chief Engineer) traveled to Japan for training 
to better understand bipolar production.  This technology transfer project was the first time 
that a Chinese semiconductor enterprise imported overseas production technology.  By 1984, 
the line was in production, and that year it produced 30 million units, surpassing the 742 
Factory’s original 1984 production goal of over 26 million units.228 
According to an article written in 1986, the 742 Factory managers later decided to use 
the new equipment to meet the growing domestic demand for color television circuits.229  But 
shortly after this big decision, the 742 Factory had to switch production back to circuits for 
black and white televisions, due to a mismatch in China’s supply of cathode ray tubes for 
color televisions.  This mismatch may have occurred because the increasing production of 
consumer electronics among state enterprises was not yet fully accounted for in the central 
plan in terms of inputs and production quotas.  This switch allowed the 742 Factory to avoid a 
huge build-up of inventory and to become a major supplier for the many factories then 
producing black and white televisions.  Once again, the 742 Factory was following a strategy 
of producing a simpler product but one that was in high demand.230 
                                                        
227 Chen Ling of Qinghua University, “Chanye Xingcheng Jieduan产业形成阶段 (The Industry’s Formative 
Stage),” unpublished paper, circa 2005.  After returning from the 1981 Toshiba trip, Teng Jingxin was named 
Director of Huiajing’s New Products Research Office.   
228 Document on Institute 24 and industry milestones provided by Wuxi National IC Design Base Company, 
accessed on July 14, 2009.  The document did not have a title or author listed.  
229  The managers at the 742 Factory opted to “abandon the original P-24 and change to produce the TA circuit” 
for color televisions, see Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing 
Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit 





Despite the new equipment and training, production yields231 at the factory were still 
low at just over 80 percent, inhibiting high volume production of integrated circuits (I.C.s)  
To combat this, the 742 Factory established a “best sales yield,” which was a quality standard 
higher than the standard set by the ministry.  In effect, the “best sales yield” meant that only 
products that could be sold would be counted in the yield, so the 742 Factory managers 
measured output not only on production but on marketable yield.  When the 742 Factory 
began this program, nearly two million integrated circuits were abandoned based on quality.  
By 1985, however, the factory had fulfilled contracts for 72 million integrated circuits for 
black and white televisions, up from 30 million units in 1984.  In producing these circuits, the 
742 Factory paid a fee to five other factories in the Wuxi area for sub-processing, thus 
creating “supplement factories, which are like little dragons under the guidance of the leading 
dragon.”232  In October of 1985, the 742 Factory went on to pass the national exam for color 
linear I.C. production and began operations for color television circuits.  By 1986, the 742 
Factory was considered China’s leading electronics-semiconductor enterprise, having 
effectively put ICs into mass production while developing the capabilities of neighboring 
enterprises in Wuxi.233 
Nonetheless, entering the period of China’s 7th five year plan (1986-1990), the 742 
Factory’s technology was still significantly behind global levels.  To upgrade, the factory 
undertook a re-organization that brought advanced R&D capabilities closer to the 742 
Factory’s production operations.  At that time, most research institutes in China were not 
                                                        






directly affiliated with factories, hindering applied research and production engineering at 
production sites.  However, in 1986-1987, the 742 Factory joined with Research Institute 24 
of Sichuan’s Yongchuan area in order to leverage the institute’s renowned technical 
knowledge.234  Institute 24, established in 1970 under the Ministry of Machine Building and 
Electronics Industry, specialized in memory, linear circuits and micro-processing circuits at 
the medium scale integration (MSI) and large scale integration (LSI) levels.235  At that time 
Institute 24 was called China’s “sole comprehensive center studying semiconductors.”236  
According to Yin Guohai,237 it was the first organization in China to do all the processes of an 
integrated device manufacturer (an I.D.M.)  An I.D.M. performs the main three steps in the 
semiconductor value chain: 
Design >  Fabrication (manufacturing)238 > Packaging/Assembly/Testing (called P.A.T.) 
By the end of 1985, Institute 24 had shared its technological advances with over 20 factories 
in 13 provinces, and according to an industry article from 1990, with Institute 24’s technical 
                                                        
234 As part of the electronics industry reforms in the mid 1980s, research institutes and factories were encouraged 
to voluntarily connect through emerging technical markets (see Chapter Two), but Huajing and Institute 24’s 
union was an official (and involuntary) organizational change. 
235 Over the years, the number of devices integrated on a single chip grew, and the industry moved from small 
scale integration (SSI) to medium scale integration (MSI) to large scale integration (LSI) to very large scale 
integration (VLSI). VLSI indicates at least 1000s of devices on a single chip, but today there are commonly 
billions of devices on a single chip.  VLSI was first achieved in the United States in the 1970s.    
236 Institute 24 was founded as a combination of resources and people from Institute 13 (originally called 5th 
Research Center), the Beijing Geological Instrument Factory Semiconductor Plant, and “a group of energetic 
young people,” see Jiang Chenqi 蒋臣琦, “Pinbo Chuangye, Fazhan Pandeng: 24 Suo Chengli Ershi 
Zhounian Huigu yu Zhanwang拼搏创业, 发展攀登: 24所成立20周年回顾与展望 (A Difficult Business, the 
Development Climb: Institute 24’s 20th Anniversary Review and Prospect),”  Weidianzi Xue微电子学 
(Microelectronics), March, 1990.  The author, Jiang Chenqi, was one of the first staff members at Institute 24. 
237 Interview with Yin Guohai, June 19, 2009, at Anst (CRM’s pak/assy/test firm).  Yin Guohai was with 
Sichuan’s Institute 24, and he joined Huajing during the merger in 1986.  In 2009 Yin Guohai was Vice 
President of CRM’s Anst, which is CRM’s P.A.T. company. 
238 Semiconductors (I.C.s) are manufactured in factories that are called foundries.  Semiconductor manufacturing 




help, “some of the [recipient] factories even began to make a profit.”239  Thus, Institute 24 
was expected to be a valuable partner to the 742 Factory.  Institute 24’s move to Wuxi, 
bringing people and equipment, resulted in the 742 Factory essentially having an in-house 
advanced research unit for ICs, as Institute 24 established a Wuxi-branch called Institute 1424 
at the factory.240  (This institute is later referred to as “Institute 58” or “CETC 58,” but 
industry personnel are reluctant to talk about Institute 58, a.k.a. Institute 1424 and Institute 24, 
due to its military ties.)241 
During the 7th five year plan, this new, combined organization (24 研究所无锡微电
子联合体, 无锡微电子联合公, English name Wuxi United Microelectronics, from March of 
1987), made strides in equipment implementation, research, and product development, setting 
the stage for its selection as the site for Project 908.  The engineers studied the products of 
seven foreign companies in order to “absorb their new ideas, processes and technologies” 
with the goal of making similar products in China.242  As early as 1987, Wuxi United 
                                                        
239 Jiang Chenqi 蒋臣琦, “Pinbo Chuangye, Fazhan Pandeng: 24 Suo Chengli Ershi Zhounian Huigu yu 
Zhanwang 拼搏创业, 发展攀登: 24 所成立 20 周年回顾与展望 (A Difficult Business, the Development 
Climb: Institute 24’s 20th Anniversary Review and Prospect),”  Weidianzi Xue 微电子学 (Microelectronics), 
March, 1990. 
240 Several Chinese industry personnel said that Institute 58 was historically involved in military work.  In recent 
years, Institute 58 has formed many small companies in the Wuxi area to commercialize military 
technologies. 
241 Institute 24 in Sichuan is also described as serving the military, see Jiang Chenqi 蒋臣琦, “Pinbo Chuangye, 
Fazhan Pandeng: 24 Suo Chengli Ershi Zhounian Huigu yu Zhanwang 拼搏创业, 发展攀登: 24 所成立 20
周年回顾与展望 (A Difficult Business, the Development Climb: Institute 24’s 20th Anniversary Review and 





Microelectronics was the first in China to undertake LSI, producing 26,480,000 units.243  At 
the same time, its engineers were designing and testing the first 64k RAM VLSI circuits.244  
Until then, Chinese enterprises had had the capability only for SSI and MSI.  Also during the 
7th five year plan (1986-1990), the enterprise undertook Project 75, which was largely defined 
as the installation of a self-built 5 inch bipolar line and a self-built 5 inch MOS line,245 in 
1988 and 1989 respectively.246  While some sources describe these lines as self-built, the lines 
may have been refurbished lines from Siemens of Germany, as other sources mention that the 
enterprise imported two lines from Siemens, a 4 inch and a 5 inch line, with 2-3µm 
technology, around this same time.247  By the late 1980s, Wuxi United Microelectronics 
claimed to be a supplier to almost 900 companies in China.  Among China’s top TV brands – 
including Panda, Golden Star, Peacock, and Kaige – the enterprise was supplying the I.C.s for 
perhaps 50 percent of the televisions.  In 1985, the total revenue of Huajing was RMB278 
                                                        
243Interview with Xu Juyan ( 居衍), July 22, 2009, at CETC 58 in Wuxi.  Xu Juyan was former Chief Engineer 
of Institute 58 and in 2009 he was a senior advisor to CRM and Institute 58, among other roles.  The 26 
million units data is cited in: Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, 
““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 
(The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan State-owned Radio Equipment Factory),”  Liaowang 瞭望 (Outlook), Period 
22, 1986.  DRAM is dynamic random access memory.  64k density DRAM was achieved in the United States 
in the early 1980s. 
244 Fudan University alumni group interview, May 30, 2009, in Shanghai.  Interviewees all studied 
microelectronics at Fudan Daxue from 1963, but from 1966 they did not truly study, due to the Cultural 
Revolution.  All returned to the electronics industry in the late 1970s.  Interviewees included: Xu Guochang 
of the Shanghai IC Industry Association, Ma Peijun of Credy Industries, Li Weide (retired), and Xu Tian who 
runs an industry consulting firm. 
245 MOS is metal oxide semiconductor. 
246 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO of CRM in 2008 
and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s.  Wang discussed Huajing’s major 1980s 
projects.  
247 Wang Jifu, “China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation,” one case from an unpublished research paper on 
state-owned enterprise financial reforms in China, based on interviews with Wang Guoping and other 




million, which was 50 percent higher than 1984 and six times the revenue in 1980.248  Figure 
Five shows Huajing’s revenues. 
Although China’s centrally-planned semiconductor industry was in the process of 
being “released” in the late 1980s (see Chapter Two), the work at Wuxi United 
Microelectronics – the Jiangnan Military Project and Projects 65 and 75 – show that the 
central government supported critical technological projects.  As the former Chief Engineer of 
Institute 58 put it, Wuxi United Microelectronics got “the only [semiconductor] investment in 
the 1980s by the central government, and at that time, the government lacked money to 
invest!”249   However, this focused, high-tech investment was being directed to an SOE with 
unprofitable operations and costly employee obligations such as schools, housing, and 
healthcare.  The enterprise’s financial structure would prove untenable in the 1990s during 
Project 908.  But the state-sponsored investments at the enterprise in the 1980s and 1990s 
were not made in order to further the lifespan of a financially insolvent SOE nor to retain 
central-planning in the industry.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the intention was to create at 
least one functioning, higher-tech I.D.M.250 in China to show people in China and around the 
world that such operations were possible in China.  The hope was that an exemplary 
semiconductor enterprise would spur the development of other semiconductor-related 
                                                        
248  Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying 
Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan 
State-owned Radio Equipment Factory),”  Liaowang 瞭望 (Outlook), Period 22, 1986. 
249Interview with Xu Juyan ( 居衍), July 22, 2009, at CETC 58 in Wuxi.  Xu Juyan was former Chief Engineer 
of Institute 58 and in 2009 he was a senior advisor to CRM and Institute 58, among other roles. 
250 An I.D.M. is an “integrated device manufacturer”; this type of semiconductor enterprise conducts all the 





Figure 5: Estimates of Huajing-affiliated Organizations’ Revenues in US$ millions 
These estimates are based on ratios of revenues among Huajing-affiliated organizations.  Since 2008, Huajing-affiliated 




Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang 
华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan State-owned Radio Equipment Factory),” Liaowang 瞭望 (Outlook), Period 22, 
1986. CRM (China Resources Microelectronics) annual reports. 
















enterprises whether domestic, foreign, state-owned or private.  Nonetheless the investments in 
Wuxi United Microelectronics resulted in the enterprise being the first test site for a major 
state-sponsored semiconductor initiative and a site of many “lessons learned” that influenced 
future state-led projects.251  
Wuxi United Microelectronics’ selection as the site for the upcoming Project 908 
(1990-1998) cemented Wuxi’s identity as the cradle of China’s contemporary semiconductor 
industry.  The enterprise and neighboring Wuxi enterprises had made both technical and 
commercial gains in the 1980s, and by 1989 Wuxi had been selected as one of China’s two 
national semiconductor bases, and it was called the “National Southern Microelectronics 
Industry Base.”252  But for Project 908, officials in the semiconductor industry leading 
group253 carefully considered which city or region to select, as their hope was that Project 908 
would spawn a regional industry chain.  As Xu Juyan (formerly the Chief Engineer of 
Institute 58) explained, “the most important event [for the industry] was the formation of 
Huajing in Wuxi.”254  Professor Li of SAIC concurred that the investment in Project 908 in 
Wuxi “was the main driver of change [in the industry], because there were no foreign 
companies at that time [in China].”255 
                                                        
251 Interview Yu Xiekang, June 2, 2009, at JCET headquarters.  Yu Xiekang was General Manager of JCET and 
a China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) official in 2009.  JCET is a large, state-affiliated ATP 
enterprise in Jiangsu.  Yu Xiekang was General Manager of Huajing from 1987. 
252 Wuxi National Microelectronics Design Base Company 无 国家集成 路  基地有限公司, internal 
document, 2009. 
253 The semiconductor industry leading group was under the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of 
Machine Building and Electronics Industry, see Chapter Two. 
254 Interview with Xu Juyan ( 居衍), July 22, 2009, at CETC 58 in Wuxi.  Xu Juyan was former Chief 
Engineer of Institute 58 and in 2009 he was a senior advisor to CRM and Institute 58, among other roles. 
255 Interview with Prof. Li of Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 上海汽车工业（集团）总公司, May 
18, 2009, in Shanghai.  Actually, there were foreign companies in China in the early 1990s, but there were 
few semiconductor-related foreign companies at that time. 
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Wuxi’s main competitor for Project 908 was Shanghai, as Shanghai was home to 
several major Chinese electronics enterprises (see Figure One) as well as being a growing 
base for international trade.  A variety of explanations have been offered to explain Wuxi’s 
ultimate victory.  Professor Li of SAIC and several other industry personnel mentioned that 
Wuxi was chosen because Shanghai’s air quality was already believed to be too low to 
accommodate the clean room standards necessary in the semiconductor industry.256  That said, 
in the 1990s, Wuxi’s air quality would also become compromised by industrial pollution.  In 
another account, Wang Guoping (Huajing’s General Manager in the late 1990s and later CEO 
and Chairman of CRM) said that Jiangsu officials lobbied the industry leading group 
extensively to win the project.257  Finally, in his 1988 study, Denis Simon focused on Wuxi’s 
already advanced technological capabilities as the reason for why Wuxi was favored.258  It is 
likely that each of these factors played a role.  What is clear is that since Project 908, Wuxi 
has been recognized as the seedbed of the industry.  By 2008, Wuxi had a complete 
semiconductor industry chain and the highest concentration of semi-conductor related 
enterprises, but Shanghai was China’s largest semiconductor “base” among China’s seven 
national semiconductor bases.  (See Chapter Five for a discussion of China’s regional bases in 
the semiconductor industry.) 
                                                        
256 Ibid.  Denis Simon mentioned talks among MEI officials as early as 1984 and 1985 about whether to chose 
Wuxi or Shanghai as China’s base for microelectronics, see Denis Simon, Technological Innovation in China 
(Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), pages 136-138. 
257 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO of CRM in 2008 
and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s. 




Figure 1: China's Largest Semiconductor Production Facilities in the 1980s 
 
Facility Location 
Jiangnan Semiconductor Factory Jiangsu, Wuxi 
Tianguang Electronics Factory Gansu, Qinan 
Dongguang 878 Factory Beijing 
Changzhou Semiconductor Factory Beijing 
Beijing Semiconductor #2 Zhejiang, Shaoxing 
Shaoxing Electronics Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #5 Components Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #14 Radio Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #19 Radio Factory Shanghai 
CAS Factory #109 Beijing 
Lishan Microelectronics Corporation Xian 
Tianjin Semiconductor Factory Tianjin 




3.2 Project 908 and Huajing: 1990-1998 
 
As part of the second semiconductor industry strategy conference held in Wuxi in 
February of 1989 (see Chapter Two), the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics 
Industry259 began to consider sponsoring one significant project that would upgrade and 
hopefully showcase China’s emerging semiconductor capabilities.  At the time, industry 
officials also agreed that the government should encourage the industry to upgrade by 
investing in numerous local companies in the different semiconductor sectors, i.e., materials, 
equipment, design, foundry and P.A.T. (packaging/assembly/testing), although they believed 
that the foundry sector was the top priority.260  Thus, the officials of the semiconductor 
industry leading group (under the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Machine 
Building and Electronics Industry, see Chapter Two) decided to invest in one major foundry-
focused project, while also supporting upgrades in multiple enterprises across sectors.  
Examples of other organizations selected for upgrades and investments included 18 different 
design enterprises, the Beijing General Research Institute for Non-Ferrous Metals in the 
materials sector, and Nantong and Jiangying P.A.T. enterprises.261 
At that time, only three enterprises had the equipment and technology to be viable 
candidates for a significant foundry project.  Those were Huajing, Huayue, and Shanghai 
Belling, with Huajing being the largest enterprise in the industry at the time with about 5000 
                                                        
259 The Ministry of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry was later renamed the Ministry of the Electronics 
Industry (MEI).  In 1998, the MEI was subsumed under the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). 
260 Foundries are high-tech and very capital intensive.  Developing the ability to manufacture semiconductors, 
i.e., building and operating foundries, is technically and financially difficult.  In 2010, a foundry cost between 
US$2 and US$10 billion to build, depending on size and technology. 
261 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO of CRM in 2008 
and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s. 
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employees and already in possession of a self-built 5 inch foundry line.  According to Wang 
Guoping, the Jiangsu provincial government lobbied the leading group and central 
government to win the project, proposing that Huajing would upgrade its existing 5 inch line 
and build a 6 inch line, which would be less expensive because of their existing equipment.262  
The budget for the foundry project was substantial, but Huajing’s relatively low-cost proposal 
to upgrade existing equipment and its technical advances in the late 1980s led the leading 
group to recommend Huajing for the foundry project.  As an outcome of the second strategy 
seminar, on April 14, 1989, the leading group got approval for the formation of a “new” 
enterprise to be called Huajing (华晶), which was to be a re-incarnation of the current 24 研究
所无锡微电子联合体, 无锡微电子联合公.  Huajing was formally established in August of 
1989, with Su Guangping (苏广平) as General Manager and Teng Jingxin as Chief 
Engineer.263 
As the key project in China’s electronics industry, Project 908 sought to develop 
production lines for LSI circuits at the 1.0µm to 0.8µm level.  The plan was to achieve annual 
output of 50 million LSI circuits.264    Specifically, Project 908 (also referred to as Project 85 
or the Wuxi Microelectronics Project) was to introduce a 6 inch, 0.8µm production line.  Total 
state investment in Project 908 was RMB970 million, of which 380 million was from the 
                                                        
262 Other enterprises would likely have to import equipment. 
263 Interview with Teng Jingxin, April 8, 2009, at Huajing Headquarters in Wuxi.  Teng Jingxin was Chief 
Engineer of CRM in 2008 and former Chief Engineer of Huajing. 
264 Zhang Longquan 章隆泉, “Huajing Jianshe Chaodaguimo I.C. Shengchanxian华晶建设超大规模 I.C. 生产




State Development Bank.265  According to Huajing’s proposal, the 5 inch MOS line that had 
been the centerpiece of Project 75 would be the foundation for Project 908, and importantly, 
Huajing also planned to introduce technology from AT&T-Lucent.266 
Huajing was established as a new enterprise in August of 1990, and Project 908 was 
intended as an 8th five year plan (1991-1995) project.  However, there were significant delays 
in finalizing Huajing as the official site as well as delays in funding and government 
examinations and approvals for Project 908.  These delays are reputed to have been 
administrative or political in nature rather than a result of Huajing’s management or technical 
operations, but whatever the case, the delays negatively affected the productivity of Huajing’s 
MOS line in the 1990-1995 period.267  The slow start up also caused Huajing’s then General 
Manager Su Guangping to acknowledge in 1995 that Huajing’s management could improve.  
In a published article, Su noted the need for “quality change with Huajing’s enterprise 
management,” and he said he wanted to “deepen the revolution” by creating a good 
compensation system and improving “inside skills” and management.268  That said, Huajing’s 
                                                        
265 Gao Gaifang 高改芳, “Guojia Ziben Touru Xinpianye de Gean: Huajing Wuyan Jieju 国家 本投入芯片 
的个案： 晶的无言 局 (The Nation’s Capital in the Chip Industry: Huajing’s Silent Ending),” Shanghai 
Baodao 上海 道 (Shanghai Report), May 23, 2003. 
266 CoCom export controls, discussed in Chapter Two, remained in place until 1994, and in 1996, 41 nations 
established the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies.  Commonly known as the Wassenaar Arrangement, this arrangement was the post-Cold War 
successor to the CoCom.  Wassenaar Arrangement member nations include Russia and several eastern 
European nations, but not China.  Just as CoCom did not materially effect China’s importation of 
semiconductor equipment in the 1980s, the Wassenaar Arrangement did not inhibit Project 908 from 
procuring equipment from AT&T/Lucent in the 1990s.  See also Chapter Five on export controls.   
267 China’s expansive government bureaucracy was undertaking multiple reforms and initiatives during this 
period, so bureaucratic delays, negotiations, and conflicts were not uncommon.  
268 Su Guangping 苏广平,  “Xianzhai ‘Hong Pingguo’ Guangzai ‘Yao Qianshu’:  Guanyu Zhongguo Huajing 
Jituan Gongsi Fazhan Xin Silu 先摘 ‘红苹果’ 广栽 ‘摇钱树’:  于中国华晶集团公司发展新思路 (First 
Pick ‘Red Apple’, Widely Plant ‘Money Tree’: Developing New Ideas for China’s Huajing),”  Jiangnan 
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management problems were likely similar, but not necessarily worse, than those of many 
SOEs in China at that time.269  Finally, on June 25th of 1994, Project 908 passed the national 
examination and was “accepted by the state.”270  Yet, it was not until December of 1995, the 
last year of the 8th five year plan, that construction for Project 908 actually commenced. 
By that time, Huajing’s managers had had ample time to consider their goals and 
outlook in China’s rapidly emerging electronics market.  General Manager Su Guangping 
wrote an article for the Jiangnan Forum in April of 1995 explaining his views.271  His broad 
concern was “how can Huajing improve rapidly in [China’s] relatively weak conditions, 
within the competitive international environment?” Su was well aware of Huajing’s “low 
quality, low efficiency and high costs” relative to the global industry.  Thus in terms of 
Project 908’s production priorities, Su wanted to emphasize scale (low-cost) production and 
applied products, such as consumption and life-style enhancing products, working in 
cooperation with domestic and overseas partners.  Su thought Huajing’s ongoing focus should 
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Market: the Contract Management Responsibility System in China (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).  Barry 
Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  Edward Steinfeld, 
Forging Reform in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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Luntan 江南论坛 (Jiangnan Forum), Period 4, 1995.  The author, Su Guangping, was the General Manager 
of Huajing in 1995. 
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be on capturing market share in low and mid level products, e.g., discrete devices, writing 
“We can push the stronger competitors to stay away from the low-end market.”  Su and his 
team were well aware of the rapidly growing market for circuits and components in China due 
to both growing domestic demand for electronics and China’s increasing role as an assembler 
and manufacturer of electronic products for the global market. To capture market share even 
in low and mid-level products, Huajing would need to simultaneously maximize its existing 5 
inch MOS circuit line and get the Project 908 lines up and running as soon as possible.272 
Although Su thought Huajing ought to focus on low-end products, Huajing had indeed 
made some technical progress between 1990 and 1995.  In this era, China was three 
generations behind international levels in semiconductor technology, and advances were 
somewhat hindered by import restrictions.273  For both equipment and knowledge, Huajing 
sent staff to Germany, the United States and Japan.   For example, Huajing’s Teng Jingxin 
traveled to Stanford’s Electronics Research Center in 1993, and while in the United States, he 
also had an opportunity to study 1.5µm to 1.0µm CMOS technology at Pioneer.  In 1994, 
Teng Jingxin also went to Japan and France to study I.C. card technology.274  Huajing’s 
research institute also invited a number of foreigner experts give talks and provide training to 
their staff.  As for written materials, according to Xu Juyan, his engineers could get books and 
articles from IEEE (the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers),275 but generally they 
                                                        
272 Ibid. 
273 See Chapter Five for more on the impact of import restrictions. 
274 In 1991 Teng Jingxin was Haujing’s Vice Officer of Central Research Office; in 2009 he was the Chief 
Engineer of CRM, according to his biography, provided by the Wuxi National IC Design Base Company. 
275 The IEEE, usually referred to as “I Triple E,” is the largest and best known association for electronics.  IEEE 
publishes books and articles, holds conferences and other events, and develops technical standards. 
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could not get other books and publications from the West.276 In this mix of isolation and 
outreach, in 1993, the Huajing team produced China’s first 256k DRAM,277 and by early 1995, 
Huajing had developed 1 nanometer (nm)278 products.  In spring of 1995, Huajing produced a 
new generation of 2nm bipolar circuits for color televisions.279   
However, in General Manager Su’s view, producing higher technology products was a 
longer-term goal (and necessary in order to “get out of the condition of being controlled by 
others”), but Su did not see it as Huajing’s immediate priority. For longer-term technical 
advance, Su’s ideas had more to do with global integration than with Huajing’s own 
immediate implementation of advanced production lines.  Su suggested that Huajing should 
analyze and improve upon foreign innovations, increase its trade with foreign companies, and 
utilize or attract overseas Chinese talent, but he did not explicitly cite the importation of 
complete production lines.  He also noted the need to work more closely and openly with 
China’s own national design centers, research institutes and universities, an ironic comment 
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given Huajing’s affiliation with the technologically renowned Institute 1424.280  At that time, 
managers from Huajing and Institute 1424 were both unhappy with their merger, see Section 
3.3. 
 
Huajing’s Organization circa 1994-1995281 
• Headquarters 
• Institute #1: This was Huajing’s central research institute.  This was likely 
renamed from Institute 24, a.k.a., Institute 1424 and Institute 58.  The institute 
also has “The Wuxi IC Design Center” with 160 people, with two-thirds of 
having bachelors or masters and half with overseas training. 
• Department #3: This consisted of the discrete devices department, bipolar 
circuit department, and MOS circuit department.  These groups focused on 
production, sales and recent market driven products; this was a profit center.  
• Factory #5: This was for auxillary functions including: silicon materials plant, 
mask plant, power plant, public abrasives plant, machine shop plant, and 
technical support plant. 
• Employees: 5700, fifty percent with secondary education or above 
• Technical Staff: 1000 engineers and 300 senior engineers.282 
 
Huajing’s Technical Awards, 1990-1995”283 
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Luntan 江南论坛 (Jiangnan Forum), Period 4, 1995.  The author, Su Guangping, was the General Manager 
of Huajing in 1995. 
151 
 
• 1990: Named “National Top Class Enterprise” 
• 1991: Recipient of the “National Enterprise Technology Advancement Award” 
• 1992: Recipient of the “National May First Labor Award” 
• 1993: Approved by the Global Electro-technical Commission IECQ 
• 1993: Completed contract examination (producing China’s first 256k D 
DRAM) 
• 1994: Completed the national examination 
 
As mentioned above, at the end of 1995, Project 908 finally was given the funding and 
approval to begin, and in 1996, the state “accepted” Huajing’s bipolar production line (to be 
used for VCR production).284  This line was an upgraded line and was likely a 6 inch line, 
built from a 5 inch line, which had been part of Huajing’s original rationale for why Huajing 
should be selected for Project 908.  Industry personnel will refer to Huajing’s “self-built” 
lines as evidence of Huajing’s technical capabilities in the early 1990s, and according to Xu 
Juyan, the self-built 6 inch line was still in use as late as 2009.285   
By late 1995, Project 908 was already in some disfavor.  Whether or not Huajing 
managers and engineers were at fault, the project simply had not happened from 1991-1995 as 
originally planned.  Indeed, in light of the failure of Project 908, the next major state-led 
semiconductor project -- Project 909 -- was approved to begin in 1995 in Pudong.  Project 909 
is discussed in Chapter Four. 
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Huajing’s 6 inch line had been “accepted” by the state in 1996, but the production line 
that was really the penultimate goal of Project 908, which was a 6 inch line with 0.9µm 
technology from Lucent, was not implemented until 1998.   On January 18th of 1998, Huajing 
received “approval” for Project 908 in a ceremony attended by Huajing leaders, government 
officials from the State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Electronics Industry, and 
representatives from Lucent.  At that time, Huajing had a monthly production capacity of 
6,000 units (annual output of 72,000 units)286 on a 6 inch line.287  (Recall, the original goal of 
Project 908 was annual output of 50 million circuits on a 6 inch production line(s) at the 0.8 to 
1.0µm level.)288  Despite Lucent’s presence at this approval ceremony, the Lucent line was 
still not in use; prior to 1995, Huajing had introduced 0.9µm technology from Lucent, but this 
technology had not yet been fully implemented.  In early 1998, Huajing was operating at a 
loss due to its Project 908 funding (which was actually interest-bearing loans from state 
banks), high cost structure, and lack of scale production.  In April of 1998, further funding for 
construction at Huajing (as well as nine semiconductor design centers) was approved, and 
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later that year, Huajing finally implemented the 0.9µm CMOS equipment from Lucent.289  
Project 908 is usually referred to as a 1990 to 1998 endeavor, but official production may not 
have begun until early 1999.290 
3.3 The Obstacles for Huajing and Project 908 
 
Funding.  Huajing’s management had to operate with funding that was both delayed 
and expensive.   Reports on the funding for Project 908 range from RMB970 million291 to 
RMB1.39 billion,292 with 380 million coming from the State Development Bank.293  Although 
the semiconductor industry leading group (under the State Planning Commission and the 
Ministry of the Electronics Industry) agreed to invest this sum in Project 908, in actuality, this 
only meant that banks were given the authority to make loans to Huajing for this amount. 
Huajing had to repay principal and interest, although the government may have eventually 
                                                        
289 Unnamed reporter, “Lucent to Complete Contract,” China Business News, March 2-5, 1998.  
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291 Gao Gaifang 高改芳, “Guojia Ziben Touru Xinpianye de Gean: Huajing Wuyan Jieju 国家资本投入芯片业
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December, 1995. 
293 Gao Gaifang 高改芳, “Guojia Ziben Touru Xinpianye de Gean: Huajing Wuyan Jieju 国家资本投入芯片业
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covered some of Huajing’s loans.294  Huajing was not able to secure the full amount of the 
approved loans until about 1995.  Once Huajing’s lines were in operation, Huajing’s output 
was too low to offset the costs of the continuously running line.  Huajing also faced high 
energy costs and equipment depreciation.295  In the mid 1990s, there was a period when 
Huajing was unable to pay its employees their wages.  As this renowned Wuxi enterprise 
faltered, local people recall protests by Huajing employees at Huajing’s headquarters and at 
the homes of Huajing executives.296  By 1998, Huajing was in debt for principal and interest, 
with little revenue and no profit.297   
Timing.  In terms of timing, both officials and industry personnel viewed Project 908 
as a failure due to its many delays.  Although the semiconductor industry leading group 
approved the project in August of 1990, it was another two full years before they selected 
Wuxi’s Huajing over Shanghai’s Belling as the official site for Project 908.298  As discussed 
in the previous section, Project 908 was intended to be an 8th five year plan (1991 to 1995) 
project, but Huajing did not even begin construction until December of 1995.  At that time, 
officials anticipated that the construction process itself would take another 16 months, with 
                                                        
294 Interview with Mao Chenglie, May 19, 2009, at ETEK headquarters in Wuxi.  Mao Chenglie was on the 
ETEK senior management team in 2008.  Mao Chenglie and eight other Huajing staff left Huajing with a 
former Huajing Vice General Manager to found ETEK in 2002. 
295 Wang Jifu, “China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation,” unpublished, circa 2000. 
296 Several Wuxi residents recalled such protests. 
297 Wang Jifu, “China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation,” unpublished, circa 2000. 
298 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO of CRM in 2008 
and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s. 
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results in 1997.299  However, some funding was not awarded until April of 1998.  Even in 
1998 and 1999, Huajing’s unit output did not meet the original project goals. 
As will be discussed in Chapter Four, when Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were 
developing capital intensive and higher technology industries during their decades of rapid 
development, government support for technology acquisition and transfer was critical.  At 
Huajing, however, Chinese officials essentially failed to fund and complete a timely 
technology transfer. 
Technology and Organization.  In addition, once Huajing did have new equipment, the 
staff had problems using the new production equipment and designing new products.  As 
discussed in Section 3.2, General Manager Su wanted to focus on consumer applications and 
low-end products, making technical advances (perhaps more slowly) through global 
integration.  Yet, Huajing’s production side lacked access to appropriate designs.  (The lack of 
connection between R&D and production is an oft-cited problem in centrally-planned 
economies, due to “vertical silos” within enterprises and because of the use of specialized 
institutes for R&D.  See Chapter Two.)  In the late 1980s, Huajing had tried to bridge the gap 
by supplementing its capabilities with R&D from the co-located Institute 24 (a.k.a., Institute 
1424 and Institute 58) as well as technical experts from Dongnan University.300  Nonetheless, 
Yu Xiekang, who was General Manager of Huajing in the late 1980s, said that he did not have 
enough control over R&D and R&D (conducted by Institute 1424 at Huajing) was not 
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300Interview Yu Xiekang, June 2, 2009, at JCET headquarters.  Yu Xiekang was General Manager of JCET and a 
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providing enough new products.  Yu says “I talked with the president many times about the 
problems between R&D and production, but the president could not re-organize, because it 
was a state-owned company.  After six months, the president agreed to move some R&D 
closer to production,” but still the production side of Huajing was not working effectively 
with design to be able to produce higher technology products.301  Xu Juyan, originally with 
Institute 24 in Sichuan and later Chief Engineer of Institute 58 (a.k.a., Institute 1424), 
explained that “the leaders of Huajing and Institute 58 had not wanted to join and share power 
in the beginning, but they were ordered by the government to combine.”302  In 1990, one of 
the initial staff of Institute 24 in Sichuan wrote about the move to Wuxi saying “Institute 24 
will never [again] be a comprehensive research center [due to the Wuxi move], and it has to 
find a new position again.”  This individual further described the Institute 24 team as 
“tortured” by the move from China’s inland to the east coast and by concerns about wage 
gaps, their children’s futures, and the like.  By 1990, long before Project 908 ever got 
underway, the personnel from Institute 24 already felt that they had endured several years of 
an unwanted, difficult, government-mandated merger with Huajing, all the while remaining a 
loyal and productive team.303  According to Ye Tianchun (of CAS Institute of 
Microelectronics), the Ministry of the Electronics Industry invested in Huajing and “let the 
plant do the research itself, but this turned out to be useless from 1990 to 1995 at Huajing.” 
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Nevertheless from its inception, the intent of Project 908 at Huajing was primarily 
production, not necessarily R&D, which was supported by other state initiatives discussed in 
Section 2.1d.  Design and production were both problematic at Huajing: after securing 
equipment, Huajing did not have the designs for higher tech products and it did not have the 
skills to use its equipment to produce higher-tech designs.  These shortcomings may have 
been caused by technical deficiencies or by the organizational rifts resulting from the forced 
merger.  Finally, in 1995, Institute 58 split from Huajing, and as late as 2000, Huajing staff 
still complained that the institutes -- 24 and others -- had never provided Huajing with useful 
designs.304  Anyway, after the mid 1990s, the five and 6 inch MOS lines were no longer 
considered “advanced” in the global industry, so Project 908 had failed to establish an 
“advanced” Chinese semiconductor enterprise. 
Foreign Challengers.  Related to Huajing’s inability to produce higher-tech products 
was the fact that China’s market was increasingly opening, so factories in China were able to 
import higher quality foreign components and I.C.s.305  There was less demand for Huajing’s 
copies of (already outdated) foreign I.C.s, and further, “Huajing had a wide product line, but it 
was not a leader in any product segment.”306  To combat these problems, Huajing set up 
several joint ventures in Shenzhen and Zhuhai in 1993 and 1994, as the market in southeast 
China for I.C.s and related products was growing.  These ventures focused on product 
development, marketing and sales.  The intention of this southeast expansion was not only for 
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Huajing to capture market share but more generally to expand the role of state-owned 
semiconductor companies in China’s growing southeastern market.307  As China’s electronics 
market grew, Chinese enterprises (Huajing included) became known as providers of low-cost, 
low-end discrete devices, but customers trusted imports for I.C.s and higher quality discrete 
devices.  
Management.  Huajing’s managers had had success in running their state-owned 
enterprise in the 1980s.  However, as SOE mangers they had less experience in finance, 
marketing, quality control, and human resource management, which were all functions that 
were increasingly important in China’s growing and opening electronics industry.  According 
to a former Huajing engineer, “Huajing’s orders were from the government, and Huajing got 
loans from the government.  [Generally] Huajing’s management had a central-planning 
focus.”308  (This obstacle would begin to be rectified in 1997, with new and foreign 
management, as discussed Section 3.4 below.)  Huajing’s General Manager Su Guangping 
recognized the need for “quality change within Huajing’s enterprise management,” along with 
a better compensation system.309   Indeed, in the pre-1995 period, Huajing lost a number of 
engineers because salaries were so low that, when possible, engineers emigrated to Singapore 
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or the United States or other foreign destinations for better livelihoods.310  Finally, Huajing’s 
reputation in the late 1990s and early 2000s as a provider of low-end products to mostly 
Chinese enterprises suggests that Huajing lacked marketing expertise and quality control. 
3.4 Enterprise Solutions Emerging from Project 908 
 
Huajing attempted a large-scale project of national importance and in doing so 
Huajing faced difficulties that were common in China’s reforming and opening economy.  In 
the 1990s, Huajing’s reputation changed from renowned to disparaged.  Nonetheless, in 
response to the difficulties and failure of Project 908, Huajing undertook a number of reforms 
that previewed the structure and focus of the broader semiconductor industry in China in the 
early 21st century.  Further, the so-called lessons learned at Huajing were instructive as the 
Ministry of the Electronics Industry planned Project 909, SMIC and other semiconductor 
industry-related policies. 
 
From Old Management to New 
In 1997, owing to Project 908’s lack of results and Huajing’s mounting production 
losses and inability to meet payroll, the central and provincial governments “ordered” Huajing 
to restructure.311 Around this time, a number of senior Huajing leaders were asked to retire 
(with generous retirement packages), and a new generation of younger Huajing managers 
were promoted, including Wang Guoping.  According to Wang and Teng Jingxin, younger 
                                                        
310 Interview with Li Zhihong, March 26, 2009, at Chipown headquarters in Wuxi.  Li Zhihong was General 
Manager of Chipown in 2009 and had previously worked at Huajing.  Other industry personnel mentioned 
the phenomenon of staff leaving Huajing to work abroad (or domestically) for better pay. 
311 Wang Jifu, “China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation,” unpublished, circa 2000. 
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individuals were allowed to ascend due to a belief that Huajing needed open-minded, creative, 
and energetic managers.  (Teng Jingxin was part of the older generation, but he was allowed 
to keep his job.)312  As Xu Juyan put it, when Huajing was changing its management team, 
“they wanted to follow the example of allowing the young [to emerge and lead].  If the I.C. 
industry is to prosper, it needs young people for talent and passion.  …Like Intel and HP and 
Fairchild were built by young people.”313  Thus in 1997, Wang Guoping, then age 36, was 
named Executive Vice President of Huajing and soon after he was named General Manager.  
Wang had not lived or studied abroad, but his approach (as will be shown in the following 
sections) reflected global norms and trends.  With Huajing in crisis and support from above 
for real change, Wang and his team pursued the tactics and strategies below.     
 
From Enterprise to Individual Accounting Units 
The management team decided to restructure Huajing with a gradual unit-by-unit 
approach.  Wang emphasizes that his team’s first important move was to establish individual 
accounting units for each part of Huajing’s operations.  The management team’s view was 
that – through individual accounting – each unit would begin to function almost as an 
independent, market-facing company.  Wang emphasized the difficult and important process 
of implementing standardized, transparent accounting for each unit, restructuring the 
enterprise so that Huajing’s main office oversaw the new accounting units.  In late 2000, 
Wang and his management team further restructured by establishing groups for standard 
                                                        
312 Interview with Wang Guoping and Teng Jingxin, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO 
of CRM in 2008 and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s.  Teng Jingxin was the Chief 
Engineer of CRM in 2009 and the former Chief Engineer of Huajing. 
313 Interview with Xu Juyan (许居衍), July 22, 2009, at CETC 58 in Wuxi.  Xu Juyan was former Chief 
Engineer of Institute 58 and in 2009 he was a senior advisor to CRM and Institute 58, among other roles. 
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managerial functions.  These new functions included: “general management, production 
operations, science quality, human resources, finance and accounting, and materials supply” 
as well as departments devoted to sales.314  Despite these necessary changes, Huajing 
remained a deeply indebted state-owned enterprise.   
 
Establishing Taiwan Links and the Foundry Model 
The reforms discussed above were important, but Huajing’s most notable feat in the 
1997 to 1999 timeframe -- when it was still ostensibly undertaking Project 908 -- was its 
adoption of the Taiwan-originated “dedicated foundry model.”315    In 1997, the Ministry of 
the Electronics Industry and the China Semiconductor Industry Association brought a 
Taiwanese semiconductor business delegation to visit Huajing in Wuxi.  This visit ultimately 
culminated in Huajing adopting the foundry model to serve both Chinese and international 
customers.316 
                                                        
314  “Huajing Weidianzi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Shunli Touru Guifanhua Yunzuo华晶微电子股份有限公司顺
利投入规范化运作 (Huajin Microelectronics Co. Ltd. Smoothly Standardizes Operations),”  Weidianzi Jishu 
微电子技术 (Microelectronic Technology), January, 2001.  The author of this article is not shown. 
315 Into the 1990s, most major global semiconductor firms operated under the “integrated device manufacturer 
(I.D.M.)” business model.  In an I.D.M., one vertically integrated company designs, fabricates (i.e., produces 
or manufactures), and packages/assembles/tests (P.A.T.) its own semiconductors, using its own foundry for 
fabrication.  This foundry model was first developed in Taiwan in 1987 at the Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC).  The foundry model is in contrast to the I.D.M. model.  Under the 
foundry model, a stand-alone foundry leases its capacity to any number of customers.  Customers design their 
semiconductors and then simply lease foundry capacity for fabrication.  The foundry does not sell 
semiconductors into the market.  That said, one company can act as a foundry while also having other 
revenue streams. 
316 Zhu Yiwei 朱贻纬 of the China Semiconductor Industry Association, “Liangan Jicheng Dianlu Chanye 
Jiaoliu Shinian Huigu 两岸集成电路产业交流十年回顾: 三，华晶上华 (Ten Years of Cross-Strait 




In late September and October of 1997, Huajing began negotiations with Taiwanese 
counterparts for the purpose of structuring a business that might resurrect Huajing’s loss-
making CMOS lines.317  After many sessions, on December 18, 1997, the two sides agreed to 
co-operate in running the 5-inch and 6-inch CMOS lines.  Huajing would provide the plant, 
production equipment and the original MOS plant’s 200 employees.  The Taiwanese team 
would found a company called CSMC in Hong Kong, and CSMC would provide capital, 
management and overseas customers for Huajing.  The Taiwanese group was led by Peter 
Chen; in the 1980s, Chen had successfully founded Mosel Electronics.318  In late 1997, the 
Huajing-CSMC agreement was approved by “the leading organs of the state,”319 and the two 
sides commenced joint work on February 1, 1998.320 
The arrangement above is often referred to as CSMC “leasing” Huajing’s facilities, in 
order to operate the facilities using the foundry model.  Yet, at that time, China’s domestic 
semiconductor industry was not yet open to Taiwan.  Why was this first, ad hoc arrangement 
with Taiwan able to proceed?  According to Wang Guoping, when the Huajing leaders were 
initially sorting out their relationship with CSMC, they simply did not involve provincial and 
national officials.  As Wang put it “We didn’t really talk about it or ask for permission, and no 
                                                        
317 The initial group from Taiwan consisted of: Xiong Cainan and Feng Mingxian from Taiwan, Xiao Chenghui 
from Hong Kong, and Peter Chen (Chen Zhengyu), a Chinese-American. 
318 Peter Chen (Chen Zhengyu) has a Ph.D from Cornell and has also worked for several global semiconductor 
firms, including Fairchild. 
319 Zhu Yiwei 朱贻纬 of the China Semiconductor Industry Association, “Liangan Jicheng Dianlu Chanye 
Jiaoliu Shinian Huigu 两岸集成电路产业交流十年回顾: 三，华晶上华 (Ten Years of Cross-Strait 
Exchanges in the I.C. Industry: Part 3, CSMC),” available in the archives of www.CSIA.com accessed in 
2009.   
320 Ibid.   
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one really said no.”321  (As we will see in Chapter Four, by this time, national leaders’ 
attention had begun to shift to the new Project 909 in Shanghai.)  Of course, the Ministry of 
the Electronics Industry had arranged the initial business delegation from Taiwan, and 
ultimately Huajing’s arrangement got approval from the state.  Yet, Wang and others 
expressed pride and some surprise in their own initiative in bringing Taiwanese into a 
nationally renowned (but challenged) Chinese enterprise.  Essentially, Taiwanese managers 
and engineers began working in Wuxi, helping Huajing’s managers move China’s Project 908 
toward an acceptable endpoint, if not exactly success.322   
The immediate purpose of the CSMC-Huajing arrangement was to bring capital into 
Huajing by leasing the foundry, but the larger purpose was to secure Taiwanese management 
and longer-term financial stability.  The Taiwan team sent a General Manager and several 
staff and brought in orders, as Huajing did not yet have marketing and sales capabilities to 
attract foreign orders.  (Huajing’s marketing and sales functions would be more solidly 
established in 2000).323  Under CSMC leadership, CSMC managers worked with Huajing 
staff to solve problems with finance, marketing, and quality control.  In 1998 and 1999, orders, 
equipment utilization, and salaries all began to increase.  In 1998, the operation lost about 
US$1million, but after 15 months, output quantity and quality had significantly improved,324 
                                                        
321 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  Wang was the CEO of CRM in 2008 
and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 1990s. 
322 Interview Wang Guopin and Teng Jingxin, July 16, 2009, at CRM headquarters.  As a counterpoint, Xu Juyan 
(formerly of Institute 58) said “The Chinese government allowed the CSMC deal because there were many 
joint ventures at that time.”  However, while international joint ventures were increasingly common in China, 
at that time, China’s domestic semiconductor industry was not open to Taiwan. 
323 Interview with Xu Juyan (许居衍), July 22, 2009, at CETC 58 in Wuxi.  Xu Juyan was former Chief 
Engineer of Institute 58 and in 2009 he was a senior advisor to CRM and Institute 58, among other roles. 
324 Zhu Yiwei 朱贻纬 of the China Semiconductor Industry Association, “Liangan Jicheng Dianlu Chanye 
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reaching 13,000 units per month in 1999, twice the monthly production of 1998.  CSMC 
moved from loss-making to break-even, verging on profitable.  (Recall, in April of 1998, 
Huajing got additional funding from the state and finally implemented the equipment from 
Lucent.) 
In 1999, Huajing and the Taiwan team again entered negotiations to further define and 
advance their arrangement.  After repeated talks, they agreed to form an official joint venture 
starting from August 1, 1999.325  The joint venture was called Wuxi CSMC-HJ Co., Ltd, and 
it was located in Wuxi’s new National High Technology Development Zone.  Huajing owned 
49 percent of the joint venture, and CSMC raised another US$6 million of capital.326  This 
joint venture was only a part of Huajing; it covered only the agreed upon fabrication lines.  
Working together, production quantity and quality continued to improve: by late 1999, the 6 
inch line had reached 60,000 units per month (roughly ten times 1998),327 and in 2000, 
monthly output reached 70,000 units.328 
CSMC’s lease of Huajing in 1997 was a pivotal turning point for Huajing.  With this 
arrangement, Huajing adopted the foundry model that was being used with much success in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Jiaoliu Shinian Huigu 两岸集成电路产业交流十年回顾: 三，华晶上华 (Ten Years of Cross-Strait 
Exchanges in the I.C. Industry: Part 3, CSMC),” available in the archives of www.CSIA.com accessed in 
2009. 
325 Publicly available company documents of China Resources Microelectronics.  
326 Wang Jifu, “China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation,” unpublished, circa 2000. 
327 Zhu Yiwei 朱贻纬 of the China Semiconductor Industry Association, “Liangan Jicheng Dianlu Chanye 
Jiaoliu Shinian Huigu 两岸集成电路产业交流十年回顾: 三，华晶上华 (Ten Years of Cross-Strait 
Exchanges in the I.C. Industry: Part 3, CSMC),” available in the archives of www.CSIA.com accessed in 
2009.   
328 In 2000, Wuxi CSMC-HJ produced “229 different I.C.s using…technology from Lucent.  Also…developed 
more than 30 new technologies…and 36 new MOS products for applications” according to Jifu Wang in 
“China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation,” unpublished, circa 2000. 
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Taiwan and had become the new model for the global semiconductor industry.329  As well, 
Huajing was engaging closely with foreign (Taiwanese) management and technical talent and 
was benefitting from new sources of funding and customers.  CSMC had more success with 
operating on the relatively simpler foundry model than Huajing had had with trying to operate 
on the I.D.M. model.  Contemporary China Resources Microelectronics (CRM) documents 
refer to CSMC’s founding in Hong Kong in 1997 as the origin of the enterprise, despite the 
enterprise’s much longer history on the Mainland.  (Recall, Huajing has been called CRM 
since 2002.) 
Finally, Huajing’s relationship with CSMC was a major step forward in terms of 
technology transfer from abroad.  Prior to CSMC, Huajing had imported equipment from 
Siemens (late 1980s), Toshiba (1980s and 1990s), and Lucent (1990s), as well as software 
from Promis Systems of Canada (1996),330 and in each of these cases, the technology transfer 
had included training.  However, Huajing had had limited results in utilizing the foreign 
technology.  The arrangement with CSMC, however, represented a more complete transfer 
and integration of management technology as well as material technology from abroad.  For 
example, Peter Chen brought several of his former Taiwanese managers from Mosel to work 
at CSMC in Wuxi.  In hindsight, Wang Guoping said “To seek outside partners…was the 
                                                        
329 The foundry model is an example of industry de-verticalization.  In the foundry model, fabrication is 
essentially out-sourced.  Semiconductor manufacturing is highly complex, but outsourcing was increasingly 
possible due to the modularization of electronics as well as electronic communication.  The primary benefit 
to customers of the foundry model is that they can design and sell semiconductors without making the huge 
capital investment necessary for building and maintaining an in-house foundry.  In the semiconductor 
industry, high utilization of foundry capacity is key for profitability.  For foundries (that is, enterprises or 
divisions of enterprises which are operating on the foundry model), the benefit of having an array of 
customers is that the foundry can try to fully utilize its capacity by carefully staging orders from different 
customers.  From the late 1990s, the foundry model became prevalent in the global semiconductor industry, 
with Taiwanese firms leading this trend. 
330 Pecht, Michael, The Chinese Electronics Industry: The Definitive Guide for Companies and Policy Makers 
(Norwich, NY: William Andrew Publishing, 2006), page 114. 
166 
 
only way out.  Choosing the Chinese [Taiwanese] management team was based mainly on its 
rich experience in operating overseas and on the foundry model.  Looking back, reviewing the 
options…cooperation with the Chinese [Taiwanese] was correct.”331 
 
From Vertical Integration to Sectoral Businesses 
Separating the foundry to be run jointly with CSMC provided a critical financial 
bailout for Huajing,332 but it also foreshadowed Huajing’s continued restructuring by sector, 
that is, its pursuit of vertical disintegration.333  The key value-chain sectors in the 
semiconductor industry are: 
Materials 
       
      V 
 
Design  >  Fabrication (foundry)  >  Packaging/Assembly/Testing (P.A.T.) 
 
     ^ 
Equipment 
 
By 1999, Huajing had combined the P.A.T. work of its bipolar and MOS plants to form one 
P.A.T. business unit.  Then, in 2000, Huajing established Wuxi Huajing Microelectronics to 
focus on discrete device manufacturing.  By late 2000, the management team had also 
established individual groups to focus on design (Wuxi Huajing Guike Microelectronics) and 
                                                        
331 “CRM: Internally and Externally to Challenge the New Target,” China Electronics News, July 18, 2007.  The 
author of this article was not listed.   
332 By leasing the foundry to CSMC, Huajing was able to use the lease income to support its remaining 
operations.  




other groups to focus on materials.334  In this way, Huajing further restructured to designate 
materials, design, foundry, and P.A.T. as separate spheres of work.  Of course, the separation 
of R&D and production had been problematic under central planning, and for Huajing the 
lack of coordination between R&D and production was still a problem in the early 1990s 
when Huajing ostensibly was working with Institute 1424.  However, by 2000, Huajing’s 
business environment had changed in several ways such that there was less concern about 
gaps between R&D and production.  Some examples: the foundry was fabricating customers’ 
designs; Huajing’s design institutes were aligned with its production lines (e.g., the “device 
design institute” and the “bipolar design institute” served their respective production lines); 
and the design institutes were actually part of Huajing rather than merely “affiliated with” 
Huajing, as had been the case with Institute 1424.   
In the early 2000s, Huajing (by then called “China Resources”) formalized its vertical 
dis-integration, establishing individual businesses by sector, including: 
Design:  Wuxi China Resources Semico Co., Ltd. 
Foundry:  CSMC Technologies; Wuxi China Resources Semiconductor Wafers & 
Chips 
P.A.T.:  Wuxi China Resources Micro-Assembly Technology, Ltd. 
Discrete Devices:  Wuxi China Resources Huajing Microelectronics Co., Ltd.   
 
Note that China Resources retained the Huajing name in the business that was established to 
focus on discrete devices, which were the low-end devices for which the Huajing brand was 
renowned.  Huajing’s P.A.T. business, as well as the P.A.T. sector generally, is analyzed in 
Chapter Five.  (P.A.T. is a lower-end but still technical sector.) 
                                                        
334 “Huajing Weidianzi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Shunli Touru Guifanhua Yunzuo华晶微电子股份有限公司顺
利投入规范化运作 (Huajin Microelectronics Co. Ltd. Smoothly Standardizes Operations),”  Weidianzi Jishu 
微电子技术 (Microelectronic Technology), January, 2001.  The author of this article is not shown. 
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From Central to Municipal Control, From Debt to Stock 
By 2000, Huajing had made progress in terms of both revenue and organization, but it 
was still a centrally controlled state-owned enterprise (despite having one sub-company that 
was a joint venture with CSMC), and despite some debt relief, Huajing still had significant 
debt.   Further ownership, financial, and managerial reforms were needed. 
In 2000, the central government transferred Huajing from the (central) Ministry of 
Information Industry335 to the Wuxi municipal government.  The city of Wuxi offered 
Huajing significant financial and policy support, including establishing a Microelectronics 
High Tech Park.336  To reduce Huajing’s costs, the Wuxi government took responsibility for 
Huajing’s schools, hospital and other community services.  With these changes, Huajing came 
under the control of the Wuxi Asset Management Company (WAMC), which consisted of the 
Wuxi State Asset Committee and banks that had loaned money to Huajing.  At that time, 
Huajing may have owed around RMB530 million to the National Adjustment Fund.  With the 
transfer to Wuxi, Huajing’s debt was converted to stock.   The WAMC owned 59 percent of 
Huajing’s stock, and the banks held the remaining 41 percent.  The new Wuxi-controlled 
Huajing had a board of directors, management committee, and stockholders.  The intention 
was that each of these groups would have clear roles and responsibilities, and Huajing would 
                                                        
335 In 1998, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry merged with the Ministry of Posts and Communications to 
become the new Ministry of Information Industries. 
336 Gao Gaifang 高改芳, “Guojia Ziben Touru Xinpianye de Gean: Huajing Wuyan Jieju 国家资本投入芯片业
的个案：华晶的无言结局 (The Nation’s Capital in the Chip Industry: Huajing’s Silent Ending),” Shanghai 
Baodao 上海报道 (Shanghai Report), May 23, 2003.  The National Adjustment Fund (国家调节基金) had 




follow China’s newly implemented corporate laws and regulations.337  The influence of 
government officials would be confined to their role on the board of directors, and they would 
not be involved in daily operations.338  That year, the enterprise was renamed “China Huajing 
Electronics Group Limited.”  By taking ownership of Huajing, the city of Wuxi sought to 
reinforce (or regain) its vital role in China’s semiconductor industry.  For Huajing, the new 
ownership and management structures meant increased management autonomy, but the debt 
and revenue problems continued. 
Huajing’s Organization in 2000339 
Total Employees: 4,393, about one third with college degrees 
Engineers and Technicians: 2,300, many with international training from 
Toshiba, Siemens, etc. 
Assets: RMB3 billion 
Primary Products: 
(1) transistors, semiconductors and related products 
                                                        
337 China enacted a new “Company Law” in July of 1994; this law established new forms of ownership as well 
as new corporate governance mechanisms.  Historically, China’s state owned enterprises were not companies 
in the Western sense.  They were vehicles of the government, assets to be utilized to meet the central plan.  
These assets were owned by the state on behalf of the people.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese 
officials experimented with a number of reforms aimed at establishing some legal basis for corporate forms 
and at giving some responsibilities and independence to managers in the state owned enterprises.  Prior to the 
1994 law, China’s state owned enterprises were not independent legal entities and they lacked property rights 
commonly attributed to “property” in the West, such as the right of ownership, the right to use, the right of 
returns on property, and the right to transfer property (“alienation.”)   The Company Law of 1994 established 
the legal basis of joint stock companies and limited liability companies (although, of course, not all state 
owned enterprises were immediately reformed into these new structures.)  For limited liability companies and 
joint stock companies, the New Company Law established shareholder rights and duties as well as structures 
of corporate governance, i.e., the roles and duties of corporate boards and directors and the requirements for 
disclosure, transparency, and monitoring of company records. 
338 Wang Jifu, “China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation,” unpublished, circa 2000.  During this era, many 
of China’s state owned enterprises underwent structural and ownership reforms.  In the semiconductor 
industry, however, Huajing’s restructuring process was unique.  China’s other “key” semiconductor 
enterprises were established as Sino-foreign joint ventures and, after Huajing, China’s two follow-on 
semiconductor “national champions” were structured anew (see Chapter Four.)  Thus, the restructuring of 
Huajing was not a model that influenced the larger industry or that was copied in other semiconductor 
enterprises.  The specifics of Huajing’s ownership restructuring (details of which were not available in full 
for this study) seem not to be germane to the larger story of the industry’s development.  That said, Section 




(2) bipolar analog I.C.s 
(3) MOS I.C.s 
Subsidiary Products:  
Silicon materials and epitaxial wafers, precise molding dies, lead-frames 
for discrete devices and I.C.s, photo-masks, hyper pure water, N2, H2, O2 
and industry gases 
Customers:  approximately 2000 including: Konka, Changhong, HiSense, TCL, 
Amoisonic, Great Wall, Haier, Panda, Chunlan and overseas customers 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, India, Indonesia, and South 
America. 
 
   
From Huajing (Wuxi) to China Resources (Hong Kong) 
Huajing’s ongoing financial problems eventually led to its acquisition by yet another 
state-owned enterprise.  But the new owner -- despite being state-owned -- would bring new 
capital and opportunities to Huajing.   
In 1999 and 2000, with growing debt and lack of investment capital, Huajing’s 
managers realized that Huajing could not survive much less thrive in the fast changing 
semiconductor industry.  Thus, in September of 1999, Huajing and the Wuxi Asset 
Management Company (WAMC) sought international partners (in addition to CSMC) in 
order to gain investment capital, but there were no takers.  By 2001, Wuxi and Huajing 
officials believed that they could only save Huajing by finding “like minded investors” to 
inject new capital, and thus they decided to pursue resource-rich Huarun (华润), English 
name China Resources (CR), of Hong Kong.  Huajing’s rising executive Wang Guoping 
backed this strategy, just as he had backed the strategy of bringing in CSMC from Taiwan.340  
                                                        
340 “Zaibao Huajing: Wuxi Gongye San Da Chongzu Jiedu zhi Yi 再造华晶: 无锡工业三大重组解读之一 
(Recycling Huajing: Three Interpretations of Wuxi’s Industrial Reorganization),” Wuxi Ribao 无锡日报
(Wuxi Daily), October 9, 2002.  The author of this article is not listed. 
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China Resources was and is a large Chinese state-owned enterprise group,341 and it is one of 
the largest companies in all of Hong Kong and China.  (Revenues were HK$110 billion and 
assets were HK$240 billion in 2010.)342  China Resources is a holding company that operates 
businesses across a spectrum of industries.  In 2000, China Resources was aggressively 
expanding in mainland China, including in the electronics industry.  Despite being state-
owned, China Resources’ experience base and management quality were perceived as being at 
an international level.  Yet, the decision to cooperate with China Resources was fraught: 
many Huajing staff were uncertain about their own and Huajing’s future under China 
Resources because China Resources was viewed as a foreign company.  Nonetheless, in July 
of 2001, China Resources and Huajing signed an “agreement in principal” to restructure 
Huajing.343 
After a longer than expected approval process and a complex, multi-step restructuring, 
China Resources’ completed an acquisition of Huajing in September of 2002.344  The key 
steps were as follows:345 
                                                        
341 See Chapter Four, Section 4.5 (4.4?), for an explanation of China’s large enterprise groups. 
342 Huarun华润, Huarun 70 Nian!华润 70 年  (Huarun at 70!) (Hong Kong: Huarun, 2008).  See a synopsis of 
China Resource’s history at http://www.crc.com.hk/aboutus/historry/.  China Resources was originally 
founded in 1938 in Hong Kong as an enterprise to raise funds for the CCP.  From the early 1950s, it was 
China’s import and export company in Hong Kong.  In 1983, it restructured as China Resources Holdings 
Company, Ltd., expanding into many industries in Mainland China and listing on the Hong Kong exchange 
in 1992.  Although located in Hong Kong, China Resource’s management team is from Mainland China, and 
it is one of China’s largest enterprise groups and a member of China’s “national team,” see Chapter Four, 
Section 4.42.  The group has holdings in retail, textiles, medicine, and finance as well as land, power, cement, 
gas and electronics.  China Resources had over 200,000 employees in 2010. 
343 “Zaibao Huajing: Wuxi Gongye San Da Chongzu Jiedu zhi Yi 再造华晶: 无锡工业三大重组解读之一 
(Recycling Huajing: Three Interpretations of Wuxi’s Industrial Reorganization),” Wuxi Ribao 无锡日报
(Wuxi Daily), October 9, 2002.  The author of this article is not listed. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Publicly available China Resources company documents.n 
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• In 2000, China Resources founded China Resources 
Microelectronics (CRM) as a holding company. 
• In 2001, China Resources’ previously existing microelectronics 
company, called China Resources Logic Ltd., acquired CRM.  Both 
continued to exist, but with CRM subordinate to China Resources 
Logic.  
• In 2002, CRM acquired Huajing; Huajing was renamed Wuxi CRM 
Holding Company.  CRM had not acquired CSMC-HJ, but CSMC-
HJ continued to lease the foundry from Wuxi CRM.   
• In 2004, CSMC-HJ listed on the Hong Kong exchange, and in 2006, 
China Resources Logic acquired CSMC through CRM.     
 
In the 2002 agreement under which China Resources acquired Huajing, Huajing’s debt was 
restructured and reduced by RMB324 million to RMB569 million.  China Resources had four 
years to repay the debt, until December of 2005.  Wuxi CRM operates to this day as part of 
the China Resources enterprise group, and CRM has businesses in the various sectors of the 
semiconductor value chain, e.g., design, foundry, and P.A.T.  CRM’s revenues grew rapidly 
from 2002.346  Figure Five shows Huajing and CRM’s revenue. 
With China Resources’ acquisition of Huajing, the state did not lose assets (assets 
were not privatized), the outstanding loans to WAMC were repaid, and the city of Wuxi 
benefited from Huajing’s continued operations, which provided jobs and tax revenue.  
Nonetheless, in the eyes of some industry personnel, Huajing’s sale to CR was a loss because 
CR was not a long-standing, mainland semiconductor enterprise.  Huajing, a national 
champion, had not been able to achieve financial and technical success on its own.   
                                                        
346 China Resources planned to invest RMB 4 billion in Huajing in the three to five years after re-establishing 





Figure 5: Estimates of Huajing-affiliated Organizations’ Revenues in US$ millions 
These estimates are based on ratios of revenues among Huajing-affiliated organizations.  Since 2008, Huajing-affiliated 




Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang 
华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan State-owned Radio Equipment Factory),” Liaowang 瞭望 (Outlook), Period 22, 
1986. 
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3.5 Huajing, Project 908, and the Evolution of China’s Domestic Semiconductor 
Industry 
 
Project 908 did not materialize as planned on a number of fronts: the long wait from 
1990 to 1995 for approvals and funding, the exodus of Institute 1424 in 1995, seeking help 
from Taiwanese managers in 1997, the restructuring from central to municipal ownership in 
2000, the myriad internal reorganizations from 1997 through 2000, and finally the acquisition 
by Hong Kong-based China Resources.  Project 908 did not result in China having an 
“advanced semiconductor enterprise” with Huajing standing as a beacon to other Chinese and 
foreign enterprises, despite real product advances by 2000.347  Nonetheless, Huajing’s 
rectification process resulted in many changes that previewed the relatively successful future 
of Huajing (a.k.a. CRM), and Huajing’s reforms also previewed the future of China’s 
domestic semiconductor industry, as the industry further reformed and globalized.  More 
broadly, Huajing’s history demonstrates how a “national champion” high-tech, state-owned 
enterprise attempted to reform and advance from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, a critical 
period in China’s economic and industrial development. 
Many of the enterprise solutions that Huajing undertook will resurface in the 
following chapters, as we look at the two major follow-on projects, Project 909 and SMIC 
(Chapter Four), and as we look at China’s further integration with the global semiconductor 
industry (Chapter Five.)  We will see personnel from Huajing and other so-called old (i.e., 
state) enterprises managing seemingly “new” enterprises.  As one example, a number of the 
executives from Taiwan and Hong Kong who were involved in the original planning of the 
                                                        
347 See “China’s Huajing to Supply Lucent with Telecom I.C. Chips,” AsiaPulse News, April 3, 2000.  Lucent 
signed a contract to purchase telecom I.C. chips that were being produced on the equipment that Lucent 
transferred to Huajing.  Between 1998 and 2000, Huajing had produced more than 70,000 (MOS technology) 
chips, of 229 types, with production yields of over 95 percent.  Huajing had also “independently developed” 




CSMC-Huajing went on to play major roles in some of China’s other important 
semiconductor enterprises, such as SMIC, Grace Semiconductor, and others.348  Indeed, older 
industry personnel refer to Huajing as the Whampoa Military Academy of China’s 
semiconductor industry not because of Huajing’s historical military connections but because 
so many semiconductor industry talents were “trained” at Huajing.349  
Also, just as Huajing brought in Taiwanese talent in 1997, as China further opens to 
the global semiconductor industry in the 2000s, Taiwan’s influence will quickly be seen 
throughout the industry in China.  This will especially be true at SMIC, but also in China’s 
broader adoption of the [Taiwan originated] foundry model.  In effect, Project 908’s “failure” 
came to serve as the launching pad for both cross-strait semiconductor business relationships 
and for China’s identity as a global site for foundry production.  In Project 909 and SMIC, 
officials will apply lessons learned from Huajing and will enlist significant foreign 
partnerships from the start and take new approaches to funding, in terms of quantity, timing 
and sources.   
Amid and after Project 908, Chinese officials retained the vision of developing one 
large, successful Chinese I.D.M., but most of the industry eventually followed the vertically 
disintegrated business model that Huajing adopted and that was indeed the new global 
model.350  And, China’s adoption of the foundry model would foster human resource 
development and innovation in China, as new design houses and P.A.T. firms emerged to 
work with the foundries, as we will see in Chapter Five.  
                                                        
348 Zhu Yiwei 朱贻纬 of the China Semiconductor Industry Association, “Liangan Jicheng Dianlu Chanye 
Jiaoliu Shinian Huigu 两岸集成电路产业交流十年回顾: 三，华晶上华 (Ten Years of Cross-Strait 
Exchanges in the I.C. Industry: Part 3, CSMC),” available in the archives of www.CSIA.com accessed in 
2009. 
349 The Whampoa Military Academy was the famous military academy in early 20th century China (under the 
Guomindang) where many well-known military leaders were trained. 
350 By the late 1990s, advances and standardization in E.D.A. (electronic design automation, which are software 
tools used to design semiconductors) and advances in inter-firm electronic communications enabled 
electronics firms to focus on their so-called core competencies.  Non-core work could be more easily 
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In Chapter Three, we saw the origins and eventual outcomes of China’s first major 
state sponsored semiconductor project, Project 908 at Huajing in Wuxi.  Project 908, 
instigated in 1990, followed a cascade of new policies in the 1980s for China’s electronics 
and semiconductor industries, covered in Chapter Two.  Project 908 was – and is – often 
called a failure, and it is little referenced in Chinese or foreign sources,351 although Chinese 
industry elders now seem to recognize Wuxi and Project 908 at Huajing as the “cradle” of 
China’s domestic semiconductor industry.  Despite Project 908’s challenges and shortcomings, 
the enterprise solutions implemented at Huajing previewed key changes in China’s domestic 
semiconductor industry from 1990 to 2000 and beyond, especially in the manufacturing sector.  
Key changes included: engaging foreign partnerships and management; improving state 
support for key projects; vertically dis-integrating enterprises by sector; adopting the foundry 
model;352 and accepting investment from Taiwan.  Importantly, because of the central 
government’s prioritization of microelectronics, Project 908’s obstacles and eventual 
solutions received high level official attention, and lessons from Project 908 were applied to 
                                                        
351 iSupply, a leading global industry research organization, published a report in 2002 called “Semiconductor 
Wafer Manufacturing in China: A Panacea or a Global Investment Trap?”  This report devoted just three 
sentences to Project 908 concluding with “Unfortunately, Project 908 was never as successful as initially 
hoped, primarily due to poor management,” page 4.  In Michael Pecht’s China’s Electronics Industry 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2006), Pecht’s only reference to Project 908 is as follows: “In 1998, Huajing 
set up six inch lines with technology transferred from Lucent as part of National Project 908.”*  The footnote 
ends with “Because of the bureaucracy and low level management of state owned enterprises, the project 
resulted in huge deficits and was regarded as a failure.” 
352 Until the 1990s, most major global semiconductor firms operated under the “integrated device manufacturer 
(I.D.M.)” business model.  In an I.D.M., one vertically integrated company designs, fabricates (i.e., 
manufactures), and packages/assembles/tests (P.A.T.) its own semiconductors, using its own foundry for 
fabrication.  This foundry model was first developed in Taiwan in 1987 at the Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC).  The foundry model is in contrast to the I.D.M. model.  Under the 
foundry model, a stand-alone foundry leases its capacity to any number of customers.  Customers design their 
semiconductors and then simply lease foundry capacity for fabrication.  The foundry does not sell 





other enterprises and influenced industry policy.  From Project 908 we begin to see how 
Chinese officials learned from the experiences of individual enterprises, and in this way, we 
see both “state led development” and “enterprise led development” in the semiconductor 
industry, as will be analyzed more fully in Section 4.4 of this chapter. 
This chapter looks at the major state supported353 semiconductor projects of the 1990s 
that followed Project 908.  The research centers on three endeavors: 1) China’s establishment 
of five “key” enterprises (wu da zhugan qiye 五大主干企业), four of which were Sino-
foreign joint ventures (Section 4.1), 2) Project 909, which largely consisted of establishing 
Huahong-NEC (华虹-NEC), a new Sino-Japanese joint venture (Section 4.2), and 3) the 
establishment of Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC, Zhongxin 
Guoji 中心国际), which was a new wholly foreign owned enterprise, registered in the 
Cayman Islands but headquartered in Shanghai (Section 4.3).  Project 908 provided funding 
for the five key enterprises, one of which was Huajing.  Huajing was thus a key enterprise, but 
Huajing was also considered a “national champion” (guojia guanjun 国家冠军) while the 
other key enterprises were not.  As we will see in this chapter, Project 909’s Huahong-NEC 
and SMIC were also considered national champions.  The chronology was Project 908 
(Huajing), followed by the establishment of China’s key enterprises, then Project 909 
(Huahong-NEC), and finally SMIC.  However, these were all long-term projects (construction 
alone took several years), and because each of the projects was instigated in the ten years 
                                                        
353  Here, the phrase “state supported” indicates that a project or enterprise was in some way supported by the 
state but was not necessarily state owned. 
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between 1990 and 2000, there was actually much overlap in timing and operations, although 
they were all separate projects with unique facilities. 
This chapter reveals the origins, goals, and contributions of these projects and 
enterprises and ultimately considers how they add to our understanding of “state led 
development” and national champion enterprises in China’s contemporary economic history.  
Other scholars such as Chalmers Johnson, Alice Amsden, and Robert Wade have studied the 
extent to which state led development and industrial policies fostered rapid economic 
development in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, respectively, in the latter half of the 20th 
century.  Their studies on these three nations are broad-based.  They address state led 
development and industrial policies that were designed to influence enterprises and trade 
across many industries, but they also address the entire modern economic history of a nation 
as well as global economic history and economic theory.  Similarly, many studies of China’s 
economy since reform and opening have also been broad-based, with a number of studies 
addressing China’s state owned sector across industries.354  These studies aim to show how 
China on the whole is developing or how China’s state owned sector is developing, including 
the legal and financial structures of state owned enterprises.  Such studies have revealed 
fundamental, cross-industry trends and issues, e.g., China’s gradual, experimental approach to 
economic reforms, the ongoing role of state owned enterprises, the “soft” budgets of state 
owned enterprises, and others.  Yet, these studies do not necessarily reveal how particular 
                                                        
354 Chen Derong, Chinese Firms Between Hierarchy and Market (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1995); Edward 
Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter Nolan, “Beyond 
Privitization: Institutional Innovation and Growth in China’s Large State Owned Enterprises,” World 
Development, Volume 27, Number 1, 1999; Dylan Sutherland, China’s Large Enterprises and the Challenge 
of Late Industrialization (London: Routledge, 2003). 
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industries in China have developed during the reform era.355  As important as the state owned 
sector is, industries in China have been influenced by more than just the state sector since 
reform and opening.  Further, different types of industries (i.e., heavy industries, light 
industries, high technology industries) have likely developed in different ways.356  For 
example, the contemporary history of the semiconductor industry in China may suggest how 
other high technology industries (e.g., the life sciences or new energy) have developed, but it 
is likely less relevant to industries such as steel and textiles.  Thus, this study does not take a 
cross-industry, broad-based approach.  Instead, this research is concerned with how a 
particular industry developed in China, including state policies and projects and state owned 
enterprises, but also industry-specific requirements for technological catch-up, foreign 
partnering and investment in China, global knowledge sharing, and global trade.357 
After considering China’s key and national champion enterprises, this chapter 
introduces the notion that, in the 1990s, the semiconductor industry in China was both “state 
                                                        
355 The notable exception to this approach is Peter Nolan, China and the Global Business Revolution (London: 
Palgrave Press, 2001.)  Nolan’s concern is whether China’s state owned “national team” is having success in 
China and globally, and he includes eight industry case studies.  Ling Liu’s China’s Industrial Policies and 
the Global Business Revolution: The Case of the Domestic Appliance Industry (New York: Routledge, 2005) 
looks at the effectiveness of industrial policy in the appliance industry in China by considering how three 
state owned Chinese appliance companies evolved.  Other studies do include cases on state ownership in 
particular industries, but the cases are usually presented to support broader claims about state ownership, and 
thus the cases are not necessarily meant to capture the multi-dimensional history of their industry.  Steinfeld’s 
Forging Reform presents China’s steel industry as a “bellweather” (page 24) for state owned enterprise 
reform and property and ownership institutions.  Steinfeld documents that lack of hard budgets for these 
enterprises, concluding that China’s state owned enterprises were quite troubled (page 249).  Also using case 
studies of state owned enterprises in the iron and steel industries are John Hassard, Sheehan, Zhou, Terpstra-
Tong, and Morris, China’s State Enterprise Reform (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
356 In China, industries varied widely in terms of their level of development upon reform and opening, their 
requirements for physical and human capital, and their position in domestic and international trade.  Further, 
within a particular industry, individual sectors may have developed differently.  In the semiconductor industry, 
the manufacturing sector was directly affected by state projects in the 1990s, but the semiconductor P.A.T. 
sector was less affected.  The P.A.T. sector is effectively a high technology industry in its own right. 
357 Industry-specific and technology-specific developments figure prominently in economic and business history, 
i.e., the new technologies of coal, steam, and telegraph and related new industries including rail and telecom. 
182 
 
led” and “enterprise led.”  That is, the state indeed defined and supported certain projects and 
enterprises (state led development), but the experiences of enterprises also influenced Chinese 
policy makers (enterprise led development.)  Indeed, top central government officials were 
well aware of the obstacles that China’s key and national champion semiconductor enterprises 
faced.  In the 1990s, officials and enterprise leaders more often resolved problems through 
one-off solutions rather than through top down policies designed to influence all enterprises or 
trade.  Reforms to China’s centrally planned semiconductor industry were announced in 1986 
and 1987 (Chapter Two), but it was only after 2000 that officials announced new, industry-
wide policies for the semiconductor industry.  Thus, in this particular high technology 
industry, for a period of about fifteen years, enterprise led development (bottom up input from 
enterprises) influenced the formation of new, industry-wide policies that Chinese officials did 
not put in place until after 2000 (see Section 4.4.) 
A note on terms: In discussing the 1990s, it is appropriate to refer to “the 
semiconductor industry in China” rather than “China’s semiconductor industry.”  In this 
decade, China’s major state supported semiconductor enterprises all had foreign partners.  
Also in the 1990s, foreign electronics and semiconductor-related firms began to establish 
operations in China.  In this way, the industry in China transitioned from being “China’s” 
industry to being a site for the global industry.  
In this chapter we will see that, in the 1990s, Chinese officials approached the 
establishment of each of the three national champions (Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC) 
differently, but one belief remained the same throughout each of the projects.  Chinese 
officials believed that state support for a particular large-scale production enterprise would 
ultimately attract and foster the growth of non-state firms, both foreign and domestic.  The 
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goal of these state supported projects was not to create a “national” semiconductor industry.  
The goal was to show that a high technology production enterprise could function in China, 
despite China’s less than ideal operating environment (discussed in Chapter Two, Section 
2.43)358 and that such an enterprise would ultimately foster the establishment and growth of 
other enterprises – regardless of ownership – throughout the industry value chain. 
As we will see, each of the national champions enjoyed official and financial support 
at the highest levels.  Leading central government officials were directly involved in planning, 
management, and oversight.  These included Premier Li Peng, President Jiang Zemin, 
Shanghai’s Mayor, the head of China’s Ministry of the Electronics Industry, and top 
electronics experts from the Chinese Academy of Science.  The funds invested – ultimately 
well over US$2 billion – were outsized; for example, the funding for Project 909 alone was 
equal to almost seven percent of China’s entire reported military budget for 1995.359   
Why did Chinese leaders choose to invest in large-scale semiconductor fabrication 
facilities (that is, semiconductor production enterprises) to foster the semiconductor industry 
in China?  This decision may seem counterintuitive, given the technological complexity and 
cost of these facilities, in addition to the cut-throat global competition in the industry.  In fact, 
the Chinese government was simultaneously making related investments in education, design, 
and industrial clusters to support the semiconductor industry, as we will see in Chapter Five.  
                                                        
358 Section 2.43 deals with issues related to moving away from central planning, but foreign semiconductor-
related firms also saw China’s operating environment as less than ideal in the 1990s.  Problems included the 
lack of transparent rules for foreign investment, high and inconsistent tariffs on imported equipment, materials, 
and semiconductors, lack of protection for intellectual property, and rampant smuggling of electronics 
components in China, among others.  See Section 4.43 for more detail. 
359 China’s reported military budget in 1995 was US$7.6 billion, according to GlobalSecurity, a US-based, non-
governmental organization.  However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that 




But there were reasons why officials initially prioritized investing in large-scale production 
enterprises.  First, Chinese leaders were still in the process of partially dismantling and 
consolidating China’s formerly centrally planned semiconductor industry, and they wanted to 
create just a few advanced enterprises.  Second, the Chinese government invested in large 
production enterprises because of China’s low technological level in production and because 
of the hope that better capabilities in production would lead to capturing a larger part of 
China’s growing semiconductor market.  In describing late industrializers, Alice Amsden 
noted “The shop floor tends to be the strategic focus of firms that compete on the basis of 
borrowed technology.  …It is there that borrowed technology is first made operational and 
later optimized.  …Incremental, yet cumulative, improvements in productivity and product 
specification are essential to enhance price and quality competitiveness.”360  Indeed, in China 
too, semiconductor industry leaders planned to use borrowed technology to make 
improvements in manufacturing that would – eventually – advance the broader industry.  
Officials did not create these key and national champion enterprises because they 
believed that state ownership (or state investment) was the most profitable form of ownership.  
In the Chinese industry sources available for this study, Chinese leaders make no argument 
for the financial or technical performance of state owned or state invested enterprises.  Rather, 
they seem eager for the growth of non-state firms.  Again, the hope in establishing these 
enterprises was that numerous non-state firms would emerge alongside the state supported 
enterprises, ultimately resulting in a vibrant, diverse industry chain.  Thus, the aim of these 
enterprises was not first and foremost profit, nor import substitution, nor to preclude foreign 
competitors in China.  Chinese leaders increasingly recognized the need for profits to sustain 
                                                        
360 Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), page 5. 
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semiconductor operations, yet in the available sources, there was no mention of the 
enterprises being bound to specific business plans, timelines, or financial models, even though 
most of the government’s investment came in the form of loans that had to be repaid.361 
The final and perhaps most important reason why the Chinese government invested in 
large production enterprises related to capital.  In the 1990s, the technology of the global 
semiconductor industry had advanced to the point that, according to a Rand analysis, only 
companies with more than approximately US$5 billion in annual revenues likely had the 
capital to build competitive semiconductor fabrication facilities.362  As no Chinese firm had 
this level of capital and China lacked capital markets, the only way for a relatively advanced 
semiconductor production enterprise to emerge was through government support. 
As we will see in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, Huahong-NEC and SMIC’s outcomes were 
mixed.  Project 909’s Huahong had trouble attracting a foreign partner and resorted to 
guaranteeing potential partners a protected segment of China’s market.  SMIC faced a number 
of intellectual property-related lawsuits.  Both Huahong-NEC and SMIC were viewed by 
industry personnel as not well managed, due in part to their ties to the state.  These problems 
and critiques confirmed perceptions that business practices in China were problematic and 
institutions were weak, yet we will see that these enterprises did manage to enlist numerous 
foreign partnerships. 
                                                        
361 There could have been timelines for profitability and loan repayment, but these were not mentioned in the 
sources used, despite frequent mention of other financial matters, i.e., revenue results and investments.  The 
goals mentioned were almost always technological, not financial.  Of course, the inability of Chinese state 
owned enterprises to pay back loans is a well-documented problem, see for example, Steinfeld, Forging 
Reform. 
362 Rand National Defense Research Institute (M. Chase, K. Pollpeter, J. Mulvenon), “Shanghai-ed?: The 




Despite their serious problems, these enterprises bridged the era of the centrally 
planned semiconductor industry of the 1980s with the post-2000 globally linked era.  What 
were the ultimate contributions of Huahong-NEC, SMIC, and China’s key enterprises?  These 
enterprises resulted in significantly increased semiconductor production in China (see Figure 
Six) and Chinese firms (or Sino-foreign joint ventures) remained among the largest 
semiconductors firms operating in China in the 2000s, despite the arrival of foreign 
semiconductor firms (see Figure Seven.)  These enterprises also employed thousands of 
Chinese staff, exposing them to more advanced technology as well as to foreign partners and 
customers, and thus these enterprises made significant contributions to China’s talent pool.  
Finally, the experiences of these enterprises and the obstacles they faced prompted policy 
changes and changes in enterprise organization and management that benefited the entire 
industry.  Officials announced new policies in 2000 for investment, tax, trade, financing, and 
intellectual property protection.  These policies supported the key and national champion 
enterprises, but they also applied to the larger semiconductor industry in China, including 
non-state and foreign firms. 
4.1  China’s Five “Key” Semiconductor Enterprises 
As Project 908 was being planned and implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Chinese officials were still following through on plans to divest, consolidate, and strengthen 
China’s remaining state owned semiconductor enterprises.  In the 1980s, China state owned 
semiconductor industry had had some 340 semiconductor-related enterprises, with most 
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Figure 7: Largest 15 Semiconductor Firms in China in 2003 by Revenue
Chinese enterprises in italics. 
Note: These are the firms with hightest revenues operating in China.  
These are not the same at the largest semiconductor suppliers to the Chinese market because most of the semiconductors that meet China's market demand are 
imported. 
Analysis:  
Of the top 15 firms' revenue in 2003, "Chinese" firms constituted 47 percent. 
The "Chinese" firms were a mix of ownership forms. 
Rank Headquarters Name Revenue in 2003 (US$ million) 2003 Notes on "Chinese" Firms 
1 US Motorola 962   
2 China/Cayman 
Islands/International 
SMIC 350 SMIC is a WFOE registered in the Cayman Islands. 
3 Japan Renesas 195   
4 China/Japan Huahong-NEC 188 Huahong-NEC of Project 909 is a Sino-Foreign JV. 
5 China/US Leshan 149 LeShan has a JV with Motorola and provides mainly discrete devices. 
6 Switzerland Shenzhen Sai STMicroelectronics 125   
7 US Intel 109   
8 China Jianxin XinChao 108 XinChao is a state owned group. 
9 China/Netherlands ASMC 94 ASMC has a JV with Netherlands-based Philips and serves mainly as a foundry for Philips. 
10 China/Japan Nantong-Fujitsu 92 Nantong-Fujitsu is a Sino-foreign JV. 
11 China JCET 84 JCET is large state owned P.A.T. enterprise near Wuxi. 
12 China/Hong Kong China Resources 
Microelectronics/CSMC 
77 CRM is a member of the CR enterprise group; it includes Huajing and CSMC of Project 908. 
13 China Datang 75 Datang is a state owned enterprise group in electronics-related industries. 
14 Singapore ChipPAC 73   
15 China/Japan Shougang-NEC 68 Shougang-NEC is a Sino-foreign JV; Chinese partner is Beijing Shougang, a steel enterprise 
group. 
Source: PWC, "China's Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2004," data sources include CSIA, CCID, and PwC analysis. 
"Chinese" revenue: 1,285  47% 
Other revenue: 1,464  53% 




making discrete devices while only about twenty enterprises could actually produce integrated 
circuits.363  Recall from Chapter Two that as early as 1982, the State Council Leading Group 
for the Revitalization of the Electronics Industry was setting strategies to reform the 
semiconductor industry, including a policy called “Control Fragmentation and Control Chaos” 
(zhi san, zhi luan 治散, 治乱).  This strategy referred to the fact that the state industry had too 
many organizations that were not effectively cooperating.  This strategy was discussed in the 
1980s while industry leaders were dispersing more advanced, imported semiconductor 
equipment to thirty-three semiconductor sites, with few results. 
In the mid to late 1980s, the Leading Group for the Revitalization of the Electronics 
Industry decided to technologically upgrade just a handful of semiconductor enterprises while 
investing in two Bases and one “Point,” the city of Xian.364  Indeed, in 1989, the leading 
group held a conference in Wuxi (see Chapter Two) resulting in a specific strategy for the 
semiconductor industry for 1989 through 1995.  The strategy included allocating RMB5 
billion (about US$600 million) to the two Bases as well as to Project 908 and the five “key” 
semiconductor enterprises.365  The goal was for the five key enterprises to meet more than 60 
percent of China’s domestic sales volume by 1995. 
                                                        
363 Zhu Yiwei朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji中国集成电路产业发展: 论述文
集 (China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development: Collected Works), Xinshidai Chubanshe 新时代出版
社 (New Times Press), 2006, pages 127-128.  Discrete devices are the components that go into 
semiconductors, e.g., resistors, capacitors, transistors, etc., while integrated circuits are actual semiconductors. 
364  The North Base included Beijing, Tianjin and Shenyang, and the South Base included Jiangsu, Shanghai, and 
Zhejiang.  Certain high technology industry parks were associated with the two bases.  The North Base had 
two parks in Bejing: 1) the North Microelectronic Technology Research and Development Base and 2) the 
North Microelectronic Production Base.  The South Base was initially defined as Wuxi and but eventually 
Shanghai also had the Caohejing technology park and the Zhangjiang technology parks among other parks in 
the Shanghai-Suzhou-Wuxi corridor, see iSupply, “Panacea,” 2002, page 21. 
365 The 1989 Wuxi conference also determined that China’s semiconductor industry needed to achieve scale 




China’s five key enterprises were established between 1988 and 1991, but these oft-
quoted dates are misleading because most of the five enterprises did not begin production 
until several (or more) years later, as facilities had to be built, equipment procured, etc.  These 
enterprises were essentially consolidations of some of China’s existing semiconductor 
factories and institutes, mainly those that had relatively higher levels of technology and 
production.366  Figure Four identifies the five key enterprises, their partners, capabilities, 
etc.367 
Importantly, Chinese officials were able to find foreign partners and establish a joint 
venture for each of the key enterprises except Huayue.368  At Huajing, the CSMC-Huajing 
joint venture formed in 1997-1998 was just one unit of the larger enterprise; recall, CSMC-
Huajing only covered Huajing’s five and six inch CMOS lines, while the larger Huajing 
remained in place.  Notably, however, for the other three joint ventures (each formed well 
before CSMC-Huajing), the joint venture was the primary semiconductor enterprise.  The 
joint venture was not just a sub unit of a larger state owned semiconductor enterprise.  Of the 
three, the one variation on this structure was Shougang-NEC which was part of the larger 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Semiconductor Industry Association), “China’s I.C. Industry, the Status Quo and Future,” a presentation 
delivered at Stanford University, 2005.  Hu Qili 胡启立, Chao Daguimo Jichengdianlu Gongcheng Jishi 超
大规模集成电路工程纪实 (Ultra Large Scale Integrated Circuit: Project Records), Beijing: Dianzi Gongye 
Chubanshe电子工业出版社 (Electronics Industry Publishing House), 2006, pages 14-16. 
366 Zhu, Wenji, page 162. 
367 Interview with Zhou Weiping, July 15, 2009, at ASMC headquarters in Shanghai.  Zhou is C.E.O. of ASMC 
and a former General Manager of Shanghai Belling.  Also, Chen Ling, “Chanye Xingcheng Jieduan产业形
成阶段 (The Industry’s Formative Stage),” Qinghua University paper, circa 2005.  Chen notes that RMB2.5 
billion was spent by 1995, citing the China Electronics Industry Yearbook, 1996, page 125. 
368 Huayue apparently sought but did not find a foreign partner.  Huayue exists to this day, but it considered a 





Figure 4: China's Five Key Semiconductor Enterprises
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color TVs, air 
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cards, clocks, palm PCs
This chart is compiled from the following sources: 
1) Interview with Zhou Weiping, July 15, 2009, at ASMC headquarters in Shanghai.  Zhou is C.E.O. of ASMC and a former General Manager of Shanghai Belling. 
2) Zhu Yiwei 朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji中国集成电路产业发展:  (China’s IC Industry Development: Collected Works), Beijing: Xinshidai 新时代出版社 (New Times Press), 2006, 
pages 162 and 164. 
3) Wang Yangyuan and Wang Yongwen 王阳元 and 王永文, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhilu: cong Xiaofei Daguo Zouxiang Chanye Qiangguo我国集成电路产业发展之路：从消费大国走向产业强国 
(China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development Path: From a Big, Consuming Nation to a Strong, Industrial Nation),  Kexue Chubanshe 科学出版社 (Science Press), 2008, page 294. 
4) iSupply, “Semiconductor Wafer Manufacturing in China: A Panacea or a Global Investment Trap?,” Q3, 2002, page 11. 




Shougang state owned enterprise, but Shougang was a steel enterprise, so Shougang-
NEC was the primary semiconductor enterprise.   
Each of the key enterprises relied to a significant extent on its foreign partner for 
technology, capital, and access markets, and once operational, each had significant scale and 
focused on higher-quality production.  The decision to partner with foreign firms aligned with 
strategies that had been articulated as early as 1985 and 1986, recapped below from Chapter 
Two.  The italics added below highlight alignment between the strategic guidelines of 1985 
and the formation of the key enterprises.  
1985 Strategic Guidelines:369 
7. Increase electronic applications including, for example, Chinese character programs 
and microcomputers. 
8. Use foreign technology to advance China’s technology, including engaging in joint 
ventures with foreign firms. 
9. Create an integrated electronics supply chain – equipment to final products – with 
emphasis on quality mass production and large-scale integrated circuits. 
10. Allow markets and competition to play a greater role in the industry while relying on 
unified, national-level plans for projects that required very large investments. 
11. Coordinate the development of the electronics, communications and 
telecommunications industries. 
12. Design a system to allocate central funding through competitive bids (versus grants) 
and leverage foreign capital.   
The key enterprises also benefitted from the following State Council preferential 
policies for the semiconductor Industry, adopted in 1986:370 
1. The government will extract less capital from enterprises. 
                                                        
369 In 1985, the leading group published a document called “The Strategy for the Development of China’s 
Electronics and Information Industries” which had strategies for 1986 and forward.  Denis Simon 
summarized the 1985 document, see Denis Simon and Detlef Rehn, Technological Innovation in China 
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1988), pages 63-64. 
370 Industry-wide tax reforms in the early 1990s overrode and essentially de-activated these semiconductor-
friendly tax policies, see Chapter Two. 
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2. Imported equipment will be exempt from tariffs for major, approved projects. 
3. Enterprises will be exempt from value-added tax. 
4. Enterprises will pay only half of their income tax.   
With the establishment of these new enterprises, China’s semiconductor leaders had 
furthered structural reform and consolidation of the formerly centrally planned industry.  
Nonetheless, the five key enterprises did not entirely replace nor consolidate the state owned 
industry.  In the 1990s, China still had perhaps over thirty integrated circuit manufacturers 
and perhaps dozens more semiconductor-related factories for discrete devices.  However, 
most of the over thirty so-called integrated circuit manufacturers were not designing nor 
producing (fabricating) integrated circuits but rather were only doing P.A.T.  The key 
enterprises, in contrast, were doing fabrication, as well as some design, although the 
technology that the foreign partners provided for fabrication was not leading edge. 
These five key enterprises (including Project 908’s Huajing) essentially represent the 
foundation of China’s contemporary domestic semiconductor industry.371  These enterprises – 
with four of the five being Sino-foreign joint ventures – arguably fostered the industry chain 
in the 1990s in terms of technology, equipment, quality, management, and sales, largely by 
working with their foreign partners.372  Along with these five key production enterprises, by 
the mid 1990s, China had ten or more semiconductor-oriented special equipment companies 
and more than twenty semiconductor design houses.  Several key enterprises served export 
markets via their foreign partners, and by the 1990s, due to overall reforms of China’s 
                                                        
371 Wang Yangyuan and Wang Yongwen 王阳元 and 王永文, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhilu: 
cong Xiaofei Daguo Zouxiang Chanye Qiangguo 我国集成电路产业发展之路：从消费大国走向产业强国 
(China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development Path: From a Big, Consuming Nation to a Strong, 
Industrial Nation),  Kexue Chubanshe 科学出版社 (Science Press), 2008, page 294. 




planned economy, they could also sell to “non-affiliated” enterprises within China.373  The 
enterprises benefited from foreign capital through their partners, and Shanghai Belling was 
the first of these enterprises to be publicly listed, joining the Shanghai Exchange in October of 
1998.374  By 1995, industry leaders claimed that the five key enterprises indeed constituted 
perhaps 60 to 80 percent of all sales of integrated circuits (that is, actual semiconductors 
rather than merely discreet devices) by Chinese domestic enterprises, as planned,375 
representing significant industry consolidation. 
Despite these advances, China’s domestic industry was still not producing in large 
volumes, it was not technologically “caught up” with the global industry, most profits were 
found in the Sino-foreign joint ventures, and China still did not yet have a full semiconductor 
industry value chain.  Hu Qili, the leader of Project 909, explained that by 1995 there were 
“certain achievements, but we could not say we had already obtained success.”376  The 
formation of the joint ventures was a necessary step forward, but it was not sufficient for real 
technological advance in China’s semiconductor industry. 
4.2  Project 909 and National Champion Huahong-NEC 
In 1995, China was still nearly twenty years behind the global technology level in 
semiconductor production with most production lines in China using five inch or less 
                                                        
373 Denis Simon, “The Microelectronics Industry Crosses a Critical Threshold,” The China Business Review, 
2001, page 6 
374 Ibid., page 4 
375 Zhu, Wenji, page 163, estimates sixty percent or more.  Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 15, estimates 80 percent 
or more.  Chen Ling and Lan Xue, “Global Production Networks,” China and the World Economy, Volume 
18, Number 6, 2010, page 114, estimates sixty percent.  
376 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 116. 
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technology.  Investment in the industry to that time had been only RMB5 billion, see Figure 
Two.377  Despite the reforms and restructuring of the state-owned industry, research and 
development were still largely separate from production and not sufficiently funded, and thus 
Chinese semiconductor production personnel had little opportunity to learn and utilize new 
technologies.  Most of China’s semiconductor-related products were still discrete devices 
rather than actual integrated circuits, and even with the key enterprises ramping up, 
production in China only met a small fraction of the rapidly growing market for 
semiconductors in China, see Figure Eight.378 
By mid 1995, China’s semiconductor industry leaders realized that their premier 
project, Project 908, was not going to result in China being home to an advanced 
semiconductor enterprise.  Project 908 had been intended as a five-year project from 1991 to 
1995, but in 1995, the project was still underfunded due to bureaucratic delays, and the 
planned technology transfers and production outcomes had not been realized.  Worse, by 1995, 
industry leaders realized that, due to the rapidity of technological advance in the 
semiconductor industry, the production technology that Project 908 was planning to 
implement (six inch, 0.9µm) was no longer the global standard.  Indeed, by 1995, Taiwan 
alone already had some ten production lines that were using eight inch production 
equipment.379  Even if Project 908 was completed, with six inch and 0.9µm production 




377 Zhu, Wenji, page 163-164. 
378 Ibid., page 128-129 





Figure 2: Gap Between China and Global Leading Technology (year attained) 
  Wafer Size in Inches (larger is more advanced)   
Year Global China 
1970 2 1.5 
1975 4 1.5 
1980 5 2 
1985 6 3-4 
1990 6-8 3-4 
1995 8 6 < Shougang-NEC 
2000 12 6-8 < Huahong-NEC and CSMC-Huajing 
2005 12 12 < SMIC 






      





Very Large Scale 
Integration 
Ultra Large Scale 
Integration  
Global 1958 1964 1966 1976 1986 
China* 1965 1972 1972 1986 1999 
The years indicated for China seem optimistic.  They may reflect technological understanding more than actual production capabilities. 
Source: Zhu Yiwei 朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji 中国集成电路产业发展:  (China’s IC Industry Development: 
Collected Works), Beijing: Xinshidai 新时代出版社 (New Times Press), 2006, page 69. 
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Bureaucratic obstacles were common across industries at that time in China, but for the 
semiconductor industry, such delays were particularly problematic because of the fast pace 
and high cost of technological upgrading.          
Despite the discouraging state of Project 908, China’s central leaders remained fully 
committed to somehow supporting the development China’s semiconductor industry, 
designating it a “pillar industry” in China’s ninth five year plan (1996-2000).  Recall from 
Chapter Two that Li Peng, China’s Premier from 1988 to 1998, had led China’s State Council 
Leading Group for the Revitalization of the Electronics Industry from 1982.  With his 
leadership and support, national officials held work conferences in both January and April of 
1995 for the electronics industry.  Hu Qili, the leader of China’s Ministry of the Electronics 
Industry and the future leader of Project 909, was present at these conferences.  In Hu’s 
compilation on Project 909 called Ultra Large Scale Integrated Circuit: Project Records,380 
he included notes on the top leaders’ comments on China’s semiconductor industry.  
According to Hu, during planning sessions for China’s ninth five year plan (1996-2000) in 
December of 1995, Premier Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin voiced strong commitment for 
the semiconductor industry, with Premier Li Peng saying “Spare no cost! (Bu xi dai jie, 不惜
代价).”  President Jiang Zemin, who had recently visited semiconductor giant Samsung in 
South Korea, said that China must accelerate the development of its semiconductor industry, 
saying “Smash the pot, sell the iron (Za guo mai tie, 砸锅卖铁)!,” that is, do whatever is 
necessary and be willing to sacrifice everything.  President Jiang said China’s semiconductor 
                                                        
380 Hu Qili 胡启立, Chao Daguimo Jichengdianlu Gongcheng Jishi 超大规模集成电路:工程纪实 (Ultra Large 
Scale Integrated Circuit: Project Records), Beijing: Dianzi Gongye Chubanshe电子工业出版社 
(Electronics Industry Publishing House), 2006. 
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industry must be lifted, and he repeatedly stressed the importance and urgency of the 
industry’s development.381   Officials knew that China’s economic reforms were creating 
tremendous annual growth in the demand for semiconductors.  Demand was driven by the 
need for semiconductors in electronic consumer goods, computers, and new electronic 
information systems that Chinese organizations were increasingly implementing.   From the 
experiences of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, China’s top central government officials 
recognized semiconductors as critical to commerce, industry, living standards, national 
security, and as a general measure of China’s technological and business competency.382  
Project 908 may have been faltering due largely to bureaucratic obstacles, but Li Peng, Jiang 
Zemin, and other leaders remained open to new approaches, new plans, and better 
prioritization (both political and financial) for the semiconductor industry. 
4.21  The Origins of Project 909 
In November of 1995, top officials from China’s Ministry of the Electronics Industry 
and the State Council held a rapid series of meetings on the semiconductor industry, with the 
primary outcome being an immediate release of RMB4 billion (approximately US$500 
million) to support China’s largest ever electronics project.  The project would be called 
Project 909, and it would primarily establish a new national champion semiconductor 
enterprise with 8 inch, 0.5µm technology as well as funding other investments in the 
                                                        
381 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 4.  Hu described Jiang’s comments: “We must more quickly develop our 
country’s semiconductor industry, we definitely must ‘smash the pot and sell the iron’ to make the 
semiconductor industry rise up.” (Bixu jia kuai fazhan wo guo jichengdianlu chanye, jiushi, ‘Za guo mai tie,’ 
ye yao bandaoti chanye ti shang qu! 必须加快发展我国集成电路产业， 就是，’砸锅卖铁’，也要把半导
体产业搞上去!”) 
382 Hu, Wenji, pages 7-8. 
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semiconductor industry chain.  Project 909’s enterprises would be grouped under the new 
Shanghai Huahong Group, and they would eventually include: national champion Shanghai 
Huahong-NEC (discussed below) as well as Beijing Huahong I.C. Design Company, 
Shanghai Huahong I.C. Design Company, Shanghai Huahong International (U.S.-based), 
Shanghai Hongri International Company (a sales company), and the Shanghai Huahong Jitong 
Smart Card System Company. 
The RMB4 billion allocated for these organizations was a significant investment.  For 
comparison, RMB4 billion was equal to about 6.6 percent of China’s entire reported military 
budget for 1995.383  Early in these meetings, Hu Qili and Liu Jianfeng, both of the Ministry of 
the Electronics Industry, had shared with Premier Li Peng the problems plaguing Project 908, 
namely the slow approvals and resultant lack of funds, and therefore the technology that 
Project 908 was pursuing was already behind the global standard.  According to Hu, Li Peng 
bluntly asked “How much money do you need?”  Hu indicated at least US$1 billion, as this 
was the global norm for an eight inch line.  Li Peng responded that he would put a block of 
U.S. currency directly from his Premier’s Fund into the Ministry of the Electronics Industry’s 
account, although this money would ultimately have to be repaid.  With this transfer, the 
Ministry of the Electronics Industry would essentially have a “current passbook account” 
(huoqi cunzhe, 活期存折) from which to draw funds for Project 909, and they would not need 
approvals from different government offices to access funds.384 
                                                        
383 China’s reported military budget in 1995 was US$7.6 billion, according to GlobalSecurity, a US-based, non-
governmental organization.  However, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that 
China’s total 1995 military-related expenditures may have been almost 3 times higher than the reported 
budget.  
384 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 3-7. 
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The following timeline demonstrates the involvement of – and sense of urgency 
among – China’s highest ranking officials in authorizing, funding, and initiating Project 909, 
all within just four months from November of 1995 to March of 1996. 
• November 23, 1995: The Ministry of the Electronics Industry and the National Bureau 
of Foreign Specialists submit a joint report called Document #826 to the State Council.  
This report proposes Project 909.385 
 
• December 11, 1995: Premier Li Peng and Vice Premiers meet in Beijing to discuss 
semiconductors.  They phone Hu Qili and ask him to fly to Beijing the following 
morning to discuss the state of the industry and the proposed Project 909. 
 
• December 13, 1995: Premier Li Peng leads a working conference on Project 909.386  
According to Hu, it was on this day that Li Peng committed treasury deficit money, 
initially RMB4 billion in U.S. currency, to fund Project 909.   
 
• December 23, 1995: The State Council approves Project 909.387 
 
• December 27, 1995: The Ministry of the Electronics Industry and the Shanghai 
Municipal Government send a jointly drafted report called Paper #920 on Project 909 
to the National Planning Committee.388  
 
• January 17th, 1996: Premier Li Peng, Vice Premier Wu Banguo, members of the State 
Council, and semiconductor industry leaders all conference in a Shanghai hotel.  The 
conference confirms to all that the State Council and central government have decided 
to pursue Project 909.389 
 
• March 29, 1996: The National Planning Committee officially approves Project 909.390 
 




385 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 296. 
386 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 24-25. 
387 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 296. 
388 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 24-25. 
389 Ibid., page 24-25. 
390 Ibid., page 27. 
391 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 296. 
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• Later in 1996:  The State Council adds another US$100 million in funding for Project 
909, creating a total investment of about US$600 million, approximately RMB4.8 
billion.392 
 
Central leaders supported Project 909 with significant funding, but this was not to be 
simply a case of throwing good money (and more of it) after bad.  In 1995, Project 908 was 
still blundering along, so how was Project 909 going to be different?  Going into Project 909, 
China’s semiconductor industry leaders had learned a number of lessons from their past 
experiences, and Project 909 would incorporate these lessons.  Hu Qili explicated three 
“misunderstandings” from the past that leaders were considering when planning Project 
909.393  The first misunderstanding was that by simply importing advanced equipment China 
would be able to manufacture semiconductors.  Actually, semiconductor manufacturing was 
not possible without the technical experience to use and maintain the equipment and without 
the existence of the whole complex semiconductor industry chain for parts, materials, etc.  
The importation of 24 second hand production lines in the 1980s enabled a handful of Chinese 
enterprises to upgrade somewhat (see Chapter Two), but production was still not large scale 
nor was the production equipment at global standards.  The second misunderstanding was 
trying to acquire leading edge technology (as was the goal of Project 908) without considering 
China’s domestic market, which was dominated by demand for low and medium technology 
semiconductors.  Indeed, even by 2002, industry data indicated that some eighty-five percent 
of China’s demand was for semiconductor products at six inch and 0.5µm or simpler 
                                                        
392 Ibid.  Also Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 5.  Project 909 also included eight design institutes which got 
RMB262 million in funding from the central government, along with another RMB382.5 million from other 
sources.  See Chapter Five. 
393 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 16-18. 
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technology.394  In addition, leading edge technology is more costly and advances and changes 
quickly.  Purchasing such equipment can drain funds without succeeding in capturing leading 
edge technology, which is a moving target.  The third misunderstanding was that money alone 
would enable China to successfully join the global semiconductor industry.  In 1995, an eight 
inch production line cost over US$1 billion (and the new 12 inch lines were well over US$2 
billion.)  Annually, another twenty percent of the initial cost of the line would be incurred for 
operating and maintenance costs, ongoing equipment upgrades, technological training, and 
other costs.  These additional annual costs were mandatory because if updating, etc., fell 
behind, customers would migrate to other suppliers.  The key to supporting these costs and 
technological demands was to have access to international talent and capital.  As Hu put it, 
success would require “an excellent team… cooperative, persistent and with a long term, 
common goal…with international standards and [able to] attract talented people….[and with] 
the ability to finance in international capital markets.”395  Having the money to establish a 
production line would not ensure ongoing success.  Thus, from their experiences in the 1980s, 
through Project 908 and into Project 909, China’s semiconductor industry leaders were 
calibrating their approach in this industry. 
Project 908 centered on acquiring higher technology equipment, and so would Project 
909, but Project 909 would differ by also bringing in the necessary talent and product designs 
from the start.  As we will see, Project 909 and SMIC brought in talent from overseas, 
including overseas Chinese.396  Further, Project 909 would make targeted investments in 
                                                        
394 iSupply, “Panacea,” page 15. 
395 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 16-18. 
396 The Chinese government was simultaneously making investments in education and research, which would 
ultimately enhance the local tool pool.  See Chapter Five. 
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research and other activities to support the whole semiconductor industry chain.  As Wang 
Guoping of Huajing and Project 908 put it “[It is] easiest to build the production line, but 
harder to have the talent and products.  Huajing got the [production] line, but 909 would 
introduce technical teams and products.”397  Generally, Projects 908 and 909 are viewed by 
Chinese semiconductor personnel as well as by foreign observers as having been production 
oriented,398 but Project 909 intended to foster the whole semiconductor industry chain, 
especially through its support for design initiatives, addressed further in Chapter Five.399 
4.22  The Goals of China’s New National Champion 
Project 909 had two broad goals.  The first was to bring in and coordinate extensively 
with foreign partners.  In planning Project 909, Hu Qili wrote that the leaders believed “We 
must depend on collaboration, not self-development.”400  Project 909 needed additional 
capital as well as advanced foreign technology, foreign management and technical talent, 
foreign product designs along with the associated intellectual property (I.P.), I.P. protection, 
and access to markets.  Indeed, at the January 17, 1996 meeting, the State Council decided 
that Project 909 could bring in any willing foreign companies for participation and 
                                                        
397 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at China Resources Microelectronics (formerly Huajing) 
headquarters.  Wang was the C.E.O. of CRM in 2008 and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 
1990s. 
398 Interview with Ye Tianchun, July 3, 2009, at the CAS Institute of Microelectronics in Beijing.  Ye is the 
Director of the Microelectronics Institute and a top advisor on national semiconductor industry policies.  Also, 
the brief descriptions of Project 909 in foreign sources tend to characterize it as production-oriented, see 
Dimitri Kessler, “Capital Accumulation and the Information Industries of Mainland China,” University of 
Wisconsin dissertation, 2005.  See various works by Michael Pecht.  
399 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 298. 




investment.401  According to Hu, the “harsh reality [is]….we must bring in international 
management and technical partners, as have other countries.  Eventually we will lay a 
foundation for further development.”402  Indeed, in the semiconductor industry, Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan all began by using foreign technology and later were able to develop 
technology themselves.  The hope was that Project 909 would “break the vicious cycle of 
technology catch-up…[by] building up a product line, [and later] being able to self-develop, 
but we must have I.P.…” through foreign partnerships.403  Early in the planning stages of 
Project 909, Hu met with U.S. semiconductor experts, and they advised him to partner with 
multi-national companies that could provide I.P. and I.P. protection and markets, saying that 
Huahong (Project 909’s primary production enterprise) should share stock with foreign 
partners.404  Both the Chinese and their potential foreign partners were aware of China’s weak 
legal protection for I.P. at that time.  This was a problem, but companies could also find ways 
to work around the problem, for example, by not sharing leading edge designs or by keeping 
design work out of China.405  By cooperating with global enterprises, Project 909 attempted 
from the start to resolve the insufficiencies in China’s semiconductor industry.406 
The second and no less important goal of Project 909 was to serve China’s domestic 
semiconductor market, as well as the export market, and in doing so, to earn the profits 
necessary to sustain operations.  Wang Yangyuan, who would later co-found SMIC, explained 
                                                        
401 Ibid., page 38. 
402 Ibid., pages 38-39. 
403 Ibid., pages 167-168.  Stressing this point, Hu wrote “Without I.P., enterprises can be born, but can not grow 
up, and might be killed.” 
404 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 38-39. 
405 China enacted enhanced protections for I.P. after 2000; see Chapter Five. 
406 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 298. 
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that Project 909 was founded on two principals.  The first was foreign partnering, per above, 
and the second principal was that the project must be market oriented to “bring profit, so that 
it can form a good cycle of industry revenue and investing.”407  The Project 909 leaders 
planned to establish a Sino-foreign joint venture (with shared stock) so that Huahong could 
get foreign technology, I.P., and market access.  In this way, Project 909 would have more 
advanced technology but would also be “market led” rather than strictly “technology led.”  In 
choosing this approach, the Project 909 team was reflecting on the experiences of Huajing and 
Project 908.  According to Wang Guoping (current C.E.O. of the former Huajing), Huajing 
had wanted to “be an Intel,” studying advanced, foreign products and trying to find products 
they could produce.  Eventually, however, Huajing had to return to focus “on China’s 
domestic market and simple products and not shoot so high.”408  China’s top leaders were also 
following the approach and progress of Project 909.  President Jiang Zemin advocated a 
market led approach, often asking Hu Qili about Project 909 and reminding him to pay 
attention to the market.409  During conversations regarding Huahong’s partner-to-be NEC of 
Japan (which could provide export markets), Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji410 repeatedly said that 
the market is the key to Project 909’s success, because markets will lead to profits, and thus 
Huahong’s semiconductor operations could be maintained and upgraded over time.411  
Following these ideas, in early 1997, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry researched 
                                                        
407 Ibid., page 296. 
408 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at China Resources Microelectronics (formerly Huajing) 
headquarters.  Wang was the C.E.O. of CRM in 2008 and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 
1990s. 
409 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 6. 
410 Zhu Rongji had been Mayor of Shanghai from 1987 to 1991, and he is credited with establishing Shanghai’s 
new Pudong economic district, where Huahong was (and is) located.  He became Vice-Premier of China in 
1991, and he then served as Premier of China from 1998 until 2003. 
411 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 60. 
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China’s domestic market and proposed that Project 909 focus on producing selected products, 
such as I.C. cards or telecomm-related I.C. products for China’s domestic market.412  By 
exceling in a particular segment of China’s market, Project 909 would (hopefully) be 
profitable and could gradually stop “relying on national subsidies.”413   
China’s semiconductor industry leaders established Project 909’s two tangible goals of 
foreign partnering and serving the market, but these goals served higher purposes.  Chinese 
officials did not intend for Project 909 to only result in a new state owned enterprise with 
better equipment and more funding for design work, as some foreign summaries suggest.  
Officials planned for Project 909 to foster China’s whole semiconductor industry value chain.  
Yes, Project 909 would fund a new production enterprise, Huahong, with eight inch, 0.5µm 
technology, as well as design and sales organizations.   The intention, however, was that all 
these organizations would make use of international talent and global capital markets.  In 
addition, the leaders of Project 909 would press for better domestic tax and tariff policies in 
the semiconductor industry to make China more attractive to global firms.414  Finally, the 
hope was that Project 909 would give foreign investors more confidence in China and even 
promote the development of other industries, i.e., finance and construction, in Shanghai.415 
                                                        
412 I.C. cards are also known as C.P.U. cards or smart cards.  These e-cards can be used for bankcards, 
metrocards, identification cards, etc.  Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 132-133.  The issue of Project 909 and 
Huahong focusing on China’s I.C. card market is addressed further below. 
413 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 40. 
414 Ibid., pages 11-13, 18, and 25.  
415 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 81. 
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4.23  Project 909’s Sponsorship, Leadership, and Talent 
From the start, Project 909 had powerful political sponsorship.  Industry leaders 
recognized that the previous pillar project, Project 908, was faltering due to bureaucratic 
delays,416 and they determined that Project 909 would not suffer the same fate.417  Project 909 
was thus co-invested by the State Council and the Central Party, the first time the two groups 
had co-invested in a major project, and the project was directly under these two groups.  
According to Hu, the State Council and the Central Party gave the Ministry of the Electronics 
Industry a “military order” to carry out Project 909.  That said, he also describes Project 909’s 
initial funds as coming from the “Premier’s Fund,” and in another instance he says that 
Project 909 was funded by the State Council and Shanghai’s municipal government, with a 
sixty-forty split.418  Whatever the precise sources of the government’s investment, the project 
had powerful financial backers.  To execute the project, the Ministry of the Electronics 
Industry and Shanghai’s municipal government jointly established the Project 909 Promotion 
Committee, and Shanghai created the Shanghai Support Project 909 Leading Group.  
Shanghai Mayor Xu Kuandi was this group’s leader, and Shanghai’s Vice Mayor and top 
CCP official were also involved.  Shanghai’s various governmental departments were told to 
give Project 909 a “green light, to treat it as a special case, [and] every department should 
make a bridge or road to ensure this project can pass.”419   According to Hu, to have “so many 
                                                        
416 Ibid., page 4. 
417 Project 908 was a national priority, yet bureaucratic obstacles prevented timely funding.  The precise nature 
of these bureaucratic or political obstacles are unclear, but it is not surprising that even a high priority project 
could be delayed given China’s bureaucracy and the rapid pace of organizational and economic changes in 
China. 
418 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 3-7. 
419 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 79. 
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high profile people involved…this was seldom seen.”420  This high level political sponsorship 
decreased bureaucratic delays and ensured funding for Project 909, but the need for high level 
officials to send word through the ranks to “treat [this project] as a special case” indicates that, 
generally, bureaucracy was still a hindrance in China. 
As for Huahong, Hu Qili was appointed Chairman; prior to this position, Hu had been 
a leader of China’s Ministry of the Electronics Industry since 1989.  Members of the January 
17, 1996 conference also appointed Huahong’s Board of Directors, and the Ministry of the 
Electronics Industry appointed Huahong’s C.E.O.  The Shanghai municipal government was 
supposed to appoint Huahong’s General Manager, but ultimately Huahong’s foreign partner 
insisted on providing the General Manager.   
With leaders installed, the challenge was to staff Huahong with capable managerial 
and technical talent.  Project 908’s Huajing supplied thirty staff directly to Project 909,421 and 
between 1997 and 2000, another 300 managers left Huajiing, although it is unclear how many 
of these individuals ultimately migrated to Huahong.  Ye Xiekang recounted “The 
government had given Wuxi the focus [for the semiconductor industry], then chose Shanghai.  
So, people left Huajing…[This was] good for the industry…,”422 suggesting that a portion of 
these Huajing-trained personnel ultimately went to Huahong and other Chinese enterprises.  
In addition to Huajing, Huahong’s leaders recruited talent from across China to participate in 
                                                        
420 Ibid., page 80. 
421 Interview with Wang Guoping, July 16, 2009, at China Resources Microelectronics (formerly Huajing) 
headquarters.  Wang was the C.E.O. of CRM in 2008 and had been the General Manager of Huajing in the late 
1990s. 
422 Interview with Yu Xiekang, General Manager of Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Technology (JCET), June 2, 
2009, JCET headquarters near Wuxi. 
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Project 909 and sought staff from the Chinese Academy of Science’s (C.A.S.) Institute of 
Microelectronics in Beijing, which was China’s top semiconductor related research institute. 
Despite recruiting the best domestic talent, Huahong still needed foreign managers and 
technical staff.  Later, when Huahong negotiated with potential foreign partners, foreign firms 
insisted that Huahong supply a top management team for eight inch production, but Huahong 
simply could not find such managers within China’s domestic talent pool.  For example, 
C.A.S. Institute of Microelectronics offered staff and support to Huahong, but the C.A.S. 
personnel really had no experience with eight inch production.  Hu says “we were determined 
to break the rules and use huge money to recruit a large group of overseas experienced 
management and technical talent to participate in Project 909.”  The belief was that, overall, 
such compensation would be a small part of the total value these individuals could bring to 
Huahong.423  The lack of talent in China made Project 909 even more dependent on a foreign 
partner, and this problem was not unique to Huahong.  Recall, around this same time Huajing 
was considering bringing in Taiwanese managers.  Like Hu at Huahong, Wang Guoping at 
Huajing seemed to have been uninhibited – even eager – to bring foreign managers into a 
Chinese national champion.  (Indeed, Wang said he “would have quit” if others on his 
management team had not agreed to bring in foreign help, but his management team was in 
full agreement.)   Apparently, these national champion enterprises were quite open to 
international leadership. 
                                                        
423 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 41-42.  Twice, delegations from Project 909 went to Silicon Valley to try to 
recruit Chinese overseas students.  Students were very interested, and a one hour recruiting meeting turned 
into a post-1am discussion in a California hotel room.   However, ultimately the students were concerned 
about the likely rigidity of a state owned enterprise and most did not join Huahong.  Yet, many stayed in 
touch with Huahong leaders and provided value advice and services in the ensuing years, see page 42. 
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4.24  Huahong and International Partnering 
In 1996 when Huahong began to look for an international partner for its primary 
production enterprise, the global semiconductor industry was entering a cyclical slump.  From 
1992 to 1996, global semiconductor revenues had grown over twenty percent annually, and 
semiconductor firms had built a number of six inch and eight inch production lines.  By 1997, 
however, the supply of semiconductors came to exceed demand, and prices fell.424  In this 
environment, global semiconductor firms mostly stopped building new lines, and thus 
Huahong faced a difficult environment in which to find a partner.  Another potential problem 
for Huahong was U.S. export controls on high technology, dual use technology.  Chinese 
leaders were very concerned that U.S. export controls would cause the U.S. government to 
obstruct Huahong’s negotiations with U.S. firms.  However, when Huahong approached 
potential U.S. partners, the U.S. firms were not primarily concerned with export controls, as 
around this same time, the U.S. administration was in the midst of loosening restrictions on 
dual-use technology to China.425 
                                                        
424 The semiconductor industry is cyclical.  In semiconductor production, improving different production factors 
(technical skills as well as humidity, temperature, vibration, etc.) leads to increased production yields over 
time.  That is, a higher percentage of units produced can be sold.  So, as production improves, a fixed amount 
of investment in a production line will result in lower per unit costs, as yields increase.  A line is set up for a 
fixed number of wafers per month, but the production yield on those wafers can improve from ten to ninety 
percent as production technique is perfected through trial and error.  In the global industry, as all firms 
producing a particular semiconductor product learn and improve, all yields go up, and thus output goes up, 
and thus price per unit goes down.  So, average unit cost changes over the product life cycle.  Initially unit 
cost is high, but later, it is very low.  Yet, unit costs tend to fall faster than price.  Even as price per unit 
decreases, a firm continues to fully utilize its line to sell the most product it can.  The variable cost per chip is 
very low (fixed costs are staff, equipment, research, etc.), so a company will continue to maximize the 
throughput of a line, even when price per unit goes down.   (Because of high fixed costs, if demand goes up, 
semiconductor firms can not respond quickly with new capacity.)  If demand falls due to less demand for 
electronic-related goods, then semiconductor prices fall sharply because output stays nearly the same.  For 
more explanation, see Baldwin, “The Impact of the US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement,” 1994, pages 130-
134.   
425 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 65-66.  U.S. actions regarding high technology exports to China in the late 1990s 
are addressed further in Chapter Five. 
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To find a foreign partner, the Project 909 team contacted some twenty to thirty global 
firms, but initially the responses were not encouraging.  Huahong’s lack of an existing 
revenue stream and profit was likely a major cause for concern.  Despite the project leaders’ 
ostensible focus on markets and profits, this research found no actual business plan nor any 
mention of a business plan or financial model for Huahong.  In the case of U.S. 
semiconductor firms, executives were cynical toward Project 909.  Foreign industry personnel 
had a number of concerns.  Project 908 had gotten no results, demonstrating that China lacked 
technology and talent.  As for Project 909, it lacked a business plan, was desperate for a 
partner, and was offering an unattractive minority stake in Huahong.  Finally, foreigners 
believed that working in China was often even more problematic than expected.426  Foreigners 
expected to face inconsistent and opaque rules and regulations, interventions from Chinese 
officials, culture and skill gaps between foreign and Chinese personnel, and other obstacles, 
and foreigners believed that these problems were usually worse than expected. 
Faced with little interest from foreign partners, Project 909’s two goals of “serving the 
market” and “partnering with foreigners” ultimately became linked.  In Project Records, Hu 
added the following explanation: 
“Turning point:  On one cold, dark winter night in late 1996, I was alone thinking.  
909 was under construction, but did not yet have a partner.  I could not sleep. … 
Li Peng had said cooperation with the U.S. is based on following the contract and 
avoiding political disturbances, so try to ask them to make economic promises.  
But at that time, all factors indicated that 909 negotiations will be delayed a long 
time.  Facing this, on January 12, 1997, I… made some concrete suggestions for 
negotiations.  There are two urgent things: negotiations and market.  Those two 
are connected.  The last stepping stone is the market, if the market is concrete, 
then we have ways to bring in technology and can negotiate with foreign 
companies.  For foreign companies, the real concern is the I.C. card.  China’s 
                                                        
426 Denis Simon, “From Cold to Hot,” China Business Review, November-December, 1996.  Also, Hu, 
Gongcheng Jishi, page 46. 
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government controls this market.  Huahong will never fail if we master this 
market.  If we take concrete and powerful steps in this area, then we can 
strengthen our position in negotiations.”427   
 
 
China’s market for I.C. cards (social security cards, metrocards, etc.) was growing 
under China’s “Three Goldens” project.  From 1993, China’s State Council had sought to 
develop China’s information infrastructure through the Three Goldens.  The Three Goldens 
included: 1) the “Golden Bridge,” which would electronically connect a number of national 
ministries, 2) the “Golden Card” for various banking cards, and 3) the “Golden Gate,” which 
would electronically connect the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Customs.  Largely from 
these projects, China was forecasted to have the largest I.C. card market in Asia by the year 
2000.428  The Three Goldens project supported China’s information modernization, and it had 
the added benefit of fostering the semiconductor industry. The Ministry of the Electronics 
Industry hosted the Golden Projects Office and coordinated most Golden-related projects.  
Indeed, Hu Qili had been a leading proponent of the Three Goldens from the early 1990s.429  
Now, Hu saw an opportunity to simultaneously support the Three Goldens and Project 909.  
In early 1997, just after Hu proposed using China’s I.C. card market as a negotiating 
chip for Huahong, China’s government took steps to define and protect this market, i.e., 
setting the manufacturing location and creating a certification diploma system for I.C. cards.  
Then, in March 1997, the State Council announced that all Chinese government organizations 
would adopt I.C. cards, using Huahong’s (future) products.  With the market better defined, 
                                                        
427 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 46-48. 
428 Asia Pulse, “China to be the World’s Largest Telephone I.C. Card Market,” May 31, 1999. 
429 Professor Liang Xiong-Jian, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, “Convergence and China’s 
National Information Infrastructure” in M. Hukill and R. Ono, C. Vallath, editors, Electronic Communication 
Convergence (Singapore: 1999). 
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potential foreign partners “changed their attitude toward Project 909.”  Essentially, this was a 
quid pro quo of technology transfer for market access.  Several potential partners entered into 
negotiations, including Siemens, IBM, Rockwell, and Toshiba.  Siemens, for example, made 
significant concessions in order to have the opportunity to capture China’s I.C. card market.430   
After more than a year of negotiations with several firms, Huahong agreed to a 
partnership with NEC of Japan in July of 1997.  In Hu’s comments on the negotiation process, 
he seems surprised that only five firms entered negotiations and that negotiations were 
difficult and took over a year.  Yet, this level of participation and timeline seems reasonable.  
In fact, given that Huahong had zero revenues and that Project 908 had shown no results at its 
five year mark, it is actually surprising that five renowned global semiconductor firms would 
consider partnering with Huahong and that negotiations were completed within only a year.  
Even much smaller partnerships and merger and acquisition transactions – with proven 
revenue – commonly take a year or more to finalize.  Perhaps the offer of China’s I.C. card 
market did indeed “change attitudes.”  The following recaps the timeline: 
 
Huahong’s Establishment Phase: 
• April 9, 1996:  Shanghai Huahong, home of Project 909, is founded in Shanghai’s 
Pudong district.431   
 
• March, 1997:  The State Council decides that all Chinese governmental organizations 
will adopt I.C. cards, using Huahong’s (future) products.432 
 
• July 17, 1997:  Huahong and NEC form Huahong-NEC.433 
                                                        
430 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 46-48 and 138.  China’s quid pro quo of offering market access in exchange for 
technology transfer is discussed further in Section 4.43. 
431 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 296. 




• July 31, 1997:  Construction begins on Huahong-NEC. 
 
 
Huahong-NEC’s Production Phase: 
 
• February 23, 1999:  Huahong-NEC DRAM trial production is underway. 434 
 
• July, 1999:  Huahong-NEC begins to sell products. 
 
• September 25, 2001:  Project 909 passes its “national acceptance” check.435 
 
• July, 2004:  Huahong-NEC begins high volume production of China’s 2nd generation 
I.D. card.436 
 
Why did the Project 909 leaders ultimately select a Japanese partner rather than a U.S. 
or European partner?  Industry observers have said that NEC was selected over U.S. firms due 
to U.S. export restrictions,437 and Chinese officials were indeed initially concerned that the 
U.S. government would impede China’s negotiations with U.S. firms.  However, several 
factors indicate that U.S. export controls were not why Huahong chose Japan’s NEC.  First, 
the U.S. government was in the process of loosening high technology export controls to China 
in the mid to late 1990s.  Second, U.S. firms were generally eager to enter China in the 1990s, 
although they were suspicious of the specifics (or lack of specifics) around Project 909, as 
mentioned above.438  Further, once Project 909 was able to guarantee revenue by offering 
                                                                                                                                                                             
433 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 296. 
434 Chen Ling, “Chanye Xingcheng Jieduan.” 
435 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 259. 
436 Ibid., pages 139-140. 
437 For example, Denis Simon in “Critical Threshold” said “Because of the continued restrictions on technology 
transfer posed by the U.S. and several other countries, the PRC government picked Japan’s NEC Corp. to 
form the joint venture [for Project 909].”   
438 See Chapter Five for more on this first and second point. 
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China’s newly protected I.C. card market, U.S. and European firms began to actively 
negotiate to partner with Project 909.  Finally, it is important to recall that China and NEC 
commenced production in Beijing in March of 1995 at their joint venture Shougang-NEC.  
NEC had proven to be respectful439 of its Chinese partners, and it had been able to persevere 
in ramping up a major operation in China.  (Shougang-NEC was established in 1991 and 
began production four years later in 1995.)  Thus, issues other than U.S. export controls were 
likely the determining factor in Huahong choosing a Japanese partner. 
Project 909 and Huahong succeeded in establishing a joint venture with the world’s 
second largest semiconductor enterprise, NEC of Japan, but this was not NEC’s first venture 
in China.  Since 1994, NEC had been in a semiconductor-oriented joint venture with China’s 
state owned Shougang enterprise in Beijing.  Owing to this existing venture, NEC had been 
one of the first international companies that Chinese leaders, including Premier Li Peng and 
Hu Qili, had personally contacted for a possible partnership on Project 909.  Thus, while the 
Project 909 team was conducting negotiations with various potential partners throughout 1997, 
a team at NEC was independently analyzing the potential benefits of working with the new 
                                                        
439 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 53-54.  Hu includes an aside among his reports on Project 909 that suggests that a lack 
of respect from U.S. semiconductor experts soured Huahong on partnering with a U.S. firm.  In the midst of a 
section on negotiations with NEC, Hu added: “Here, I must mention our Mr. Ye Xuanji, the Chairman of Guoye 
Company.  … In March 1997, he got in touch with friendly U.S. semiconductor companies.  After learning our 
situation and requirements [regarding Project 909], those companies said ‘We are willing to support and help, but 
we can not because China…[can not solve its many industry problems], and the key point is that Chinese talents 
are not satisfying.  If you listen to us, we believe if China uses US$1 billion for semiconductor investment, why 
not use that money to dig several more tunnels under Shanghai?  This way, you will not waste your money!’”  Hu 
wrote: “This conversation really hurt Mr. Ye (shoudao hen da ciji, 受到很大刺激) and firmed his mind to help 
Project 909.  He called us continuously through the night that night, saying he wanted to get in touch with NEC 
[owing to Shougang-NEC in Beijing]...  [Later] Mr. Ye sought to test NEC’s attitude in Japan.  NEC’s C.E.O. and 
senior officials met with Mr. Ye.  … If NEC gets into Project 909, then [we] will realize mutual benefit, and NEC 
can get high praise from China’s central government, then [this would be] helpful for the whole company [NEC] 
and development in China.  … The [NEC] leader seeks profits… and he considers the long-term strategic 
development of China.”  From Hu’s account, the suggestion by U.S. experts that the Chinese should dig tunnels 
rather than invest in the semiconductor industry was disrespectful and short sighted. The U.S. experts may not 
have realized Mr. Ye’s influence in China.  As a company chairman, they might have taken him as a 
businessperson rather than a government official. 
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Huahong.  From this analysis, NEC came to view partnering with Huahong as a long term 
strategy, with an eye toward producing I.C. cards and telecomm-related semiconductors for 
the Chinese market.440 
Under the new Huahong-NEC joint venture, NEC agreed to transfer eight inch, 0.5µm 
technology to Huahong, but NEC insisted on providing the General Manager for Huahong-
NEC and running production operations as well as sales and marketing.  Importantly, NEC 
could immediately provide an export market for Huahong-NEC memory products (DRAM), 
which initially would be about 80 percent of Huahong-NEC’s production.441  NEC also 
offered five months of training in Japan for 450 Chinese engineers.442  NEC committed that 
the joint venture would be profitable within five years, which would necessitate NEC 
eventually transferring technology of less than 0.5µm,443 a positive for Huahong.  Notably, 
none of the main Chinese sources mention any frustration or disagreement over NEC’s 
demand to provide the General Manager and to run both production and sales.444 
Project 909 and Huahong are commonly referred to as being a US$1.2 billion 
investment,445 however, the Chinese government did not directly fund this amount.  US$200 
million came from Japan and another US$500 million may have been a future commitment in 
equity.  According to Wang Yangyuan, funding for Huahong-NEC included:446 
                                                        
440 Ibid., pages 52-60. 
441 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 296. 
442 Jifu Wang, “China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation”, unpublished business case study, 2000. 
443 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 52-60. 
444 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye; Hu, Gongcheng Jishi; Zhu, Wenji; CSIA. 
445 Sources such as iSupply, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Michael Pecht’s works, and other articles refer to Project 
909 as a US$1.2 billion project. 
446 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 296.  Accounts differ as to the ownership and funding 




US$500 million from Huahong  
US$130 million from NEC 
US$70 million from Japan Electronics 
Other investment: 
US$500 million, guaranteed by Huahong’s and NEC’s equity shares  
Total investment: 
US$1,200 million (approximately RMB10 billion) 
 
With strong Chinese sponsorship, available funds, and an experienced foreign partner, 
Huahong-NEC production was underway in February of 1999, just 18 months after the 
enterprise was established.  The rapidity with which Huahong-NEC launched was a big 
improvement over the years of delays at Project 908’s Huajing.  Further, owing to NEC’s 
market, Huahong-NEC had an immediate market and claimed to be profitable as early as 2000, 
although industry personnel typically say that Huahong-NEC was operational for a number of 
years before achieving profitability.447 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Central Party.  Yet, Hu also described Project 909’s investment funds as coming from the State Council 
and Shanghai’s municipal government, with a sixty-forty split, see Hu 5-6.  According to Denis Simon, 
Project 909’s majority shareholders were the China Information Industry Holding Co. with 52.5 percent and 
Shanghai Instrumentation and Electronics Holding Co. at 47.5 percent, see Denis Simon, “From Cold to Hot,” 
China Business Review, November-December, 1996.  US$500 million was likely the original RMB4 billion 
investment.  Hu described it as coming directly from the Premier’s Fund, although he also said it had to be 
repaid, suggesting it was a loan.  Wang mentions US$500 million as a bank loan collateralized on HH-NEC 
equity. 
447 Ibid., page 297.  Some Chinese semiconductor industry personnel disputed that Huahong-NEC was profitable 
in its early years.  Even Wang, later on page 297, mentions that Huahong-NEC has had “continuous profit” 
since May of 2004, which is closer to the start of profitability that most industry personnel recall. 
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4.25  Huahong-NEC’s Results 
In 2005, five years after commencing production, Huahong-NEC was listed among the 
top ten global semiconductor foundries, and it has remained on that list each year since.448  In 
its early years, Huahong-NEC progressed on a number of fronts: it adopted the foundry model, 
expanded its product and customer base, acquired I.P. from foreign partners, began producing 
I.C. cards for the domestic market, and extended significant equity to a U.S. firm.   
From 2002, Huahong-NEC changed its business model from an I.D.M. to a 
foundry,449 following the global trend, and it shifted from primarily producing DRAM to 
producing I.C. cards as well as a variety of semiconductor products for its foundry clients.   
By late 2003, foundry revenues constituted about ninety percent of Huahong-NEC’s total 
revenue.  An important organizational change in 2003 was Huahong’s take over of 
management and operations from NEC, putting Huahong-NEC under Chinese control.  From 
2004 to 2007, Huahong-NEC claimed profitability.450 
Initially, Huahong-NEC’s sales orders had all been exports for NEC’s customers, but 
Huahong-NEC quickly developed other sales channels.  Early on, Huahong-NEC produced 
DRAM products for export to NEC’s customer base, but at the same time, Huahong-NEC 
established sales organizations in China to better understand and serve China’s market.  
                                                        
448 Len Jelinek, “China Research: Q4, 2004,” iSupply, 2004. 
449 Into the 1990s, most major global semiconductor firms operated under the “integrated device manufacturer 
(I.D.M.)” business model.  In an I.D.M., one vertically integrated company designs, fabricates (i.e., produces 
or manufactures), and packages/assembles/tests (P.A.T.) its own semiconductors, using its own foundry for 
fabrication.  This foundry model was first developed in Taiwan in 1987 at the Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC).  The foundry model is in contrast to the I.D.M. model.  Under the 
foundry model, a stand-alone foundry leases its capacity to any number of customers.  Customers design their 
semiconductors and then simply lease foundry capacity for fabrication.  The foundry does not sell 
semiconductors into the market.  That said, a company can have a foundry while also having other revenue 
streams. 
450 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 297. 
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Huahong also established locations in a number of foreign countries.  Huahong-NEC first 
expanded its customer base by serving Chinese branches of Japanese companies, but 
eventually Huahong-NEC served customers in all provinces of China, Taiwan, South Korea, 
the U.S., and other countries.451   
Huahong gained intellectual property and intellectual property protection through its 
joint venture with NEC as well as through other partner arrangements.  Early on, for example, 
Huahong managed to secure an agreement with Belgium’s IMEC on intellectual property for 
0.18-0.13µm technology.452  Huahong then used this cooperation as a bargaining chip to 
convince NEC to transfer this same level of production technology to Huahong.  A major 
benefit of Huahong gaining intellectual property rights was that Huahong could transfer its 
intellectual property to other groups and other companies in China.  Importantly, Huahong’s 
cooperation with foreign partners on design and intellectual property also made possible 
Project 909’s design initiatives.453 
Through I.P. sharing agreements with its partners, Huahong eventually began to 
produce and sell I.C. cards in China using its own (and co-owned) I.P.  The I.P. was 
developed by one of the Project 909 design firms, the Huahong Integrated Circuit Company.  
Previously, Chinese organizations had largely purchased I.C. cards from foreign suppliers.  
After Huahong-NEC developed I.C. card products, various Chinese government organizations 
purchased these I.C. cards for subway ticket machines, metro-cards, bank cards, identification 
                                                        
451 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 149 and 153.  Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 297. 
452 Ibid., pages 176-177.  Some members of IMEC’s team did not trust Huahong’s capabilities and were against 
sharing I.P. with Huahong. 
453 Ibid., pages 176-178.  Jiang Shoulei led the Huahong group to Belgium.  Jiang was formerly at Huajing, and 
he later led Huahong’s sales affiliate, Hongri.  Under the agreement with IMEC, Huahong would send ten 
people per year for four years to Belgium to work with IMEC design staff.  Wang and Wang, Wo Guo 
Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 298. 
221 
 
cards, social security cards, and other uses.   Indeed, between 2003 and 2004, Huahong-NEC’s 
revenue’s nearly doubled, as 2004 was the year that Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, and other 
cities introduced social security (I.C.) cards for residents.454 
Huahong continued to globally integrate through various partnerships.  A good 
example is Huahong-NEC’s 2003 re-organization into a three-way joint venture between the 
U.S., Japan, and China.  That year Jazz Semiconductor, a California-based foundry that 
focuses on serving the aerospace and defense industries, joined Huahong-NEC.  Jazz 
Semiconductor exemplifies global integration in the semiconductor industry.  Jazz was 
founded by Shu Li, originally from China, but educated and working in the U.S. for many 
years.455  In 2003, Jazz Semiconductor obtained an eleven percent equity stake and board seat 
on Huahong-NEC.  Jazz was founded in 2002 just a year before its venture with Huahong-
NEC.  It was a spinoff from U.S. semiconductor company Conexant Systems, which had 
previously spun-off from (U.S.) Rockwell Semiconductor in 1999.  The Carlyle Group, a 
leading U.S. private equity firm, was the majority shareholder at Jazz’s founding.  In 2008, 
Jazz became a subsidiary of TowerJazz of Israel, while maintaining its venture with Huahong-
NEC.456   
                                                        
454 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 297.  Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 80-81 and 138-139.  
The Huahong Integrated Circuit Company was a Project 909 design firm jointly founded by the Huahong 
Group, the State Investment Electronics Company, Shanghai Research Institute of Metallurgy, Shanghai 
Academy of Science, and the Shanghai Fudan High-Tech Company. 
455 As a successful business executive, Shu is a member of the U.S.-based Committee of 100, a group of 
prominent Chinese-Americans from a variety of fields. The group is a non-profit, non-partisan organization 
that brings a “Chinese-American perspective to issues concerning Asian-Americans and U.S.-China relations.” 
See www.committee100.org. 
456 Jazz Semiconductor press releases and website, see www.jazzsemi.com.  Also in 2003, Jazz announced a 
partnership with China’s ASMC, one of China’s key semiconductor enterprises.  Jazz’s products are for use 
in wireless communications, optical networking, power management and other ultra-high performance 
applications.   
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As a globally integrated, relatively advanced semiconductor enterprise, Huahong-NEC 
arguably fostered – at least to a degree – China’s semiconductor industry chain, which was 
the original intention of Project 909.  According Wang Yangyuan, “Huahong-NEC set a huge 
good example for the whole industry and pushed related policies to come up….With its 
profits, Huahong-NEC proved that China has the conditions and environment [for the 
semiconductor industry]…including the facilities, markets, [technical] specialists, and 
policies.”457 
4.26  Huahong-NEC’s Contributions to the Industry 
Huahong-NEC made progress, but it also faced a number of policy-related obstacles.  
The enterprise faced inconsistent importation costs, inconsistent tax policies, a huge black 
market for smuggled electronics goods, and limited access to foreign capital.  The following 
discussion addresses these obstacles, and in responding to these obstacles, we begin to see 
how Huahong-NEC’s experiences helped to shape China’s business and policy environment 
for the semiconductor industry. 
When Huahong-NEC was established in 1997, China’s official value added tax 
(V.A.T.) on imported semiconductors and discrete devices was 17 percent in addition to other 
import-related costs.  Owing to this high cost, electronic components were commonly 
smuggled into southeast China.458  Indeed, buyers in China often bought electronic 
                                                        
457 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 298. 
458 Smuggling was widely reported as prevalent in China, especially in the 1990s as China’s economy was 
growing and import-export policies remained problematic, i.e., high tariffs on many imported products, 
inconsistent policies, etc.  For a description of China’s smuggling problems and the government’s anti-
smuggling campaign of the late 1990s, see Dali Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition 
and the Politics of Governance in China (California: Stanford University Press, 2004.) 
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components by the kilo, that is, in bulk, rather than by the unit.  A former Huajing manager 
claimed that even state owned enterprises (including Huajing) commonly and knowingly 
sought smuggled semiconductors well into the 1990s.  According to this source, there were 
several reasons: enterprises’ inability to self-produce more advanced semiconductors, the 
general lack of supply in China, and the higher price of legally imported semiconductors and 
discrete devices.  Seeing an opportunity, this particular manager left Huajing in 1991 to start a 
trading company.  In the first half of the 1990s, he imported semiconductors and discrete 
devices from Hong Kong, including products made by Motorola, Philips, and Toshiba, and he 
sold these products to Chinese state owned enterprises at double his cost.  He openly 
acknowledged that his trade was illegal smuggling, but he seemed to view smuggling as 
unsurprising, acceptable, and necessary during that period.459 
High importation costs and the resultant smuggling affected Huahong-NEC as well as 
foreign companies.  As Huahong-NEC sought to win customers in China, the manager of 
Huahong’s domestic sales unit complained that potential clients would say “I do not care if it 
is legal or smuggled in, I just need products at cheap prices.”460  Competing against smugglers, 
Huahong-NEC’s sales unit found it difficult to secure domestic sales.  As for global firms, 
they either had to either pay exorbitant costs to legally import semiconductors into China or 
they had to forfeit profits to middlemen who might ultimately sell into Mainland China via 
smuggling.  Given this situation, Huahong-NEC leaders pressured Chinese officials to change 
                                                        
459 Interview with David Gong, June 2, 2009, at Inchange Semiconductor in Wuxi.  Mr. Gong had been a 
manager at Huajing until leaving in 1991 to form a trading company.  In 1991, Mr. Gong’s new firm was a 
collectively owned, township and village enterprise (T.V.E.) in Wuxi.  By 1994, under China’s new 
Company Law, he was able to change the ownership structure.  In 2009, Mr. Gong’s company was called 
Inchange, and it was a private, Wuxi-based company with 100 employees, with half of its sales domestic and 
half foreign, see www.iscsemi.com. 
460 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 149. 
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the V.A.T. and tariff levels and take action against smuggling;461 ultimately, the changes 
Huahong-NEC advocated would benefit both Chinese enterprises as well as foreign 
enterprises. 
In 1998, the Chinese government did undertake a large-scale, anti-smuggling 
campaign.  This campaign was not only to help the electronics industry, but nonetheless, the 
anti-smuggling programs and results were significant enough that by late 1998 and 1999, 
Chinese semiconductor firms, including Huahong-NEC, reported that they were no longer 
losing significant sales to smugglers.462  
Anti-smuggling measures were helpful, but China’s tax environment in the late 1990s 
remained problematic.  At seventeen percent, China’s value added tax rate was significantly 
higher than that of Europe (six percent), Taiwan (five percent), and Japan (three percent).463  
Depending on negotiations with officials, total imports costs could vary from five to thirty 
percent, but seventeen was the official rate.464  Also, China’s V.A.T. was a production V.A.T. 
instead of a consumption V.A.T.  A production V.A.T. allowed the Chinese government to 
collect taxes on production-related activities, rather than collecting taxes on consumption.  
Most other countries used a consumption V.A.T., which is less onerous for production 
companies.  In China, for example, if a semiconductor enterprise imported a US$1 billion 
production line, then the enterprise would pay a (production) V.A.T. of US$170 million.  In 
                                                        
461 Ibid., pages 149-150. 
462 Ibid., pages 150-151. 
463 Countries often have a standard V.A.T. rate and a reduced rate for specified products.  These rates quoted in a 
semiconductor industry report likely reflect “reduced” V.A.T.s that countries charged on semiconductor-
related goods. For example, in 2012, the U.K.’s standard V.A.T. was twenty percent, but its reduced V.A.T. 
rate was five percent for certain types of goods. 
464 U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association, prepared by Dewey Ballantine LLP, by T. Howell, B. Bartlett, W. 
Noellert, and R. Howe, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” 2003, Figure 11, pages 20-21 
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addition the enterprise would pay customs taxes, bringing the total tax burden to about 24 
percent of the US$1 billion cost, which was much higher than tax costs in other countries.465 
Recognizing the discouraging nature of China’s tax policies in this critical industry, 
the Chinese officials took measures to help Huahong-NEC.  The enterprise was able to secure 
a tax holiday and an exemption from the normal tariffs and import-related value added taxes 
for production-related equipment and raw materials during construction.  After initiating 
operations, Huahong-NEC was granted the same preferential policies that Shanghai’s Pudong 
New District offered Sino-foreign joint ventures and high technology firms.  These included 
ongoing tax breaks on imported spare parts and raw materials and the ability to negotiate with 
the Shanghai government for a certain total level of tax free importation.466  For Huahong-
NEC, as had been the case for the Sino-foreign semiconductor joint ventures, officials 
negotiated subsidies, taxation, and import costs on a one-off basis. 
From their experiences with individual enterprises, industry leaders began formulating 
new policies for the semiconductor industry in the late 1990s.  New policies were announced 
(though not implemented) on June 25 of 2000 via State Council Document #18 called 
“Policies to Encourage the Software and Integrated Circuit Industries.”467  This breakthrough 
document (addressed in Chapter Five) benefitted domestic semiconductor enterprises as well 
as Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign owned enterprises.  Document #18 sought 
                                                        
465 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, pages 345-348. 
466 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, page 25. 
467 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 348.  The document is “18 Hao Wenjian: Guli 
Ruanjian Chanye he Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan de Ruogan Zhengce 18 号文件：鼓励软件产业和集成
电路产业发展的若干政策  (Document 18: Some Policies to Encourage the Software and Integrated Circuit 
Industries).”  This document is available from the Chinese Electronics Standardization Institute (Zhongguo 




to streamline approval processes for new enterprises, as well as improve tax policies, customs 
duties, foreign exchange regulations, and intellectual property protection. 
In addition to advocating reduced V.A.T. tax and other costs, Project 909 leaders had 
sought additional access to international sources of funding.  In Hu’s records on Project 909, 
he introduces his and his colleagues’ early consideration of venture capital as a possible 
mechanism for funding certain semiconductor ventures.  According to Hu: 
“In November 1997, the Vice President of Huahong, Lu Dechun, and Yang 
Guang from the Ministry of the Electronics Ministry visited America, especially 
Silicon Valley.  They came back and told me, in America,… semiconductor 
design company [costs] can be US$3 million in the first two years, and maybe 
you can not even make your own product.  I was really worried about this.  
Because [in our case] the investment is coming from national assets, so we need 
to keep it appreciating.  If all the money is spent, and we can not see achievement, 
how can I report [back to the government, the people]? 
 
“So because… the risk is very high, why not invest in some existing design 
companies to reach our mission?  At the same time, the venture capital concept 
jumped into my mind.  At that time, this venture capital concept was just 
introduced from overseas to China and lots of other people were very concerned 
about its ability… [would it really work?]  I invited Chinese-American venture 
capital firms to give lectures in the Ministry of the Electronics Industry and their 
ideas inspired us.  … In the early 20th century [in the U.S.], several wealthy 
families gave up railroad, oil, and other traditional industries to invest in 
computers and new technology, and they created IBM, so IBM is a good model of 
venture capital success… [also Intel, Sun, etc.]”468 
 
Project 909 leaders believed that success in the semiconductor industry would depend 
on access to international capital.  Ultimately, officials responded with two policy changes in 
support of this belief.  In January of 1998, the Ministry of Information Industries (formerly 
the Ministry of the Electronics Industry) issued new regulations to facilitate foreign 
investment in semiconductor manufacturing.  The new Guiding Catalog of Foreign 
                                                        
468 Hu, Gongcheng Jishi, pages 153-154. 
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Investment in Industry listed semiconductors among China’s “encouraged” industries; in 
encouraged industries, foreign investments and foreign invested enterprises were likely to get 
government approval.  Following this, in June of 1999, China’s Ministry of Science and 
Technology confirmed that semiconductor enterprises could seek “venture capital and other 
sources of funding that were previously off limits.”469 
These policies changes and the impending Document #18 (to be issued in 2000) were 
not exclusively predicated on Huahong-NEC’s needs.  However, as a national champion led 
by Chinese officials, the experiences of Huahong-NEC directly influenced policy makers.  
4.3  National Champion SMIC 
During the 1990s China’s semiconductor industry leaders concentrated on developing China’s 
domestic production capability, but all the while, demand for semiconductors in China was 
exploding with annual growth of thirty to forty percent.  Project 908, based in state owned 
enterprise Huajing in Wuxi, finally began producing and selling in 1998 and 1999 with 
the help of the Taiwanese managers at CSMC (Huajing’s partner), using the foundry 
model.  By 2000, Huajing was indeed producing the highest quantity and widest variety of 
discrete devices in China, as well as producing a limited volume of integrated circuits.470  
Project 909’s Huahong-NEC also began selling products in 1999.  China’s key enterprises 
(mostly Sino-foreign joint ventures) were also in production by the late 1990s.   
Nonetheless, by 2000, these China-based producers were still about ten years behind 
the global leading technology, and they were struggling to supply even perhaps 10 percent 
                                                        
469 Denis Simon, “Critical Threshold.” 
470 Wang, “China’s Huajing.” 
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(estimates vary) of China’s rapidly expanding market, see Figure Eight.  The key enterprises, 
Huajing, and Huahong-NEC were making strides, but Chinese officials still believed that the 
China’s government needed to support the industry’s growth through targeted initiatives.471  
Learning from Huajing’s and Huahong-NEC’s experiences and seeking further global 
integration, China’s next major state supported project would be a semiconductor enterprise 
called Semiconductor International Manufacturing Corporation (SMIC, Zhongxin Guoji, 中心
国际.)  SMIC would utilize the foundry model from its inception and be China-based but 
established as a wholly foreign owned enterprise (W.F.O.E.), registered in the Cayman 
Islands.  SMIC was considered by both foreign observers and Chinese industry leaders to be a 
national champion enterprise for China that was capable of competing in the global industry.  
The primary goals for SMIC were to increase semiconductor production within China, to 
advance managerial and technological levels, and to further integrate China’s semiconductor 
                                                        
471 Could China’s large and growing market for semiconductors have fostered the emergence of more 
semiconductor production without government support?  In the case of the semiconductor industry in the 
1990s, Chinese leaders believed that targeted state support for the industry was necessary due to the high 
capital costs, the technological complexity, and China’s difficult operating environment, including high 
import costs, lack of legal protection for I.P., etc. 
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industry with the global industry.  (Technically, SMIC would be a competitor of Huahong-
NEC, but because Huahong-NEC had the domestic I.C. card market and NEC’s customers, 
the two enterprises initially were not directly competing for the same customers.)  SMIC was 
neither an unequivocal success nor an unequivocal failure, but its development and 
contributions were – and remain – important to the semiconductor industry in China.  Like 
Huajing and Huahong-NEC, the history of SMIC demonstrates how Chinese leaders sought to 
advance a critical, high technology industry. 
Because SMIC was and remains an international company, publicly available sources 
such as annual reports, industry reports, and articles cover much of its development.  This 
section also makes use of accounts from SMIC cofounder and former Chairman Wang 
Yangyuan from his book “China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development Path: From a Big, 
Consuming Nation to a Strong, Industrial Nation.”472  Prof. Wang was a Director of SMIC 
from 2001 and was named Chairman in 2005.  From 1999 (if not earlier), Prof. Wang worked 
with several overseas ethnic Chinese to cofound SMIC, including Richard Chang of the U.S. 
and Taiwan.  Richard Chang was the better-known of the SMIC cofounders, and he was 
C.E.O. of SMIC from 2000 to 2009.  Mr. Chang agreed to an interview for this study in 2009, 
but he cancelled the interview on short notice.  As we will see, 2009 was a tumultuous year 
for Mr. Chang at SMIC, and he ultimately resigned later that year.  
                                                        
472 As an academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Dean of the Institute of Microelectronics at 
Peking University, Wang is a leading scientist in China.  His lengthy book primarily covers the minutia of 
technical advances in semiconductor technology, but he also includes the history of the global industry, and 
later in the book, he recounts the experiences of SMIC as well as other major national semiconductor projects.  
See, Wang Yangyuan and Wang Yongwen 王阳元, 王永文, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhilu: 
Cong Xiaofei Daguo Zouxiang Chanye Qiangguo 我国集成电路产业发展之路：从消费大国走向产业强
国 (China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development Path: From a Big, Consuming Nation to a Strong, 




4.31  The Origins of SMIC 
China’s first successful example of cooperation with ethnic-Chinese from Taiwan in 
the semiconductor industry had been Huajing’s work with CSMC.  In the late 1990s, with 
CSMC-Huajing and Huahong-NEC underway, the Chinese government was on the verge of 
issuing new tax and investment policies for the semiconductor and software industries via 
Document #18 in June 2000.  Well aware of the upcoming policy changes under Document 
#18, Wang Yangyuan began to work with Richard Chang and other overseas ethnic Chinese 
semiconductor experts to found SMIC.  Established in April of 2000 in Shanghai, SMIC was 
to be a high volume, high technology foundry. 
The founding and development of SMIC is closely tied to SMIC cofounder and first 
C.E.O., Richard Chang of Taiwan and the U.S.  Richard Chang (also called Zhang Rujing and 
Ru Gin Chang) was born in Nanjing, China, but went to Taiwan before his first birthday when 
the CCP took control of the mainland in 1949.  He was thus raised and educated in Taiwan, 
though he later came to the U.S. to pursue a master’s degree in engineering.  After graduate 
school, he joined U.S.-based Texas Instruments where he remained for about twenty years.  
Notably, Richard Chang was responsible for establishing six new semiconductor fabrication 
facilities in Asia and Europe during his time at Texas Instruments.  After leaving Texas 
Instruments in 1997, Mr. Chang returned to Taiwan and, backed by investors, he founded 
Worldwide Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (WSMC), which was essentially a 
semiconductor foundry.  Between 1997 and 2000, in the space of just two to three years, 
Richard Chang commenced operations at WSMC and sold it to Taiwan’s largest foundry 
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company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC.)
473
  TSMC had been 
founded by another former Texas Instrument’s executive from Taiwan, Dr. Morris Chang (no 
relation to Richard Chang.)  The two men’s tenure at Texas Instruments overlapped, but 
according to Morris Chang, Richard Chang was “several levels below me at Texas 
Instruments,” and they did not know one another well at that time.
474
  After WSMC, Richard 
Chang’s next venture would be SMIC in mainland China. 
China’s market for semiconductors continued to expand, but the global semiconductor 
industry went into another slump in 2000.  (Recall that the previous cyclical downturn was in 
1997.)  From 2000 to 2001, global industry revenue decreased by more than thirty percent, 
and global expenditures on capital equipment were also significantly down.
475 
 It was during 
this downturn that Chinese semiconductor leaders supported the establishment and 
construction of SMIC.  China’s central government and the Shanghai municipal government 
both offered SMIC preferential policies for land and other benefits.
476
  Owing to SMIC’s 
construction and other semiconductor production upgrades, from 2000 to 2001, equipment 
expenditures in China increased by 113 percent, in stark contrast to the global industry decline 
in capital expenditures.
477
    To avoid Wassenaar restrictions,478 SMIC imported eight inch 
                                                        
473 Bruce Einhorn and Morris Chang (interview script), “China’s Fabless Appeal,” Businessweek, September 22, 
2002. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Wilson Yu (former General Manager of CSMC-Huajing), “China Now: CSMC’s Experience as the Pioneer 
Open Foundry in China,” Future Fab International, Issue 12, 2001. 
476 Interview with Prof. Yang, June 8, 2009, in Shanghai.  Prof. Yang (retired) was formerly with a Fudan 
microelectronics-related institute.  
477 Nasa Tsai (President of Grace Semiconductor), “China: An Emerging Centre for Semiconductor 








SMIC, headquartered in Shanghai but registered and incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands, was initially led by Richard Chang.
480
  Chang recruited a team of engineers and 
production managers from China, Taiwan, the U.S., Singapore, South Korea, and other 
countries.  To attract both domestic and foreign experts, new recruits were offered stock 
options as well as an array of amenities on the SMIC campus including high quality employee 
apartments, an English-Chinese school for employees’ children, and other services.
481
 
SMIC’s initial funding is reported to have been US$1.48 billion,
482
 with US$1 billion 
in equity finance and US$480million in loans from Chinese banks.
483
 As a W.F.O.E., SMIC 
initially raised several rounds of international funding from sources such as Motorola, 
Goldman Sachs, and Walden.
484
  Wang suggests that funding from Chinese banks came only 
after raising international capital, but Richard Chang mentioned borrowing from Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                                             
478 The Wassenaar Arrangement was a post-Cold War agreement that restricted high technology, dual-use 
exports to China. 
479 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “China’s Impact on the Semiconductor Industry,” 2004, page 31. 
480 Zhu, Wenji, page 165.  Around the same time, China’s government also allowed the establishment of Grace 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (Hongli Bandaoti Youxian Gongsi 宏力半导体有限公司), which 
also had Taiwanese management.  SMIC and Grace are often mentioned together, although SMIC was 
considered a national champion enterprise.  See Chapter Five for more on Grace. 
481 Evelyn Iritani, “China on Road to Power in Chips,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2002. 
482 Japer Moiseiwitsch, “Superfab,” Financial Technology Asia, May 2001. 
483 SMIC, “SMIC Annual Results 2004,” accessed at 
http://www.smics.com/attachment/2011012017321517_en.pdf.  Interview with Prof. Yang, June 8, 2009. 
Also, Mure Dickie, “Pioneering SMIC Leads the Chip Exodus to China,” Financial Times, November 13, 
2001. 
484 Before going public, over forty percent of SMIC shares were held by the following investors: Motorola, 
Global Growth Fund and International Equity Income  Fund, Beida Jade Bird Software System Company, 
Asia Pacific Associates III, Goldman Sachs, Platinum Creative Group Ltd., Integrated Silicon Solution, Inc., 




banks before production had even commenced at SMIC.  In October of 2001, Chang 
commented "The [Chinese] authorities said how much money we could borrow and from 
which Chinese banks."
485
  SMIC’s initial US$480 from Chinese banks is similar in size to 
Huahong’s initial US$500 million, but SMIC had far more capital than Huahong from 
international sources.  After two years in production, in March of 2004, SMIC went public, 
raising another US$1.017 billion and listing on the New York and Hong Kong stock 
exchanges. 
Like Huahong-NEC, SMIC benefitted from preferential policies from China’s central 
and local governments.  Shanghai offered SMIC the standard incentives offered to high 
technology firms including, for example, a five year tax holiday and another five years at fifty 
percent of standard tax rates.  SMIC was also granted a reprieve on tariffs and was required to 
pay only a small portion of China's 17 percent V.A.T.
486
  With locations in Shanghai as well 
as Beijing and Tianjin,
487
 SMIC was later asked by local government officials in Shenzhen, 
Chengdu, and Wuhan to work with these cities to manage semiconductor facilities.  A 
Harvard Business School case study on this arrangement said: “[Richard] Chang was very 
committed to a strategy that leveraged the desire of cities within China, as supported by 
central government policies, to build clusters of high tech companies. By partnering with 
those cities to build new semiconductor fabrication facilities that SMIC would then operate 
under contract, [SMIC] could build scale without necessarily confronting immediate large 
                                                        
485 “New Plants Open on Fertile Ground,” Financial Times, October 16, 2001.  The article went on to say: “Mr. 
Chang has noticed another difference to doing business in China compared with Taiwan; he had had to 
employ eleven public relations officers to keep local officials informed, compared to just one in Taiwan.”  
486 Dickie, “Pioneering SMIC.” 





  Chang referred to this type of partnering as a “reverse B.O.T.” model, 
where B.O.T. refers to the “build, operate, transfer” model.  In the B.O.T. model, typically a 
private company builds and operates a civil infrastructure project, e.g., a transit system, and 
later transfers the system to a municipality.  SMIC, however, partnered with Chengdu, Wuhan 
and Shenzhen to execute a “reverse B.O.T.”  In the reverse B.O.T., the cities built 
semiconductor fabrication facilities, SMIC managed the facilities, and later the cities sold the 
facilities to SMIC.  SMIC C.E.O. Richard Chang explained: “Initially the depreciation [on 
semiconductor facilities] is so high, the record for the large foundries so far has been that it is 
almost impossible to be profitable during the first seven years.  So if we do a reverse B.O.T., 
it makes more sense.”
489
  This type of partnering allowed SMIC to expand its operations 
rapidly throughout China. 
4.32  SMIC’s Results 
SMIC made headlines in the global industry.  In only its second year of production, 
SMIC was named a “Top Fab of the Year” in 2003 by Semiconductor International, a leading 
global industry journal.
490
  SMIC initially produced mostly memory chips (DRAM), but over 
the years the firm migrated to producing more complex logic chips.  SMIC’s global clients 
included former clients of WSMC (which had merged into TSMC in 2000),
491
 but SMIC also 
produced semiconductors for Chinese design houses.  Indeed, as early as 2001, Chinese 
                                                        
488 Willy Shih, “Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation: ‘Reverse BOT’," Harvard Business 
School (case study), January 2009, page 2. 
489 Richard Chang quoted in Shih, “Reverse BOT," page 7.  
490 Semiconductor International, May, 2003. 
491 Kessler, “Capital Accumulation, ”page 95-96. 
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design houses migrated to 0.18µm technology, in part due to SMIC’s burgeoning 
capabilities.
492
  SMIC began production in 2002 with 0.5µm technology, but had rapidly 
upgraded to 0.18µm.  By 2006, SMIC’s production represented 40 percent of all integrated 
circuit production in China.  That year, SMIC held six percent of the global chip market, 
ranking third among all global foundries in terms of global market share.  According to 
Richard Chang of SMIC, U.S. export controls and Taiwan restrictions against semiconductor 
investments in mainland China actually helped SMIC to capture more of China’s domestic 
market in the early 2000s, as competing firms were somewhat stymied in setting up 
operations.493   
Yet, these macro results must not obscure major problems that SMIC encountered, 
namely being unprofitable most years from 2003 and being the target of numerous lawsuits 
(detailed in Section 4.34.)  Semiconductor fabrication facilities are commonly not profitable 
in their early years due to high capital costs and depreciation of equipment, but industry 
personnel have charged that SMIC was not well managed financially.  Netherlands-based 
ASML is a leading global equipment supplier that worked regularly at SMIC’s Chinese sites 
as a primary equipment and maintenance provider.  Executives at ASML were critical of 
SMIC management.  “[C.E.O. Richard] Chang wants more money [from the Chinese 
government] to expand, but he does not run the business well...  SMIC fails due to too much 
government support, asset utilization problems, and slow implementation.  If equipment 
breaks, SMIC will not pay the costs to fix it,”
494
 leading to low equipment utilization rates, 
                                                        
492 S. Chen, G. Liu, V. Lee, J. Xie, “Rising to the Challenge: China’s New Semiconductor Industry,” Future Fab 
International, February 2, 2002. 
493 Shih, “Reverse BOT.” 
494 Interviews with Fred Knijnenburg and Joseph Chen of ASML on April 11 and June 29, 2009 in Wuxi. 
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which are damning in the semiconductor industry.  Morris Chang, founder of Taiwan’s TSMC 
said “[Richard Chang] is basically a fab starter.  He has a lot of expertise in building a fab.  
That was all he did at Texas Instruments.  And basically that’s what he did as WSMC.  
[Almost] as soon as he built the WSMC fab, it was sold to us [TSMC].  His experience does 
not encompass running a fab, much less making money from it.  [Building a fab and running a 
fab] are quite different things.”
495
   
SMIC had succeeded in operating as a W.F.O.E. in China with international capital, 
management, talent, technology, and quality, but the migration to Mainland China of these 
assets – both tangible and intangible – was not without obstacles.  At this juncture, we must 
consider SMIC’s connections to Taiwan and Taiwan’s TSMC. 
4.33  Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry 
As Chinese leaders sought to development the semiconductor industry in China, they 
were well aware of the successful evolution of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan.  Indeed, 
they looked upon Taiwan as something of a model for how to develop the industry in 
China.
496
  In Taiwan, the semiconductor industry received support from Taiwan’s government 
and grew in large part through international funding and management.  Starting from 1963, a 
number of U.S. companies established semiconductor operations in Taiwan, and in the 1960s 
and 1970s, Taiwan’s government supported the semiconductor industry through new 
university courses, industry infrastructure, and by providing the capital to build an advanced 
                                                        
495 Bruce Einhorn and Morris Chang (interview script), “China’s Fabless Appeal,” Businessweek, September 22, 
2002. 
496 Chapter Six compares the history of the semiconductor industry in China to that of Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan more fully. 
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fabrication facility.  This facility ultimately became an operational company in 1980, called 
United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC).  UMC went on to become – and it remains – a 
leading global semiconductor company.  Building on this, in 1987, the government of Taiwan 
invited Dr. Morris Chang, a Taiwan-born executive at U.S.-based Texas Instruments, to return 
to Taiwan.  With investment from Netherlands-based Philips, Dr. Chang founded Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which would originate and dominate the 
foundry model.  At this writing, TSMC and UMC of Taiwan remain the world’s two largest 
semiconductor foundries.  Through government support and international cooperation, the 
contemporary semiconductor industry in Taiwan became a major global player over the 
course of about 30 years, from the early 1960s to the early 1990s.  According to a study by 
Rand, from the 1970s, “The Taiwanese government sought to foster the industry, though not 
to create a nationalized industry.  …..[And] by the early 1990s, Taiwan was [technologically] 
only one year behind the global vanguard.”
497
   
Despite Mainland China’s rapidly growing market for semiconductors in the 1990s, 
Taiwan’s semiconductor firms could not easily establish operations on the mainland.  
Taiwanese firms wanted to set up operations on the mainland in order to be closer to 
customers and to avoid import costs.  However, due to political tensions between China and 
Taiwan, China’s government restricted foreign investment from Taiwan, and the government 
of Taiwan restricted investment in the semiconductor industry on the mainland.  The 
government of Taiwan did not want to see its high technology, high value semiconductor 
industry migrate to the mainland.  Taiwan’s leaders feared that if Taiwanese semiconductor 
                                                        
497 Rand National Defense Research Institute (J. Mulvenon, M. Chase, K. Pollpeter), “Shanghai-ed?: The 




firms established fabrication facilities (foundries) in China, then Taiwanese design houses and 
P.A.T. firms would quickly follow to work with the foundries.  In this way, Taiwan’s whole 
semiconductor industry chain might migrate to the mainland.   
Facing investment restrictions from their own government, TSMC, UMC and other 
Taiwanese firms lobbied to be allowed to invest in new operations on the mainland.  Due in 
large part to this lobbying, in 2002, the Taiwanese government finally loosened restrictions on 
semiconductor investments in China.
498
   However, because of the growth in China’s 
semiconductor market from the 1990s, certain individuals and groups from Taiwan had 
already begun to circuitously make semiconductor investments in mainland China even prior 
to Taiwan’s relaxed regulations announced in 2002.   Indeed, SMIC’s origination in mainland 
China in the 2000-2001 period under a Taiwanese founder and C.E.O. signaled potentially 
illicit investments. 
4.34   SMIC’s Legal Disputes with Taiwan and TSMC 
In the 2000s, the government of Taiwan and TSMC filed suits against Richard Chang 
and SMIC alleging illegal investments in mainland China as well as intellectual property theft 
by SMIC from TSMC.  As we will see in Chapter Five, these lawsuits did not diminish 
Taiwanese firms’ overall interest in expanding into mainland China, but they did cause both 
reputational and financial problems for SMIC. 
As a citizen of Taiwan, Richard Chang was under Taiwan’s restrictions on 
semiconductor investments in mainland China, and the government of Taiwan ultimately 
brought three lawsuits against Chang personally for illegal investments based on his work 
                                                        





  In 2005, Taiwan’s government fined Chang US$155,000 and ordered him to 
withdraw his semiconductor-related investments in mainland China.  Chang, however, did not 
pay the fine, and the Taiwanese government was not able to seize his assets because it could 
not prove that Chang was SMIC’s “main investor.”
500
  Following these legal disputes, Richard 
Chang renounced his Taiwanese citizenship in 2005.501 
In addition, SMIC faced several lawsuits from TSMC and ultimately had to pay over 
US$450 million in financial and equity settlements.  SMIC was first sued by TSMC in 2003 
and 2004 for patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.
502
  Recall, Richard Chang 
sold WSMC to TSMC in 2000, but in that very same year, Richard Chang cofounded SMIC 
in mainland China.  The overlap in timing raised questions.  In 2003, TSMC accused SMIC of 
hiring more than 100 TSMC employees, obtaining trade secrets, and producing chips based on 
patented technology.
503
  Ultimately, TSMC won a settlement of US$175 million from SMIC 
in 2005 for trade secret and patent violations.  In 2006, TSMC and SMIC filed complaints and 
counter complaints, respectively, with SMIC alleging a global smear campaign by TSMC.  In 
2009, TSMC was awarded another US$200 million in a case against SMIC.  In that ruling, 
                                                        
499 Shih, “Reverse BOT.” 
500 “SMIC Founder and C.E.O. Richard Chang Resigns,” Taipei Times, November 11, 2009. 
501 An outspoken Christian, Chang has said that his decision to go to Mainland China was more than just 
economic.  “China is a good place in many aspects.  The market is huge.  Manufacturing costs are 
competitive.  The pool of talent is also very good.    …..But frankly, I was thinking about how I could share 
God’s love with the Chinese more than how I could help the economy,” see Evelyn Iritani, “China on Road 
to Power in Chips,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2002.  Many of the initial international team recruited 
to SMIC were ethnic-Chinese Christians, and the SMIC campus in Shanghai includes a church.  
Christianity was and remains a mainstay of SMIC’s culture.  As an example, the final page of a SMIC 
presentation titled “China I.C. and SMIC Progress” (presented October of 2004, by Samuel Wang, the 
President of SMIC Americas) was a biblical psalm: “You can make a difference.  The joy of the Lord is 
your strength.  Unless the Lord builds the house, its builders labor in vain...” 
502 “TSMC v. SMIC,” 161 Cal. App. 4th 581, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328, accessed online via LawLink in 2011. 
503 Mure Dickie, “Taiwanese Chipmaker Files I.P. Protection Suit,” Financial Times, December 23, 2003. 
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SMIC also had to issue TSMC approximately US$90 million worth of shares and warrants.
504
  
These settlements coupled with SMIC’s lack of profitability led to Richard Chang’s 
resignation from SMIC in 2009. 
4.35  SMIC’s Contributions to the Industry 
SMIC itself achieved significant results, i.e., being the 3rd largest global foundry by 
2006, but it also faced financial and legal challenges.  Despite these mixed outcomes as a firm, 
SMIC arguably made positive contributions to the development of the overall semiconductor 
industry in China during its first five years in operation, 2002 to 2007.  The two most 
important areas in which SMIC contributed to the industry are China’s talent pool and 
international integration.  As for the talent pool, SMIC created hundreds of high technology 
jobs and provided personnel with extensive formal training.  And, according to former SMIC 
Chairman Wang Yangyuan, SMIC fostered possibly thousands of jobs in other organizations 
throughout the semiconductor value chain.  Examples of SMIC’s contributions include:505 
• Jobs: Provided approximately 12,000 jobs at SMIC. 
 
• Training and Support: Offered around 500 courses each year; funded continuing 
education and conference attendance; provided high quality housing, bilingual 
schooling, and other infrastructure for employees’ families; and offered about 10 
percent of SMIC’s equity to employees. 
 
• Advancing Technology: Hired hundreds of research and development staff, e.g., 
approximately 800 in 2007, leading to technological advances, such as SMIC’s 
adoption of nano level process technology in 2005.  Joined cooperative projects with 
Chinese universities and research institutes. 
 
                                                        
504 Don Clark, “SMIC’s C.E.O. Resigns after TSMC Settlement,” Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2009. 
505 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, pages 299-302. 
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• Fostering the Industry Chain: Cultivated the equipment, materials, design, and P.A.T. 
sectors.  SMIC may have indirectly created 30,000 to 40,000 jobs throughout the 
industry value chain.  For example, by 2007, forty percent of SMIC’s revenues were 
from design houses, and more than a third of this forty percent was from domestic 
Chinese design houses. 
In terms of international integration, SMIC created a China-based enterprise with 
international standards, using international (and domestic) sources for technology, capital, 
talent, and markets.  Some examples include:506 
• Technology: Developed technical partnerships with foreign companies, including 
Toshiba, Fujitsu, Chartered, IMEC, Infineon, Freescale, IBM, etc. 
 
• Capital: In 2001, issued preferred stock and raised US$1.1 billion; between 2001 and 
2004 raised two rounds of private equity funding; in 2004, went public raising US$1.8 
billion; after 2004, got loans from international, as well as Chinese state owned banks. 
 
• Management and Talent: Used international management practices and hired about 15 
percent of its work force from overseas, e.g., Taiwan, the U.S., Singapore, South 
Korea and other nations.  In 2005, SMIC had 8,342 employees of which 1,079 were 
from overseas.  Over 100 were alleged to have been former Taiwan-based TSMC 
employees, and perhaps over 200 were from the U.S.507 
 
• Clients: Maintained long term client relationships with foreign and domestic clients, 
including (by 2007) eight of ten of the largest global semiconductor companies. 
 
At this writing, it is too soon to fully assess SMIC’s role in the evolution of the 
semiconductor industry in China.  However, since Richard Chang’s resignation in 2009, 
SMIC has retained its position as the leading foundry in China (by revenue) as well as its 
unique identify as a W.F.O.E. national champion for China.  SMIC’s leadership and investors 
                                                        
506 Ibid., pages 302-304. 
507 Henry Chesbrough, “Open Innovation in China,” Presentation to the Stanford Program on Regions of 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 2005.  Also, Monique Chu, “Controlling the Uncontrollable: Migration of 
Taiwanese Semiconductor Industry to China and Its Security Implications,” presentation to European 
Association of Taiwan Studies, 2006, page 4 and footnote 12. 
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continue to be both international and Chinese.  After Chang’s departure in 2009, David Wang, 
a Taiwanese former Chairman of Huahong-NEC and a former executive at Applied Materials 
(a major U.S. semiconductor company), was named C.E.O. of SMIC.  Two years later, Dr. 
Tzu-Yin Chiu, a former C.E.O. of Huahong-NEC, was named C.E.O. of SMIC.  Dr. Chiu had 
held senior positions at Huahong, SMIC, and TSMC during his career, and he was educated 
and began his career in the U.S. at AT&T Bell Labs.508  As for investors, SMIC continued to 
have international shareholders, including TSMC, as well as significant investment from state 
owned Chinese organizations, primarily Datang, a major state owned enterprise group, and 
CIC, a Chinese sovereign wealth fund.509 
4.4  State Led Development and National Champion Enterprises 
Chapters Three and Four have examined the origins, nature, and evolution of China’s 
national champion enterprises in the semiconductor industry, a critical high technology 
industry.  This section considers state led development and state support for favored large 
enterprises, sometimes called national champions, in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China 
                                                        
508 Mark Osbourne, “SMIC Appoints Huahong-NEC Executive as New C.E.O.,” Photovoltaics International, 
August 2011. 
509 Interview with Ye Tianchun, July 3, 2009, at the CAS Institute of Microelectronics in Beijing.  Ye was the 
Director of the Microelectronics Institute in 2009 and a top advisor on national semiconductor industry 
policies. Chinese state-owned enterprise group Datang invested US$171.8 million in SMIC in 2008 for a 16.6% 
interest in the company, per “SMIC Signs Cooperative Agreement With Datang,” TechSecurityChina, 
January 12, 2009.  In April of 2011, (CIC) China Investment Corp., China’s sovereign wealth fund, agreed to 
invest $250 million in SMIC, per SMIC, “SMIC to Receive Investment from CIC,” April 19, 2011, as well as 
other industry sources. 
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itself.  From this, we can consider the role of state led development and national champion 
enterprises in the semiconductor industry in China.510 
4.41  State Led Development and National Champions in East Asia 
In late developing economies in the 20th century, states took specific measures to 
foster industrialization and economic growth.511  Alexander Gerschenkron’s works in the 
1950s and 1960s on Europe suggested that the relatively “backward” nations of Europe had a 
different development trajectory than already developed nations.  In backward nations, the 
state had to intervene to compensate for the lack of technology, capital, and skills.512  In light 
of Japan’s rapid development in the 1960s and 1970s and South Korea and Taiwan’s in the 
1980s and 1990s, scholars have sought to understand the state’s role in industrialization in 
East Asia.  As just one indicator of how rapidly these economies grew, according to Robert 
Wade’s 1990 study, per capita gross national product rose by more than twenty times for 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and by more than fifteen times for Hong Kong and 
Singapore in the 25 years between 1962 and 1986.513  In each of these nations, the state used a 
                                                        
510  Chapter Six (Conclusions) compares the development of the electronics and semiconductor industries in 
China with the development of these industries in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
511 Late industrializers include not only the East Asian nations mentioned in this study but also Brazil, Turkey, 
India, Mexico, and perhaps others.  That said, state support for industrialization is not entirely new in the 20th 
century.  Britain, Germany and the U.S. all used certain protection policies during their initial periods of 
industrialization; for a discussion of this see Nolan, “Beyond Privatization,” pages 177-178. 
512 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962).  Gerschenkron challenged the “generalization…[that] the history of advanced or established 
industrial countries traces out the road of development for the more backward countries.”  Instead, backward 
countries “showed considerable differences…with regard to the productive and organizational 
structures…These differences were to a considerable extent the result of application of institutional 
instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country.”  Backward 
states had to assist their industries in acquiring foreign technology and skills to foster capital intensive, large-
scale production.  See Gerschenkron’s Introduction, pages 6-7.  
513 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrial 
ization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Chapter Two. 
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number of interventions to foment growth, and scholars have thus examined the interplay 
between industrial policy and economic growth, i.e., “state led development,” including the 
state’s support of certain large enterprises.514  Sometimes called national champions, these 
large enterprises were typically expected to become internationally competitive.  In the last 
twenty years, China too has been the focus of numerous studies related to state led 
development.  A brief review of influential works on state led development in Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and China will enable us to consider how this industry specific study adds to 
or changes our understanding of state led development and national champion enterprises in 
China.  
Chalmers Johnson’s 1982 MITI and the Japanese Miracle termed Japan a 
“developmental state,” owing to certain institutions and norms of Japan’s government.  This 
developmental state had emerged ad hoc during the 20th century as a result of Japan’s late 
                                                        
514 Not everyone is convinced that state led development was the primary cause of rapid growth in East Asia.  
The neoliberal, orthodox view challenges the results of industrial policies in East Asia, arguing instead that 
the rapidly developing nations of East Asia in the latter half of the 20th century “got the fundamentals right” 
and relied largely on market orientation and trade liberalization.  The orthodox view typically identifies 
macroeconomic stability, market orientation, trade liberalization, entrepreneurialism, resource allocation, 
private ownership, and advances in human capital as the primary drivers of growth in East Asia and 
elsewhere.  This view, sometimes called the Washington Consensus, voices much less support for state 
interventions and industrial policies, arguing the difficulty of proving causation between state interventions 
and growth.  The World Bank’s 1993 The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy took the 
orthodox position.  The report analyze00d eight Asian nations and identified macroeconomic stability, human 
resource development, capital accumulation and allocation, and market-friendly policies as the primary 
reasons for their economic growth.  The report said “industrial policy has generally not been successful” 
(page 261), citing lower productivity growth rates in some targeted industries and market conforming 
outcomes, connoting that the industrial policies did not have significant effects beyond what would have 
occurred without state intervention. To the extent that state led development might have made contributions 
in East Asia, the orthodox view suggests that benefits were contingent, succeeding in some cases and failing 
in others.  Generally, the orthodox view holds that business-government relations in East Asia have too often 
led to corruption and inefficiency, and that, since the late 1990s, East Asian nations (except perhaps China) 
are generally moving away from strong interventionist policies.  Beyond East Asia, the neo-liberal 
perspective generally suggests that government interventions in industry and trade should be limited, where 
“interventions” might include restrictive tariffs or special requirements for foreign firms such as requiring 
foreign firms to offer certain export levels, technology transfer, R&D, joint ventures, local content purchasing, 
etc.  See World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, 1993 and Robert Wade, 
Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990 and 2003), pages xiii-xiv, xliii-xlv. 
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development relative to the West and the Japanese government’s various efforts to promote 
economic growth.  Japan’s government and especially its central Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (M.I.T.I.) fostered the growth of Japan’s economy through industrial 
policy that influenced industries and large diversified business groups called kereitsu.  
Industrial policy utilized various “protective” tactics (e.g., tariffs, import restrictions, etc.) and 
“nurturing” tactics (e.g., low interest government funding, exclusion from import duties on 
critical equipment, industrial parks, etc.), as well as fostering oligopolistic competition 
between kereitsu.515  Johnson argued that Japan’s economy benefited from low cost exports 
(dating as early as the late 19th century with Japan’s entry into the global textile trade), but the 
primary source of Japan’s growth in the 1960s and 1970s was industrial investment in foreign 
technology, as planned and administered by M.I.T.I.  Johnson described the Japanese state as 
having an explicitly developmental orientation as opposed to having a regulatory orientation, 
like the United States.  Unlike the U.S. government, Japan’s government and M.I.T.I. were 
concerned with which industries ought to exist, how they should be organized, and even how 
individual enterprises should operate.   
Alice Amsden’s 1989 Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization 
argues that all late industrializers, and certainly South Korea, first and foremost were able to 
industrialize by learning, that is, “they industrialized by borrowing foreign technologies rather 
than by generating new products or processes, the hallmark of earlier industrializing 
nations.”516  This learning was explicitly technological (e.g., equipment and processes), but it 
                                                        
515 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1982). 
516 Alice Amsdem, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), Introduction.  
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also entailed the rise of capable managers and a better-educated labor force.  Amsden 
contrasts this learning-based development in South Korea with invention and innovation 
based development in Britain, Germany, and the U.S. in the first and second Industrial 
Revolutions of the late 18th and 19th centuries, respectively.  In the first and second Industrial 
Revolutions, higher productivity was the result of newly invented (or innovated) technologies, 
processes, and products.  
Amsden’s thesis is that late developers could initially leverage low labor costs to grow 
their exports, but only state support would enable such a nation to move into more 
technologically advanced industries, which required more capital, but more importantly, more 
skills and knowledge, i.e., learning.517  Korea was able to compete initially on low wages, but 
the low-wage-based light industries (textiles, clothing, etc.) that propelled growth in the 1960s 
in Korea were not able to independently foster the growth of more capital, technology, and 
skill intensive industries that Korea entered in the 1970s.  Korea’s Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and Economic Planning Board directed state subsidies to enable private Korean 
enterprises to compete in capital and technology intensive industries.  State subsidies – 
predicated on strict performance standards – enabled large diversified Korean enterprises 
(conglomerates called chaebols)518 to make productivity improvements and quality 
improvements to products that already existed in global markets. 
Notably, Amsden explained that South Korea “got prices wrong,” in contrast to the 
theoretical market that “gets prices right” by balancing supply and demand.  “Getting prices 
wrong” refers to state financial incentives and interventions to support industries and 
                                                        
517 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, page 63. 
518 Korea’s chaebols include internationally known firms such as Samsung and Hyundai. 
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individual enterprises.  State financial interventions addressed some of Korea’s contradictory 
economic needs that were rooted in its relative economic backwardness.  Some of the most 
important contradictions included the need for: 1) low interest rates to stimulate investment, 
but high interest rates to stimulate savings, 2) undervalued currency to support exports, but 
overvalued currency to minimize the cost of foreign debt and the cost of imported equipment 
and materials, and 3) protection for domestic industries, but free trade to get necessary 
imports and to export Korean-made goods.519  To address these contradictory needs, the 
Korean government used state controlled banks and industrial policies to offer, for example, 
different interest rates for consumers versus investors and different exchange rates for 
exporters and importers.  In this way, the state purposefully “got prices wrong” to stimulate 
industries, enterprises, and industrial learning, but these state supports were strictly dependent 
on the chaebols’ performance and willingness to enter new industries. 
Robert Wade’s 1990 Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization has much to say about the role of markets and the 
state in Japan and South Korea, but its main focus is Taiwan.520  In Taiwan, state officials 
were “not all knowing directors, but learning directors,” playing important roles in what Wade 
calls a “governed market.”521  In Taiwan, state policies were intended to spur the transfer of 
resources away from lower productivity industries (lower technology, more labor intensive 
industries) into new, more productive industries often through state owned firms.  The 
                                                        
519 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, page 13 and Chapter Six. 
520 Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990 and 2003), Introduction to the 2003 Edition, page xvii.  Another 
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island’s policies changed over the years, supporting import substitution in the 1950s, export 
promotion in the 1960s, “secondary” import substitution (to benefit upstream, capital 
intensive industries) in the 1970s, and promotion of high technology in the 1980s.  Taiwan 
was home to a number of dynamic small and medium sized firms that operated in part under 
market conditions, but Wade shows that Taiwan’s government made sustained investments in 
upstream industries, such as plastics, electronics, steel, and shipbuilding, for which smaller 
firms did not have the technology and capital.  Relative to Japan and South Korea, these 
industrial policies in Taiwan were less centralized, being carried out by a number of ministries 
and agencies.522 
In Taiwan, a main thrust of state led development was to foster internationally 
competitive firms in higher productivity industries.  This was sometimes called “picking 
winners.”523  Enterprises in targeted industries, e.g., heavy industry and high technology, 
benefitted from state investments.  Favored enterprises also benefited from import substitution 
policies (but not necessarily protection) and export promotion policies, which were assisted 
by an undervalued currency and export processing zones.  Government policies also 
supported education, technology, and research and development programs, to support favored 
enterprises in new, encouraged industries.  Further, Taiwan’s government limited the degree 
to which foreign firms could take ownership in Taiwanese firms, but foreign investment was 
allowed, especially when it enabled favored Taiwanese firms to acquire foreign technology.  
                                                        
522 Wade, Governing the Market, 1990, in particular Chapter Four covers how different heavy and higher 
technology industries were supported. 
523 As of 2012, the largest Taiwanese global firms are firstly TSMC (semiconductors) and then Hon Hai 
Precision Industry (commonly known as Foxconn, the massive contract electronics manufacturer), Formosa 
Petrochemical, Chunghwa Telecom, and Formosa Plastics, see Nell Shen, “Five Taiwanese Companies 
Listed among World's 500 Largest,” Focus Taiwan, July 21, 2012. 
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Indeed Taiwan’s government actively supported and coordinated technology transfer 
programs with global firms, including by reducing taxes on imported equipment. 
Other government policies also fostered selected industries.  Foreign firms operating 
on the island were often required to source from local suppliers.  Labor mobility was such that 
a number of Taiwan’s relatively well-educated engineers were able to work at foreign 
affiliated firms and later leave to start new firms of their own.  Taiwan’s officials also 
employed informal “nudging” tactics, e.g., encouraging foreign firms to work with local firms 
in their industry or making strategic suggestions to Taiwanese firms.524  Taken together, Wade 
sees the state in Taiwan as having played a critical role in moving Taiwan into higher 
productivity industries and fostering economic growth. 
These important studies by Johnson, Amsden, and Wade offer a wealth of both macro 
data and policy analyses of China’s successful neighbors.  These studies each essentially 
cover the entire modern economic history of a nation, as well as global economic history and 
economic theory, with many chapters on related matters such as “The Economic Bureaucracy” 
(Wade on Taiwan), and “The Boom in Education” (Amsden on Korea.)  Perhaps because their 
scope is so broad, they necessarily devote less time to events in particular industries.525  Yet 
from these studies we see that in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, industries developed in the 
context of state led development, which consisted of various state interventions in trade, 
industrial policy setting, and state investments.  These methods were directed at different 
industries over the decades and were often directed at supporting certain large enterprises, 
                                                        
524 Wade, Governing the Market, 2003, New Introduction to the 2003 Edition, page xxii. 
525 Ibid., pages 79-108, and Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, pages 243-316.  Surprisingly, Amsden covers more than 
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including government assistance for specific technology transfers from abroad.  In China, 
officials looked to their neighbors’ methods and accomplishments, as China was just one to 
two decades “behind” South Korea and Taiwan in its first two decades of reform and opening 
(1980s and 1990s.)  
4.42  State Led Development and National Champions in China 
As China sought to develop after 1978, vast state intervention was a pre-existing 
condition due to China’s history of state ownership of enterprises, state led industrialization, 
and central planning.  In the reform era, Chinese officials could not merely chose whether or 
not the state should intervene in any particular industry, because the state was already deeply 
involved in most industries.  The question was how to reform China’s bureaucratic-industrial 
complex.  In the 1990s, Chinese officials saw the economic and social dislocations in former 
Soviet economies that were attempting relatively rapid privatization of the state owned sector 
before establishing supportive institutions (e.g., law, finance) and services (e.g., marketing, 
distribution).  Chinese officials were also well aware of the contemporary economic histories 
of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, including these nations’ promotion of selected large 
enterprises.  
Considering the realities of China’s economy and the experience of its successful East 
Asian neighbors, it was almost inevitable that Chinese leaders would proceed in the 1990s 
with some forms of state led development or, as it has been more recently dubbed for China,  
“state capitalism.”526  China’s leaders seem to have understood the historical role of large 
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enterprises in nations and industries around the world,527 and ultimately they sought to create 
a number of globally competitive large enterprise groups, as had their East Asian neighbors.  
In 1997 at China’s 15th National Congress, President Jiang Zemin advocated that “The state 
owned sector must be in a dominant position in major industries and key areas that concern 
the life blood of the national economy…”528  Similarly, in 1998 State Council Vice Premier 
Wu Bangguo said: 
“In reality, …[history] shows that if a country has several group companies it will 
be assured of maintaining a certain market share and position in the international 
economic order.  America, for example, relies on General Motors, Boeing, 
DuPont and a batch of other multinational companies.  Japan relies on six large 
enterprise groups, and South Korea relies on ten large commercial groupings.  
…Our nation’s position in the international economic order will be to a large 
extent determined by the position of our nation’s large enterprises and groups.”529 
 
 
While reforming and consolidating state owned enterprises across industries in the 
1980s and 1990s, China’s central government ultimately formed a national team (guojia dui
国家队) of over 100 large vertically-integrated enterprise groups (qiye jituan 企业集团) in 
selected industries.530  This was part of China’s “grasp the large, let go of the small” approach 
(zhua da fang xiao 抓大 放小) in which smaller state owned enterprises were “let go” while 
                                                        
527 Alfred Chandler identified large industrial enterprises as an underlying dynamic in modern industrial 
capitalism and the importance of the “visible hand” of enterprise management.  Alfred Chandler, The Visible 
Hand : The Managerial Revolution in America Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) and 
Scale and Scope (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).   
528 Quoted in Dyland Sutherland, “China’s ‘National Team’ of Enterprise Groups: How Has It Performed?,” 
University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute, Discussion Paper 23, 2007.  Dylan quotes from Selected 
Documents of the 15th CPC National Congress (Beijing: New Star Publishing, 1997). 
529 Wu Bangguo was an electrical engineer who studied at Qinghua Universtiy and worked in electronics prior to 
attaining high positions in government.  Wu attended the early planning meetings for Project 909.  He is 
quoted in Sutherland, “China’s National Team.”  Sutherland’s source is Jingji Ribao, August 1, 1998. 
530 Lin and Milhaupt, “We are the (National) Champions,” page 17.  In 1987 the government legally defined the 
“business group.”  Fifty-seven groups were established in 1991 and another sixty-three in 1997. 
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larger enterprises were retained, consolidated, reorganized, and technologically upgraded, 
often through technology transfers from leading global firms.  Broadly, the objectives in 
establishing large enterprise groups included economies of scale, specialization, and cross-
enterprise collaboration, but the main priority was – and remains – to foster a group of 
internationally competitive enterprises to lead China’s integration in the world economy, to 
create, in effect, national champions.531  From 2003, these enterprise groups have been 
overseen by China’s central State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) under China’s State Council.  The SASAC is the controlling shareholder in these 
groups. 
Unlike Japan’s keiresu and Korea’s chaebols, China’s large enterprise groups have 
evolved not as diversified groups with member enterprises in different industries, but rather 
the groups have evolved over the years to be vertically integrated and typically (though not 
exclusively) operating within particular industries.532  (According to Barry Naughton, these 
enterprise groups actually began as diversified,533 but over time they have become industry 
focused.)  Here, vertical integration refers to the ownership structure of the enterprise groups.  
Higher level enterprises have ownership in lower level enterprises, but not vice versa, and 
member enterprises typically do not have horizontal ownership in other members.534  This use 
of “vertical integration” does not necessarily suggest that one enterprise or enterprise group 
                                                        
531 Dylan Sutherland, China’s Large Enterprises and the Challenge of Late Industrialization (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) and “China’s ‘National Team’.” 
532 Lin and Milhaupt, “We are the (National) Champions,” pages 13 and 18.  In 1998, the Provisional Rules on 
Business Group Registration better defined the structure and entities of China’s business groups.  For 
examples of these groups and their member enterprises, visit the enterprise group websites from 
www.sasac.gov.cn. 
533 Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pages 299-301. 
534 Lin and Milhaupt, “We are the (National) Champions,” page 24.  In Japan and South Korea, horizontal cross-
ownership among member enterprises was more common, even across industries. 
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conducts the full value-chain, i.e., R&D-production-distribution, although they may.  China’s 
first set of large enterprise groups was formed in 1991, and these were mostly in “backbone” 
industries such as power and construction.  In 1997 officials opted to create a second set of 
large enterprise groups in industries including automotive, electronics, chemicals, and others, 
causing China’s national team of large enterprise groups to eventually cover many if not most 
industries.  Since, 1997, the list of national team members and the ownership and governance 
structures of these groups has continued to evolve.535 
Because the 100 plus enterprise groups on China’s national team each have numerous 
member enterprises, the total number of enterprises under the national team is in the tens of 
thousands.536  According to Lin and Milhaupt, China’s large enterprise groups often consist of 
four key components: 1) a core holding company, 2) one or more publicly traded subsidiaries, 
3) a finance company, and 4) a research institute.537  These large enterprise groups then own 
(in full or in part) or are linked with many enterprises in their industry, including state owned 
enterprises at the provincial and local levels.  In recent years, China’s state owned sector has 
been responsible for an increasing share of China’s gross domestic product, and this has 
                                                        
535 Sutherland, China’s Large Enterprises, pages 55-56.  In setting policy for the large enterprise groups, 
Sutherland concluded that China “followed a ‘groping for stones’ approach, using trial and error, building 
upon more successful measures.”  He wrote: “Over the years [the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 2000s], a 
number of new policies was introduced and spread through an expanded number of trial business groups, 
including such measures as foreign trade rights, clarification of property rights within the core enterprises, the 
promotion of technology centres, and stock market listings.” 
536 These enterprises are now administered by China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), under China’s State Council.  See www.sasac.gov.cn for a current list of the 100 plus 
large enterprise groups, listed in the Central Enterprises Directory (yang qi minglu 央企名录.) 
537 Lin and Milhaupt, “We are the (National) Champions,” page 14. 
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prompted renewed attention to China’s still-being-defined “state capitalism” and the 
governance and ownership structures of China’s large enterprise groups and their members.538 
In China, state led development in the 1990s was primarily evident in the formation 
and ongoing innovations to large state owned enterprise groups as well as the use of centrally 
led five year plans, the setting of industrial policies, and extensive state control over industries 
considered important to national security including telecom, infrastructure industries, and 
banking.  In the 1990s, Chinese officials did not tightly restrict foreign investment, but they 
definitely directed foreign investment to align with centrally led plans.539  Having defined the 
broad outlines of state led development in China, we can now consider state led development 
in the semiconductor industry in China, with special attention to the role of favored 
enterprises.540  
4.43  China’s Key and National Champion Semiconductor Enterprises 
Chinese officials approached semiconductor industry development in the 1990s in 
ways that broadly reflected state led development in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  As in 
these nations, the Chinese government targeted the semiconductor (microelectronics) industry 
for support because it was a strategic, high productivity, high value, capital intensive industry 
                                                        
538 See for example Lin and Milhaupt, “We are the (National) Champions,” page 13.  According to SASAC data, 
the profits of China’s large enterprise groups were greater in 2010 than those of the largest private firms in 
China, and by 2011 China had sixty-one firms in the Global Fortune 500, ranking China third behind the U.S. 
and Japan. Lin and Milhaupt use data from the 2010 SASAC Yearbook and the 2010 China Enterprise 
Management Annual to compare profits from 133 national champions and China’s 500 largest privately 
owned enterprises, finding the former with three to four times the profits of the private enterprises, which 
could be due to low-cost government funding.  See also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, “An Analysis of State Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 2011. 
539 Nolan, “Beyond Privatization, pages 182-183. 
540 Chapter Six specifically compares the overall development of the electronics and semiconductor industry in 
China with the development of these industries in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
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that officials believed needed state investment to advance.  As was the case for strategic 
industries in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, China’s policies and programs for the 
semiconductor industry were developed at the central level but also by industry planning 
organizations, in China’s case, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry.  As we saw for 
Huajing, Huahong-NEC and SMIC, municipal governments then augmented central 
government policies and programs. 
Finally, as in other East Asian nations, China’s central government officials selected 
specific large enterprises – in this case, Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC – as national 
champions.  In developed countries in the 1990s, large enterprises were moving away from 
diversified holdings and were focusing on profitability and “core competencies,” but 
nonetheless, large enterprises remained technological and financial leaders across industries.  
China’s decision to support certain large enterprises was thus aligned with the approach of its 
East Asian neighbors in recent decades, as well as the reality of ongoing leadership by large 
enterprises in the world’s most advanced economies.541 
And yet, by looking at a particular industry and its enterprises, we see certain 
differences between the experiences in the semiconductor industry in China and state led 
development elsewhere.  Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC were selected by the 
government to be national champions, and yet the phrase “picking winners” does not quite 
apply.  Why?  First of all, these were not existing enterprises, so Chinese officials were 
actually taking an approach in this high technology industry of establishing new enterprises 
rather than “picking” existing enterprises.  Of Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC, only 
Huajing was based in an existing state owned enterprise (Wuxi’s #742 Factory), and it was re-
                                                        
541 Nolan, “Beyond Privatization,” pages 175-177. 
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established as a “new” enterprise (Huajing) in 1989.  Japan, Korea, and Taiwan also, in some 
cases, established new enterprises or significantly changed the operating capacity of existing 
enterprises through state investment for capital deepening and technological upgrading.  Thus, 
the approach of the state creating (or supporting the creation of) new enterprises is not entirely 
unique to China.  Yet, it bears mentioning that, in this particular high technology industry in 
the 1990s, China’s national champions were not “picked” from existing state owned 
enterprises (except Huajing) nor from existing private enterprises. 
Returning to the notion of “picking winners,” these enterprises also were not 
necessarily established with the goal of being “winners” in terms of being internationally 
competitive.  First and foremost, Chinese officials established Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and 
SMIC with the goal of advancing the technological level of a Chinese enterprise and of 
fostering the development of the full semiconductor industry chain in China.  Officials did 
hope that each of these firms would, at least at their inception, be a technological leader 
among Chinese firms, but the larger goal was to advance the technological level of many 
firms in China, including state and non-state firms as well as foreign and domestic firms.  In 
each case, officials believed that if one large scale, technologically advanced enterprise could 
operate in China, then other firms would have the confidence to establish operations in 
China’s admittedly imperfect business environment.  In the case of SMIC, there was more of 
an expectation that the firm might eventually be quite internationally competitive, but the 
technology that SMIC initially sought to use was not global leading edge.542  Finally, China’s 
emphasis in the 1990s on the manufacturing sector of the industry (via adoption of the 
                                                        
542 SMIC initially sought eight inch production technology whereas global leading firms were already moving to 
twelve inch.   
258 
 
foundry model and the use of Sino-foreign joint ventures for export production) essentially 
placed China in a somewhat subordinate role in the global industry value chain, because in 
these production operations, the semiconductor designs typically did not originate in China. 
Here, we must acknowledge an important reality that is often missing from 
frameworks that emphasize competition, winning, and leadership.  Business case studies 
usually focus on leading firms, but the reality is that most firms are not leaders in their 
industries.  Yet, firms can survive and contribute and attain positive results behind the 
vanguard.  There can be much success in terms of learning, catch-up, innovation (in 
organization and business processes, if not technology), revenues, and even profits for firms 
that are not on the leading edge and are not “winners.”  For the semiconductor industry in 
China, this study has assessed the contributions of the national champions, without 
exclusively asking whether they were “internationally competitive” or profitable or “winners.”  
In the semiconductor industry, China went from having an isolated, nationalized industry in 
the late 1980s to being very much a participant in the global industry by the 2000s.  China’s 
national champions and key enterprises were not global leaders, but they made contributions 
in terms of retaining and gaining some market share for Chinese firms, training thousands of 
industry personnel, and integrating Chinese firms with the global industry.  As a U.S. 
Semiconductor Industry Association report put it, China’s semiconductor industry was 
“primitive by Western standards through the mid 1980s” and had “historically proven unable 
to develop an internationally competitive semiconductor industry,” but after 2000, the 
industry in China “bore little resemblance to the technologically lagging industry” that existed 
into the 1990s.543  Arguably, China’s national champions and key enterprises were the site of 
                                                        
543 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page i and 23. 
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Chinese industry experience in the 1990s, and these experiences (often difficult, not 
“winning”) contributed to advances in the industry in the late 1990s and 2000s. 
Unlike some state led development efforts in Japan and Korea, Chinese officials did 
not establish national champions Huajing, Huahong-NEC and SMIC to promote oligopolistic 
competition within China.544  Although each began production in earnest in the space of just 
three years from late 1999 to 2002, each enterprise took a different approach to serving the 
market.  Huajing sought to serve China’s low end domestic market, Huahong-NEC initially 
sought to serve exports markets as well as the domestic market for I.C. cards, and SMIC 
sought to serve both foreign and domestic clients with relatively high end products.  To 
produce for the market, Huajing, Huahong-NEC and SMIC each came to the Taiwan-
originated foundry model by different routes.  After years of struggling, Huajing ultimately 
leased part of its facilities in late 1997 to CSMC to be run as a foundry.  Huahong-NEC 
migrated to the foundry model from the I.D.M. model in 2002, and SMIC (with Taiwanese 
managers) used the foundry model from its inception in 2000.  Finally, in the sources used for 
this study, there was no mention of collusion between these three firms as well as China’s key 
semiconductor enterprises, although it is possible that collusion might have occurred. 
Perhaps surprisingly, China’s key and national champion semiconductor enterprises 
were not all closely aligned with China’s national team of over 100 large enterprise groups.  It 
is important to recall that China’s national team was established in the 1990s and 2000s, and 
                                                        
544 Into the 1990s, most major global semiconductor firms operated under the “integrated device manufacturer 
(I.D.M.)” business model.  In an I.D.M., one vertically integrated company designs, fabricates (i.e., produces 
or manufactures), and packages/assembles/tests (P.A.T.) its own semiconductors, using its own foundry for 
fabrication.  This foundry model was first developed in Taiwan in 1987 at the Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC).  The foundry model is in contrast to the I.D.M. model.  Under the 
foundry model, a foundry leases its capacity to any number of customers.  Customers design their 
semiconductors and then lease foundry capacity for fabrication.  The foundry does not sell semiconductors 
into the market.  That said, a company can have a foundry while also having other revenue streams. 
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its members have undergone acquisitions, consolidations, and other reorganizations in the 
intervening years.  Thus, China’s large enterprise groups are not the origin of important 
enterprises; most national team members are conglomerations of (mostly) pre-existing 
organizations, though these organizations may have been renamed.  Huajing was eventually 
bought by national team member Huarun, but Huarun is somewhat unusual among China’s 
national team in that is has member enterprises spanning many, diversified industries instead 
of being in just one industry.  In the diverse Huarun enterprise group, China Resources 
Microelectronics (the present incarnation of Huajing) is not listed among Huarun’s “strategic 
business units.”  Huahong-NEC, in contrast, is directly controlled by the China Electronics 
Corporation (CEC), a member of China’s national team and a leader in electronics.545  Finally, 
SMIC’s closest tie to China’s national team is the Datang enterprise group’s investment in 
SMIC.  Datang is a state owned power generation enterprise group established in 2002.  
Datang did not invest in SMIC until 2008 at which time it took a 16.6 percent stake.  Thus, 
SMIC’s origins and early contributions were not under the auspices of China’s national 
team.546 As of this writing, Datang’s investment in SMIC has grown to over 20 percent, but 
SMIC is not included in Datang’s list of primary member enterprises.  
As for China’s other key semiconductor enterprises (Shanghai Belling, ASMC, 
Shougang-NEC, and Huayue), Shanghai Belling is most directly linked to China’s national 
team and has long been considered a leading electronics enterprise.  Recall, Shanghai Belling 
had been in competition around 1989 with Huajing in Wuxi to be selected as the site for 
                                                        
545 CEC was established in 1989 as part of the restructuring of the former Ministry of Electronics Industry.  
It has been a member of the national team since 2000 and is now China’s largest state owned 
“information technology” enterprise with sixty-one subsidiaries, including four semiconductor 
subsidiaries: Huahong, Huahong-NEC, Shanghai Belling, and China Integrated Circuit Design Group 
Corporation (CIDC, see Chapter Five.)  CEC is administered by SASAC, see www.cec.com.cn. 
546 “SMIC Signs Cooperative Agreement With Datang,” TechSecurityChina, January 12, 2009. 
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Project 908.  Shanghai Belling is a national team member in its own right, while also being 
listed by SASAC as a member enterprise of CEC, along with all the Huahong affiliated 
enterprises, as noted above.  (Shanghai Belling and Huahong also have significant cross 
ownership in one another.)  Shanghai Belling is a minority shareholder (five to six percent) 
since 1999 in another key semiconductor enterprise, ASMC.  ASMC’s other shareholders 
(with over ninety four percent ownership), however, are not directly members of China’s 
national team.547  Huayue was another of China’s key semiconductor enterprises, and CEC 
has been a shareholder in Huayue since the 1990s, but CEC currently does not list Huayue as 
a primary member enterprises.  Finally, key enterprise Shougang-NEC is a subsidiary of NEC 
of Japan, and the Chinese partner, Shougang of Beijing, is a major steel enterprise group in 
China, but this steel group is not a direct member of China’s national team.  Thus, among 
China’s national champion and key semiconductor enterprises, only Huahong-NEC and 
Shanghai Belling are directly tied to China’s national team.548  Of course, as China’s national 
team continues to evolve, it could become more directly influential in the semiconductor 
industry. 
The three semiconductor national champions were not all strictly state owned 
enterprises and were not all directly tied to China’s national team, but in each, this research 
has shown that the Chinese government was a major investor and government officials often 
                                                        
547 Access ASMC’s capital structure at http://www.asmcs.com/en/en-aa-capitalstructure.html. 
548 For current information on links between the semiconductor enterprises and the national team, see SASAC at 
www.sasac.gov.cn for links to each of the 100 plus national team members.  For the semiconductor 
enterprises, see 1) Huarun (English name China Resources) at www.crc.com.hk, 2) Huahong-NEC at 
www.cec.com.cn, 3) SMIC at www.smic.com, 4) Shanghai Bell at www.bmmc.net.cn, 5) Huayue at 




filled executive roles.549  Yet, the various government investors in each enterprise seem to 
have been less concerned with directly leading the enterprise – or trying to influence the 
industry – to enable their national champion to dominate in the industry.  As we have seen, 
Huajing, Huahong-NEC and SMIC each had investments from different government-affiliated 
organizations (banks, ministries, cities, funds, etc.), but ultimately these different government-
affiliated investors did not seem to speak with one voice.  Government investments were 
coordinated at the founding of each enterprise, but over time, the investments changed hands 
with much negotiation.  The overall impression from available sources and interviews is that 
government-affiliated investors were primarily concerned with getting their loans repaid or 
getting returns.  Recall for example the ownership and investment changes at Huajing in 
Chapter Three.  Huajing was passed from central ownership to (mostly) municipal ownership 
to the Huarun enterprise group.  These changes were financially motivated, with the goal of 
recovering Huajing’s debts and enabling the enterprise to survive, not necessarily to make 
Huajing more dominate in the industry.550  SMIC’s Chinese government-affiliated investors 
also changed over the years (including state owned banks, the sovereign wealth fund CIC, and 
national team member Datang), and these government investors at times disagreed over the 
direction of the company.  For example, at one point, CIC (China’s major sovereign wealth 
                                                        
549 For example, Jiang Shoulei who had been with the Ministry of the Electronics Industry in the early 1980s 
became a Vice President at Huajing in late 1980s and later C.E.O. of Hongri, a sales affiliate of Huahong.  
Hu Qili was a former Minister of the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, and he was appointed Chairman of 
Huahong-NEC.  Wang Yangyuan, Director of the Institute of Microelectronics at Peking University and CAS, 
was a founder and Chairman of SMIC.  In the 2000s, a group of industry executives, many of whom were 
ethnic Chinese either from Taiwan, Singapore or Mainland China revolved through different leadership roles 
at Huahong-NEC and SMIC.  For example, SMIC recently appointed Zhang Wenyi, a former chairman of 
Huahong and a former Vice-Minister for China’s electronics industry, as its new Chairman. 
550 In the course of these changes, the discussion was always about Huajing’s debt not about Huajing’s ability to 
maintain leadership as a national champion.  Huajing had been considered a national champion from its 
inception in 1989-1990, but the enterprise seems to have fallen from official favor in the mid to late 1990s 
and early 2000s.  Nonetheless, it survived, and today CRM is still considered a kind of national champion. 
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fund) did not want Datang to increase its stake in SMIC because officials at CIC feared that 
the global semiconductor industry would then perceive SMIC as a Chinese “state owned 
enterprise.”551  
Unlike in South Korea, where Amsden found that government subsidies to large 
enterprises were performance based, it is not at all clear that China’s semiconductor national 
champions were held to such standards.  The accessible sources do not contain or even refer 
to concrete business plans or financial models for these firms’ expected revenues or profits.  
Sources do indicate an increased awareness among Chinese officials from Project 908 to 909 
to SMIC that semiconductor enterprises needed to be profitable to sustain operations, and yet 
short term or even medium term profits seem to have been overshadowed by the primary 
goals of technological advance and global integration.552  The leaders of Project 908, 909 and 
SMIC agreed that the Chinese government needed to invest in the semiconductor industry 
(due to Chinese enterprises being technologically behind and not having access to capital for 
capital intensive semiconductor facilities), but there seems to have been no model or demand 
for long term revenue, profitability, or innovation in these state owned or state supported 
enterprises. 
China’s semiconductor national champions were similar to favored large enterprises in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in that the state directly facilitated their key technology 
                                                        
551 Robin Kwong, “SMIC’s Future Unclear after Wang’s Resignation,” Financial Times: Tech Hub, July 18, 
2011.  Datang was (and is) a national team member, but its status as such has been threatened due to its size.  
It sought more control of SMIC to enlarge itself, in order to maintain its national team status and avoid being 
subsumed under another national team member.  Yet, CIC (China’s major sovereign wealth fund) did not 
want Datang to have too large a stake in SMIC because it feared that the global semiconductor industry 
would perceive SMIC as a “state owned enterprise.”  
552 Even for leading global firms, new semiconductor fabrication facilities take years to become profitable.  And 
more generally, while it is common for observers to focus on profitability, it bears mentioning that not all 
endeavors are profitable, whether they are investments in research, firms, products, etc.  An unprofitable 
venture can serve as a learning experience and eventually lead to a more productive venture. 
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transfer agreements.  Chinese officials directly negotiated for the transfer of second hand 
equipment in the 1980s for Wuxi’s #742 Factory and continued this practice for each of the 
key and national champion semiconductor enterprises.  Like elsewhere in East Asia, we have 
seen that Chinese officials exempted critical foreign semiconductor equipment imports from 
taxes, duties, and other import-related costs. 
As for foreign ownership, it was indeed limited in Chinese semiconductor enterprises 
(as it had been, for example, in Taiwan), and foreign firms could not establish fully foreign 
owned subsidiaries in China.553  However, Chinese policies limiting foreign ownership were 
common across industries in China in the 1990s.  In the semiconductor industry, Chinese 
officials sought to control foreign investment, but they simultaneously sought to allow more 
foreign ownership in the key enterprises (Sino-foreign joint ventures) and in the national 
champions.  Typically, foreign firms were allowed less than fifty percent ownership in 
Chinese enterprises, but for example, in 1999 Huajing had just a forty-nine percent stake in 
the new CSMC-Huajing joint venture, and in key enterprise Shougang-NEC, Japan’s NEC 
was able to increase its ownership to fifty-one percent by 2000.554  Each of these 
arrangements was uniquely negotiated, and recall that during this period foreign firms 
complained that “clear-cut transparent rules governing the terms of inward investment did not 
exist.”555   
Indeed, relative to favored large enterprises elsewhere in East Asia, China’s 
semiconductor national champions had a surprising level of foreign ownership and 
management.  Huajing was a pioneer in bringing in Taiwanese management and ownership.  
                                                        
553 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” Figure 11, page 20-21, 26. 
554 Michael Pecht, “Electronics Manufacturing Update” for the Office of Naval Research, 2000, page 37. 
555 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page 26. 
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From there, Chinese officials leaned even more on foreign management and ownership, 
establishing Huahong-NEC from the start as a Sino-foreign joint venture, and then supporting 
SMIC, a wholly foreign owned, Taiwanese-led enterprise as a “Chinese” national 
champion.556 
Chapter Five will address two additional similarities between the development of the 
semiconductor industry in China in the 1990s and state led development in Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan.  In brief, these are: 1) industrial policies’ auxiliary support for targeted 
industries and 2) labor mobility resulting in new firm formation.  In the 1990s, semiconductor 
personnel in China increasingly enjoyed labor mobility enabling them to move among state 
supported enterprises, Sino-foreign joint ventures, and foreign enterprises.  Both Denis Simon 
and Robert Wade have shown that technical and managerial training in large firms coupled 
with labor mobility resulted in new firm formation in Taiwan.557  In the 1990s, some Chinese 
personnel began to leave larger semiconductor enterprises and form non-state firms, 
especially in the design, P.A.T., and distribution sectors of the industry.  As for auxiliary 
support for targeted industries, industrial policies in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan provided 
investments in research, industrial parks, and education, and this was true for the 
semiconductor industry in China as well.   
In sum, China’s semiconductor national champions had some surprising 
characteristics relative to general conceptions of national champion enterprises in East Asia.  
China’s semiconductor national champions were newly established enterprises that were not 
                                                        
556 Chapter Six compares the development of the electronics and semiconductor industries in China to these 
industries’ development in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.  As for foreign ownership and management of favored 
semiconductor enterprises, we will see that Taiwan also relied extensively on foreign assistance. 




necessarily expected to be “winners” but rather were operating behind the global industry 
vanguard.  They were not a uniform group of enterprises established to foster domestic (or 
oligopolistic) competition.  They were not all directly aligned with China’s national team, 
although government officials served in executive roles and the enterprises were recipients of 
state investments.  Finally, the national champions had a high degree of foreign ownership 
and management.   
Revealing the actual nature of these enterprises helps us to define state led 
development in China’s contemporary economic history.  The true character and role of 
national champions are also important because the terms “state led development” and 
“national champions” have gained currency beyond academia.  So called national champions 
can seem threatening or opaque to foreign observers, especially when they hail from a nation 
with a different type of government and legal system and with different ownership structures.  
Here are just two examples of how foreign industry and government sources have 
represented state led development (or industrial policy) and national champion enterprises in 
the semiconductor industry in China.  This first selection is from a 1997 U.S. government 
hearing before the House of Ways and Means Committee.  The statements are from the 
President of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association. 
“[China’s] Ministry of the Electronics Industry last spring announced the 
formation of Project 909…Huahong is a Ministry of the Electronics Industry 
owned company, and its chairman, Hu Qili, is Minister of the Ministry of the 
Electronics Industry.558   
 
“…There have been repeated reports that China’s Ministry of the Electronics 
Industry and its State Planning Commission have drafted electronics industrial 
                                                        
558 George Scalise (transcript), President of the Semiconductor Industry Association, “Hearing on the Future of 
US-China Trade Relations and Accession of China to the W.T.O.” (hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means), November 4, 1997. 
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policy to promote development of its domestic industry.  However, this policy plan 
has not been issued publicly.  …While no details are currently available, earlier 
reports indicated that the electronics industrial policy could proscribe foreign 
majority ownership of semiconductor firms, establish export performance 
requirements for Sino-foreign joint ventures, and provide the basis for eventual 
displacement of foreign semiconductors….  The recent establishment of Project 
909, in which…[NEC] has been granted a 28.6 percent share in a Sino-foreign 
joint venture in return for supplying the advanced technology…suggests a 
continuing Chinese Government focus on development of a domestic 
semiconductor production capability.”559  
 
[China seeks to] “persuade foreign firms to invest in China and share their 
technology with Chinese firms through joint ventures…  In return, suggestions are 
made that increased market access may be made available…560 
 
“…As a result of the continuing active government role…[there is] significant risk 
that …state invested enterprises will be encouraged by Chinese officials to 
purchase from domestic suppliers.  …[There are] recent reports that, as the 
Chinese government moves out of many sectors, it will actually focus more 
attention on building up a select group of national champions in the electronics 
industry.”561 
Much like this report, in their relatively brief descriptions of Project 909, foreign industry and 
academic sources have incorrectly stated that the goal of Project 909 was “self sufficiency” 
aimed “to protect [China’s] large market from foreign domination,”562 and “to end reliance on 
foreign [semiconductor] imports.”563  Further, foreign sources tend to emphasize the particular 





562 Pecht, “Electronics Manufacturing Update,” page 26. 
563 Michael Klaus, “Red Chips: Implications of the Semiconductor Industry’s Relocation to China,” Asian Affairs, 
an American Review, Winter 2003.  This article is concerned with China’s growing power relative to the U.S. 
and Taiwan.  It has a section entitled “Code Project 909: A Roadmap for Self-Sufficiency” which says 
“China is becoming less reliant on imported technology and is gaining control over every stage in the 
international semiconductor supply chain…[China’s] dedicated government support should fuel speculation 
that Project 909 is an insidious strategy to become self-sufficient…and facilitate military expansion.”  
iSupply, “Semiconductor Wafer Manufacturing in China,” page 4, put it more mildly saying that Project 909 




impression that Project 909 was primarily concerned with gaining a particular level of 
technology to ensure China’s own ability to produce. 
Yet, this research has shown that national champions Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and 
SMIC, as well as China’s key enterprises, were not established with the goal of “self 
sufficiency,” import substitution, or precluding foreign competitors in China, although indeed 
they were established to gain more share of China’s domestic market.  The goal was not for a 
particular firm (Huajing or Huahong-NEC or SMIC) to be so technologically dominant as to 
fully mitigate the need for imported semiconductors or the need for semiconductors made by 
foreign firms with operations in China.  They were expected to be “leaders” in the industry 
only in the sense that at their inception they would be equipped with more advanced 
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technology, but technology acquisition at each of the national champions was meant to 
serve the larger purpose of fostering a globally integrated, diverse industry chain in China. 
Further, this research did not find evidence that these national champions were 
expected to be leaders in China in terms of revenues, profits, or market share.  Indeed, larger 
global semiconductor firms had already begun to operate in China in the 1990s, and Chinese 
officials were moving towards policies that would allow more access to global firms 
(addressed in Chapter Five.)  Huajing, Huahong-NEC and SMIC were certainly not expected 
to dominate market share.  In the 1990s, the vast majority of semiconductors used in China 
(perhaps eighty-five percent) were imported, and surely the majority would continue to be 
imported for the foreseeable future.  Figure Eight (previous page) shows the wide gap 
between semiconductor production in China and semiconductor demand in China. 
Finally, these enterprises were not expected to dominate particular “protected” sectors 
of China’s domestic semiconductor market.  The major exception to this is China’s protection 
of its I.C. card market for the benefit of Huahong and its foreign partner.  Essentially, 
Huahong offered potential foreign partners a guaranteed sector of China’s semiconductor 
market in exchange for partnership and technology.  This quid pro quo, however, was not 
Project 909’s (Huahong’s) original plan.  Rather, the decision by Chinese officials to protect 
the I.C. card market seems to have been a last-ditch effort to attract partners, given China’s 
undeveloped semiconductor industry, overall business environment, and poor results with 
Project 908.  If Hu Qili’s account is accurate (and on this point, it may not be),564 foreign 
                                                        
564 While most of Hu’s records of Project 909 seem credible, this particular point raises questions.  The use and 
production of I.C. cards in China affected various organizations and Chinese government priorities.  Thus, it 
is difficult to know whether Huahong’s need to attract a partner was the sole reason why Chinese officials 
decided to protect this market.  
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companies were only willing to partner with Project 909 after the quid pro quo was offered, 
despite being in principal opposed to such arrangements.  Foreign companies have lodged 
complaints against China in the semiconductor industry and in other industries for the quid 
pro quo of market access in exchange for technology transfer.565  This research, however, did 
not find examples of this quid pro quo actually being transacted, except in the case of 
Huahong-NEC.  Yet, another possible case would be the Sino-foreign joint venture Shanghai 
Belling.  Shanghai Belling (foreign partner Alcatel Bell of Belgium) may have been offered 
specific market segments, as this enterprise supplied telecom-related semiconductors as well 
as being the early provider of I.C.s for I.C. cards in China.566 
Market protection was a common aspect of state led development in Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan with the state making financial interventions in international trade to 
protect or foster industries.  In China, too, the key and national champion semiconductor 
enterprises operated under state interventions in trade.  These interventions included export 
requirements for the Sino-foreign joint ventures and high tariffs on imported semiconductors, 
but providing protected market segments to foreign firms seems to have been limited, in 
practice. 
To what extent did export requirements and high tariffs on imports succeed in 
protecting segments of China’s semiconductor market?  China’s tariffs on semiconductors 
ranged from five to thirty percent, with more advanced semiconductors that could not be 
                                                        
565 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page 26.  This claim was 
repeated in several industry articles, but without details. 
566 Pecht, “Electronics Manufacturing Update,” 2000, page 37. 
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made domestically enjoying lower tariffs in the five to ten percent range.567  Lower end 
semiconductors that could be produced domestically had higher tariffs, and thus the domestic 
products should have been somewhat protected.  However, given that semiconductor demand 
grew rapidly in the 1990s and all the while perhaps eighty-five percent of semiconductors 
continued to be imported, it is difficult to argue that the official tariffs (which were often 
negotiated down) had a significant protectionist effect.  Further, the higher tariffs on simple 
products resulted in significant smuggling of foreign made electronics into China through the 
late 1990s (see Section 4.26), resulting in the domestic market not being well protected.  
Chinese officials did establish export requirements on a one-off basis with foreign partners in 
Sino-foreign joint ventures to ensure that foreign producers in China did not come to 
monopolize China’s market.568  In this way, the domestic market was perhaps in part 
protected, but the nature of the electronics supply chain was such that these export 
requirements probably had negligible affect.  Electronics assemblers in China were required 
to use whichever semiconductor products were specified by the product designs.  Designs 
often specified foreign, imported semiconductors even for low end semiconductors because 
Chinese semiconductors were believed to have inferior quality.  Thus, even if a comparable 
semiconductor was available from a local Chinese enterprise and even if the low end foreign 
semiconductor was more expensive (due to high import tariffs on low end semiconductors), 
the assembler still had to use the more expensive import.   
                                                        
567 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page 26, from Rules and 
Regulations for the Import and Export of Tariff of the PRC, 1994. 
568 Export requirements did not necessarily cover all of an enterprises’ output.  Export agreements were 
established for, for example, CSMC-Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and ASMC.  Shougang-NEC was supplying 
China’s domestic market but may have also been under export agreements for part of its production. 
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To be sure, state led development in China and elsewhere has included government 
subsidies, import substitution, and certain market and industry protections, which at times 
were disadvantageous to foreign competitors.  Yet, this close examination of the 
semiconductor industry has shown that the reality of China’s semiconductor policies and 
practices in the 1990s did not fully align with foreign observers’ concerns. 
4.44  Semiconductor National Champions and China’s Policy Environment 
Chapter Two, Section 2.43 considered “bottom up” influences in the 1980s reforms to 
China’s semiconductor industry.  Despite the seemingly top down, centralized nature of 
central planning and state owned industries, this research has shown that in the 1980s Chinese 
officials made a number of decisions and established new industry guidance mechanisms for 
the semiconductor industry based on bottom up input from semiconductor experts and leaders 
from around the country. 
State led development and the use of national champions also seems to suggest top 
down influence.  Indeed, Chapters Three and Four have shown that Huajing and Huahong-
NEC were directly established and fostered through state plans and investment and SMIC was 
established with state support.  In addition to this top down approach, this research suggests 
that the experiences of these enterprises resulted in bottom up influences in the industry.  The 
experiences and obstacles of these national champions directly influenced officials’ decisions 
for specific enterprises and policies for the broader semiconductor industry.  As in Taiwan 
and Korea, Chinese officials were not all knowing but rather were learning from experience.  
We will see that one-off exceptions that officials made to support national champions (e.g., 
tax exemptions for imported equipment) fed into new industry policies in 2000.  This section 
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highlights the experiences in the 1990s that directly influenced new policies in 2000 and 
beyond, which are covered in Chapter Five.  Foreign observers have been critical of 
government “bureaucrats” holding executive positions in favored state supported enterprises 
in China,569 but in the semiconductor industry (most apparently at the key enterprises and 
Huahong-NEC), these dual roles seem to have enabled government officials to see and 
determine firsthand what policy and operational changes were needed in the industry.   
Thus, in the semiconductor industry in China in the critical 1990s, the industry’s 
advances appear to have been both “state led” and “enterprise led.”  That is, integration with 
the global industry brought issues to the fore, causing enterprise leaders and policy makers in 
China to respond with organizational changes and new policies.  (This notion of enterprise led 
development is different than the theoretical “market led” development that tends to 
emphasize allocation of resources toward meeting market demands, export led development, 
market pricing, etc., in a stable macroeconomic environment.)570  The following discussion 
reveals enterprise led development through the experiences of Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and 
SMIC, and Chapter Five finds enterprise led development through foreign firms’ presence in 
China and through developments in the semiconductor P.A.T. and design sectors. 
Government officials led the establishment of each of China’s key and national 
champions semiconductor enterprises between 1988 and 2000.  Each was a unique case and 
each of the enterprises (except key enterprise Huayue) had an ownership form that differed 
from China’s state owned enterprises in the 1980s.  The experience of negotiating, 
                                                        
569 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” refers to the Chinese 
“bureaucrats” that were positioned as managers in the Sino-foreign joint ventures. 
570 “Market led” development follows the orthodox view that advocates reliance on market orientation and trade 
liberalization, as well as macroeconomic stability, entrepreneurialism, resource allocation, private ownership, 
and advances in human capital. 
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establishing, and supporting these “one off” enterprises influenced Chinese officials as they 
sought to define new ownership and foreign investment policies for the broader 
semiconductor industry around 2000.   The new policies are identified in Chapter Five, but 
here, let us consider three major enterprise led learning experiences of the 1990s, in terms of 
ownership and investment. 
The key enterprises were formed by joining an existing Chinese state owned factory 
with a foreign partner to form a Sino-foreign joint venture, except in the case of Huayue.  It is 
important to understand that these joint ventures were not merely small, experimental units 
imbedded within larger Chinese state owned enterprises.  Rather, the joint ventures were the 
primary enterprise, attempting to operate in China’s evolving and inconsistent policy 
environment.  The structures of the joint ventures varied, but as an example, let us consider 
ASMC.  ASMC was founded in 1988 as a Sino-foreign joint venture between Shanghai’s #7 
Radio Factory and Philips of the Netherlands.   From 1988 to 1995, it was called Shanghai 
Philips Semiconductor Company.  The joint venture did not continue with the work of the #7 
Radio Factory.  Instead, from its inception, the joint venture produced semiconductor products 
for export to Europe, based on designs and customers supplied by Philips.  (ASMC was thus, 
in effect, China’s first semiconductor enterprise to adopt the foundry model.)  ASMC did 
have Chinese state-affiliated investors (Bank of China, Shanghai Belling, China Orient Asset 
Management Corporation, and others over the years), but the new Shanghai Philips 
Semiconductor Company (now ASMC) was not just one part of a larger Chinese state owned 
enterprise.571  Forming these enterprises and working with foreign partners on concerns and 
                                                        
571 ASMC, Jinian Gongsi Chengli 20 Zhounian: Shanghai Xianjin Bandaoti Zhizao Gufen Youxian Gongsi纪念
公司成立 20 周年：上海先进半导体制造制造有限公司 (20th Anniversary Memorial Book: ASMC), 2008. 
276 
 
obstacles ultimately influenced Chinese official’s new policies for foreign investment in the 
semiconductor industry in 2000.  As mentioned above, when these joint ventures were being 
established, foreign firms said that transparent rules for investment and trade did not exist.572   
Another ownership-related learning experience involved the national champions.  The 
ownership of the national champions shifted from state ownership (Huajing), to Sino-foreign 
joint venture (Huahong-NEC), to wholly foreign owned enterprise (SMIC.)  This shift was not 
the result of a top down, state led plan, rather it was based on what was possible and desirable 
in each situation.  Summarizing this shift, a Chinese semiconductor industry leader explained 
“There was no plan [for Huahong-NEC to follow Huajing, etc.]  It was a complicated 
time.”573 
A third important learning experience in the 1990s that related to ownership and 
investment was China’s opening to cooperation with Taiwan, first at Huajing and then 
through Taiwanese-led SMIC.  Both of these arrangements served as stepping stones to later 
policies allowing Taiwanese investment on the mainland.  These experiences also allowed 
Taiwanese semiconductor leaders and personnel to experiment with operations on the 
mainland (with investments often routed through Hong Kong) even before official changes to 
Taiwan’s restrictions on such in 2003.574 
Finally, in Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC, as well as the key enterprises, Chinese 
officials used certain tactics in the 1990s to enable technology imports, to attempt to partially 
                                                        
572 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page 26. 
573 Interview with Ye Tianchun, July 3, 2009, at the CAS Institute of Microelectronics in Beijing.  Ye is the 
Director of the Microelectronics Institute and a top advisor on national semiconductor industry policies. 
574 Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page 68.  Taiwanese 
investment in the mainland is addressed in Chapter Five.  There are numerous articles and reports on 
Taiwanese investment in the mainland, see for example, Taipei Times, “Critics say China Policy Doesn't 
Address Real Needs” and “New Rules for Mainland Investment May Be Ignored,” November 9, 2001. 
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protect the domestic market, to entice foreign partners, and to gain access to foreign capital.  
New policies in 2000 would extend and standardize these practices.  As we have seen, 
officials offered semiconductor enterprises tax holidays and exemptions and reductions on the 
high V.A.T.s for imported equipment, materials, and spare parts.  China’s import tariffs on 
semiconductors and semiconductor-related products in the 1990s were higher than those of 
other countries, but they were within the range of tariff levels for other industries in China.575  
In the 1990s, there was not a special plan to impose particularly high tariffs for the 
semiconductor industry.  Nonetheless, with relatively high tariffs for the semiconductor 
industry (by international standards), Chinese officials offered one-off tariff reduction 
measures to assist enterprises.  In addition, in Shanghai’s high technology parks and districts, 
officials also offered the opportunity to negotiate with the municipal government for the 
possibility of tax-free importation.  Huahong-NEC and SMIC (located in Shanghai’s new 
Pudong district), for example, received all the Pudong preferences made available to Sino-
foreign joint ventures and high technology enterprises.  In the 1990s, China’s generally higher 
V.A.T. on imported semiconductors incented foreign firms to form joint ventures in order to 
produce in China; this tactic also influenced policy after 2000.  Though foreigners objected 
based on W.T.O. rules,576 China announced a preferential V.A.T. for locally produced 
semiconductors in 2000, whether produced by domestic or foreign firms.  Although the policy 
                                                        
575 Across industries in 1995, China’s “average tariff” on imports was thirty-six percent.  After 1995, as China 
began to seek entry to the World Trade Organization, China’s average tariff level was reduced to twenty-
three percent, per Nolan, “Beyond Privatization,” pages 182-183.  
576 Scalise, “US-China Trade Relations.”  In the mid 1980s, the US, Japan, and Canada agreed to eliminated 
tariffs on semiconductors.  Later, in 1997, thirty-nine additional countries agreed to eliminate semiconductor 
tariffs through the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), an agreement under the W.T.O. to remove 
duties from information technology products.  Later that same year China agreed to join the ITA, thus 
agreeing to (eventually) remove its semiconductor tariffs.  This plan was disrupted, however, by China’s 
announcement under its tenth five year plan (from 2001) of ongoing discriminatory tariffs for imported 
semiconductors.   
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was not implemented as late as 2003, it strongly fostered the relocation of global 
semiconductor fabrication to mainland China, which was well underway between 2000 and 
2003. 
Finally, this research has shown that Huahong-NEC’s desire for foreign capital 
influenced China’s 1998 Guiding Catalog of Foreign Investment in Industry, which added 
semiconductors to China’s “encouraged” industries wherein foreign investments were likely 
to be approved.  Further, in mid 1999, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology confirmed 
that semiconductor enterprises could seek venture capital, a new source of funding for 
Chinese enterprises at that time.577  We will see these capital channels formalized in new 
policies for the semiconductor industry in 2000 and supported by statements in China’s tenth 
five year plan (2001-2005).578 
In the 1990s, the national champions and key enterprises were also the site of major enterprise 
led organizational, operational, and managerial changes.  These changes were not instigated 
by top down policies for all semiconductor enterprises in China, rather, they occurred as 
enterprises in China took tentative steps to align with the global industry.   These changes 
included the reorganization of enterprises by sector, e.g., establishing design, fabrication, and 
P.A.T. business units or companies, as we saw in Chapter Two at Huajing and in this chapter 
at Huahong.  Creating these sector-based units effectively re-trained Chinese semiconductor 
personnel by changing internal and external business processes.  Further, the adoption of the 
foundry model positioned Chinese enterprises as sites for global outsourcing, an important 
                                                        
577 Simon, “Critical Threshold.” 
578 China’s Tenth Five Year Plan, Section 3.5.2.3: “Expand the number of financing channels, change from 
relying on bank loans to obtaining capital investment directly from overseas or local financial markets,” from 
the Ministry of Information Industries’ (MII) contribution to China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan, translation 
accessed at United Nations Public Administration Network, www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc. 
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development.  In Taiwan’s 20th century economic history, Robert Wade described Taiwan’s 
entry into the global semiconductor value chain by saying that 1961 was “a landmark year in 
the history of East Asia” because, in that year, foreign semiconductor firms began to 
outsource their semiconductor P.A.T. work to Taiwan, giving Taiwan a valuable role in the 
global industry.  Wade said this was “the beginning of the corporate strategy that came to be 
called global manufacturing.”579  By the time China adopted the foundry model in the 1990s 
(first, in effect, at ASMC, then in desperation at Huajing, and finally as a strategy at SMIC 
and Huahong), the global electronics industry had de-verticalized and electronic 
communications enabled “global production networks.”580 (These networks obviously 
encompassed more than just production.)  Finally, China’s semiconductor enterprises brought 
in foreigners to act as General Managers and sales managers thus bringing new skills to 
enterprise management.  Recall that CSMC-Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC all had 
foreign General Managers at their inception.  With these changes and others, enterprises in 
China began to align with global industry practices. 
                                                        
579 Wade, Governing the Market, page 94. 
580 See, for example, Chen and Xue, “Global Production Networks” or Dieter Ernst, “The New Mobility of 
Knowledge: Digital Information Systems and Global Flagship Networks,” in Digital Formations (Princeton: 





Figure 7: Largest 15 Semiconductor Firms in China in 2003 by Revenue
Chinese enterprises in italics. 
Note: These are the firms with hightest revenues operating in China.  
These are not the same at the largest semiconductor suppliers to the Chinese market because most of the semiconductors that meet China's market demand are 
imported. 
Analysis:  
Of the top 15 firms' revenue in 2003, "Chinese" firms constituted 47 percent. 
The "Chinese" firms were a mix of ownership forms. 
Rank Headquarters Name Revenue in 2003 (US$ million) 2003 Notes on "Chinese" Firms 
1 US Motorola 962   
2 China/Cayman 
Islands/International 
SMIC 350 SMIC is a WFOE registered in the Cayman Islands. 
3 Japan Renesas 195   
4 China/Japan Huahong-NEC 188 Huahong-NEC of Project 909 is a Sino-Foreign JV. 
5 China/US Leshan 149 LeShan has a JV with Motorola and provides mainly discrete devices. 
6 Switzerland Shenzhen Sai STMicroelectronics 125   
7 US Intel 109   
8 China Jianxin XinChao 108 XinChao is a state owned group. 
9 China/Netherlands ASMC 94 ASMC has a JV with Netherlands-based Philips and serves mainly as a foundry for Philips. 
10 China/Japan Nantong-Fujitsu 92 Nantong-Fujitsu is a Sino-foreign JV. 
11 China JCET 84 JCET is large state owned P.A.T. enterprise near Wuxi. 
12 China/Hong Kong China Resources 
Microelectronics/CSMC 
77 CRM is a member of the CR enterprise group; it includes Huajing and CSMC of Project 908. 
13 China Datang 75 Datang is a state owned enterprise group in electronics-related industries. 
14 Singapore ChipPAC 73   
15 China/Japan Shougang-NEC 68 Shougang-NEC is a Sino-foreign JV; Chinese partner is Beijing Shougang, a steel enterprise 
group. 
Source: PWC, "China's Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2004," data sources include CSIA, CCID, and PwC analysis. 
"Chinese" revenue: 1,285  47% 
Other revenue: 1,464  53% 






Figure 9: Largest 15 Semiconductor Firms in China in 2011 by Revenue
Chinese enterprises in italics. 
Note: These are the firms with hightest revenues operating in China.  This is not the same at the largest semiconductor suppliers to the 
Chinese market because most of the semiconductors that meet China's market demand are imported. 
Rank Headquarters Name 2011 Revenue  
US$mm 
2011 Notes on "Chinese" Firms 
1 US Intel 4,765    
2 Korea Hynix 2,452    
3 China/Cayman 
Islands/international 
SMIC 1,315  SMIC is a WFOE registered in the Cayman Islands. 
4 US Freescale 1,119    
5 China HiSilicon (formerly with 
Huawei) 
1,032  HiSilicon was formerly part of state-owned Huawei (telecomm), but is now a 
private, listed firm. 
6 China XinChao (JCET) 969  XinChao is a state owned group; it includes the large P.A.T. firm called JCET. 
7 Korea Samsung 838    
8 China Spreadtrum 684  Spreadtrum was private from its inception. 
9 China/Japan Huahong 671  Huahong includes Huahong-NEC of Project 909, which is a Sino-foreign JV. 
10 Taiwan ASE 657    
11 Japan Renesas 643    
12 China/Hong Kong China Resources 
Microelectronics 
631  CRM is a member of the CR enterprise group; it includes Huajing and CSMC of 
Project 908. 
13 US Cree Huizhou 631    
14 China Nantong Huada 620  Nantong is a state owned group. 
15 Japan Panasonic 602    
Source: PWC, "China's Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2012 Update," data sources include CSIA, CCID, and PwC analysis. 
"Chinese" revenue: 5,922  34%
Other revenue: 11,707  66%
Total revenue: 17,629  100%
Analysis: Of the top 15 firms' revenue in 2011, "Chinese" firms constituted 34 percent. 




In each of the areas discussed above – ownership, financial incentives, and operations 
– the turbulent 1990s directly influenced China’s policy and business environment after 2000.  
The national champions and key enterprises may not have been internationally competitive in 
their technology and their financial results may have been mixed, but they bridged China’s 
isolated industry of the 1980s with the globally integrated industry of the post 2000 era.  
Through these enterprises, China was able to grow domestic production to (approximately) 
keep pace with the growth in the semiconductor market in China and to keep a foothold in its 
rapidly globalizing semiconductor industry, see Figures Seven and Nine (previous pages.)  
The enterprises created lasting global linkages, augmented China’s talent pool, and improved 
China’s policy and operating environment in the industry. 
The industry and enterprise experiences of the 1990s affected the thinking of Chinese 
officials and semiconductor leaders.  After three years with Huahong-NEC, Hu Qili reflected 
on China’s experiences in the 1990s, and he concluded that henceforth Chinese officials 
should focus their efforts on “creating a general environment which is suitable for the 
development of the semiconductor industry, providing preferential policies that are as good as 
those in the peripheral countries, simplifying examination and approval procedures, and 
encouraging foreign investment introduction and multi-channel financing…”581  More 
specifically, a senior Chinese official at the Ministry of the Information Industries (the former 
Ministry of the Electronics Industry) said in 2000 that going forward the state should “refrain 
from the operation of [semiconductor] enterprises.”582 
                                                        
581 Hu Qili, “Seize Opportunities to Develop China’s Semiconductor Industry,” Renmin Ribao, April 19, 2000 
quoted in Semiconductor Industry Association, “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page 37. 
582 Qu Weizhi, “How to Develop the Integrated Circuits Industry,” Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2000 quoted in 




This study’s approach of examining a particular industry identifies the “how” of 
technological and economic advance in a high technology industry in China.  In this chapter 
and Chapter Two, we saw Chinese officials supporting key and national champion enterprises 
in the 1990s.  (At the same time, officials also supported research and design initiatives, 
covered in Chapter Five.)  Yet, officials did not attempt to implement uniform, 
semiconductor-industry-wide policies in the 1990s, to try to guide all enterprises or trade.  
Rather, they learned from the experiences of enterprises for a period of about ten to fifteen 
years before implementing new policies for the industry after 2000.  This enterprise led 
learning phase was one part of the “how” of technological and economic advance in this 
industry.  Other aspects of global integration were also part of the “how,” and these are 
covered further in Chapter Five.  In her 1989 study of Korea, Alice Amsden made an 
important point about analyses of industrialization.  She noted that nations’ progression 
through the “stages of development” (from low skill, low capital activity to higher skill and 
capital intensive activity) has been credited to the work of entrepreneurs and spin-off firms.  
Amsden, however, carefully examined how Korea progressed through different stages of 
development, and she demonstrated that, particularly for capital and technology intensive 
industries, capital infusion and guidance by the state were critical.583  Wade’s study of Taiwan 
also has much to offer about the “how” of technological and economic advance, from state 
financial interventions to culture to politics to economic planning bureaus and more.  And 
indeed, in what he calls the “electrical and electronic goods” industries, there may have been 
an important period of enterprise led learning in Taiwan prior to the implementation of 
                                                        




supportive industry-wide state policies.  Wade recounts that in 1953 a Taiwanese electronics 
firm (Tatung) signed a technology transfer and training agreement with a Japanese firm.   Ten 
years later, by 1963, seven electronics joint ventures between Taiwanese and foreign firms 
were in operation, and in the early 1960s a number of U.S. firms were investigating the 
possibility of cooperation with Taiwan.  In 1962, Taiwan’s government “revised the rules” for 
foreign investment, local content, and other matters affecting the industry.  In the following 
two years “twenty-four U.S. firms rushed to make production agreements” in Taiwan.  For 
this particular industry, Wade does not explicitly make the connection between the decade of 
learning (1953-1963) through joint ventures and the implementation of effective state policies 
(from 1962), but the implication is there.584 
As we will see in Chapter Five, in the 1990s, China was a rapidly growing site for 
global electronic products production and assembly (i.e., televisions, telephones, DVD players, 
etc.), with numerous foreign firms already operating in China, including some semiconductor-
related firms.  In the 1990s, China’s semiconductor-related research institutes and design 
organizations were also evolving, seeking to eventually commercial their designs.  These 
1990s trends, in addition to the experiences of China’s key and national champion 
semiconductor enterprises, resulted in a notable degree of enterprise led development in this 
high technology industry. 
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In Chapters Three and Four, we saw the origins, challenges, and eventual 
contributions of China’s key and national champion semiconductor enterprises in the 1990s.  
The existence and prioritization of these state-affiliated production enterprises suggests a 
degree of state led development in the industry, but Chapter Four showed that Chinese 
officials did not institute industry-wide, top-down policies to development the industry until 
after 2000.  For a period of ten to fifteen years in the late 1980s and 1990s, Chinese officials 
learned from the experiences of China’s key and national champion enterprises as these 
enterprises established partnerships with leading global semiconductor firms.  With these 
lessons in mind, officials implemented new policies for the whole industry after 2000.  For 
this reason, Chapter Four suggested that the semiconductor industry in China evolved through 
both “state led” development and “enterprise led” development.  This chapter will show that 
the policies enacted after 2000 supported a new era of growth, from the foundation developed 
in the 1990s. 
Having addressed China’s state-affiliated production enterprises in Chapter Four, this 
chapter considers other important ways in which the semiconductor industry in China in the 
1990s and early 2000s increasingly integrated with the global semiconductor value chain.  
The industry in China underwent notable changes and growth from 1995 to 2000, and then 
entered a period of rapid growth after 2000.  The chapter connects events and trends in the 
1990s with the take off after 2000, which included a rapidly growing market for 
semiconductors in China, the arrival of more foreign semiconductor-related firms in China, 
and growth in semiconductor R&D and design work in China.  Importantly, this chapter also 
covers the Chinese government’s new policies for the industry after 2000, as well as other 




dynamics of the industry in China in the 1990s and early 2000s, this chapter provides further 
evidence that this high technology industry advanced through a combination of state led 
development and enterprise led development. 
Global semiconductor industry sources provided somewhat more coverage to the 
semiconductor industry in China from around 2000.  Sources such as the U.S. Semiconductor 
Industry Association (SIA), global industry research firms such as iSupply, Gartner, and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC), individual firms, and news sources increasingly recognized 
the growth of the industry in China and its integration with the global industry.  For data on 
revenues, numbers of firms, etc., global sources usually used data from the China 
Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA) and the China Center for Information Industry 
Development (CCID), which are the official Chinese sources for semiconductor industry data.  
Thus, most global industry analyses, in terms of data, correlated with Chinese sources and 
reports. 
5.1 The “World’s Factory Floor” for Electronics 
5.11 The Global Semiconductor Market and China 
The market demand for semiconductors grew rapidly in China in the 1990s, due to the 
migration of global electronics manufacturing and assembly in China.  From 2000, about two 
thirds of the market demand for semiconductors went into products that were ultimately 
exported, but China’s home market for electronics products (all of which required 
semiconductors) was also growing.585  In 1995, the market demand in China for 
semiconductors was only perhaps two to three percent of the global market, see Figure Ten,
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but China was the world’s fastest growing market for semiconductors.  Despite global 
downturns in the semiconductor industry in 1997 and 2001, China’s market for 
semiconductors and semiconductor capital equipment both grew rapidly in the late 1990s and 
into the early 2000s.  China’s demand for semiconductors approximately tripled between 
1995 and 2000.  In the late 1990s, the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association predicted that 
China would be the world’s largest semiconductor market by 2010.  Global electronics firms 
were creating much of the semiconductor demand in China, as these firms were increasingly 
manufacturing and assembling in China.  By 2005, China was twenty five percent of the 
global semiconductor market, and surpassing the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association’s 
predictions, by 2008 China was already the world’s largest market for semiconductors.  In 
2010, the market in China was more than forty percent of the total global market, per Figure 
Ten.  With much of the global semiconductor market relocating to China, Chinese leaders set 
a goal of supplying thirty percent of the market demand in China during the tenth five year 
plan (2001-2005), and officials planned to continue to provide research and other auxiliary 
support and funding for the industry.586 
Generally, as electronics products advanced in the 1990s, the relative value of 
semiconductors in such products rose.  Electronics became less expensive to manufacture and 
                                                        
586 Hu Qili 胡启立, Chao Daguimo Jichengdianlu Gongcheng Jishi 超大规模集成电路工程纪实 (Ultra Large 
Scale Integrated Circuit: Project Records), Beijing: Dianzi Gongye Chubanshe电子工业出版社 (Electronics 
Industry Publishing House), 2006, page 149-151.  Daryl Hatano of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 
Association with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in Jerry Mahoney, “China’s Chip Challenge,” 
Electronics Business, 2003.  Precise numbers on China’s semiconductor market and level of importation are 
difficult to identify in the 1990s because semiconductors are nested in other products and because of rampant 
smuggling (described in Chapter Four, Section 4.26.)  However, Chinese and U.S. industry sources both 
indicate that smuggling was sufficiently curtailed between 1998 and 2002.  This was due to China’s anti-
smuggling programs in 1998 and 1999 and through new Chinese policies implemented in January of 2002 that 




assemble (due, in part, to low cost labor in China), and thus the value of semiconductors 
relative to the value of the products in which semiconductors were embedded rose, reaching 
in the range of twenty percent by 2000.587 
Despite the rise in semiconductors’ value relative to that of electronics products, much 
of the market for semiconductors in China was for relatively low end semiconductors.  The 
market for semiconductors can be broadly segmented between low-end discrete devices (e.g., 
transistors, diodes, resistors, capacitors) and higher value integrated circuits (I.C.s), which can 
have billions of discrete devices integrated on each chip.  In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
although the dollar value of the market for I.C.s in China was about five times larger than the 
market for discrete devices, the market demand for I.C.s in China was mostly comprised of 
demand for relatively low tech I.C.s, those made with 0.4micron or larger process 
technology.588 
Estimates of the percent of the semiconductor market demand in China that was met 
through imports in the 1990s and early 2000s typically range from eighty to ninety-five 
percent.  As Chapters Two, Three, and Four have shown, semiconductor enterprises in China 
were mostly producing discrete devices in the 1990s, although their production of I.C.s was 
increasing.  Indeed, more than half of semiconductor production revenues in China were for 
discrete devices until as late as 2003, when I.C. revenues finally began to surpass discrete 
device revenues, see Figure Eleven.  Thus, production in China was geared more toward 
meeting the market for discrete devices, while most I.C.s had to be imported.  
                                                        
587 This held true for the leading categories of electronics products made in China including consumer electronics, 
telecomm products, and computers. 
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The following summarizes key aspects of China’s growing semiconductor market in the late 
1990s. 
• Market demand was driven by global electronics firms, which were increasingly 
manufacturing and assembling in China due to low cost labor. 
 
• Many of the semiconductors demanded in China were imported, approximately 
eighty five percent, although the semiconductors demanded in China were 
relatively low end at 0.4micron or greater process technology. 
 
• Semiconductor production in China could only meet about fifteen percent of 
demand in China, and production in China was primarily lower end products. 
 
• Approximately two-thirds of the semiconductors installed into electronics products 




5.12  Global Semiconductor Firms Enter China 
In the 1990s, although there was a growing market for semiconductors in China, there 
was not an ideal “marketplace” of semiconductor producing firms owing to China’s history of 
central planning and state ownership of industries, lack of capital sources, non-transparent and 
inconsistent policy environment, and relatively small semiconductor talent base.  Despite this 
environment, global firms were selling in China in the 1990s (that is, their semiconductors 
were being imported into China), and increasingly, global firms began to try to locate in 
China.  These firms sought to establish operations in China because they believed that the 
market for semiconductors in China would continue to grow and China’s policies would 
evolve. 
Chapters Three and Four showed how five of the largest global semiconductor firms 




establishment of China’s “key” and “national champion” semiconductor enterprises.  To recap, 
these included: 
• Alcatel’s joint venture with China’s Shanghai Belling (key enterprise) 
• Philips’ joint venture with China’s ASMC (key enterprise) 
• NEC’s joint ventures with China’s Shougang (key enterprise) 
• NEC’s joint venture with Huahong (national champion) 
• AT&T-Lucent as Huajing’s primary equipment partner for Project 908 (key 
enterprise and national champion) 
 
As Chapter Four discussed, each of these major ventures was arranged on a one-off 
basis, despite being part of broad governmental plans for the semiconductor industry 
developed in the late 1980s (see Chapter Two.) 
And yet, these important relationships were just a part of the migration of global 
semiconductor firms to China in the 1980s and 1990s.   In addition to the firms above, other 
global semiconductor firms such as Texas Instruments, Toshiba, Fujitsu, Siemens, and Intel, 
began making notable semiconductor equipment sales in China and began establishing joint 
ventures and operations in China in the 1980s and 1990s, along with importing into (that is, 
selling semiconductors into) China.  Figure Thirteen shows numerous examples of global 
firms’ activities in China in the 1990s.  Motorola is the company most commonly cited for 
having significant and early operations in China, and indeed Motorola invested over US$3.4 
billion in China.589  The Motorola’s story, however, should not overshadow the reality that 
                                                        





Figure 13: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
1984 Applied Materials Began selling in China in 1984 and by 2000 had sites in Wuxi, Shanghai, 
Beijing and Tianjin. 
21 
1985 Hewlett-Packard Established assembly (P.A.T.) operations with multiple Chinese partners 
from 1985. 
7 
From 1986 Fujitsu Transferred technology to Nantong Huada for assembling logic chips; 
established JVs in Nanjing (1992), Jiangsu (1994), Xian (1995), Nantong 
(1997), and another Nanjing (1999.)  Also established a research center 
with CAS in Beijing in 1994.  Also operated a semiconductor assembly 
(P.A.T.) plant from 1999. 
1 
1986 Texas Instruments Established first office in Beijing in 1986. 2 
1991 Daw Technologies Chinese government signed possibly the "single largest" semiconductor 
equipment purchase from Daw for Huajing, for clean room equipment. 
3 
1992 United States (various 
companies) 
China sent three delegations to the U.S. to buy older, used semiconductor 
equipment. 
4 
1992 Motorola Established Tianjin production facility for discrete devices and ICs, a 
wholly (Motorola) owned subsidiary. 
5 
1993 AMD Opened a design office in Beijing. 7 
1993 Diodes Established production in China of discrete devices.  
1994 Toshiba Established an assembly (P.A.T.) plant near Shanghai. 1 
1994 Intel Subcontracted P.A.T. work to Huajing for 386 chips; 1995, set up 
operations in Shanghai. 
4 
1994 Northern Telecom Established joint venture with Shanghai government bodies to produce 
Ics; Norther was majority owner; the joint venture was to supply 
Northern's other China-based joint ventures.  Northern set up four 







Figure 13, continued: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
1994 ITT Formed joint venture with Zhejiang Connector Factory; ITT owned 51 
percent of the joint venture. 
8 
1994  Toshiba Established JV with Haujing to produce semiconductors.  Toshiba owned 
60 percent of the JV. 
9 
1994 U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
The DOC along with three U.S. electronics-related trade associations 
established a U.S. Information Technology Office in Beijing. 
10 
1994 Microelectronic Packaging Contracted with Chinese organizations to provide technology, training, 
and equipment for manufacturing (semiconductor) ceramic packaging. 
12 
1994 National Semiconductor Signed agreement with Chinese government to provide semiconductor-
related technologies to China. 
13 
1994 IBM Supplied capital equipment and a major research contract to Beijing's 
Application Software Development Corp (associated with Qinghua 
University.) 
19 
1994 Hitachi Established first China office in 1994; established an assembly (P.A.T.) 
site for DRAM in 1999. 
20 
By 1995 Sun Microsystems Established a partnership with China-based Huasun. 19 
1995 AlphaTec Formed JV in Shanghai with Huaxu of the MEI for P.A.T.; Microchip 
Technologies (of Arizona) also participated in the venture. 
11 
1995 General Instruments Received a business licencse to establish a semiconductor wholly forieng 
owned manufacturing facility in Tianjin. 
14 
1996 AT&T-Lucent Established six JVs and two wholly foreign owned enterprises in China, 
with a total of 20,000 workers (also transferred primary technology to 
Huajing under Project 908.) 
16 
1996 Daw Technologies Sold semiconductor equipment to Huajing, Huayue, and Chinese Design 







Figure 13, continued: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
Before 1997 Siemens Sold equipment to Huajing; established a production facility in Jiangsu 
Wuxi. 
17 
1997 Hitachi Established a packing (P.A.T.) plant for DRAM. 1 
1997 Bell Labs (the R&D unit of 
Lucent) 
Built branches in Beijing and Shanghai and launched a joint lab with 
Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue. 
16 
1997 Matsushita Provided technology to Wuxi Little Swan, a large 
electronics/semiconductor R&D firm. 
17 
Before 2000 Fairchild Esblished manufacturing in China. 15 
 
Sources: 
1) Jifu Wang, "China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation," unpublished business case study, 2000. 
2) Texas Instruments, see article at http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/csr/news_community_ti_china.shtml. 
3) High Beam Research, November 1992. 
3) High Beam Research,"Daw Technologies," August 1, 1991. 
4) New York Times, "Intel to Begin China Venture," March 26, 1994. 
5) Bill Rumbler, "Motorola Building $120million Factory in China," Chicago Sun Times, March 28, 1992. 
6) PR Newswire, "Northern Telecom Announces Larege Investment Program…in China," April 22, 1994. 
7) Rebecca Smith, "China's Growing Market Lures U.S. Computer Chip Makers," Tribune Business News, April 3, 1994. 
8) PR Newswire, "ITT Unit Forms JV with China's Largest Connector Company," April 12, 1994. 
9) New York Times, "Toshiba in Chinese Deal," August 9, 1994. 
10) PR Newswire, "U.S. Departmetn of Commerce Awards First Ever Grant for U.S.-Beijing Information Technology Office," October 26, 1994. 
11) Business Wire, "Alphatec Groups Forms JV in Shanghai, China," July 18, 1995 
12) Business Wire, "Microelectronic Packaging Receives $2million Contract from Chinese Government Electronics Concern," November 23, 1994. 
13) Business Wire, "National Semiconductor and Chinese Government Sign Agreement…in China," December 22, 1994 
14) PR Newswire, "General Instrument Corp. Division Receives Business License from PRC," May 25, 1995. 
15) Business Wire, "Fairchild Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of QT Optoelectronics," May 30, 2000. 
16) Xinhua News Agency, "Lucent Technologies' Investment Exceeds 100million," January 19, 1998. 
17) Washington Post, "'Made in China' Takes Great Leap Forward," June 15, 1997. 
18) Business Wire, "Daw Technologies Inc. Receives Approximately $8billion in New Contracts," January 9, 1996. 
19) Michael Zielenziger, "Pacific Rim: China Builds 'Brainpower Center'," Tribune News Service, November 1, 1995. 
20) Hitachi, see article at http://www.hitachi.com/about/corporate/history/1980.html. 




many global semiconductor firms began to establish operations in China in the 1980s and 
1990s, and in the 1990s, Japanese semiconductor firms were actually the largest foreign 
presence in China.  Prominent examples include Toshiba’s equipment transfers to Huajing in 
1980s and its plant near Shanghai from 1994, Hitachi in China from 1997, and Fujitsu with 
several locations in China in the 1990s.  That said, these global firms did not contribute 
substantially to overall revenues in the semiconductor industry in China in the 1990s because 
many of these global firms’ China-based activities were “offices,” (lower value added) P.A.T. 
facilities, equipment sales, or arrangements to produce discrete devices, see Figure 13 above.  
Global semiconductor and semiconductor-related firms increasingly desired to locate 
in China to be close to customers, where customers were mainly firms that were 
manufacturing or assembling electronics products and thus using semiconductors.590  In the 
1990s, brand name original equipment manufacturers (i.e., O.E.M.s such as Apple, Toshiba, 
Nokia) began to use contract manufacturers (that is, outsourcing) for manufacturing and 
assembly.  O.E.M.s would outsource to E.M.S. (electronics manufacturing service) firms or 
O.D.M. (original design manufacturers), which were increasingly located in China in the 
1990s.  Figure Twelve broadly defines the role of 1) global electronics firms, that is O.E.M.s, 
original equipment manufacturers, 2) electronic contract manufacturing firms called E.M.S. 
firms or O.D.M.s, and 3) semiconductor firms.  For example, Chinese O.E.M. Panda may 
contract its manufacturing to O.D.M. Foxconn (also known as Hon Hai, Taiwan-owned but 
                                                        
590 Asia Pulse News, “Briefing,” December 14, 1999.  For example, by 1999, Jiangsu’s Suzhou High Tech 
Development Zone already had some thirty foreign computer and electronics companies, including well-know 






Figure 12: The Global Electronics Supply Chain: OEMs and Contract Manufacturers
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China-based), who may source semiconductors from Qualcomm of the U.S., who would own 
the fundamental I.P. 
Global semiconductor firms’ move to China was facilitated by the industry’s transition 
from the vertically integrated I.D.M. business model, wherein one firm would do design, 
fabrication, and packaging/assembly/testing (P.A.T.), to a vertically disintegrated model, in 
which firms specialized in design or fabrication (foundries) or P.A.T.  This trend was 
instigated by TSMC in Taiwan, which established the world’s first foundry for outsourcing 
fabrication work in 1987.  The availability of foundries then fostered the emergence of 
independent design firms.  With foundries available, design firms could be successful without 
the high level of capital required to establish a foundry for their products; they could just 
outsource fabrication to foundries.  Meanwhile, existing global I.D.M.s adopted a “fab-lite” 
strategy, which meant they were doing less fabrication themselves and outsourcing fabrication, 
when appropriate.  The vertical disintegration of the semiconductor industry furthered the 
industry’s relocation to China, because firms in both the P.A.T. sector and the foundry sector 
wanted to be close to customers.591 
 
5.12a  The P.A.T. Sector 
Semiconductor P.A.T. is technologically sophisticated relative to what might be called  
“packaging,” “assembly,” or “testing” in other industries.  However, relative to the 
semiconductor design and fabrication sectors, the semiconductor P.A.T. sector is less capital 
                                                        
591 SMIC, “Rising to the Challenge.”  In 2001, seventy percent of China’s fabrication lines were still 3 and 4 inch 
lines, while the high-end semiconductor market was being met by 12 inch lines.  U.S. export restrictions 
would not allow 12 inch production equipment to be sold into China, but European and Japanese suppliers 




intensive, more labor intensive, requires fewer skills, and there is less concern about 
intellectual property protection.  P.A.T. firms handle the final preparation of semiconductors 
before they go to the customer, so P.A.T. firms seek geographic proximity to customers such 
as E.M.S. firms and O.D.M.s.  For all these reasons, P.A.T. firms increasingly sought to 
locate in China in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Generally, the semiconductor P.A.T. sector was the first sector in the global 
semiconductor industry to undergo de-virtualization and locate in Asia.  P.A.T. was 
traditionally done in house by the major global I.D.M.s, but as early as the 1960s, some 
I.D.M.s began to outsource their P.A.T. work to regions with lower labor costs.  By 1980, 
perhaps eighty percent of the U.S. P.A.T. work was being done overseas, largely in Asia.  
Some overseas facilities were owned by global I.D.M.s and others were stand-alone P.A.T. 
firms or joint ventures.  The semiconductor industry’s de-verticalization in the 1990s (with 
the emergence of “fab-less” design houses and foundries) furthered the trend of stand-alone 
P.A.T. facilities.592 
In the early 1990s, the P.A.T. sector in China consisted primarily of smaller Chinese 
facilities using 1980s technology.  However, by 2000, non-Chinese firms already accounted 
for more than half of the revenues in the sector.  Non-Chinese firms established operations in 
China in the 1990s due to the migration of global electronics manufacturing and assembly in 
China during that decade.  At US$1.61 billion, P.A.T. revenues in China in 2000 were already 
                                                        
592 Wang Yangyuan and Wang Yongwen 王阳元 and 王永文, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhilu: 
cong Xiaofei Daguo Zouxiang Chanye Qiangguo 我国集成电路产业发展之路：从消费大国走向产业强国 
(China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development Path: From a Big, Consuming Nation to a Strong, 




more than twice the revenues of the semiconductor manufacturing sector in China, see Figure 
Seventeen ahead.593 
From 2000, more global P.A.T. firms established operations in China either as wholly 
foreign owned enterprises or as joint ventures, and this influx caused China to become a 
leading global site for P.A.T. activity.594  By 2005, fifteen of the world’s largest I.D.M.s had 
P.A.T. facilities in China, and many of the leading global P.A.T. firms had operations in 
China.  This resulted in the P.A.T. sector being more globalized than the fabrication or design 
sectors, at that time.595  The P.A.T. work in China integrated the back end of the 
semiconductor value chain with the global industry and contributed to the notion of China as 
“the world’s factory floor.” 
The influx of P.A.T. activity, mainly in Jiangsu province in Wuxi, Suzhou, and 
Nantong, led P.A.T. revenues in China to multiply by 2.7 times by 2005, causing China’s 
semiconductor industry to be significantly “unbalanced” in terms of the proportion of 
revenues accruing to the P.A.T. sector, as compared to the proportion of P.A.T. revenues in 
                                                        
593 Chen Ling and Lan Xue, “Global Production Networks,” China and the World Economy, Volume 18, 
Number 6, 2010. 
594 Denis Simon wrote in 20001 that there were about 160 P.A.T. facilities in China, with about 60 being “major” 
facilities including wholly foreign owned enterprises and joint ventures.  A 2004 PwC study said there were 
about 78 P.A.T. facilities in China in 2004, and of the 78, only 21 were firms that were headquartered in China.  
And, of the 78, “35 did not exist in 1999.”  I attended a P.A.T. conference in Wuxi in 2009, and from the 
attendee list, it seemed that there well over 100 P.A.T. facilities in China by then.  The conference participants 
were from a mix of mostly Asian countries, suggesting that many P.A.T. facilities in China had international 
management or ownership.  See Denis Simon, “The Microelectronics Industry Crosses a Critical Threshold,” 
The China Business Review, 2001.  PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2004, pages 38-39.  SMIC (S. Chen, G. Liu, V. 
Lee, J. Xie), “Rising to the Challenge: China’s New Semiconductor Industry Future Fab, Feb 2, 2002.  
Leading global firms already with P.A.T. facilities in China by 2001, included Motorola, Philips, Panasonic, 
Fujitsu, and Alphatec, and by 2005, Intel, AMD, Samsung, and Hyundai were building P.A.T. facilities in 
China.  Joint ventures included: Shougang NEC, Wuxi Huazhi, Mistubishi-Stone, Leshan-Pheonix, Nantong 
Fujitsu, and Shenzhen-SGS Thomson.  Major P.A.T. firms in China by the early 2000s included: Amkor, 
ASAT Holdings, ASE, ChipMOS, Millinium Microtech, PSI Technologies, and STATSChipPac. 




the global industry.596  This is not surprising, given China’s low labor costs and the desire of 
P.A.T. firms to be close to customers.  However, throughout the 2000s, P.A.T. revenues 
declined as a percentage of the industry, and the industry achieved better balance, see Figure 
Seventeen.  According to the CEO of China’s largest domestic P.A.T. enterprise (he was 
previously a General Manager of Huajing), despite the development of this sector, Chinese 
domestic P.A.T. enterprises were still about ten years behind global standards in the late 
2000s, with their primary constraints being: capital, technical personnel, and competition 
from foreign firms that benefitted from government incentives in China.  Chinese officials 
had not targeted the sector for support in the 1990s or through new policies around 2000 
because the sector was considered lower-value-added and lower-technology, in terms of the 
semiconductor industry.  The targeted sectors of the semiconductor industry were fabrication 
(manufacturing) and design.597 
5.12b  The Fabrication (Foundry) Sector 
Global companies wanted to fabricate their semiconductors in China (by outsourcing 
to foundries) in order to be close to China’s market and to avoid China’s seventeen percent 
tariff on imported semiconductors.  The V.A.T. for locally produced semiconductors was only 
three to six percent.  (China’s V.A.T. policy in the early 2000s is covered in Section 5.2
                                                        
596 Interview with Yu Xiekang, General Manager of Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Technology (JCET), June 2, 
2009, JCET headquarters near Wuxi. 
597 Yu Xiekang 于燮康, “Fengceye: Guimo Zhan I.C. Banbijiangshan Tongzhihua Jingzheng Jiaju 封测业：规
模占 IC 半壁江山同质化竞争加剧 (The P.A.T. Sector: Half of the Nation’s Integrated Circuit Industry),” 






Figure 17: Semiconductor Production Revenues in China, by Sector (RMB100 million), excluding Discrete Devices
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Design 9.8 14.8 21.6 44.9 81.8 124.3
• Percent of industry 5 7 7 13 15 18
Fabrication (manufacturing) 48 27.7 33.6 60.5 180 232.9
• Percent of industry 26 14 14 17 33 33
Packaging, Assembly, Testing (P.A.T.) 128.4 161.1 213.3 246 283.5 344.9
• Percent of industry 69 79 79 70 52 49
Total 186.2 203.6 268.5 351.4 545.3 702.1
Source: National Burea of Statistics, 2001-2005, shown in Chen Ling and Xue Lan, "Global Production Networks," China and the World Economy, 





By 2004, a number of firms were offering foundry services in China, including:598 CSMC 
(Huajing’s affiliate), Huahong-NEC, SMIC, ASMC, Hejian, TSMC, and Grace.  Only four 
foreign I.D.M.’s had fabrication facilities in China by 2003, owing to the “fab-lite” trend.  
These four included: 1) NEC of Japan, which had partnered with Chinese national champion 
Huahong and was a partner in a key Chinese semiconductor enterprise Shougang-NEC, 2) 
Philips of the Netherlands, which had partnered with Chinese key enterprise ASMC, 3) ON 
Semiconductor of the United States, and 4) Rohm of Japan.599  While Taiwan’s TSMC and 
UMC remained the world’s largest foundries throughout the 2000s, foundry work 
increasingly migrated to China during that decade. 
A common perception is that the fabrication sector took off in China after 2002, when 
Taiwan lifted investment restrictions on the semiconductor industry in Mainland China.  This 
research, however, has shown that the increase in semiconductor production in China began 
prior to Taiwan’s 2002 policy change, see Figure Six.600  (Taiwan’s policies are discussed in 
Section 5.22.)  That said, there was indeed an influx of Taiwan-related talent and investment 
to Mainland China from around 2000, particularly new foundries.  These included Beijing’s 
Huaxia Semiconductor Manufacturing (HSMC) which was a Sino-foreign joint venture with 
Taiwanese management and U.S. investment, as well as SMIC and Grace in 2000.  SMIC and 
Grace are sometimes called “Taiwanese,” due to their ties to Taiwan.601  However, both are  
                                                        
598 PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2004, page 35. 
599 Motorola sold its Tianjin fabrication facility to SMIC in 2003.  
600 Chen Ling, a professor at Qinghua University who studies the semiconductor industry, shows similar data 
regarding the take off in production in two documents, see Chen, “Global Production Networks,” page 113 
and Chen Ling, “Government Policy-making Capability,” a presentation from Tsinghua University’s Chinese 
Institute of Science and Technology Policy, November 30, 2010. 
601 SMIC and Grace both had executives from Taiwan and possible investments from Taiwan. 
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Figure 7: Largest 15 Semiconductor Firms in China in 2003 by Revenue
Chinese enterprises in italics. 
Note: These are the firms with hightest revenues operating in China.  
These are not the same at the largest semiconductor suppliers to the Chinese market because most of the semiconductors that meet China's market demand are 
imported. 
Analysis:  
Of the top 15 firms' revenue in 2003, "Chinese" firms constituted 47 percent. 
The "Chinese" firms were a mix of ownership forms. 
Rank Headquarters Name Revenue in 2003 (US$ million) 2003 Notes on "Chinese" Firms 
1 US Motorola 962   
2 China/Cayman 
Islands/International 
SMIC 350 SMIC is a WFOE registered in the Cayman Islands. 
3 Japan Renesas 195   
4 China/Japan Huahong-NEC 188 Huahong-NEC of Project 909 is a Sino-Foreign JV. 
5 China/US Leshan 149 LeShan has a JV with Motorola and provides mainly discrete devices. 
6 Switzerland Shenzhen Sai STMicroelectronics 125   
7 US Intel 109   
8 China Jianxin XinChao 108 XinChao is a state owned group. 
9 China/Netherlands ASMC 94 ASMC has a JV with Netherlands-based Philips and serves mainly as a foundry for Philips. 
10 China/Japan Nantong-Fujitsu 92 Nantong-Fujitsu is a Sino-foreign JV. 
11 China JCET 84 JCET is large state owned P.A.T. enterprise near Wuxi. 
12 China/Hong Kong China Resources 
Microelectronics/CSMC 
77 CRM is a member of the CR enterprise group; it includes Huajing and CSMC of Project 908. 
13 China Datang 75 Datang is a state owned enterprise group in electronics-related industries. 
14 Singapore ChipPAC 73   
15 China/Japan Shougang-NEC 68 Shougang-NEC is a Sino-foreign JV; Chinese partner is Beijing Shougang, a steel enterprise 
group. 
Source: PWC, "China's Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2004," data sources include CSIA, CCID, and PwC analysis. 
"Chinese" revenue: 1,285  47% 
Other revenue: 1,464  53% 






Figure 9: Largest 15 Semiconductor Firms in China in 2011 by Revenue
Chinese enterprises in italics. 
Note: These are the firms with hightest revenues operating in China.  This is not the same at the largest semiconductor suppliers to the 
Chinese market because most of the semiconductors that meet China's market demand are imported. 
Rank Headquarters Name 2011 Revenue  
US$mm 
2011 Notes on "Chinese" Firms 
1 US Intel 4,765    
2 Korea Hynix 2,452    
3 China/Cayman 
Islands/international 
SMIC 1,315  SMIC is a WFOE registered in the Cayman Islands. 
4 US Freescale 1,119    
5 China HiSilicon (formerly with 
Huawei) 
1,032  HiSilicon was formerly part of state-owned Huawei (telecomm), but is now a 
private, listed firm. 
6 China XinChao (JCET) 969  XinChao is a state owned group; it includes the large P.A.T. firm called JCET. 
7 Korea Samsung 838    
8 China Spreadtrum 684  Spreadtrum was private from its inception. 
9 China/Japan Huahong 671  Huahong includes Huahong-NEC of Project 909, which is a Sino-foreign JV. 
10 Taiwan ASE 657    
11 Japan Renesas 643    
12 China/Hong Kong China Resources 
Microelectronics 
631  CRM is a member of the CR enterprise group; it includes Huajing and CSMC of 
Project 908. 
13 US Cree Huizhou 631    
14 China Nantong Huada 620  Nantong is a state owned group. 
15 Japan Panasonic 602    
Source: PWC, "China's Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2012 Update," data sources include CSIA, CCID, and PwC analysis. 
"Chinese" revenue: 5,922  34%
Other revenue: 11,707  66%
Total revenue: 17,629  100%
Analysis: Of the top 15 firms' revenue in 2011, "Chinese" firms constituted 34 percent. 




wholly foreign owned enterprises in China, and they are not registered nor headquartered in 
Taiwan.602  Later in the 2000s, Taiwan’s two largest foundries, TSMC and UMC, established 
operations in China.603 Despite this seeming shift in foundry capacity from Taiwan to 
Mainland China,604 Taiwanese firms did not dominate industry revenues in China in the 2000s, 
as shown in Figures Seven and Nine on the previous pages.  (Recent twists in China-Taiwan 
semiconductor industry ties have garnered media attention.  In 2009, Taiwan’s UMC, the 
world’s second largest foundry, bought China’s Hejian foundry.  Hejian had been established 
in Suzhou in 2001 allegedly with illegal investments tied to UMC of Taiwan.  Thus, UMC’s 
eventual purchase of Hejian is noteworthy.  Also, in 2011, China’s national champion 
Huahong merged with Taiwan-affiliated Grace.)605 
 
5.12c  Global Firms and China’s Business Environment 
Despite the integration of the semiconductor industry in China with the global industry 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Chinese government does not seem to have had national 
level plans for coordinating global semiconductor-related firms’ entrance to China during 
                                                        
602 Grace was established in Shanghai in 2000 as a pure foundry; it began production in 2003.  Grace was 
founded as a wholly foreign owned enterprise, and it was a subsidiary of the Grace T.H.W. Group.  Grace’s 
co-founders were well connected.  Winston Wong is eldest son of the former Chairman of Formosa Plastics of 
Taiwan, and Jiang Mianheng is the son of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin.  Wong and Jiang met while 
studying in the U.S. Winston Wong initially served as president and CEO of Grace, but he was not an official 
investor due to investment restrictions imposed by Taiwan.  By 2002, Nasa Tsai was President of Grace.  Tsai 
got his doctorate at Stanford and worked at Fairchild and Intel in the U.S. before returning to Taiwan to co-
found Mosel and Vitelic with Peter Chen.  He and Chen also worked together in the late 1990s as founding 
executives of CSMC, affiliated with Huajing in Wuxi, see Chapter Three.   See Chapter Four for SMIC’s ties 
to Taiwan. 
603 By 2013, Grace listed its significant shareholders as: Shanghai Alliance Investment, Cheung Kong Holdings 
and Hutchison Whampoa of Hong Kong, Silicon Storage Technology, Sanyo, and private equity firms GEMS 
and UCL Asia, see www.gracesemi.com, “Company Profile.” 
604 Manufacturing and Technology News, Volume 10, Number 15, August 4, 2003. 
605 Hynix is 3rd largest memory maker in world, and about forty percent of its production was in Wuxi by 2008.  





Figure 13: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source 
1984 Applied Materials Began selling in China in 1984 and by 2000 had sites in Wuxi, Shanghai, Beijing 
and Tianjin. 
21 
1985 Hewlett-Packard Established assembly (P.A.T.) operations with multiple Chinese partners from 
1985. 
7 
From 1986 Fujitsu Transferred technology to Nantong Huada for assembling logic chips; established 
JVs in Nanjing (1992), Jiangsu (1994), Xian (1995), Nantong (1997), and another 
Nanjing (1999.)  Also established a research center with CAS in Beijing in 1994.  
Also operated a semiconductor assembly (P.A.T.) plant from 1999. 
1 
1986 Texas Instruments Established first office in Beijing in 1986. 2 
1991 Daw Technologies Chinese government signed possibly the "single largest" semiconductor equipment 
purchase from Daw for Huajing, for clean room equipment. 
3 
1992 United States (various 
companies) 
China sent three delegations to the U.S. to buy older, used semiconductor 
equipment. 
4 
1992 Motorola Established Tianjin production facility for discrete devices and ICs, a wholly 
(Motorola) owned subsidiary. 
5 
1993 AMD Opened a design office in Beijing. 7 
1993 Diodes Established production in China of discrete devices.  
1994 Toshiba Established an assembly (P.A.T.) plant near Shanghai. 1 
1994 Intel Subcontracted P.A.T. work to Huajing for 386 chips; 1995, set up operations in 
Shanghai. 
4 
1994 Northern Telecom Established joint venture with Shanghai government bodies to produce Ics; 
Norther was majority owner; the joint venture was to supply Northern's other 
China-based joint ventures.  Northern set up four agreements and had locations in 






Figure 13, continued: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
1994 ITT Formed joint venture with Zhejiang Connector Factory; ITT owned 51 
percent of the joint venture. 
8 
1994  Toshiba Established JV with Haujing to produce semiconductors.  Toshiba owned 
60 percent of the JV. 
9 
1994 U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
The DOC along with three U.S. electronics-related trade associations 
established a U.S. Information Technology Office in Beijing. 
10 
1994 Microelectronic Packaging Contracted with Chinese organizations to provide technology, training, and 
equipment for manufacturing (semiconductor) ceramic packaging. 
12 
1994 National Semiconductor Signed agreement with Chinese government to provide semiconductor-
related technologies to China. 
13 
1994 IBM Supplied capital equipment and a major research contract to Beijing's 
Application Software Development Corp (associated with Qinghua 
University.) 
19 
1994 Hitachi Established first China office in 1994; established an assembly (P.A.T.) site 
for DRAM in 1999. 
20 
By 1995 Sun Microsystems Established a partnership with China-based Huasun. 19 
1995 AlphaTec Formed JV in Shanghai with Huaxu of the MEI for P.A.T.; Microchip 
Technologies (of Arizona) also participated in the venture. 
11 
1995 General Instruments Received a business licencse to establish a semiconductor wholly forieng 
owned manufacturing facility in Tianjin. 
14 
1996 AT&T-Lucent Established six JVs and two wholly foreign owned enterprises in China, 
with a total of 20,000 workers (also transferred primary technology to 
Huajing under Project 908.) 
16 
1996 Daw Technologies Sold semiconductor equipment to Huajing, Huayue, and Chinese Design 






Figure 13, continued: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
Before 1997 Siemens Sold equipment to Huajing; established a production facility in Jiangsu Wuxi. 17 
1997 Hitachi Established a packing (P.A.T.) plant for DRAM. 1 
1997 Bell Labs (the R&D unit of Lucent) 
Built branches in Beijing and Shanghai and launched a joint lab with 
Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue. 16 
1997 Matsushita Provided technology to Wuxi Little Swan, a large electronics/semiconductor R&D firm. 17 
Before 2000 Fairchild Esblished manufacturing in China. 15 
Sources: 
1) Jifu Wang, "China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation," unpublished business case study, 2000. 
2) Texas Instruments, see article at http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/csr/news_community_ti_china.shtml. 
3) High Beam Research, November 1992. 
3) High Beam Research,"Daw Technologies," August 1, 1991. 
4) New York Times, "Intel to Begin China Venture," March 26, 1994. 
5) Bill Rumbler, "Motorola Building $120million Factory in China," Chicago Sun Times, March 28, 1992. 
6) PR Newswire, "Northern Telecom Announces Larege Investment Program…in China," April 22, 1994. 
7) Rebecca Smith, "China's Growing Market Lures U.S. Computer Chip Makers," Tribune Business News, April 3, 1994. 
8) PR Newswire, "ITT Unit Forms JV with China's Largest Connector Company," April 12, 1994. 
9) New York Times, "Toshiba in Chinese Deal," August 9, 1994. 
10) PR Newswire, "U.S. Departmetn of Commerce Awards First Ever Grant for U.S.-Beijing Information Technology Office," October 26, 1994. 
11) Business Wire, "Alphatec Groups Forms JV in Shanghai, China," July 18, 1995 
12) Business Wire, "Microelectronic Packaging Receives $2million Contract from Chinese Government Electronics Concern," November 23, 1994. 
13) Business Wire, "National Semiconductor and Chinese Government Sign Agreement…in China," December 22, 1994 
14) PR Newswire, "General Instrument Corp. Division Receives Business License from PRC," May 25, 1995. 
15) Business Wire, "Fairchild Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of QT Optoelectronics," May 30, 2000. 
16) Xinhua News Agency, "Lucent Technologies' Investment Exceeds 100million," January 19, 1998. 
17) Washington Post, "'Made in China' Takes Great Leap Forward," June 15, 1997. 
18) Business Wire, "Daw Technologies Inc. Receives Approximately $8billion in New Contracts," January 9, 1996. 
19) Michael Zielenziger, "Pacific Rim: China Builds 'Brainpower Center'," Tribune News Service, November 1, 1995. 
20) Hitachi, see article at http://www.hitachi.com/about/corporate/history/1980.html. 





Figure 14: Examples of Global Firms' Major Activities in China in the Early 2000s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
2000, 2001 Applied Materials Re-enforced existing science funding and training center in cooperation 
with the Shanghai Science and Technology Commission 
6 
2000 Accord Advanced 
Technologies 
Hired by Huajing-CSMC for "multi-million dollars" to refurbrish 
equipment; AAT's first project in China 
15 
2000 AMD Announced wholly owned subsidiary in Suzhou with US$108 million 
investment 
14 
2000 Philips Announced a wholly foreign owned P.A.T. operation in Dongguan 18 
2000, 2001 SMIC (foreign owned, 
though considered 
"Chinese") 
Established in 2000, began production in 2002.  
2000 Grace Established in 2000, began production in 2003.  
2000 Motorola US$1.9 billion investment in a Tianjin IC fabrication and P.A.T. facility. 18 
2001 Cirrus Logic Signed a five year agreement with CSMC for CSMC to manufacture 
semiconductors for Cirrus 
17 
2001 Ericsson Announced US$5 billion investment in China from 2001-2006 2 
2001 Nokia Invested in a US$1.2 billion project in Beijing 3 
2001 Dell Moved its Asia headquarters to China 4 
2001 Alcatel Moved its Asia Pacific headquarters to Shanghai 5 
2001 Nelco Wuxi (part of Park 
Electromechanical 
Corporation) 
Opened semiconductor materials facility in Wuxi 9 
2002 ASML Received a major order for multiple equipment products from Huajing 16 
2002 Motorola Announced US$10 billion investment in China from 2002-2012 1 





Figure 14, continued: Examples of Global Firms' Major Activities in China in the Early 2000s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
2002 Texchem-Pack Established a wholly foreign owned subsidiary in Wuxi to supply semiconductor firms 8 
2002 Toshiba Bought the Toshiba-Huajing P.A.T. joint venture and formed a wholly owned subsidiary called Toshiba Wuxi Semiconductor Company 10 
2002 MEMSIC Established P.A.T. facility in Wuxi 11 
2002 TOWA Established an equipment facility in Shanghai for P.A.T. firms 12 
 
Sources: 
1) www.motorola.com, noted in Nasa Tsai,President of Grace Semiconductor, “China: An Emerging Centre for Semiconductor Manufacturing,” Future Fab 
International, Issue 13, July 8, 2002. 
2) China Computer News, November 22, 2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
3) People's Daily, December 21, 2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
4) www.finance.lycos.com.cn, October 10,2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
5) Shanghai Computer News, May 23, 2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
6) Business Wire, "Applied Materials Pledges Additonal Funds…," May 5, 2000 and "Applied Materials Shanghai…," October 18, 2001. 
7) China Daily, "In Brief," June 25, 2002 
8) Asia Pulse News, "Malaysia's Texchem Resources to Set Up Unit in Wuxi," April 12, 2002. 
9) PR Newswire, "Park Electrochemical Announces…," November 8, 2001 
10) Asia Info Services, "Toshiba Expands Semiconductor…," July 11, 2002 
11) Sensor Business Digest, "From the Editor: Market Opportunities Abound…," June 1, 2002 
12) Asia Info Services, "TOWA Comes to Shanghai," November 26, 2002 
14) Rand (James Mulvenon), "Shanghaied? The Economic and Political Implications...," July 2004, page 109. 
15) PR Newswire, "Accord Advanced Technologies Announces…," June 21, 2000. 
16) Business Wire, ASML Increases Presence in China with Huajing…," December 3, 2002. 
17) Business Wire, "Cirrus Logic Signs Five Year Foundry….," August 30, 2001. 




those decades.  The Sino-foreign partnerships in China’s key enterprises and national 
champion enterprises were one-off projects, as shown in Chapter Four, and likewise, the 
entries of other foreign semiconductor firms to China in the 1990s and early 2000s appear to 
have been uncoordinated and handled on a case-by-case basis, see Figures Thirteen and 
Fourteen, previous pages.  Neither Chinese nor foreign industry sources include references to 
governmental plans for coordinating foreign semiconductor firms’ entry to China.  China’s 
new policies from around 2000 (see Section 5.2) fostered the industry but did not explicitly 
plan or coordinate the arrival of foreign firms.  For example, these policies did not plan for a 
certain number of foreign firms to establish operations in China, they did not define what 
types of foreign semiconductor firms would be welcomed, they did not specify locations in 
China for foreign firms, etc.  
That said, Chinese national and local plans clearly prioritized the semiconductor 
industry,606 leading officials to support foreign firms’ efforts to enter China.  However, in 
coordinating with various Chinese government authorities to establish contracts or operations 
in China,607 foreign executives complained about restrictions and ambiguities on ownership, 
production, and sales in China and the lack of coordination among Chinese government 
agencies.  New entrants to China complained about China’s “legal and political system” and 
governmental “policies and procedures,” saying “business policies are often 
incomprehensible.”608  In 1997, the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association testified to the 
                                                        
606 China’s eighth, ninth, and tenth five year plans (1990-2005) all prioritized microelectronics, as did the 
massive Project 909.  
607 From 1992, the U.S. and China had had the U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding on Market Access in 
place, under which China agreed to eliminate the use of import substitution policies.  




U.S. Committee on Ways and Means’ Subcommittee on Trade, outlining the specific 
problems of doing business in or with China.609  These included: 
• Policy Ambiguity:  Generally, China-based trade and business transactions were 
“fraught with anomalous, ever-changing, and non-transparent regulations.” 
 
• Investment and Market Restrictions: 100 percent foreign ownership of manufacturing 
sites in China was allowed, but for electronics, all production had to be for export.  
However, each deal was individually negotiated.  Commonly, in Sino-foreign joint 
ventures, the percentage of foreign ownership correlated with the percentage of export 
required, i.e., if a Sino-foreign joint venture had seventy percent foreign ownership, 
then seventy percent of production had to be for export.  Export targets were not 
necessarily enforced, but the possibility existed that they might be retroactively 
enforced. 
   
• Trade Limitations:  Importation and exportation was limited to only those firms 
(including foreign-invested firms) designated by the Chinese government.  Other firms 
operating in China had to conduct trade through designated firms.  Foreign companies 
could not sell directly into China, and thus did not have direct access to the Chinese 
market; they had to sell through Chinese distributors.    
 
• Local Content Requirements:  There were also “localization” requirements for 
products made in China requiring that some percentage of parts and materials be made 
in China.  These were not necessarily legal requirements, yet localization plans had to 
be filed with officials, firms could be audited for compliance, and the definition of 
“local” could vary.  “Local” could include, for example, foreign-made components 
that were “localized” by having been imported through a Chinese distributor. 
 
• Chinese Firms’ Advantage:  The SIA feared that China’s state-invested enterprises 
would be pressured to purchase from domestic Chinese suppliers.  China’s state-
invested enterprises were believed to “control a significant share” of the electronics-
related products that are imported into or exported out of China and to “control a 
significant share” of China’s electronics and computer industries.  The SIA feared that, 
as Chinese leaders opted to disband or restructure many state owned enterprises, the 
Chinese government would actually become more involved in owning and controlling 
national champions in the high-priority electronics-semiconductor industry and would 
push state supported enterprises to purchase from Chinese suppliers, thus harming the 
prospects of global electronics and semiconductor firms in China. 
 
                                                        
609 George Scalise, President of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association, transcript, “Hearing with the U.S. 
Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means: The Future of U.S.-China Trade Relations,” 
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Figure 15: China's Imports and Exports of Semiconductors (I.C.s and Discrete Devices) in $US
 
Imports Exports 
1995 2,000,000,000 370,000,000 
1996 2,700,000,000 600,000,000 
1997 3,500,000,000 860,000,000 
1998 4,500,000,000 940,000,000 
1999 7,533,550,000 1,889,290,000 
2001 19,900,000,000 3,700,000,000 
2002 30,300,000,000 5,500,000,000 
2003 41,700,000,000 7,700,000,000 
2004 62,000,000,000 12,400,000,000 
Sources: 
1) 1995-1998 data from China Electronics Industry Yearbook, 1997 page 147, and 1999 page 211, shown in Michael Pecht, China's Electronics Industry, 
1999, page 28. 
2) 1999 data from Xu Xiaotian, Chief of Electronics Department, China's Ministry of Information Industry, cited in Michael Pecht, China's Electronics 
Industry, 1999, page 29. 
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In the 1990s, global enterprises entered China and worked with Chinese enterprises to 
instigate many Sino-foreign ventures, partnerships, and trade relationships.  The global 
integration of the industry is evidenced by growth in: 1) the market for semiconductors in 
China, 2) the import and export values of semiconductors to and from China, and 3) the 
revenues of China-based semiconductor enterprises.  See Figures Ten, Fifteen, and Nineteen, 
previous pages.  Through all of this, Chinese officials were well of aware of the growth in the 
semiconductor market and production, and they had been involved in establishing the Sino-
foreign arrangements in China.   Officials were thus well aware of the policy-related 
difficulties that semiconductor enterprises faced in China.  These experiences led to what 
Chapter Four called “enterprise led learning,” and by 2000, Chinese officials were prepared to 
announce new, industry-wide policies to foster the semiconductor industry in China. 
5.2 Changes in China’s Policy Environment, Circa 2000 
 
“If we just engage in development behind closed doors, totally rely on ourselves 
in the aspects of talented people, funds, and technologies, and produce products 
only to serve and support ourselves, it is absolutely impossible to establish 
ourselves in the intense international competition.  Therefore the strategic guiding 
principle for our developing the semiconductor industry should be basing the 
enterprises’ positions on the market, the technological development on 
international cooperation, the application of talented people on a global scale, and 
the investing and financing policies on international fund markets…   
…Government must attach importance to creating a general environment which is 
suitable for the development of the semiconductor industry, providing preferential 
policies which are as good as those in the peripheral countries, simplifying 
examination and approval procedures, and encouraging foreign investment 




Hu Qili, (former) Minister of the Electronics Industry, 2000610 
 
In July of 2000, Chinese officials announced new policies that applied to both Chinese 
firms and foreign semiconductor firms operating in China.  New policies were imperative 
because, as an official at the Ministry of Information Industry said “[China’s semiconductor 
industry] has remained rather weak and small in terms of its overall scale and has lagged 
relatively far behind in terms of its production technology development capability, product 
design and development capability, standards, and so on…”611  New semiconductor policies 
from 2000 are largely credited with ushering in an era of more rapid growth for the 
semiconductor industry in China, including the more technologically sophisticated design 
sector of the industry.  With regard to these new semiconductor policies, an extensive U.S. 
Semiconductor Industry Association policy report noted that “With the exception of the auto 
industry – another Chinese government priority – no comparable sector specific measure has 
been issued by the [Chinese] government, a fact duly noted by national, regional, and local 
government officials.”612  The new semiconductor policies were announced prior to China’s 
entering the World Trade Organization (W.T.O.) in December of 2001, and the policies in 
                                                        
610 Hu Qili “Seize Opportunities to Develop China’s Semiconductor Industry, People’s Daily, April 19, 2000, in 
Rand National Defense Research Institute (J. Mulvenon, M. Chase, K. Pollpeter), “Shanghai-ed?: The 
Economic and Political Implications of the Flow of I.T. and Investment Across the Taiwan Strait,” 2004, 
pages 103-104.  Similarly, see Simon, “The Microelectronics Industry.”  Simon recounts that the Ministry of 
the Information Industry Minister Wu Jichuan said that China’s semiconductor industry is a weak area that is 
critical to development.  Minister Wu said that China must be careful not to waste money (due to the 
industry’s high capital costs) and must focus on not just production but the whole industry chain and on the 
domestic semiconductor market.  Due to the limitations of China’s semiconductor industry, the Chinese 
government was willing to rely on the market and foreign investment to develop the industry.  These 
comments were from September of 2001 at the National Integrated Circuit Work Conference and July of 2001 
at a seminar on microelectronics and the information technology sector. 
611 Qu Weizhi, “How to Develop the Integrated Circuits Industry,” Renmin Ribao, May 15, 2000 quoted in the 
U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), “China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry,” page 37. 
612 U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association, prepared by Dewey Ballantine LLP, by T. Howell, B. Bartlett, W. 




part conflicted with W.T.O. agreements.  Because of the W.T.O. conflicts, a (preferential) 
V.A.T. described in the new policies was ultimately changed, but not until April of 2005 
when the W.T.O.-noncompliant V.A.T. had been in effect for several years.  From the 
introduction of the policies in 2000 to 2005, the total revenues of the semiconductor industry 
in China increased by 377 percent, see Figure Seventeen.  Revenues in the more 
technologically sophisticated design sector rose at a rate similar to the overall industry during 
this period.  Thus, growth in the industry was not confined to the fabrication (manufacturing) 
sector or to the less technologically demanding assembly-packaging-testing (P.A.T.) sector of 
the industry. 
Before delving into China’s new domestic semiconductor policies in 2000, let us first 
address two international policy issues that were relevant to the development of the 
semiconductor industry in China leading up to 2000.  These are Western export controls on 
dual-use technology to China and Taiwan’s restrictions on semiconductor investments in 
China. 
5.21  Western Export Restrictions 
 
Semiconductor industry observers often suggest that Western export controls on 
semiconductor equipment to China hindered or blocked China’s technological progress in the 







Figure 17: Semiconductor Production Revenues in China, by Sector (RMB100 million), excluding Discrete Devices
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Design 9.8 14.8 21.6 44.9 81.8 124.3
• Percent of industry 5 7 7 13 15 18
Fabrication (manufacturing) 48 27.7 33.6 60.5 180 232.9
• Percent of industry 26 14 14 17 33 33
Packaging, Assembly, Testing (P.A.T.) 128.4 161.1 213.3 246 283.5 344.9
• Percent of industry 69 79 79 70 52 49
Total 186.2 203.6 268.5 351.4 545.3 702.1
Source: National Burea of Statistics, 2001-2005, shown in Chen Ling and Xue Lan, "Global Production Networks," China and the World Economy, 





use technology to China were indeed part of CoCom restrictions until 1994 and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement after 1996.613  However, interviews with Chinese industry leaders. 
and the accounts of equipment imported to China in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s 
suggest that export controls did not inhibit the importation of desired semiconductor 
production equipment to China, primarily because the equipment sought did not rise to the 
level of “export controlled” and because equipment that was restricted by U.S. suppliers could 
typically be purchased from European or Japanese suppliers.614 
 
                                                        
613 NATO organization CoCom (the COordinating COMmittee for Multilateral Export Controls, established in 
1949) indeed limited high technology and dual use technology exports to China, the Soviet Union, and other 
Warsaw Pact countries.  The role of CoCom was to set acceptable “technical specifications for dual-use items 
that were being considered for export” to China and Warsaw Pact countries.  CoCom export controls remained 
in place until 1994.  In 1996, 41 nations established the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.  Commonly known as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, this arrangement was the post-Cold War successor to the CoCom.  Wassenaar retained 
CoCom’s list of embargoed goods.  Wassenaar Arrangement member nations include Russia and several 
eastern European nations, but not China.  Wassenaar is not a formal treaty, and member countries can not 
compel other member countries to avoid controversial sales.  Under the Wassenaar Arrangement, member 
countries voluntarily exchange information (on orders, sales, etc.)  See Hanns-D. Jacobsen, “CoCom-The 
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (1st Draft),” The Economics of the Cold War, a 
conference at the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, September 2-4, 2009. 
614 These interviewees included: Teng Jingxin, Chief Engineer of Huarun, and Wang Guoping, CEO of Huarun, 
July 16, 2009, Wuxi, Huarun headquarters; Yu Zhongyu, President of China Semiconductor Industry 
Association, July 2, 2009, CSIA headquarters in Beijing; and Yu Xiekang, General Manager of Jiangsu 
Changjiang Electronics Technology, June 2, 2009, JCET headquarters.  According to an interview with 
leading global equipment supplier ASML, (with Joseph Chen, June 29th of 2009 in Wuxi), in the 1990s, 
ASML could sell into China as long as they had “end user agreements,” which had to be signed by Chinese 
officials.  Mr. Chen also gave examples of Chinese staff being able to maneuver around export controls.  For 
example, in the 1990s, staff from China’s Institute 24 (affiliated with Huajing in the 1990s) wanted to buy 
equipment from the U.S., but they could not get visas, so they purchased from Freescale in the U.K.  Also, 
when ASML sold equipment to a Chinese organization for a government project, ASML had to sell to the 
ostensibly “neutral” Fudan University to avoid export restrictions.  See Chapter Three for Huajing’s 
importation of equipment from AT&T/Lucent in the mid to late 1990s.  See Chapter Four for Huahong’s 
decision to partner with Japan’s NEC and a discussion of why this decision was not compelled by Western 
export controls, as is sometimes claimed.   See Chapter Four for how SMIC maneuvered around export 
controls to import necessary equipment.  Further, SMIC adopted a comprehensive Internal Compliance 
Program (I.C.P.) to comply with Western export control regulations.  When the U.S. Department of 
Commerce enacted the Validated End User (VEU) program in 2007, SMIC was one of the initial participants.  
This program gave “validated” companies operating in China easier access to export controlled technology.  
These companies were authorized to purchase equipment without having to get individual export licenses for 





Confirming these findings, an extensive 2002 U.S. government study reported that 
Wassenaar export controls had been essentially ineffective in restricting relatively advanced 
semiconductor equipment from being exported to China.  This study, “Export Controls: Rapid 
Advances in China’s Semiconductor Industry Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy 
Review,” concluded that “Wassenaar has not effected China’s ability to obtain semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment because the U.S. is the only member of this voluntary agreement 
that considers China’s acquisitions a cause for concern.”615  In practice, the U.S. typically 
restricted sales of equipment to China if the equipment was less than two generations behind 
commercial state of the art.  A “generation” in the semiconductor industry is usually about 
eighteen months to two years.  Each generation employs smaller process technology, i.e., 
from 0.35microns to 0.25microns.  U.S. regulations, however, did not stipulate exactly what 
technologies were restricted which have been because “commercial state of the art” is a 
moving target. 
Generally, after the end of the Cold War, dual use technologies were less controlled 
and restricted.  Global semiconductor industry leaders viewed semiconductor equipment as 
generic and widely available.  Executives argued that restrictions were inappropriate and 
caused U.S. firms to lose sales to international competitors.  According to the 2002 report, the 
U.S. generally approved exports of semiconductor equipment to China under the following -- 
somewhat surprising -- regulations: 
 “For the People’s Republic of China, the general licensing policy is to approve 
[license] applications, except for those items that would make direct and 
significant contributions to [warfare technologies.]  Each application will be 
                                                        
615 General Accounting Office (GAO), Report to the U.S. Senate, “Export Controls: Rapid Advances in China’s 




considered individually.  Items may be approved even though they may contribute 
to Chinese military development or the end user or end use is military.” 
Export Administration Regulations, Title 15, 
Sections 742.4(a) and 742.4(b)(7)616  
 
Between 1997 and 2000, the U.S. only denied export licenses to 0.4 to 0.5 percent (in 
dollar value) of all semiconductor equipment destined for China, and, when not available 
from the U.S., China could purchase similar equipment from European or Japanese 
suppliers.617  Similar to this study’s findings in Chapters Three and Four, the 2002 study 
reported that foreign semiconductor firms had been instrumental to the development of the 
industry in China and to enhancing the capabilities of the largest enterprises in China in the 
1990s and early 2000s [italics added below.]  Thus, the common refrain that Western export 
controls inhibited the semiconductor industry in China seems amply refuted by both Chinese 
and U.S. industry sources. 
“Today (2002), China’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities 
can produce integrated circuits that are only one generation or less behind the 
current state of the art.  Acquiring semiconductor technology and know how is a 
priority of the Chinese government.  The country’s improvements in 
semiconductor manufacturing capability are the direct result of the involvement of 
Europe, Japan, and U.S. integrated circuit manufacturing in China, typically 
through joint ventures or wholly foreign owned manufacturing facilities.  
Currently China has eight major integrated circuit manufacturing facilities with 
substantial levels of foreign investment or ownership.  The country’s rapid 
advances in this sector have integrated China into the global semiconductor 
industry, improved China’s commercial and defense industrial base, and created a 
potential new source of sophisticated integrated circuits for China’s industry and 
military.  Fifteen years ago (1987), China was five generations behind the United 
States’ then-current commercial production capability…..”618   
                                                        
616 Ibid., page 24. 
617 Ibid., pages 17-19 and 27. 
618 Ibid., page 9.  These “eight major integrated circuit manufacturing facilities” were four of China’s five key 
semiconductor enterprises, national champions Huahong-NEC and SMIC, and new arrival Grace, which was 
wholly foreign owned but headquartered and based in China as of 2000.  The report does not say, but the 
eighth enterprise must refer to either Huaxia in Beijing or Hejian in Suzhou.  Those two enterprises were under 





5.22  Taiwan’s Policies on Semiconductor Investments in China 
 
Taiwan’s government had historically restricted most investments in Mainland China, 
but officials in Taiwan opted to lift many of these restrictions, including Taiwan’s ban on 
semiconductor investments in Mainland China, in March of 2002.  This was shortly after 
China and Taiwan joined the W.T.O., China in December of 2001, and Taiwan in January of 
2002.  Taiwan’s 2002 policy change resulted from several pressures.  First, executives of 
Taiwan’s semiconductor firms, including Taiwan’s two largest foundries, TSMC and UMC, 
lobbied extensively to be allowed to establish operations in China in order to be close to 
China’s growing semiconductor market.  In that same timeframe, the business environment in 
Taiwan had become less hospitable to the semiconductor industry owing to recent 
earthquakes and power outages, reductions in industry tax breaks, limited water and land at 
key technology parks, and rising incomes for engineers.619  Second, the global recession in the 
early 2000s and Taiwan’s domestic recession caused Taiwanese government leaders to seek 
expanded economic exchanges with Mainland China.  Finally, the W.T.O. forbade most trade 
and investment restrictions among member countries.620    
Taiwan’s March 2002 policy allowed Taiwanese semiconductor firms to invest in or 
establish eight inch (or less) semiconductor manufacturing operations in Mainland China, if 
they first upgraded their operations in Taiwan to twelve inch production, which was leading 
edge technology at that time.  In turn, the Taiwanese government committed to increase its 
support for the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, through increased funding for research and 
                                                        
619 Japer Moiseiwitsch, “Superfab Financial Technology Asia, May 2001. 
620 Professor Chyan Yang and Shiu-Wan Hung, “Taiwan’s Dilemma Across the Straight: Lifting the Ban on 




semiconductor-related infrastructure, in order to keep the most advanced elements of 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry on the island.  Taiwan’s government also pledged to 
investigate existing allegations of illicit Taiwanese investment in the semiconductor industry 
on the Mainland, most notably at SMIC, as discussed in Chapter Four.  In 2002, Taiwan was 
the world’s fourth largest semiconductor industry, behind the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, 
and the industry was considered a crown jewel of Taiwan’s electronics industry.  Thus, the 
decision to allow certain semiconductor activity and investment on the Mainland was debated 
by Taiwan’s leaders and its business community for nine months, from August 2001 until 
April 2002, due to fears by some constituents that semiconductor migration to the mainland 
would “hollow out” Taiwan’s electronics industry and create an exodus of Taiwanese 
semiconductor professionals to the Mainland.621  The new regulations for the semiconductor 
industry were part of a broader set of economic regulations devised by Taiwan’s new 
Economic Development Advisory Conference (E.D.A.C.) in 2001.  The E.D.A.C.’s proposed 
approach to Taiwan-China trade was called “active opening, effective management,” and it 
sought to open more cross-Strait trade, but with mechanisms to ensure fair taxation, risk 
management, and transparency.622   
The semiconductor industry was actually following much of the rest of the electronics 
industry in terms of migrating from Taiwan to Mainland China.  As discussed in Section 5.12, 
much of the lower-value added segments of the broader electronics industry, i.e., firms that 
manufacture and assemble electronics products (E.M.S. firms and O.D.M.s), had migrated to 
Mainland China in the 1990s for low cost labor and land, including many Taiwanese owned 
                                                        
621 For a longer discussion of Taiwanese officials’ and the Taiwanese business community’s concerns about 
regulations toward China, see Rand, “Shanghai-ed,” pages 30-41. 




or invested firms.  Through these electronics-related ventures, Taiwanese semiconductor 
leaders were familiar with the electronics and semiconductor industries in China.  A study by 
the Rand National Security Research Division found that by 2000 China was already 
manufacturing more information technology hardware than Taiwan (by revenue), and in 2002, 
Taiwan-invested companies produced more than seventy percent of the electronics products 
made in China.623  Taiwan had always restricted investments in the mainland, and from 1996, 
Taiwan enacted the “no haste, be patient” policy, which capped Taiwanese investment in the 
Mainland at US$50million and forbid Taiwanese investors and firms from manufacturing a 
list of over one hundred information technology products in Mainland China.  At US$50 
million, the cap certainly enabled many productive investments on the Mainland, and 
Taiwanese investors also routed money through third countries to skirt the cap.  By 2002, 
estimates of the total amount of Taiwanese investment in Mainland China ranged from US$30 
billion to US$100 billion.624  Thus, Taiwan’s new policies allowing eight inch or less 
semiconductor investments in China were additive to existing Taiwanese electronics 
investments in Mainland China. 
The integration of the semiconductor industry across Taiwan and China occurred 
primarily through: 1) circuitous investments on the Mainland from Taiwan prior to 2000, 2) 
open investment from Taiwan after Taiwan’s new 2002 semiconductor policies, and 3) the 
vertical dis-integration of the global semiconductor industry beginning in the 1990s and 
gaining momentum after 2000.  In this research, we have seen that prior to Taiwan’s 
                                                        
623 Rand, “Shanghai-ed,” page xiii. 
624 CRS Report for Congress, International Trade and Finance: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 





semiconductor-specific policy changes in March of 2002, Taiwanese were already active 
leaders or investors in several of the largest semiconductor enterprises in Mainland China 
including CSMC (affiliated with Huajing), SMIC, Grace, and allegedly at China’s Hejian in 
Suzhou, established in 2000.625  Immediately after Taiwan’s new policy in 2002, Taiwan’s 
giant TSMC foundry also announced plans to establish operations in Mainland China.  Other 
China-Taiwan integration followed, including the migration of smaller Taiwanese firms and 
industry professionals to the Mainland. 
5.23  China’s Document 18 and Entry to the W.T.O. 
 
Prior to Taiwan’s 2002 policy changes discussed above, officials in Mainland China 
announced several new policies for the semiconductor industry in mid 2000.  These changes 
reflected the Chinese government’s ongoing commitment to the semiconductor industry as 
well as officials’ understanding of the specific needs of semiconductor firms in China.  
China’s Ministry of the Information Industry, with input from overseas Chinese, scholars, and 
foreign advisors, drafted the most influential semiconductor-related policy document of this 
period, Document 18.626  Importantly, the document concluded by saying that “enterprises 
                                                        
625 CSMC was established in Hong Kong in 1997, but its leadership team was Taiwanese.  SMIC’s relationship 
with Taiwan is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  Grace was established in Shanghai in 2000 as a wholly 
foreign owned enterprise.  One of Grace’s co-founders was Winston Wong, eldest son of the former Chairman 
of Formosa Plastics of Taiwan.  Winston Wong initially served as president and CEO of Grace, and by 2002, 
Nasa Tsai of Taiwan was President of Grace.  Tsai got his doctorate at Stanford and worked at Fairchild and 
Intel in the U.S. before returning to Taiwan to co-found Mosel and Vitelic with Peter Chen.  He and Chen also 
worked together in the late 1990s as founding executives of CSMC, affiliated with Huajing in Wuxi, see 
Chapter Three.  From it’s inception in 2001, China’s Hejian was rumored to have grey investment from 
Taiwan’s UMC, and ultimately, Taiwan’s UMC bought Hejian in 2009. 
626 Chen Ling at the U.S.-China Science and Technology Forum, “Government Policy-making Capability: A 
Case Study on China’s Semiconductor Industrial Policy Process,” Chinese Institute of Science and 




established in China, regardless of the nature of ownership, can enjoy these policies.”627  Thus, 
China’s new policies for the semiconductor industry were not designed to benefit only 
“Chinese” companies or China’s state supported enterprises, but rather to support the 
development of the global industry in China.  That said, the policies did support the industry 
in China, meaning that the policies incented companies (of whatever ownership form) to 
locate in China.  One particular policy (the V.A.T. policy) would provoke the U.S. 
Semiconductor Industry Association to press Chinese officials for changes, based on W.T.O. 
commitments.  Nonetheless, the offending policy was in effect from 2000 to 2005, a period of 
rapid growth that built on the existing industry from the 1990s.  Document 18 did not resolve 
issues around intellectual property protection and financial repatriation, but its effects were 
significant. 
On June 24 of 2000, the State Council published Document 18 called “Several 
Policies to Encourage the Software and Integrated Circuit Industries.”628  One of the most 
influential and controversial aspects of Document 18 was its V.A.T. policy that gave 
semiconductor manufacturers located in China a substantial rebate on the V.A.T.  This caused 
imported semiconductors to be relatively more expensive than semiconductors produced in 
China.  This policy had two effects, both of which were positive for the industry’s 
                                                        
627 See article 52: “Fan zai Zhongguo jingnei sheli de….qiye, bu fen suoyouzhi xingzhi, junke xiangshou ben 
zhengce 凡在我国境内设立的…..企业, 不分所有制性质, 均可享受本政策 (Enterprises established in 
China, regardless of the nature of their ownership, all can enjoy this policy)” of “18 Hao Wenjian: Guli 
Ruanjian Chanye he Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan de Ruogan Zhengce 18 号文件：鼓励软件产业和集成电
路产业发展的若干政策  (Document 18: Some Policies to Encourage the Software and Integrated Circuit 
Industries).”  This document is available from the Chinese Electronics Standardization Institute (Zhongguo 
Dianzi Jishu Biaojunhua Yanjiusuo 中国电子技术标准化研究所) at 
www.chinasoftware.com.cn/calling_info_detail.asp?id=47. 




development in China.  First, it gave domestic producers such the key Sino-foreign joint 
ventures and China’s national champion enterprises a cost advantage over foreign competitors.  
At the same time, the V.A.T. policy encouraged foreign firms to establish operations in China 
in order to benefit from the V.A.T. rebate available to producers located in China.  (The 
V.A.T. policy is discussed further below.)  The V.A.T. policy, however, was just one of many 
policies established via Document 18. 
Around the time that Document 18 was released in 2000, global industry personnel 
were interested in Document 18’s potential effects on semiconductor manufacturing.  After all, 
China seemed to be in the midst of a massive build up of foundry capacity, and there was a 
question as to whether China would overtake Taiwan as the leading global site for foundries.  
However, Document 18 targeted both the semiconductor industry and the software industry.  
In addition to the important closing article mentioned above that said all semiconductor 
companies, regardless of ownership form, could utilize Document 18’s policies, there was 
another important closing article.  Article 51 of Document 18 declared that semiconductor 
design firms could enjoy all of Document 18’s policies that targeted the software industry, as 
semiconductor design firms are similar to software firms.629  These new policies for the 
semiconductor design sector would help move the semiconductor industry in China up the 
global value chain.  Document 18’s potential effects on the semiconductor manufacturing 
sector were more apparent because China had already made strides in the manufacturing 
sector and because the manufacturing sector is so capital intensive.  Foundry operations are 
                                                        
629 See Article 51: Jichengdianlu sheji ye shitong ruanjian chanye, shiyong ruanjian chanye youguan zhengce 集
成电路设计业视同软件产业，适用软件产业有 政策 (Integrated circuit design companies will be 





necessarily large-scale, highly visible undertakings.  New design firms (commonly called 
“design houses”), on the other hand, are often small, low-capital endeavors that “fly under the 
radar” for some time before achieving results.  Thus, Document 18’s effects on the design 
sector were less evident, in the short term.  This section deals primarily with Document 18’s 
effects on the manufacturing sector, and Section 5.3 below addresses the development of the 
semiconductor design sector in China, both before and after Document 18. 
Document 18 actually refers to three documents.  The initial Document 18 was 
promulgated in July of 2000.  The document was followed by Letter 51, a document from the 
State Council issued in 2001 confirming Document 18 and offering additional supportive 
policies for the software and semiconductor industries.  Document 18 was then revised with 
input from Letter 51.630  As a central level document, Document 18 calls on other central, 
provincial, and local governmental agencies to develop policies and procedures to implement 
Document 18’s policies.  The following summarizes the final policies of Document 18 for the 
semiconductor industry, particularly for manufacturing.631 
 
Easing the Formation of New Firms and Overseas Branches: 
 
• New Sino-foreign joint ventures, new wholly foreign owned firms, and new Chinese 
firms will be approved by the relevant Chinese governmental departments. 
 
                                                        
630 Guowuyuan Guo Ban Han (2001) 51 Hao: Guowuyuan Bangongting guanyu Jinyibu Wanshan Ruanjian 
Chanye he Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhengce youguan Wenti de Fu Han 国务院, 国办函 (2001) 51 号: 
国务院办公厅 于进一 完善软件产业和集成电路产业发展政策有 问题的 函 (State Council, State 
Office (2001) Letter 51: State Council’s Office Reply Regarding Issues to Further Improve Software and 
Integrated Circuit Industry Development.) 
631 “18 Hao Wenjian (Document 18)” Article 12.  Document 18 and Letter 51 from the State Council instruct 
other governmental departments, agencies, etc., to implement the necessary processes and regulations in order 




• Enterprises will get approval to establish branches in Hong Kong and Macao. 
 
• Enterprises will get approval to establish overseas trading companies or representative 
offices, if they meet one of the following conditions: 
— Annual import/export volume is more than US$500,000 and growth rate is 30 
percent over the previous three years. 




Clarifying and Decreasing Taxation 
 
• When new enterprises are approved, the tax department will simultaneously provide 
information on enterprise taxation. 
 
• If an enterprise’s total tax burden is beyond six percent of revenues, then the amount 
over six percent will be rebated.  The rebated amount must be invested in research or 
expanded production.  [NOTE: This created the “preferential” V.A.T. policy.  China-
based firms got the 17 percent V.A.T. rebated to bring their total tax burden to six 
percent.] 
 
• The Catalog for the Guidance of Foreign Investment in Industries will list 
semiconductor production equipment and related technology as exempt from import 
duties and import V.A.T. 
 
• If domestically (Chinese) designed semiconductors must be produced overseas due to 
lack of production capability in China, then those semiconductors can be imported to 
China with a preferential tariff rate. 
 
• Enterprises can fully depreciate their capital equipment in three years. 
 
 
Encouraging Foreign Investment and Trade 
 
• If a foreign firm invests more than US$1 billion in Chinese operations or invests in 
0.25micron production technology (or better) in China, then that firm will have: 
— A refund of the seventeen percent V.A.T., to bring the total tax burden to six 
percent, and the rebated amount must be re-invested in China.632 
— A lower tax rate of fifteen percent.633 
                                                        
632 The fifteen percent tax rate was part of the tenth five year plan (2001-2005) and was not included explicitly 
Document 18. 





— No customs duties nor import V.A.T. on imported materials or other 
consumables. 
— Special procedures for expedited customs clearance. 
— A special foreign exchange account for its profits to avoid foreign-exchange 
rate risks. 
— Five year corporate income tax holiday, beginning in the first year of 
profitability, and another five years taxation at fifty percent. 
 
— [NOTE: In practice, firms did not have to meet this investment or technology 
threshold in order to get the benefits.] 
 
• If a production firm exports more than US$50 million annually and if a design firm 
exports more than US$5 million annually, then they will have special import/export 
processes to expedite security, clearance, customs, inspection, etc.  
 
 
Creating More Capital Availability 
 
• China’s government will set up venture capital pools for semiconductor firms.  Along 
with this, the tenth five year plan said the government will “change from relying on 
[government] bank loans to obtaining capital investment directly from overseas or 
local financial markets.”634 
 
Protecting Intellectual Property 
 
• China’s government will protect the intellectual property of semiconductor-related 
designs and products. 
 
Notably, Document 18’s “policy” to protect intellectual property was written in very 
abbreviated form and offered no specifics about how intellectual property would be protected.  
However, in April of 2001 the State Council promulgated new regulations specifically to 
protect semiconductor designs, to be enforced by China’s State Intellectual Property Office.  
China’s protection of intellectual property is discussed in Section 5.4 below. 
Document 18’s policy on intellectual property was insubstantial, but otherwise, 
Document 18 was reinforced by other national policies around 2000.  China’s tenth five year 
                                                        




plan (2001-2005) included investments in critical high technology industries and projects, 
including semiconductors.  The plan called for US$120 billion in investments in the 
semiconductor industry between 2001 and 2005, or approximately US$24 billion annually.635  
For comparison, China’s official annual defense budget was US$14.6 billion in 2000 and 
US$29.9 billion in 2005.636  The goal was for domestic production to meet thirty percent of 
the domestic market by 2005.  (With fast growth of the global semiconductor industry in this 
timeframe, China’s “thirty percent” goal was still not met by 2011.)  Also, Chinese officials 
increased semiconductor research funding through China’s existing 863 Plan, and the 
"Guiding Catalog for Foreign Investment in Industry" further encouraged semiconductor 
investments via an August 2000 update.637  Finally, semiconductor firms were eligible for 
China’s national “Two + Three” plan, which offered a two year corporate tax exemption from 
the first profitable year and a fifty percent tax reduction for the following three years. 
Document 18 was also reinforced by local policies.  Shanghai and Beijing, the two 
most popular destinations for foreign semiconductor firms, promulgated follow up documents 
to Document 18,638 as well as offering local incentives.  Shanghai offered the “Five-Five” 
                                                        
635Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xinxi Chanye Bu Zonghe Guihua Si Bian 中华人民共和国信息产业部综合规
划司 编 (PRC Ministry of Information Industry Comprehensive Planning Yearbook), “Zhongguo Xinxi 
Chanye Shiwu Fazhan Guihua 中国信息产业十五发展规划 (10th Five Year Plan of China’s Information 
Industry)” (Beijing: Renmin Youdian Chubanshe 北京: 人民邮电出版社 [Beijing: Post and 
Telecommunications Publishing House], 2001), pages 33-42, summarized in Rand, “Shanghai-ed,” pages 104-
106. 
636 China’s actual defense expenditures may have been much higher.  These figures are from GlobalSecurity, a 
U.S.-based, non-governmental organization. 
637 Simon, “Microelectronics.”  The tenth five year plan called for investments in a national research and 
development center, a design firm with the goal of RMB100 million in revenue, six to ten fabrication facilities 
(with six to twelve inch production lines and 0.35 to 0.13micron technology), and five to six packaging-
assembly-testing plants. 




plan, which included a total tax holiday for five years for manufacturers and a fifty percent 
discount for the following five years, along with other incentives.  Beijing offered incentives 
including the “Shanghai + One” plan, which promised to exceed any incentives offered by 
Shanghai by one year.  Beijing also offered relocation packages for semiconductor executives 
and grants to offset project costs.639 
Global semiconductor leaders generally welcomed Document 18 and its related 
policies as they demonstrated Chinese officials’ desire to offer clarity, consistency, and 
support to domestic and foreign enterprises.  That said, Document 18’s implementation was 
called “chaotic” by one Chinese official, although it “achieved its primary goals.”640  The goal 
of providing a preferential V.A.T.-related tax policy for China-based producers, however, 
displeased foreign semiconductor executives from the start.  In China, the V.A.T. was 
collected by sellers at the point of sale and remitted to China’s tax authorities.  Foreign firms 
manufacturing in China qualified for China’s preferential domestic rebate on the seventeen 
percent V.A.T., to bring their total tax burden down to six percent.  This policy was 
“improved” in September of 2001 to bring the total tax burden down to three percent for 
semiconductors that were both designed and manufactured in China.641  Under this policy, 
imported semiconductors were more expensive than those manufactured in China because 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ruanjian Chanye he Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Ruogan Zhengce de Shishi Yijian 京政发 [2001] 4号:  
于贯彻国务院鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发展若干政策的实施意见 (Beijing Circular [2001] Number 
4: Measures for Implementing the State Council 'Policies for Encouraging the Development of Software and 
Integrated Circuit Industries')” accessible at 
http://govfile.beijing.gov.cn/Govfile/front/content/12001004_0.html. 
639 “Beijing to Foster Semiconductor Business,” People’s Daily, June 17, 2003.  Rand, “Shanghai-ed,” page xix.  
Moiseiwitsch, “Superfab.” 
640 SIA, “China’s Emerging,” page 47, per an interview with a Chinese Ministry of Information official in 2002. 




makers of imported semiconductors had to pay a one to twelve percent import tariff,642 as well 
as the V.A.T. of seventeen percent.643  This gave firms manufacturing in China (whether 
domestic or foreign) a sizable cost advantage over firms manufacturing overseas, and thus 
incented foreign firms to locate in China.644 
The semiconductor V.A.T. also compelled semiconductor firms to use the “Hong 
Kong turnaround,” a cost-evasion tactic used by many industries in China.  In the 
semiconductor industry, “unfinished” products that were imported to China were not charged 
a V.A.T.  To avoid China’s V.A.T., semiconductor manufacturers in China would export 
unfinished silicon wafers to Hong Kong.  As an export, the wafer would not be charged a 
V.A.T.  Then, a China-based P.A.T. facility would import the unfinished wafers from Hong 
Kong for final processing.  Because the imported wafers were “unfinished” products, they 
were not charged a V.A.T.645 
Chinese officials eliminated the tariffs (ranging from one to twelve percent) on 
imported semiconductors in January of 2002 as part of its W.T.O. commitments, but the 
preferential V.A.T. remained in place from 2000 until 2005.  During this time, semiconductor 
revenues in China increased by almost 400 percent, from US$4.3 billion to US$16.1 billion.  
Semiconductor leaders in the U.S. Japan, and Europe compelled the U.S. House of 
                                                        
642 Different sources describe this tariff as ranging from one to twelve percent.  The range is not surprising given 
the inconsistency in China’s policies and one-off negotiations between individual firms and officials, as 
described in Chapter Four.  It seems that around three percent may have been common for tariffs.  See 
Moiseiwitsch, “Superfab,” which cites a one to three percent tariff.  Also, Simon, “Microelectronics,” which 
cites a six to ten percent tariff.  The SIA cites a six to twelve percent tariff, see Hatano of the SIA, statement to 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Is China Playing by the Rules?” 
643 Hatano of the SIA, statement to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Is China Playing by the 
Rules?” 
644 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, pages 347-349. 




Representatives, the World Semiconductor Council, and the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative to launch complaints against China.  Finally, in March of 2004, the U.S. filed 
a formal complaint through the W.T.O., followed by Japan and Europe.  After this, on July 9th 
of 2004, China agreed to eliminate the preferential V.A.T. through a U.S.-China agreement, 
and the formal W.T.O. complaint was withdrawn.  The preferential V.A.T. then expired in 
April of 2005.646 
China’s new policies for -- and investments in -- the semiconductor industry from 
2000 were primarily articulated in Document 18 and China’s tenth five year plan, but the 
global integration of the semiconductor industry in China was also fostered by China’s entry 
to the W.T.O. in December of 2001.  Since the early 1990s, the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 
Association had been sending delegations to China and advising Chinese leaders on possible 
benefits of “opening” the industry.  In a November 1997 summit between U.S. President Bill 
Clinton and China’s President Jiang Zemin, Chinese officials agreed to eventually join the 
Information Technology Agreement (I.T.A.), a W.T.O. agreement among over forty nations 
(as of 2013, over seventy nations) that eliminated tariffs on semiconductors and other 
information technology products.  China’s became an official member of the I.T.A. in April 
of 2003, but it was due to the I.T.A. that Chinese officials eliminated semiconductor tariffs in 
January of 2002.647  Also, in November of 1999, the U.S. and China had signed a bilateral 
trade agreement in anticipation of China joining the W.T.O.  The 1999 agreement included 
several U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association demands including: “elimination of tariffs 
                                                        
646 Hatano of the SIA, statement to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Is China Playing by the 
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647 Scalise of the SIA, transcript, “Hearing with the U.S. Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and 
Means; Hatano of the SIA, statement to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Is China Playing 




by 2002..., de-politicization of buying decisions by [China’s state supported enterprises], 
trading and distribution rights for foreign firms, removal of technology-transfer and export 
requirements as a condition for market access or foreign investment, adequate protection of 
intellectual property rights, and continued permission for the U.S. to use anti-dumping 
methodology in trade disputes with China.”648 
Following the 1997 and 1999 agreements, China officially joined the W.T.O. in 
December of 2001 and enacted laws and regulations to improve transparency and consistency 
in China.  In the early 2000s, Chinese officials also committed to allowing W.T.O. members 
to review Chinese trade-related regulations before new regulations were implemented and 
enforced.  Officials further agreed to establish one official “journal” for all Chinese trade-
related regulations, measures, etc., and they considered posting the journal on the web, in 
English.649  China also enacted a new “Government Procurement Law” in January of 2003.650  
This complex law attempted to create greater transparency around the purchasing decisions of 
government agencies and state supported enterprises.651 
                                                        
648 The White House Office of Public Liaison, “November 17, 1999 Summary of U.S.-China Bilateral 
W.T.O. Agreement,” accessible via www.uschina.org/public/991115a.html; also, Simon, “Microelectronics,” 
page 8. 
649 Hatano of the SIA, statement to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Is China Playing by the 
Rules?”  I have not been able to identify this (proposed) all-in-one English language website. 
650 “The Government Procurement Law of the People's Republic of China, Order of the President No. 68,” 
accessible in English translation at http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/08/content_75023.htm. 
651 “Purchases of goods or services by these state-owned and state-invested enterprises do not constitute 
‘government procurement’ and thus are subject to W.T.O. rules” see The White House Office of Public 
Liason, “November 17, 1999 Summary of U.S.-China Bilateral W.T.O. Agreement.”  Foreigners 
complained that the procurement law said Chinese government agencies must purchase products with fifty 
percent local content, but “local content” had several definitions, so, for example, foreign products imported 
by a Chinese distributor could be considered “local.”  For an analysis of the Government Procurement Law, 
see the Commission of the European Communities’ “E.U.China Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment: 




Despite Document 18, the U.S.-China 1999 agreement, China’s W.T.O. entry, and 
W.T.O.-related policy changes, foreign semiconductor leaders were still voicing complaints 
about China’s policies in 2003.  In particular, the preferential V.A.T. was still an issue, 
foreign firms still faced “local content” requirements in China, policies and the bureaucracy in 
China remained opaque, and intellectual property was not adequately protected.652 
Nonetheless, foreign and Chinese firms continued to expand in China after 2000, with 
semiconductor firms receiving the tax and other incentives discussed above.  An industry 
survey by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2004 found that “foreign [semiconductor] 
organizations operating in China indicate that [national and local government] incentives have 
been consistently delivered as promised.”653  However, Chinese officials did not simply allow 
foreign firms to establish operations in China and dominate China’s huge semiconductor 
market.  One semiconductor executive said “depending on the agreement you make [with the 
Chinese government,] they usually allow you to sell into China up to half of your output.”654 
At this writing in 2013, Document 18 is still considered a turning point in the 
semiconductor in China, and in fact, the document was renewed and re-issued in 2011 with 
additional supportive policies.  The policies in Document 18 offered four primary areas of 
support: 1) easing firm formation, 2) clarifying and decreasing taxation, 3) encouraging 
                                                        
652 Hatano of the SIA, statement to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Is China Playing by the 
Rules?”  Profit repatriation was also (and remains) an issue, although larger global firms seem to the financial 
wherewithal and accounting expertise to abide this frustration.  In 2001, Winston Wong of Grace, a major new 
semiconductor foundry in Shanghai, said: “Of course China is a foreign exchange controlled country.  But 
there are certain procedures to go through to get your money out.  In our experience, the procedures are 
tedious but…we are always able to legally get the money out,” see Moiseiwitsch, “Superfab.”  See Deloitte, 
“Finding a Smooth Path to Repatriate Cash and Profits from China,” online at 
www.transactionservices.citigroup.com. 
653 PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2004, page 16s and 35. 




foreign investment and trade, and 4) protecting intellectual property.  Should Document 18 
and the follow-on policies enacted by relevant agencies and localities be viewed as “state led” 
development?  Certainly, the V.A.T-related tax policy favored producers located in China, 
and aligned with Document 18, China’s tenth five year plan called for substantial 
governmental investments in the semiconductor industry.  These conjure state led 
development, as it is commonly understood, as discussed in Chapter Four.  That said, other 
than the V.A.T.-related preferential tax policy, the other policies of Document 18 were open 
to forms of any ownership type and were geared toward creating a more consistent and 
functional business environment.  Document 18 did not create any state investments in 
particular enterprises, although funding from the tenth five year plan did.  On balance, 
China’s new policies for the semiconductor industry from around 2000 can be interpreted as 
having elements of state led development, but as being largely geared toward creating a better 
context for the industry, in order to allow enterprises to develop.  
5.3 Moving Up the Global Value Chain: R&D and Design 
 
For China, to advance in the semiconductor design sector would signal “moving up 
the global value chain” and not merely being “the world’s factory floor.”  Design is the most 
technologically demanding sector in the industry, in terms of the human capital needed.  In 
the global semiconductor industry, only about six percent of personnel in the P.A.T. sector 
and about twenty-four percent of personnel in the fabrication sector are degreed engineers, 




about eighty five percent.655  In design, human capital is key, and it is not just education, it is 
practical experience and also managerial and marketing experience, and of course, the ability 
to create and manage intellectual property.   
China emergence in the global industry was first in manufacturing and P.A.T., but less 
visible in the 1990s were Chinese semiconductor leaders’ efforts to improve design 
capabilities and the infrastructure for design work in China.  Somewhat like the 
manufacturing sector, Chinese officials made plans and investments in the design sector in the 
1990s and 2000s.  The sector was enhanced by talent cultivated in the 1990s through 
investments in design-oriented bases, projects, and organizations.   The sector was also 
enabled by the ability of Chinese fabrication facilities to take “outside” orders in the 1990s; 
that is, fabrication facilities could produce not only for their own sales or for the central plan, 
but they could serve as “outsourced” manufacturing for other enterprises or design houses.  
Then, policies around 2000 created a better operating environment for the design sector.  
Finally, modularization and standardization in the semiconductor industry and the ease of 
electronic communication among firms (due to the Internet) fostered the design sector around 
the world.  All these factors contributed to rapid growth of the design sector in China in the 
2000s, despite China’s still insufficient protection of intellectual property.   
The development of the design sector in China in the 1990s does not lend itself as 
easily to measurement by revenues.  Progress in the design sector does not necessarily 
translate into revenues in the short term.  Thus, this section examines the investments and 
activities in the sector from the 1990s, policy changes around 2000, and finally the not 
                                                        





insignificant results realized in the 2000s, when design sector revenues grew from US$0.13 
billion in 2000 to US$1.52 billion in 2005. 
This section concludes with a discussion of how intellectual property protection, or 
lack therefore, may have influenced this sector.  In the 1990s and 2000s, foreign investment in 
the design sector in China was likely constrained by lack of intellectual property protection.  
That said, foreign firms did establish design operations in China from the 1990s, and there is 
no way to measure how much more foreign investment might have arrived had I.P. protection 
been more robust.  Also, several realities mitigate the notion that lack of I.P. protection was a 
primary determinant – or deterrent – in the level of foreign design activity in China.  First, 
firms tend to keep their leading edge design work in their home country in order to preserve 
their I.P. and their technological advantage.  Second, there were many obstacles to doing 
business in China in the 1990s, manufacturing and P.A.T. were only beginning to ramp up, 
and thus the industry was not yet a natural site for advanced global design activity.  Finally, 
China was not home to vast numbers of cutting-edge design talent, so in terms of human 
capital resources, China was not an obvious geographic choice for design activity.  Thus, 
China’s lack of I.P. protection was not the only factor against foreign investment in design in 
China in the 1990s and into the 2000s.  (I.P. is discussed further in Section 5.34 below.) 
5.31 State Investments in Design, 1990s and early 2000s 
 
From the 1980s, Chinese leaders prioritized semiconductor design along with 
manufacturing, although efforts to promote design took different forms than those to promote 
manufacturing.  The approaches that Chinese officials primarily used to foster design included 




and by supporting certain semiconductor design organizations.  In Chapter two, we saw that 
Chinese officials established a number of new central-level “industry guidance mechanisms” 
(see Section 2.43c) for the semiconductor industry in the mid to late 1980s, when officials 
were in the midst of restructuring and reforming the formerly centrally planned industry.  
These guidance mechanisms promoted design bases and created processes whereby expert 
committees could prioritize and fund design projects, based on competitive proposals from 
design organizations.  Further, Chapter Four noted that Chinese leaders supported specific 
semiconductor design organizations, several of which were funded as part of Project 908 and 
909.  At the national level, China’s Ministry of the Information Industry (the M.I.I., formerly 
the Ministry of the Electronics Industry), the Chinese Academy of Science (C.A.S.), and the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (M.O.S.T.) led most semiconductor-related policy 
making and investment decisions, but municipal and provincial bodies made their own 
semiconductor-related investments as well as coordinating with national investments, as we 
will see in this section.  The various government-supported efforts were intended to cultivate 
human resources and design capabilities and to create processes and organizations that would 
foster the design sector.  Then, from the late 1990s, alongside these government-supported 
bases, projects, and organizations, many new revenue-generating design houses emerged. 
 
5.31a  Design Bases 
 
From 1983, Chinese leaders pursued a strategy of geographically clustering 
semiconductor activity.  This approach was not unique to the semiconductor industry.  
Chinese officials were well aware of the benefits of industrial clustering from experiences of 




Industrial Park in Taiwan.656  These and other clusters had high quality and mobile technical 
specialists, a culture of meritocracy and risk-taking, local universities, professional service 
providers (law, accounting, etc.), capital sources (especially venture capital), and business-
friendly policies.657  The synergies among these factors are credited with fostering innovation 
and business development.  Thus, Chinese leaders attempted to create clusters for various 
industries and activities in China.  In the semiconductor industry, officials pursued clustering 
in order to reap the benefits of coordination and knowledge sharing among semiconductor 
experts and organizations and to offer preferential policies and infrastructure to design 
organizations in the clusters.  The various efforts at clustering included design “bases,” 
research and design centers, and talent cultivation “bases” within universities. 
Following the examples from the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, China’s 
semiconductor leaders’ first broad notion for restructuring the industry in the 1980s was to 
establish “Two Bases and One Point” (see Section 2.43b.)  The initial intention was for the 
South Base to cover Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang and the North Base to cover Beijing, 
Tianjin, and Shenyang.  The Point was to be the city of Xian.   The intention of this policy 
was to cluster semiconductor activity in the hope of fomenting the emergence of a full 
semiconductor industry value chain in the North Base, the South Base, and Xian.  This was in 
contrast to the geographically dispersed character of the industry in China in the 1980s.  The 
Two Bases, One Point concept remained influential in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.  
Ultimately, Wuxi (home of Huajing and Project 908) was designated the “National Southern 
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Microelectronics Industrial Base” in 1989.  Shanghai also established two important spaces 
for microelectronic activity, first the “Caohejing Microelectronic Industrial Zone” in 1984 
(now known as the “Caohejing Hi-Tech Park”) and the “Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park” in 1992 in 
Pudong, which was (and is) in part identified as an “integrated circuit industry base.”  The 
Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park was (and remains) home to both Huahong and SMIC.  In the north, 
Beijing did not officially establish the “Northern Microelectronics Industry Base” until 2000.  
As we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, more production-related semiconductor activity 
in the 1990s was located in the Wuxi-Shanghai corridor.  Beijing was viewed as less 
appropriate for semiconductor production than Shanghai/Jiangsu/Zhejiang, due to the 
prevalence of sand storms in the north, but Beijing was conducive to design work due to its 
proximity to the Chinese Academy of Science, Tsinghua, and various technology 
organizations both in and out of the semiconductor industry.  The Northern Microelectronics 
Industry Base now consists of the “North Microelectronic Technology Research and 
Development Base” and the “North Microelectronic Production Base,” both in the vicinity of 
Beijing.658 
In addition to these larger sites, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology worked 
with municipal governments to establish seven “national integrated circuit design bases” in 
the following seven cities: Wuxi, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Xian, Hangzhou, and 
Chengdu.  (The Wuxi National Integrated Circuit Design Base, “WXICC,” was the host for 
                                                        
658 There are thousands of technology parks, industrial bases, high technology zones, etc. in China.  This chapter 
covers only the leading semiconductor-related bases.  To identify China’s many parks, zones, bases, etc., see 
“SPICA Directory Profiles for China” at www.spica-directory.net.  For an analysis of the effectiveness of 
these clusters, see Haiyang Zhang and Tetsushi Sonobe, “Development of Science and Technology Parks in 
China, 1988 - 2008,” Economics: The Open-Access Journal, Volume 5, 2011.  On Beijing’s most famous and 
largest technology park, Zhongguancun, see Yu Zhou, The Inside Story of China's High-Tech Industry: 




this research.)  A design base was also established in Hong Kong, and thus these bases were 
known as the “7 + 1” program.  These bases, established in 2000 and 2001, offered young 
design firms office space, training programs, talent/hiring programs, inter-firm introductions, 
tax and other subsidies, and technical infrastructure such as E.D.A. tools for designing 
semiconductors and access to I.P. libraries.  The management teams at the bases also solicited 
overseas Chinese to return to China and invest in design firms or relocate existing overseas 
firms to China.  Each base had a management staff that provided start up firms with these 
services and worked to attract semiconductor-related firms across the value chain to their 
region.  By 2008, each base had dozens of mostly small semiconductor design-related firms 
on site.  Between 2001 and 2007, these bases offered various training opportunities to over 
12,000 personnel and attracted over 1,000 overseas Chinese, in various capacities.659 
                                                        
659 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 356, author’s visits.  There is a large body of 
literature on industrial and technological clusters.  In Franco Malerba and Stefano Breschi, editors, Clusters, 
Networks, and Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapter One gives an overview of the 
literature and arguments.  Primarily the arguments in favor of clustering hinge on: shared knowledge, user-
producer proximity, mobility of human capital, flexible firm formation (and disbanding), business-government-
academic networks, entrepreneurial culture, availability of service industries and capital, heterogeneous 
experiences of human capital, and sectoral differences.  Douglas Fuller and Cao Cong have questioned the 
effectiveness of China’s technology bases.  See Fuller, “Importing Institutions to Enhance Performance: Foreign 
Finance and China’s I.C. Firms,” M.I.T. Dissertation, Political Science, 2005, page 34-36, and Cong Cao, 
“Zhongguancun.”  Fuller argues that the bases are an attempt by the Chinese government to “pick winners” and 
that not all firms in the bases are sufficiently innovative.  Cong concurs with the lack of innovation, citing poor 
technical skills, unclear ownership, lack of capital, and other problems.  In my view, it is difficult to know how 
many of the firms and individuals on such bases ultimately achieve some kind of success.  The effects of the 
bases are not just the revenues and products achieved on site.  One of Fuller’s interviewees mentioned that the 
technology park “did enough by providing preferential policies…without any cushion from the state, the 
founders would have been hard put to come back to China to set up shop…”  Similarly, I found that bases were 
important for their “one stop shopping” aspect.  That is, bases helped new firms to connect with the right 
agencies, apply for subsidies, source accounting help, etc., in addition to serving as tech hubs.  In the West, there 
are very few “break out” technological successes among new firms, and the fact that tech bases in China are not 
replete with obvious technology success stories does not prove that the bases are ineffective.  Much progress is 
gradual as people and firms evolve.  In the U.S., businesspeople seek out technology parks because start-up firms 
really do want the infrastructure and synergies, and local governments in the U.S. and U.S. universities provide 




As human capital is the primary prerequisite for semiconductor design, from 2001, 
China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, via the 863 Project, established sixteen national 
“integrated circuit talent cultivation bases” to enhance design capabilities at leading Chinese 
universities.  These university bases hired overseas semiconductor experts and increased 
semiconductor-related courses and degrees.  Meanwhile, through the 1990s and 2000s, 
universities and technical schools throughout China were increasing semiconductor-related 
courses, as well as other electronics and information-related courses.  Prior to 1995, most 
semiconductor design at universities was done at Fudan University in Shanghai and Tsinghua 
University in Beijing.  Leading schools also sought funding through the Ministry of 
Education’s national Project 211 or Project 985.660 
In addition, from the late 1990s, university leaders also coordinated with industry 
leaders to establish joint research programs to train young engineers.  As just two examples, 
in the city of Xian, Xidian University partnered with global semiconductor firm Infineon to 
establish Xian’s “national integrated circuit talent cultivation base.”  Infineon also provided 
scholarships and training labs for both Xidian University and Xian Jiaotong University.  In 
Shanghai, Fudan University and Shanghai Jiaotong University established partnerships with 
Huahong and global semiconductor giant AMD.  By 2000, AMD had invested US$2 million 
in an arrangement with Shanghai’s Science and Technology Commission for research and 
development projects and scholarships.  There were many other partnerships between 
universities, the talent and design “bases,” and companies, all geared toward enhancing 
China’s pool of semiconductor design talent, especially from the late 1990s.  Nonetheless, in 
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the 2000s, funding for Chinese university research was not as closely tied to industry research 
as it is in the West.661 
 
5.31b  Research and Project Funding 
 
In addition to the bases described above, central officials established several sources in 
the 1980s that provided project funding for semiconductor-related research and design.  These 
sources remained in operation in the early 2000s, although by then, some industry leaders 
believed that that “turn around time” between applying for project grants and actually putting 
funds to use was too long, relative to fast-pace of semiconductor technological change.  The 
four primary sources for project funding (also mentioned in Chapter Two) included: 
1.  Electronics Annual Fund:  From 1986, the State Council offered the Ministry of the 
Electronics Industry (later called the Ministry of the Information Industry) an annual fund for 
research projects, some of which were specific to semiconductors.  These project funds were 
distributed to enterprises and other organizations.  From 1986 to 2006, the M.E.I. fund 
allocated RMB3.9 billion for research projects.  Local governments (particularly in Shanghai) 
augmented this funding with RMB15.6 billion between 2000 and 2004.  These funds likely 
supported both design and other sectors of the industry. 
2. National Engineering Research Centers:  From 1985, the Chinese Academy of 
Science began establishing National Engineering Research Centers.  By 1996, there were 
                                                        
661 Moiseiwitsch, “Superfab,” per Michael Pecht.  Professor Pecht has extensive experience with electronics 




seventy such centers; of these, the thirty-four devoted to semiconductor and electronics-
related research received RMB1.7 billion in funding.662   
3. I.C.C.A.D. and I.C.C.A.T. Specialist Committees:  From 1985, the State Council 
directed the State Planning Commission’s Science and Technology Division to emphasize 
semiconductor capabilities.  Central-level I.C.C.A.D. and I.C.C.A.T. specialist committees 
were established to guide and allocate funding for semiconductor-related research and 
development programs and projects.  From 1990, these committees introduced a new “rolling” 
mechanism for project proposals, investment, and testing.  In this system, every four months, 
new projects are proposed and potentially funded.  The progress of funded projects is checked 
at regular intervals.663  (This program was still in place as of 2008.)  From about 1983 to 2000, 
the I.C.C.A.D. and I.C.C.A.T. committees allocated RMB1.2 billion. 
4. 863 Program I.C. Specialist Project:  From 1986, the “I.C. Specialist Project” was 
established as part of the broader, national 863 Program, a.k.a. The National High Technology 
R&D Program.  In the 863 Program, expert committees in Beijing establish research priorities, 
and organizations apply (compete) for funding to pursue advances in specific technological 
areas.  If awarded funding, the expert committee periodically checks project milestones.  The 
863 Program is under the Ministry of Science and Technology.  From 2000 to 2004, the 863 
Program invested RMB700 million in semiconductor-related projects.664 
5.31c  Design Organizations 
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From the late 1980s and through the early 2000s, China’s central level officials also 
opted to provide government funding directly to major, new semiconductor design 
organizations.  These were in addition to China’s existing leading semiconductor-related 
design institutes: the Chinese Academy of Science Institute of Microelectronics, Institute of 
Semiconductors, Institute of Software, Institute of Metallurgy, and the National Engineering 
Center for A.S.I.C. Design.  The most prominent of the new organizations are listed below, 
and each remains in operation as of this writing. 
China I.C. Design Center (CIDC):  In 1986, Chinese semiconductor industry leaders 
established China’s first significant (state owned) design house.  Around 2000, CIDC had 180 
staff members, and sixty percent had worked or studied abroad.  This organization was 
restructured in 2002 under the China Electronics Group (one of China’s largest enterprise 
groups) with the new name Huada Electronic Design Company.665   
908-Related Design Organizations:  From 1989, Project 908 funds were intended to 
support not only Huajing and its #1424 research institute, but also a number of enterprises 
across the semiconductor industry chain.  908 funding was delayed, as addressed in Chapter 
Three, but finally in 1998, the central government made 908 funds available to support 
Huajing as well as nine design centers.666  (With little information about Project 908 publicly 
available, the identity of these nine design centers is not clear.)   
909-Related Design Organizations:  Like Project 908, Chinese officials intended for 
Project 909 funding to support design as well as manufacturing.  Project 909, under Huahong, 
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eventually provided funding for: the Beijing Huahong IC Design Company; the Shanghai 
Huahong IC Design Company; and the Shanghai Huahong Jitong Smart Card System 
Company; as well as other design-related endeavors.667   
 The Shanghai I.C. R&D Center Consortium (ICRD):  In 2002, the Shanghai 
municipal government, in cooperation with Huahong, established this “open platform” 
consortium to support semiconductor design work throughout China.  This non-profit 
consortium has a team of advanced semiconductor experts (thirty percent hold Ph.Ds.), and 
the ICRD team works with enterprises, universities, and institutes to provide technical support 
and technology transfer and to share intellectual property.   
~~~~~~~~~~ 
Despite the state investments covered in Sections 5.31a, 5.31b, and 5.31c above, the 
design sector in China did not take off in terms of revenues until after 2000, and even then, 
the sector was small relative to the revenues of the manufacturing and P.A.T. sectors.  As was 
discussed in Chapter Four, Chinese officials purposely targeted the manufacturing sector for 
initial large investments, believing that manufacturing was an area where China could use 
borrowed technology to master manufacturing and eventually advance the broader industry.668  
However, officials’ decisions to invest in design bases, design research, and design 
organizations, as outlined above, all helped to cultivate design talent in China leading up to 
2000. 
                                                        
667 See Chapter Four, Section 4.25 on Huahong’s I.P. agreements with foreign firms and its in-house I.P. 
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The sources available for this study did not reveal China’s total governmental 
investment in the semiconductor design sector in the 1990s and early 2000s.  Indeed, because 
semiconductor-related expenditures were disaggregated throughout the economy, it is likely 
that a figure exclusive to the semiconductor design sector does not exist.  However, some high 
level estimates and comparisons are shown below.  The list below is only to provide points of 
comparison; there were of course many other semiconductor-related investments in 
manufacturing, design, and other sectors of the industry.  Nonetheless, these examples suggest 
that Chinese officials highly prioritized microelectronics. 
Estimates in US$ billions: 
7.6 billion:  Annual official military budget, 1995669 
14.6 billion: Annual official military budget, 2000 
29.9 billion: Annual official military budget, 2005 
14.2 billion:  Annual electronics investments, 1996-2000670 
24 billion:  Annual semiconductor investments, 2001-2005 
1+ billion:  Project 909, 1996-2000 
~ 0.7 billion:  Research projects in Section 5.31b, over 15 to 20 years671 
 
5.32  New Design-related Policies, Circa 2000 
 
As in other sectors of the semiconductor industry, new policies in 2000 correlated with 
rapid growth in the semiconductor design sector, one of the worlds most – if not the most – 
                                                        
669 Official military budgets from GlobalSecurity, a U.S.-based, non-governmental organization.  However, the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that China’s total military-related expenditures 
may be almost three times higher than the reported budgets.  
670 Simon, “Microelectronics.” 
671 This rough estimate is from Section 5.31b.  In RMB billion, (3.9*0.5) + 1.7 + 1.2 + 0.7= 5.55.  Then, 5.55 / 8 
= 0.7,  to convert to US$ billion.  For the Electronics Annual Fund, the 3.9 is multiplied by 0.5 because the 
fund was not specific to semiconductors.  The overall estimate is very rough, due to these projects covering 




influential technological sectors.  In 2000, Document 18 offered a number of supportive 
policies to the industry, and the semiconductor design sector was entitled to all software 
policies because design houses are similar to software firms.  The following summarizes the 
most important benefits from Document 18 for semiconductor design houses. 
 
Taxation and Exports Benefits: 
• Design firms will get the seventeen percent V.A.T. on their sales rebated to effect an 
overall tax rate of three percent.672 
• Design firms will get a preferential income tax rate.673 
• Design firms will be exempted from customs and import V.A.T. for equipment and 
technology.674 
• Design firms will get approval to export and certain benefits related to exportation.675 
 
Capital Provision: 
• The government will establish venture capital funds676 and will allow and support 
design firms in seeking foreign investment.677 
 
Infrastructure Support: 
• The government will provide support and funding for design-related infrastructure 
needs and will fund design incubation centers (these were the “7+1” design bases.)678 
• The government will fund R&D centers to allow firms, research institutes, and 
universities to collaborate on semiconductor design initiatives.679 
 
Human Resource and Firm Encouragement: 
• The government will provide funding for:680 
— Attracting global human resources, by offering funds to set up companies with 
preferential policies. 
                                                        
672 “18 Hao Wenjian (Document 18),” Article 5. 
673 Ibid., Chapter on Tax Policy. 
674 Ibid., Chapter on Tax Policy, Article 8. 
675 Ibid., Chapter Five. 
676 Ibid., Chapter Two, Article A. 
677 Ibid., Chapter Two.  
678 Ibid., Chapter 2, Article B 
679 Ibid., Chap on Industrial Technology Policy, Article 11. 




— Hiring foreign experts and providing family subsidies to attract high-end 
experts (e.g., housing, tuition, etc.) 
• The government will provide funding for:681 
— Expanded course offerings and advanced degree programs in universities 
— Vocational training, re-education, and distance learning for adult learners 
— Study abroad options 
• Design firms can set wages, total income, and equity shares as they wish to encourage 
top contributors.682 




• Government procurement will purchase domestic software, if it is of equal (or better) 
quality and price relative to foreign products.684 
 
5.33 The Design Sector Proliferates 
 
In the supportive policy context described above, the design sector in China changed 
and grew rapidly from 2000.  Between 2000 and 2005, design revenues in China, including 
both foreign and domestic firms, increased by approximately 11.7 times, from US$0.13 
billion in 2000 to US$1.52 billion in 2005.  The number of design firms expanded from 98 
firms in 2000 to 479 firms in 2005.  From around 2003, the number of firms began to level, as 
individual firms grew in size.685  Figure Eighteen shows the growth in design sector revenues 
and firms in China.   
Despite this growth, by 2005, the design sector in China as a percent of total industry 




682 Ibid., Chapter Six, Articles 18-20. 
683 Ibid. 
684 Ibid., Chapter Eight, Article 25. 
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(sixteen percent.)686  At the same time, the proportion of revenues from (low-end) P.A.T. 
activity in China was high, placing China relatively lower on the global value chain.  
However, during that decade, design was the fastest growing sector in the industry, with the 
proportion of revenues from design increasing each year.  By 2011, design was sixteen 
percent of the industry in China, similar to the global industry. 
The talent pool for semiconductor design also expanded rapidly from 2000, although 
questions about the quality of talent lingered.  The number of design sector employees was 
perhaps only 2,500 in 2000 but this grew to 20,000 in 2005.687  For comparison, in the early 
2000s, there were perhaps 300,000 to 400,000 such designers in Silicon Valley.688  The 
number of design personnel expanded along with revenues and firms in the early 2000s, but 
both Chinese and foreign observers noted that the quality of Chinese designers was not at 
international levels.  Industry executives said that less than half of the semiconductor 
designers in China were “capable.”689  From the mid 1980s, the first big wave of mainland 
students had gone abroad for advanced degrees, many in engineering and science, and many 
of these advanced students opted to remain abroad for better career opportunities.  After the 
                                                        
686 Data from PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2007, pages 43-44, and author’s analysis of revenues for the following 
sectors: I.D.M., design, foundry, and P.A.T. 
687 Interview with Yu Zhongyu, President of China Semiconductor Industry Association, July 2, 2009, CSIA 
headquarters in Beijing.  iSupply noted that China was graduating about 400 “semiconductor design engineers” 
annually in the early 2000s.  However, the growth in the number of employees in the design sector is not just a 
matter of new graduates.  Experienced personnel can also move into the design sector.  A person may move 
from being, for example, a manager in a foundry (likely with a technical background) to working in a design 
organization.  Also, a number of academic fields provide appropriate background for pursuing work in 
semiconductor design, i.e. electrical engineering, computer science, materials science, chemical engineering, 
industrial engineering, software engineering, computer-electrical engineering, etc.  I do not know what 
“semiconductor design engineers” covers, in terms of academic disciplines. My educated guess is that the 
annual number of design-relevant graduates was higher than 400.  See also, Simon, “Microelectronics,” PwC, 
“China’s Impact,” 2007 page 33, and PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2012, page 3.5.   
688 Simon, “Microelectronics.” 




Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, the U.S. (a leading destination for Chinese students) 
offered Chinese students the option of remaining in the U.S. after completing their studies.690  
The tendency of overseas students, which included many of China’s brightest, to remain 
abroad left a technical talent gap in China’s labor pool.  The Chinese government put in place 
a number of programs in the 1990s to attract returning scholars, but these programs did not 
change the overall picture that more Chinese were leaving to study abroad than returning, to 
the detriment of China’s high-end technical talent base.691  To offset this drain, China 
expanded its university capacity for advanced students.  In 1995, China had just over 8,000 
first year Ph.D. candidates in science and engineering, but by 2003, that number had grown to 
over 48,000.692  
Meanwhile, in China, young domestically educated engineers had decent technical 
skills for lower-end design work, but in the 2000s, Chinese semiconductor leaders believed 
that China’s industry was still lacking advanced technological expertise as well as middle and 
senior managers with finance, marketing, and I.P. management skills.  Further, leaders 
complained that Chinese personnel were still wedded to the “old” norms of putting too much 
emphasis on degrees and titles, and thus younger people often did not get the opportunity to 
work on – and learn from – challenging projects.  Firms’ methods for training and managing 
human capital and the general mobility of human capital within the industry were also 
inadequate.693  Despite these complaints about the talent system, design firms in China grew 
                                                        
690 Cong Cao and Denis Simon, China’s Emerging Technological Edge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009.)  
691 Ibid., Chapter Six. 
692 Dieter Ernst, “Innovation Offshoring,” East-West Center Special Reports, July of 2006. 
693 Interview with Yu Zhongyu, President of China Semiconductor Industry Association, July 2, 2009, CSIA 




in the 2000s, in part by attracting overseas Chinese investment and talent, as we will see 
below. 
The design sector in China in the early 2000s consisted of different types of 
organizations.  About eighty percent of design firms were domestic and sometimes 
government-affiliated.  These included: new design firms, sometimes incubated at one of 
“7+1” design bases with partial government support; joint ventures with (or spin-offs from) 
universities; the design firms of larger Chinese electronics-oriented enterprises or enterprise 
groups, including design firms affiliated with China Resources (Huajing) and Huahong.694  
These categories are not mutually exclusive.  For example, a new design firm might also be a 
spin-off from a university.  (Enterprises such as SMIC and other electronics-related 
enterprises were effectively training large numbers of design engineers through their in-house 
design and R&D units, but these in-house units are not counted among the number of design 
organizations in China.)  
The variety of origins and forms of Chinese design firms is captured in the following 
example.  China Resources Microelectronics (CRM, formerly Huajing) had Wuxi China 
Resources Semico as its primary design company.  However, in the early to mid 2000s, CRM 
augmented its design capabilities with foreign talent, in an attempt to circumvent its overall 
reputation as a low-end Chinese enterprise.  According to one interviewee, in late 2003, CRM 
began working with a Taiwanese design firm, and together they eventually established two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Institute of Microelectronics in Beijing.  Dr. Ye is the Director of the Microelectronics Institute and a top 
advisor on national semiconductor industry policies.  Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 
354. 
694 Interview with David Gong, June 2, 2009, at Inchange Semiconductor in Wuxi.  Mr. Gong had been a 
manager at Huajing until leaving in 1991 to form a trading company.  Interview with General Manager Mao 
Chengjie, May 19, 2009, at ETEK in Wuxi.  Both these firms had engineers from Huajing.  ETEK was not 




small design houses in Shanghai.695  Eventually, CRM established a design house in which 
CRM was the only shareholder, but CRM treated the design house as an independent entity.  
This design house, located just east of Wuxi, did not use the CRM name.  The staff came from 
the U.S., where they had been working in a California-based design firm, but they were of 
ethnic-Chinese origin.   According to the interviewee, other than CSMC, this was the first 
foreign group at CRM, and its staff consisted of four U.S. citizens and seven citizens of 
Taiwan.  The purpose of CRM’s so-called independent design house was to increase CRM’s 
foreign sales by circumventing CRM’s reputation as a Chinese provider of relatively low-end 
products to Chinese customers.  The design house sought U.S. and Taiwanese customers.  The 
hope was that customers would be satisfied with the work, and though customers would 
eventually realize that the design house was part of CRM, by then the foreign customers 
would be open to buying from CRM and from Chinese semiconductor companies more 
generally.  So, here was a state owned design house, positioned and marketed as an 
“independent” firm, with all foreign staff, attempting to sell to foreign customers, and 
generally, hoping to convince overseas customers that “Chinese” semiconductor enterprises 
could have appropriate quality.696 
One important reason for the growth in domestic design firms after 2000 was 
increased access to financing through government-backed venture capital funds, as 
                                                        
695 Interview with a confidential source.  This interviewee was on staff at CRM’s independent design house, 
having re-located from the U.S.  Due to the design house’s ongoing role as a “shield” for CRM, the 
interviewee did not want his name or his firm’s name used.    
696 Interview with a confidential source at CRM’s “independent” design house.  This interviewee noted that 
CRM had hired hundreds of new college graduates for their foundry.  He said that he and his colleagues were 
“embarrassed” when customers or foreigners visited CRM’s foundry because there were “all these people 
standing around!,” meaning that the staffing level was not optimized and people were not working 




encouraged in the tenth five year plan and Document 18.  In the early 2000s, China’s Ministry 
of Information Industries, the Chinese Academy of Science, municipal governments, 
technology parks, and other government agencies established venture capital funds.  In 
addition to their government investment, these venture capital funds sought private and 
foreign investors, and the fund managers committed to “following market principals and 
international business practice,” despite being government supported.697   
Another twenty percent of design firms in China in the early 2000s were private, 
sometimes foreign firms, often run by returnees with access to foreign capital.698  These 
globally focused organizations included new Chinese (non-state) design houses, several of 
which grew rapidly in the early 2000s, including Actions Semiconductor, Vimicro, and 
Spreadtrum.  One semiconductor distributor explained that Chinese O.E.M.s, such as Haier 
and Panda, increasingly used Chinese design houses to meet particular product needs, as they 
got better service from these local designers than from overseas design houses.699  Globally 
focused design organizations in China also included foreign firms such as MEMSIC, which 
opened a design facility in Wuxi in 2001, and important semiconductor design I.P. licensors 
ARM and Cadence.700 
Also, global semiconductor firms opened design units in China beginning in the 1990s.  
(These units might not be fully captured in data on number of design firms and revenues in 
                                                        
697 SIA, “China’s Emerging,” pages 103-104.  The host organization for this research, the Wuxi design base 
(WXICC), was charged with running several funding programs.  WXICC used funds to try to attract overseas 
Chinese, foreigners, and local Chinese to Wuxi to start new businesses.  
698 PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2006, pages 34-35. 
699 Interview with Huang Qi, owner of Shenzhen Saifun Semiconductors (a distributor), March 27, 2009 at the 
Saifun office in Shenzhen. 
700 Semiconductor I.P. suppliers such as ARM, CEVA, Tensilica, Silicon Image and others increasingly licensed 




China.)701 Arrivals in the early to mid 1990s included AT&T, Motorola, NEC, Philips, and 
SGS Thomsom, among others.702  Notably, by 2005, between sixty and one hundred of the 
world’s largest semiconductor firms had design or R&D units in China.703  By locating some 
design or R&D work in China, these firms could adapt products for the local market and 
protect local market share by being involved in the technological trends in China.  There were 
also the advantages of lower-cost design engineers and government supported infrastructure 
and incentives.704  These global design and R&D units expanded China’s talent pool in the 
semiconductor industry, as they typically have a majority local staff.705  By 2011, non-
Chinese design organizations accounted for approximately forty-four percent of design 
revenues in China.706  Both the growth of the commercial design sector in China as well as its 
international links show that the semiconductor industry in China indeed “moved up the 
global value chain” in the 2000s.  
5.34 Intellectual Property Protection 
 
Perhaps the biggest concern for firms considering doing design and R&D activity in 
China was the legal protection in China of intellectual property, primarily patents.  Concerns 
                                                        
701 Simon, “Microelectronics,” also author’s visits to design firms at design bases and various conversations with 
Chinese and foreign semiconductor personnel. 
702 PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2004, page 25. 
703 CSIA and CCID identified 100 foreign design organizations in 2005, while PwC was only able to identify 63.  
However, the 63 were from the world’s 200 largest semiconductor firms, and included design units of 18 of 
the largest 25 global semiconductor firms, see PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2006, pages 34-35. 
704 PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2006, page 35; PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2012, page 3.4. 
705 In other sectors, too, global firms trained local Chinese.  Global semiconductor equipment manufacturer 
ASML had 300 employees in China in the 2000s, and over ninety percent were local Chinese.  Hynix is one of 
the largest memory producers in world.  From 2005, approximately forty percent of Hynix’ production has 
been in Wuxi, and Hynix was Wuxi’s largest employer in 2008.  Interview Fred Knijnenburg of ASML, April 
11, 2009 in Wuxi. 




about I.P. protection loom over the whole semiconductor industry in China, although more so 
in the design and fabrication sectors.  Generally, when a firm infringes on another firm’s I.P., 
the infringer gains the advantage of lower costs (due to lack of design effort) and the ability to 
quickly go to market against rivals.  Since the 1980s, the value of many large global firms has 
increasingly shifted from being located in tangible assets to being located in intangible 
assets.707  These intangible assets include intellectual property in the form of patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets.  Firms’ I.P. must be legally protected in order to 
protect their market share, and if I.P. is not protected within a certain product category or 
geographic region, then ultimately firms might not participate in that region or product line or 
they might decrease their investment in R&D and design, due to not getting sufficient return 
on those investments.  When global semiconductor firms considered entering China in the 
1990s and 2000, I.P. protection was a real concern. 
At this writing, global business leaders, semiconductor executives among them, still 
argue that I.P. protection in China is inadequate.  Nonetheless, there were important changes 
relating to I.P. in China during the period of this study.  We must consider these changes in 
order to understand the context in which some (actually, many) global semiconductor firms 
opted to locate operations in China in the 1990s and 2000s.708  Perhaps surprisingly, in 1997, 
                                                        
707 PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2005, page 7, per a Brookings Institute and NYU study by Baruch Lev. 
708 For a longer history of Chinese views on the role of intellectual property, which differ from those in the West, 
see William Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.)  For an 
understanding of events and the official discussions between the U.S. and China regarding China’s intellectual 
property regime in the 1980s and 1990s, see Michel Oksenberg, Pitman B. Potter, and William B. Abnett, 
“Advancing Intellectual Property Rights: Information Technologies and the Course of Economic Development 
in China,” National Bureau of Asian Research, November of 1996.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. 
demanded that China expand I.P. institutions and enforcement or face sanctions, based on the Special Section 
301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.  In response, China threatened trade barriers on 
U.S. imports.  Eventually, China agreed to strengthen I.P. protection, however, the results of this process were 




George Scalise, President of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), testified 
before the U.S. Committee on Ways and Means that “There has been no piracy of 
semiconductor intellectual property to date, [as] China’s level of technological development 
does not yet permit it to manufacture advanced U.S. products or misappropriate U.S. chip 
designs.”709  However, six years later in 2003, Daryl Hatano of the SIA testified before the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China that there have been “increasing numbers of 
instances” and “numerous reports of I.P. violations in China.”710  By 2003, the SIA was 
imploring the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Chinese government to work 
together to improve I.P. protection in China.  In 2003, China’s government was viewed as not 
enforcing I.P. related laws and generally having a poor record of establishing the legal and 
institutional processes required for I.P. protection. 
Emerging economies often do not have the institutions or norms to respect intellectual 
property in their early period of development.  As an economy develops, however, protecting 
I.P. should (at least in theory) further economic growth, and thus become a desirable practice.  
With economic growth, more groups within a country (firms, individuals, as well as the state) 
have an increasing interest in protecting intellectual property.  Firms and individuals can 
profit from innovation, and the state can use I.P. to further development and infrastructure 
goals, as well as demonstrate its capacity and credibility.  In the contemporary era, nations 
that participate in global trade also need to protect intellectual property to attract foreign 
                                                        
709 Scalise of the SIA, transcript, “Hearing with the U.S. Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and 
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investment and to successfully serve export markets, as products shipped overseas usually 
need to be “legitimate.” 
All these issues apply directly to China, and indeed China’s intellectual property 
regime has changed as China’s economy developed, though the regime is still imperfect.711  
China passed a series of trademark, patent, and copyright laws in the 1980s,712 but it was after 
ascending to the W.T.O. in 2001 that China had to enact new laws, regulations, and processes 
to protect I.P. under the W.T.O.’s “Trade Related Aspects of I.P.” (T.R.I.P.s).  To conform 
with T.R.I.P.s in the semiconductor industry, China’s State Council adopted new regulations 
called “Regulations on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits” on March 28, 
2001, to be effective as of October 1, 2001.713  The global semiconductor industry was 
hopeful that China’s entry into the W.T.O. would lead to better protection of I.P. in China, 
though that hope was not realized at least in the short term.  Certainly, China’s I.P. regime has 
been strengthened and expanded since 2001.  China’s State Intellectual Property Office 
(S.I.P.O., formerly the Patent Bureau) has fifty-four branch offices,714 and the judges that 
decide patent cases became increasingly professionalized in the 2000s in handling technically 
complex I.P. cases. 
China’s entry to the W.T.O. may have fostered its I.P.-related institutions, yet from the 
                                                        
711 “New Progress in China’s Protection of I.P. Rights” (“White Paper Values IPR”), China Daily, August 12, 
2005. 
712 See Andrew Mertha, The Politics of Piracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005) for an account of U.S. 
pressure on China in the 1980s and 1990s to create an effective I.P. regime. 
713  Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, page 331.  This regulation was promulgated by Decree No. 
300 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.  An English-language version is available at 
www.sipo.gov.cn. 
714 Richard Suttmeier and Xiangkui Yao, “China’s I.P. Transition: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights in a 
Rising China,” NBR Special Report, Number 29, July 2011, page 14, citing Elaine Wu, “Recent Patent Related 
Developments in China,” conference presentation at Berkeley “Beyond Piracy: Managing Patent Risks in New 




early 2000s to the present, problems have remained.  In the early 2000s, commonly cited 
problems included dis-connects between intentions and policies at the central and local levels 
and lack of policy enforcement.  Foreigners found China’s judicial system to be, generally, 
not transparent, not standardized, and not predictable.715  In the courts, some foreigners 
believed that due process was not entirely respected and discovery processes were weak.  
Further, some felt that judges were more apt to find against foreigners, and finally, monetary 
awards were often trifling. 
Under China’s new I.P.-related laws and regulations from 2001, the Chinese 
government could compel I.P. holders to license their I.P., which was at odds with the 
W.T.O.’s T.R.I.P.s agreement.  Another point of contention in China was that licensees of I.P. 
would own any improvements that they made to the I.P.  In cases of counterfeit products, the 
SIA also complained in 2003 that, under China’s laws, to file claims against counterfeiters, a 
complainant had to track down an actual buyer of the counterfeit goods and convince the 
buyer to help with the case (i.e., admit to purchasing counterfeit goods.)  The complainant 
could not hire an investigator to purchase the counterfeit goods, as claims could only be filed 
if there were “legitimate” purchases.   
In light of these and other I.P.-related obstacles in China, foreign firms with design 
activities in China used several tactics.  First, design work assigned to staff in China might be 
compartmentalized.  That is, design staff in China might be assigned to work on narrowly 
defined problems, and they would not be informed as to how their work was connected to the 
                                                        





rest of the design or program.716  At times, Chinese team design teams’ work was not fully 
electronically connected to the home country’s R&D or design center, in order to reduce 
unauthorized access to the larger project or other proprietary information.  Another option for 
foreign firms was to partner with a Chinese organization in a way that gave the Chinese 
partner a stake in protecting I.P.  (That said, foreign firms have also complained that their 
Chinese partners steal their I.P.)  Further, foreign firms typically did not conduct leading edge 
design work in China.  Rather, design work in China might be geared toward adapting 
products to the local market or serving local customers with design support.  Despite these 
cautious tactics, when semiconductor I.P. was infringed in China, foreign firms often did not 
file complaints in China owing to the problems discussed above.  Rather, foreign firms would 
file in their home countries. 
And, despite foreign firms’ caution, there were a number of ways that semiconductor 
I.P. was increasingly infringed from 1997 to 2003 and beyond.  Generally, China’s programs 
for inward-bound technology transfer created opportunities for potential infringers to gain 
access to trade secrets and patented technology and products.  In a similar way, the de-
verticalization of the semiconductor industry caused more inter-firm sharing of information 
and technology.  Further, Chinese partners sometimes licensed patents from their joint venture 
partners, but then illicitly disclosed the I.P. to outside parties.  Of course, as semiconductor 
personnel moved between companies in China, trade secrets as well as patents could be 
compromised, as occurred at SMIC, one of China’s national champion semiconductor 
                                                        
716 PwC, “Redefining Intellectual Property Value: The Case of China,” 2005, page 59.  I saw a similar 
phenomenon in defense-related engineering work at Texas Instruments.  Individuals and groups were not 




enterprises.717   
Semiconductor chips can be copied in two main ways.  First, a counterfeiter can 
optically copy a chip to create an identical chip, and then the copied chip is branded and sold 
under a different company name.  Another way to copy a chip is to reverse engineer the chip, 
produce an exact copy, and then fraudulently sell the copied chip under the original owner’s 
brand name.718  In one famous case in 2003, a professor at Shanghai’s Jiaotong University 
allegedly developed China’s first digital signal processing chip, called the “Hanxin Chip.”  
Yet, in 2006, an investigation showed that the chip was actually a copy of a Motorola chip, 
with identifying marks removed.  The Chinese government investigated the professor, and he 
was banned from research and made to return funds.719  In a 2004 case, several Chinese chip 
manufacturers including Shanghai Belling (one of China’s five key semiconductor enterprises 
and joint venture partner of Alcatel Bell) were found to be manufacturing and selling a 
counterfeit chip.  Analog Devices of the U.S. was the original owner of the copied chip design.  
Analog was able to get an injunction against Belling and the other Chinese manufacturers in 
the U.S. and did not file suit in China.720 
In the early and mid 2000s, foreign firms believed that they also incurred losses 
through Chinese firms’ patent filings.  The annual number of patents filed in China across all 
industries quadrupled between the late 1990s and 2005, owing to the development of China’s 
                                                        
717 See Chapter Four, Section 4.34. 
718 Hatano of the SIA, statement to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Is China Playing by the 
Rules?”  For obvious reasons, semiconductor companies do not provide detailed information about how their 
designs are copied. 
719 David Barboza, “In a Scientist's Fall, China Feels Robbed of Glory,” New York Times, May 15, 2006. 




I.P. regime.721  However, more than two-thirds of patents filed by Chinese firms and 
individuals were utility model patents or design patents, rather than the more substantive 
invention patents.  Some utility and design model patents were referred to as “petty” or “junk” 
patents.  These were awarded more for minor changes or improvements, and the patents were 
granted without a full examination.722  This meant that Chinese firms could get patents on 
items that were in large part copies of others’ work.  Between 2000 and 2010, foreign firms 
increasingly filed for patents in China, but about eighty percent of foreign patent applications 
were for the more rigorously examined invention patents.723  Foreign firms’ I.P. was also 
devalued when Chinese firms would sell copies or counterfeit products in countries in which 
the original foreign owner of the I.P. had not yet filed a patent.  In these ways, the growth of 
China’s I.P. regime and the increasing use of patents in China led to loopholes and abuses. 
In the semiconductor industry, there is another major area of I.P. beyond the I.P. of 
completed chips.  From the 1990s, semiconductor design firms have increasingly relied on 
complex and expensive E.D.A. (electronic design automation) software systems and I.P. cores 
to design chips.  E.D.A. software is very expensive and must be licensed; unlike off-the-shelf 
consumer software, E.D.A. software systems are not readily copied and circulated.  I.P. “cores” 
refer to standard design modules that are licensed by firms like ARM, Cadence, and Synopsis.  
These I.P. cores are also better controlled than typical software products.  Both E.D.A. and I.P. 
                                                        
721 Annual patents filed in China grew from approximately 83,000 in 1995 to 170,000 in 2000 to 475,000 in 2005 
to 980,000 in 2009.  Joanna Wu, I.P. attorney at Ropes and Gray, “Recent Patent Developments in China,” 
conference presentation at “China Scope in NYC,” March 2011. 
722 Suttmeier and Yao, “China’s I.P. Transistion,” page 14.  USITC, “China: Intellectual Property Rights 
Infringement, Indigenous Innovation Policies…,” No. 332-514, Publication 4199, November of 2010, data on 
numbers of patents are from China’s State Intellectual Property Office. 





cores are licensed to users, and for example, China’s national I.C. design bases (the “7+1” 
bases) obtained proper licenses for E.D.A. tools for the small firms on their base to legally use 
and in 2003 the Shanghai Silicon Intellectual Property Exchange was founded which offers 
databases of I.P. for licensing, design verification, other I.P.-related services.  By 2010, 7.4 
percent of worldwide license revenues for E.D.A. software and 8.0 percent of worldwide 
license revenues for semiconductor I.P. including I.P. cores were in China.  That is, firms in 
China were purchasing such licenses.724  The controlled use and licensing of such tools brings 
visibility and proper usage to I.P. in the semiconductor design sector. 
Despite I.P. infringements encountered in China, foreign semiconductor firms did opt 
to establish operations in China, although their advanced design work was not conducted in 
China.  It is difficult to estimate how many more firms might have come to China, or come 
earlier, or brought more substantial operations to China had China’s I.P. regime been more 
robust in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.  In 2005, CSIA and CCID identified 100 foreign 
design organizations in China.  PwC was only able to identify 63 of these, but the 63 were 
from the world’s 200 largest semiconductor firms, and they included design units for 18 of the 
world’s 25 largest semiconductor firms.  Given the numbers and the stature of these foreign 
firms, it seems that many foreign firms were willing to manage the risks of operating in 
China’s still-developing legal environment.725 
More broadly, Chinese views of economic development and the role of I.P. have 
differed from those in the West.  Contemporary China could be categorized as a 
                                                        
724 PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2012, page 58, data sources: CSIA, Semi, Gartner Dataquest. 




developmental state rather than a regulatory state.726  That is, the Chinese government is 
directly involved in investing in particular industries and technologies, with the goal of 
economic development and moving Chinese industries into higher value added activities.  
Thus, the government has enacted plans and policies to support “indigenous innovation” and 
(Chinese owned) I.P.727 In contrast, in a regulatory state like the U.S., innovation is assumed 
to be mostly a matter for private industry,728 and the government’s role is to provide a 
functioning legal system in which property rights are bestowed and protected.  However, in 
China, in thinking about fostering innovation and I.P., Chinese officials consider not just 
individual property rights but also the public good.729  Some I.P. might serve China’s national 
interests and development, and thus the Chinese government supports the industries, 
technologies, and global partnering that might create I.P. for the public good and enable China 
to “contribute more to world innovation.”730  For example, the Chinese government has 
supported China’s state owned large enterprise groups in pursuing certain technologies and 
related I.P.  (At the same time, high-pressure governmental goals for economic growth have 
also likely contributed to economic shortcuts in China, including I.P. abuses.)  In the 
semiconductor industry, Chinese leaders see technological advances as not only serving 
electronics-related needs but also as improving energy efficiency and energy usage across 
                                                        
726 The concept of the developmental state is presented in Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: 
The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
727 Suttmeier and Yao, “China’s I.P. Transition,” page 18.  PwC, “China’s Impact,” 2005. 
728 Of course, the government in regulatory states typically do support I.P. development through universities, 
defense spending, national institutes, industry subsidies, etc. 
729 There is a history in China of considering the public good aspects of intellectual property.  See Alford, To 
Steal a Book. 
730 Interview with Ye Tianchun, July 3, 2009, at the Chinese Academy of Science, Institute of Microelectronics 
in Beijing.  Ye is the Director of the Microelectronics Institute and an advisor on national semiconductor 
industry policies.  Dr. Ye noted that China actively looks for foreign partners to meet its medium and long-




society.  Power and energy consumption are global issues, and as semiconductors can serve to 
reduce energy use, Chinese officials see semiconductor advances as advancing the public 
good.731  (In contrast, some U.S. observers view the Chinese government’s goals for 
indigenous innovation as nefarious and nationalistic.)732  
Given China’s perspective on the role of I.P., there is also a concern by Chinese 
officials that Western countries use I.P. to dominate less developed countries.  In this view, 
I.P. rights not only motivate innovation and protect intangible assets, but these rights are used 
strategically by companies for “demonstrating value to potential investors, deterring 
competitors, and capturing value from rival firms” via legal actions and “to prevail in 
competition and to maximize value.”733  In a study entitled “China’s I.P. Transition,” Richard 
Suttmeier and Xiangkui Yao argue that “Many Chinese observers, while genuinely lamenting 
the problems of piracy and counterfeiting, nevertheless lack sympathy for some complaints 
about Chinese I.P. protection by foreign companies and governments.  They point, instead, to 
the fact that many foreign companies have adopted quite well to Chinese conditions and use 
                                                        
731 Wang and Wang, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye, Introduction and Section 2.2.3.  Improved semiconductor 
technologies result in energy savings.  “Smart” energy solutions have semiconductors (often sensors) to 
measure variables (such as temperature) and power management functions to moderate energy usage 
accordingly.  According to the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, there is a “powerful 
connection between semiconductors and energy consumption…  Despite the immediate growth in electricity 
demands to power the growing number of devices and technologies, semiconductors [enable] a surprisingly 
larger energy productivity benefit…”  
732 Foreign observers lament I.P. infringement in China, while also lamenting the desire of the Chinese 
government to support the development of legitimate I.P.  There are many examples of foreign critiques of 
China’s policies for indigenous innovation, but for example, see USITR, “China: Intellectual Property 
Infringement, Indigenous Innovation Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. 
Economy,” Number 332-514, Publication 4199, November 2010.  
733 Here Yao and Suttmeier are reflecting the views of other scholars, see Suttmeier and Yao, “China’s I.P. 
Transition,” pages 14-17, where they discuss Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo, and Corrado Pasquali article 
“How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators,?” Research Policy, 35, 2006, page 1114 and David 




their I.P. with strategic success for profits and competitive advantage.”734  Indeed, global 
companies do adopt specific strategies and programs to maximize the value their I.P. 
China’s government has its own macro perspective on the role of innovation and I.P., 
and Chinese individuals and firms also seem to have particular views on these matters.  
Chinese electronics personnel express pride in the ability of Chinese companies to imitate – 
and even improve upon – advanced, Western electronics products, such as cell phones.  They 
appreciate “follower” products, as these products demonstrate evolution in Chinese firms’ 
capabilities.  The Western business perspective on follower products is often dismissive (or 
disdainful, due to I.P. infringement), but there is a huge market for follower products.  Non-
leading firms consider themselves successful when they are able to develop, produce, and 
market viable (follower) products, although these voices are not typically heard in Western 
business case studies.735  For non-leading firms, gradual improvements in organization, 
management, and technology are often incremental and not overtly innovative by Western 
standards. 
In sum, I.P. norms and protection in China are still insufficient by Western standards.  
This situation will likely not change in the short term owing to the gradual development of 
China’s legal system and I.P. regime, the Chinese government’s “public good” considerations 
with regard to I.P., and Chinese business people’s acceptance of follower products.  Despite 
the seemingly slow pace of change with regard to I.P. protection in China, the global 
semiconductor industry made significant commitments to locate operations in China in the 
                                                        
734 Suttmeier and Yao, “China’s I.P. Transition,” page 16. 
735 Interviews including Yang Long, Mr. Jiang (WXICC), Toby Chai, Huang Qi, Xu Guochang, Mr. Gong, and 





1990s and 2000s.  
5.4  Joining the Global Value Chain 
 
This chapter has shown that around 2000-2001 the semiconductor industry in China 
entered a new era of more rapid growth and global integration.  Indeed, by 2010, over ten 
percent of the world’s highly sophisticated semiconductor industry, including a portion of the 
design sector, was located in China, and over forty percent of the global market for 
semiconductors was in China.  This was a phenomenal geographic shift in global technology 
that was almost unimaginable just fifteen years earlier.   
China’s new policies adopted around 2000 were highly influential, but they were not 
the sole determinant of the new era.  Indeed, the new era was not entirely “new,” as it built 
upon a foundation that was developed in the 1990s.  In that decade, as China’s market for 
semiconductors grew rapidly, Chinese semiconductor enterprises evolved.  As we saw in 
Chapters Three and Four, major Chinese enterprises made organizational, technological, 
ownership, and management changes, as well as embarking on significant global partnerships.  
In the design sector, too, Chinese officials made a number of investments and changes.  Also 
in the 1990s, foreign firms sought to establish operations in China, largely to be close to 
China’s market, despite inconsistency and lack of transparency in China’s business 
environment.  All this activity resulted in significant organizational learning and an enlarged 
talent pool in China. 
Building on the base established and lessons learned in the 1990s, Chinese officials 
enacted new semiconductor-related policies from 2000, including Document 18 and the (I.P.-




five year plan and W.T.O.-related policies also had provisions supportive of the 
semiconductor industry.  Together, these policies fostered both domestic and foreign firms in 
China after 2000.  Further, China’s (W.T.O.-non-compliant) V.A.T. policy gave tax 
advantages to firms located in China, particularly production firms, over firms located abroad.  
This preferential V.A.T. thus supported both Chinese domestic firms and foreign investment, 
as foreign firms sought the tax benefits of locating in China.  (The discontinuation of the 
preferential V.A.T. in 2005 did not slow the industry’s growth in China.) 
This chapter examined several other policy areas that were relevant to the 
semiconductor industry in China in the 1990s and into the 2000s.  These included:  1) 
Western (mainly U.S.) export restrictions on dual-use technology to China, 2) Taiwan’s 
restrictions on investments in China, and 3) China’s fledging I.P. regime.  In effect, this 
research suggests that both Chinese and foreign leaders found ways to advance the industry in 
China, despite these policy constraints.  With regard to export restrictions on technology, in 
the 1990s Chinese enterprises were actually able to import semiconductor equipment from 
non-U.S. sources, and thus export controls did not stifle the industry.  As for Taiwan’s 
investment restrictions, we have seen that semiconductor-related investments from Taiwan 
found their way into Mainland China well before Taiwan lifted its restrictions in 2002, and 
much of the growth in the industry after 2002 was not attributable to Taiwanese firms.  
Finally, despite the problems with China’s I.P. regime, both foreign and Chinese design firms 
proliferated in China in the 2000s, with most of the world’s largest semiconductor firms 
opting to locate design units in China.  The caveat here is that the quality and quantity of work 
from these China-based design units may have been compromised by the knowledge that I.P. 




These chapters have addressed how the semiconductor industry in China transitioned 
away from central planning in the 1980s (Chapter Two), how large semiconductor enterprises 
evolved and established global partnerships in the 1990s (Chapters Three and Four), and how 
the semiconductor industry in China -- with the support of new policies -- integrated with the 
full global value chain (Chapter Five.)  The following Conclusions consider the primary 
insights of this study as well as comparing the contemporary history of this vital industry in 
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This study has addressed one of the most important high technology industries in the 
world.  The semiconductor industry is relatively new in economic history, emerging only in 
the late 1950s and not really gaining commercial momentum until around 1970 (see Figure 
Nineteen), yet the industry serves as the core of what business historian Alfred Chandler has 
called the “Information Revolution” and “The Electronic (21st) Century.”736  In effect, 
semiconductors are the electronic engines of the Information Revolution.  In the first and 
second Industrial Revolutions, steam, electricity, and the combustion engine revolutionized 
transit and production, ushering in capital and resource intensive production and distribution.  
In the Information Revolution, semiconductor “chips” power an era of nearly instantaneous 
data storage, analysis, and communications for numerous industries around the world, 
resulting in measurable productivity gains by the late 1990s,737 and semiconductors serve as 
the core of a host of new knowledge intensive industries.738 
Simultaneous with the emergence of the semiconductor-based Information Revolution, 
East Asia began its contemporary economic ascent in the latter half of the 20th century.  Japan 
 
                                                        
736 Alfred Chandler, The Electronic Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.)  Chris Freeman and 
Francisco Louca, As Time Goes By: From the Industrial Revolution to the Information Revolution (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001.) 
737 National Research Council, Securing the Future: Regional and National Programs to Support the 
Semiconductor Industry (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press), pages 22-23, citing research by 
Kenneth Flamm and the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. 
738 Around 2000, the worldwide semiconductor market was for: computers (~42%), telecommunications (~23%), 
consumer products (~16%), and other uses such as automotive, military, and industrial (~16%), see Securing 
the Future, page 14.  The main semiconductor products are: discrete devices (i.e., transistors, capacitors, and 
resistors) and integrated circuits (I.C.s.)  I.C.s may be: memory chips, microprocessors, application specific 
I.C.s called A.S.I.C.s (for phones, computers, and other applications), logic chips, microcontrollers, digital 
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became the world’s second largest economy in 1980, and China moved into second place in 
2010.  The so-called “Tiger” economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong 
and the Southeast Asian nations of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines also experienced economic growth.  According to Robert Wade’s 1990 study,739 
per capita gross national product rose by more than twenty times for Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan and by more than fifteen times for Hong Kong and Singapore in the 25 years between 
1962 and 1986. In the latter half of the 20th century, these nations of East and Southeast Asia 
joined what scholars have called “global production networks”740 by leveraging, at least at the 
start, their comparative advantage in low-skill, low-cost labor, undertaking light 
manufacturing work and exporting products to overseas markets.  Asian nations thus joined 
global supply chains (i.e., global production networks) that were often initiated by global 
firms in developed countries which sought partners or sought to create offshore facilities in 
low-wage nations in order to lower their production costs.741  Notably, leaders in Japan, China, 
South Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere believed that participating in the rapidly growing global 
electronics industry, even if initially in low-end manufacturing, was a path to both economic 
and technological advance.  But several of the nations of East Asia moved beyond low value 
added work in electronics: by 2004, seventy percent of global semiconductor production was 
                                                        
739 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrial 
ization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Chapter Two. 
740 Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, 
Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,” International Organization, Winter of 1984.  Neil Coe, “Global 
Production Networks,” Journal of Economic Geography, Volume 8, Number 3, 2008.  Dieter Ernst, 
“Complexity and Internationalization of Innovation,” International Journal of Innovation Management, 
Volume 9, Number 1, 2005. 
741 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European 
World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974.)  Using Wallerstein’s world 
systems framework, one could describes these relationships in terms of core, semi-periphery, and periphery 




in Asia, and China was the world’s largest exporter of electronics and also the world’s second 
largest importer of electronics.742  Of course, in the electronics industry new products rapidly 
enter the market and replace older products, exemplifying a kind of Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction” at the product level and thus creating opportunities for new players to enter the 
market or at least the production chain.  In their excellent study of the Korean and Taiwanese 
semiconductor industries, Dong-Sung Cho and John Mathews argue that the real “East Asian 
Miracle” was not merely new trade linkages fostered by stable, free-market macroeconomic 
principals, but rather the real miracle was the high technology upgrading that occurred in a 
number of East Asian nations as part of the Information Revolution.743 
China is a particularly significant case of technological and economic advance within 
the dynamics of the Information Revolution.  Upon China’s “opening” in 1978, China had a 
full one fifth of the world’s population with very low per capita income.  To further 
complicate matters, China’s economy was enmeshed in central planning and state ownership 
of industries.  One important aspect of China’s economic opening and evolution from 1978 
was its engagement with the global electronics industry and its recent attainment as an 
important site of the global high-tech semiconductor industry.  China’s opening and economic 
growth and its integration with the semiconductor industry are thus at the intersection of East 
Asia’s economic ascent and the Information Revolution in the latter half of the 20th century. 
The conclusions in this chapter, then, reflect on not only the development of this 
particular high technology industry in contemporary China.  The conclusions also consider 
economic development more generally in contemporary China and the history of the 
                                                        
742 Dieter Ernst, “Innovation Offshoring,” East-West Center Special Report, July of 2006. 




semiconductor industry in China as compared to its history in Japan, South Korean and 
Taiwan, where the electronics and semiconductor industries have also been important loci of 
economic and technological upgrading.744 
 Government Involvement in the Global Semiconductor Industry 
This study has been concerned with how a critical high technology industry in China 
evolved from central planning and state ownership to market-based trade and global 
integration, and the Chinese government is an important force in the story.  Specifically, the 
study has narrated and analyzed the difficult period of about ten to fifteen years which linked 
central planning and state ownership in the mid 1980s with the industry’s era of global 
integration after 2000.  Beginning with deep reforms to China’s state owned semiconductor 
industry in the mid to late 1980s, this study then described the changes in the industry in the 
1990s as being driven by “enterprise led development” in conjunction with tactics of “state 
led development.”  That is, during the 1990s, Chinese officials pursued certain investments 
and projects in the semiconductor industry, i.e., tactics of state led development.745  At the 
same time, state supported semiconductor enterprises, Sino-foreign joint ventures, and foreign 
enterprises instigated operations in China’s still-reforming environment, bringing new 
                                                        
744 Hong Kong, Singapore and Southeast Asian nations are also active in the semiconductor industry, but these 
conclusions focus Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as these are the Asian nations with the largest role in the 
global semiconductor industry. 
745 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962.)  Gerschenkron identified a kind of state led development in the 1950s and 1960s in the less 
developed countries of Europe, particularly for capital-intensive industries.  He challenged the 
“generalization…[that] the history of advanced or established industrial countries traces out the road of 
development for the more backward countries.”  Instead, backward countries “showed considerable 
differences…with regard to the productive and organizational structures…These differences were to a 
considerable extent the result of application of institutional instruments for which there was little or no 
counterpart in an established industrial country.”  Backward states had to assist their industries in acquiring 





technology to China and, as important, adopting new organizational structures and 
management practices, resulting in what this study calls enterprise led development.  The 
obstacles encountered and lessons learned by these enterprises then led Chinese officials to 
adopt new policies for the industry in 2000-2001.  In Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, too, 
the state played an important role in fostering and shaping the semiconductor industry, 
although enterprises were the primary vehicles for transferring, adapting, and 
commercializing semiconductor technologies.  
State agencies played important roles in developing the semiconductor industry in 
China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, and we must recognize at the outset that around the world 
“the semiconductor industry has never been free of the visible hand of government 
intervention,” as a former U.S. Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers put it.746  With the 
exception of a challenge from Japan in the mid 1980s, the U.S. has been the world leader in 
the semiconductor industry, and we can see both the importance of the industry and the 
visible role of government in the industry by looking briefly at the history of the industry in 
the U.S.  This overview will disabuse the notion that the industry can be analyzed in largely 
neoclassical terms or that government support for the industry is particular to East Asia. 
Due to semiconductors’ potential for military applications and infrastructure, the U.S. 
government funded forty to forty five percent of semiconductor R&D in the industry’s first 
twenty years, the 1950s through the 1970s.  During that time, the largest customer segment of 
the U.S. semiconductor market was government procurement.747  The reason for government 
                                                        
746 Laura Tyson, Who’s Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High Technology Industries (Washington D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 1992), page 85. 
747 National Research Council, Securing the Future, page 13, citing Kenneth Flamm, Mismanaged Trade (D.C.: 




funding for semiconductor R&D was that government funding could support longer-term 
projects and priorities, while industry funding tends to have shorter time horizons, focusing on 
innovations that might be quickly commercialized.  And, R&D costs in the semiconductor 
industry, at ten to fifteen percent of revenues, are high even relative to other high technology 
industries, such as telecommunications and aerospace.748  Thus, funding for R&D from both 
government and industry was critical in advancing the industry in the U.S.  Indeed, AT&T 
Bell Labs’ invention of the transistor (the key component of integrated circuits) in the late 
1940s was sponsored by government funding for defense and telecommunications, and AT&T 
Bell’s eventual licensing of transistor technology was in part spurred by a government-backed 
antitrust suit.749 
Notably, when U.S. dominance in the semiconductor industry was challenged by 
Japan in the early and mid 1980s, the U.S. government made several “market interventions” 
to support the national industry.750  In 1982, the National Cooperative Research Act allowed 
semiconductor companies to register to form R&D joint ventures, allowing collaborative, 
“pre-competitive” research (without breaching anti-trust laws) to hasten R&D.  That same 
year, the Semiconductor Research Corporation was founded as a university research 
consortium dedicated to early stage research and training technical talent.751  Most famously, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
supported certain key industries (and private enterprise in those industries) over the years; examples cited in 
National Research Council, Securing the Future (pages xix-xx) include the machine tool industry, the 
telegraph, the railroad industry, agriculture, the aircraft industry, and others, see for example David Mowery 
and Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th Century America (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998.) 
748 National Research Council, Securing the Future, page 202, citing R&D percentages in 2000. 
749 Ibid., page 13, citing Michael Borrus, Competing for Control: American’s Stake in Microelectronics 
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988.) 
750 Ibid., pages 191-192. 




in 1986 the U.S. and Japan negotiated the Semiconductor Trade Agreement, which gave U.S. 
companies access to Japan’s market and essentially established a price floor for DRAM 
(memory) semiconductor chips, which the U.S. had accused Japan of “dumping” in the U.S. 
Then, the U.S. industry opted to establish a major government-industry consortium 
called SEMATECH to focus on research and manufacturing process quality, an area where 
Japan had bested the U.S.  Not all U.S. government and industry leaders agreed that this was a 
good approach, but nonetheless, SEMATECH was established in 1986 with government 
funding to match funding from member companies.  Government funding for SEMATECH 
was discontinued in 1996-1997 after the U.S. industry had recovered from Japan’s onslaught 
in DRAM, but individual companies continued to fund SEMATECH, and new member 
companies joined.752  The government-industry SEMATECH model was imitated in Europe 
(via the MEDEA consortium and others) and East Asia, as we will see. 
Indeed, in the semiconductor industry, infrastructure such as national consortia, 
government funded labs, and university R&D have been key governmental supports in the 
U.S., Europe, and a bit later in East Asia due to the size and importance of the electronics and 
semiconductor industries.  In the U.S., for example, electronics remained the largest U.S. 
manufacturing industry in 2000, accounting for fifteen percent of the U.S. gross domestic 
product, and the semiconductor industry was the largest value-added segment of the overall 
electronics industry, employing over 283,000 people in the U.S.753  
  
                                                        
752 Since the 1980s, in the U.S. private funding for R&D in the semiconductor has exceeded government funding, 
but there has been ongoing debate about the short-term focus of industry funding, National Research Council, 
Securing the Future, pages 189-202. 





 China’s Semiconductor Industry 
In terms of how the high technology semiconductor industry advanced in China, from 
this study we can conclude that at least four broad approaches were highly influential.  These 
approaches included: 1) the establishment of large enterprises as regional anchors for the 
industry value chain, 2) Chinese officials’ recognition and leveraging of the de-verticalization 
of the global industry, 3) the adoption of new industry “guidance mechanisms” rooted in 
bottom-up input and competitive grants, and 4) Chinese officials’ unique and limited use of 
state led development tactics.  Importantly, in each of these areas, collaboration with foreign 
firms was prioritized.  These approaches led to industry upgrading in the 1990s and thus 
created a foundation for the era of faster growth after 2000, especially under new policies 
issued in 2000-2001. 
0.2.1.  Establishing Large Enterprises as Anchors in Regional Bases 
From the late 1980s, Chinese officials sought to establish semiconductor “bases,” that 
is, areas where the nascent industry would spatially concentrate.  Initially, semiconductor 
industry leaders planned for a “North Base” and “South Base,” and eventually several key 
bases of activity were founded.  These included the Caohejing and Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Parks 
in Shanghai, Zhongguancun in Beijing (including the Northern Microelectronics Industry 
Base, consisting of the “North Microelectronic Technology Research and Development Base” 
and the “North Microelectronic Production Base”), and Design Bases in eight major Chinese 
cities.  The intention was to foment spatial concentration so that firms in the various bases 
would have access to common infrastructure and subsidies and would be able to exchange 
human capital and knowledge.  As importantly, the hope was that an entire semiconductor 




ventures, foreign) would emerge in these bases, which were also located in the proximity of 
major universities and government agencies. 
The decision by Chinese officials in the 1990s to sponsor national champions Huajing, 
Huahong, and SMIC, each of which were major semiconductor manufacturing enterprises, 
should be seen not as an attempt to create more or better or larger state owned semiconductor 
enterprises (or in the case of SMIC, a state “invested” enterprise.)  In each case, the new 
enterprises did seek more advanced technology, but the long term goal of Huajing, Huahong, 
and SMIC was that each of these new enterprises would serve as a beacon to other firms in 
their geographic region, both foreign and domestic, demonstrating that a relatively advanced 
semiconductor enterprise could function in Mainland China’s admittedly difficult 
environment.  The existence of these enterprises, it was hoped, would attract a full industry 
value chain to their areas.  Also, Chinese officials’ formation of the five key semiconductor 
enterprises in the 1990s represented a desire to consolidate the existing industry and to 
quickly form just a handful of key enterprises as Sino-foreign joint ventures.  These 
enterprises, too, were located in Wuxi, Shanghai, and Beijing, contributing to the geographic 
concentration of the industry. 
The advent of Huajing, Huahong, SMIC, and the key enterprises demonstrates 
Chinese officials’ recognition of the important role that large enterprises have played in 
industries around the world historically,754 while officials also saw these new large enterprises 
(especially Huajing, Huahong, and SMIC) as seedlings for the emergence of small and 
medium sized firms, operating synergistically in concentrated spaces.  Like the key 
                                                        
754 Chinese semiconductor industry leaders including Huahong leader Hu Qili and SMIC founder Wang 
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enterprises, Huajing, Huahong, and SMIC were founded with the intention of proactively 
establishing foreign partnerships for technology, management, and markets, as well as partial 
financing and ownership.755  That is, Huajing, Huahong, and SMIC were not merely passive 
recipients of technology transfer from foreign firms when such firms sought partners in China.  
Rather, Huajing and Huahong identified existing technology that they wanted and they 
proactively sought global partnerships to acquire the desired technology, management, etc., 
for themselves and their geographic base.  Here, the leading global semiconductors firms were 
very helpful: AT&T, NEC, Infineon, Chartered, IBM, and others all entered into technology 
transfer arrangements with China’s key and national champion semiconductor enterprises.  
Finally, the different ownership forms of China’s three national champions (Huajing was state 
owned, Huahong-NEC was a Sino-foreign joint venture, and SMIC was wholly foreign 
owned) demonstrate that officials did not create or support these enterprises in an attempt to 
create new state owned enterprises.  With the exception of Huajing’s early years, these 
enterprises differed from China’s previous state owned semiconductor enterprises in both 
ownership and organization. 
0.2.2. Leveraging De-Verticalization 
Huajing and Huahong were both initially organized as I.D.M.s, and industry sources 
often generally describe the main enterprises in China in the 1990s as “I.D.M.s.”  However, 
Chinese leaders were well aware of sector specific opportunities in the industry, i.e., design, 
fabrication, and (packaging-assembly-test) P.A.T.; they were not unduly wedded to the then-
current I.D.M. model. (In the 1990s, Taiwan’s UMC and TSMC were operating under the 
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new de-verticalized foundry model, but otherwise, the I.D.M. was still the dominant global 
business model in the industry.)  Indeed, we can see important moves toward de-
verticalization in China in the 1990s, which set the stage for integrating with the increasingly 
de-verticalized global industry in the 2000s.  China’s key semiconductor enterprises 
Shougang-NEC and ASMC were manufacturing for export in the 1990s (essentially acting as 
foundries for their global partners), and Huajing explicitly adopted the foundry model in 1997 
in partnership with CSMC.  SMIC, of course, was a foundry from its inception in 2000, and 
Huahong converted to the foundry model (while also maintaining its other lines of business) 
in 2002.  Officials’ support for the fabrication (foundry) sector in China aligned with the 
already de-verticalized electronics industry, which had been increasingly outsourcing 
manufacturing and assembly work to E.M.S. firms and O.D.M.s in China throughout the 
1990s.  By fabricating semiconductors in China, semiconductors were close to the customers 
who would install the chips into various electronic products. 
The rise of the fabrication sector in China in turn supported the rise of the design 
sector.  The availability of local foundries meant that design firms did not need to have the 
huge capital needed for foundry operations.  In the 1990s, different Chinese government 
organizations prioritized and funded R&D and design efforts, but in that decade, the design 
sector in China was in its infancy.  Around 2000, the design sector was able to rapidly take off 
due to the availability of foundries coupled with new policies specific to the design sector that 
offered venture capital and other benefits.  On the other end of the industry chain, Chinese 
officials did not target the relatively low-end P.A.T. semiconductor sector, but nonetheless, 




the 1990s, as global firms sought low cost locations and wanted to be near China’s growing 
semiconductor market. 
From the sources available in this study, Chinese semiconductor industry leaders had a 
clear view on fostering individual sectors in the industry in the 1990s, including materials and 
equipment.  This is somewhat ironic in light of the fact that a major concern in the pre-reform 
era was the separation of research from production in China’s state controlled industries and 
the resultant lack of production-ready designs.  So, there were two developments from the late 
1980s.  On the one hand, within large organizations like Huajing and Huahong, design and 
production groups were better aligned and coordinated, but on the other hand, there was an 
industry trend toward de-verticalization that saw the emergence of design (only) firms and 
stand-alone foundries.  At Huajing and Huahong, production groups were better aligned with 
design groups, but more broadly, both of these large enterprises restructured to create 
different subsidiaries by sector, e.g., Huajing (now called CRM) has a design subsidiary 
called Semico, a P.A.T. subsidiary called Anst, and the CSMC foundry. 
0.2.3. Adopting New Industry Guidance Mechanisms 
After the “divestiture” of China’s state owned semiconductor industry in the mid to 
late 1980s (described in Chapter Two), Chinese officials created new mechanisms to support 
and guide this nationally strategic industry.  The new mechanisms had three interesting 
aspects: 1) they were not managed under one central organization, 2) input on priorities and 
which organizations would pursue priorities was in part bottom-up and 3) funding was sought 




Under these new guidance and funding mechanisms,756 expert committees comprised of 
specialists from around the country would designate priority projects for the semiconductor 
industry.  Then, staff from semiconductor enterprises or research organizations could apply on 
a competitive basis for grants, thus taking the initiative themselves to pursue funding and to 
earn the funding through competition with other organizations.  These guidance mechanisms 
were funded by priorities established in China’s much broader five year plans. 
0.2.4. Using Limited State Led Development Tactics 
In the 1990s, the Chinese government pursued a number of tactics that fall under the 
rubric of state led development in its efforts to foster the semiconductor industry.  The 
designation of semiconductor design bases, the funding of Projects 908 and 909 and national 
champions Huajing, Huahong-NEC, and SMIC, and the guidance and funding mechanism 
cited above all suggest state led development.  However, China’s semiconductor national 
champions had some surprising characteristics that do not align with commonly held notions 
of state led development and national champion enterprises (see discussion in Chapter Four.)  
These enterprises were not established to dominate the industry, to preclude foreign 
competitors, to foment oligopolistic competition within China, nor to attain self-sufficiency in 
semiconductor production.  As mentioned above, the primary goal was to attract more 
semiconductor-related firms, both foreign and domestic, to locate in China.  Each of the 
national champions was technologically the most advanced in China in their time, yet these 
enterprises were not expected to achieve global technological leadership, at least not in the 
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short or medium term.  Finally, for national champions, they had a surprising degree of 
foreign ownership and management. 
State led development in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan has been associated with industry 
wide policies, often trade related, that are intended to protect infant industries.  In the 
semiconductor industry in China, trade policies in the 1990s may seem to have stifled foreign 
competition.  Indeed, there were high official tariffs and taxes on imported semiconductors, 
restrictions on foreign ownership and distribution, and local content requirements and export 
requirements for foreign firms.  However, it does not appear that the Chinese government 
enacted such policies specifically to hinder foreign semiconductors enterprises.  The 
exception here is that the Chinese government did place a higher import V.A.T. on the low-
end discrete devices that Chinese firms were adept at producing.  But generally, the obstacles 
that foreign firms faced were not established uniquely for the semiconductor industry, as part 
of a state led development effort to foster local firms at the expense of foreign firms.  For 
example, China’s official seventeen percent V.A.T. on imported semiconductors was common 
across all electronic and computer related products in the 1990s.757  Indeed, the research 
suggests that the foreign firms that established operations in China in the 1990s and early 
2000s were often able to negotiate to have tariffs, taxes, and other restrictions and 
requirements reduced, as Chinese officials on the whole wanted foreign firms to set up 
partnerships and facilities in China.758  Policy-related obstacles were problematic for foreign 
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firms not so much because they were actually enforced but because they created uncertainty 
and a lack of transparency in China’s operating environment.  These policies forced foreign 
firms to negotiate tariffs, export requirements, and the like, often with a number of Chinese 
agencies.  Such policies, however, were not indicative of state led development; they were 
indicative of China’s still-reforming policies and institutions. 
So, for ten to fifteen years (late 1980s to 2000), new semiconductor enterprises – both 
foreign and domestic – established operations in China, meeting many policy-related 
obstacles along the way.  Finally in 2000, Chinese officials announced new semiconductor 
industry-wide policies, and initially, these policies included a W.T.O.-non-compliant 
preferential V.A.T. that favored semiconductor producers with facilities in China.  This 
particular policy was discontinued in 2005.  Otherwise, the new policies in 2000 benefitted 
both domestic and foreign enterprises in China, and while these policies certainly aimed to 
develop the industry, they were not domestic favoring in the sense that state led development 
often implies.  
Progress, but Ongoing Problems 
This study suggests that each of the four broad approaches above were influential in 
the industry’s evolution in the 1990s, but nonetheless the industry in China was hindered by 
lasting influences of the era of central planning and state ownership.  Despite deep reforms to 
the industry in the 1980s (addressed in Chapter Two), the industry in the 1990s was still long 
on bureaucracy and short on capital.  This study revealed importance instances of government 
agencies providing no funding, slow funding, or low funding or disputing which government 
body was responsible for funding.  For example, the ninth and tenth five year plans both 




there was no accounting for how the named amounts were ultimately distributed or used, 
although other amounts for more specific projects were documented.  Certainly in the case of 
Project 908 all sources indicate that “bureaucratic delays” caused central funding to simply 
not be delivered to Huajing until well after 1995, the year when the project was supposed to 
be complete.  Also, there were central-local and regional disputes over funding.  In the case of 
Shanghai’s Caohejing Hi-Tech Park in the 1980s, Shanghai’s municipal government and the 
central government clashed over which government bodies would fund the base.759  On yet 
another level, semiconductor leaders complained that the industry’s new guidance 
mechanisms for project funding awarded grants for research too slowly, relative to the fast 
pace of technological change in the semiconductor industry.760  Semiconductor industry 
personnel also voiced concerns that the grant awards might not always be based on 
competitive merit but rather on relationships.761  These examples seem not to be outliers; the 
tenor of both written sources and interviews with industry personnel suggest that the 
bureaucratic channels for funding were contentious.762 
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Semiconductor Industry Results  
Despite problems with bureaucracy and funding, there were important 
accomplishments in the 1990s.  China’s national champion and key enterprises served as 
training grounds for China’s talent pool, with many personnel in the 2000s joining private or 
foreign firms or even starting new firms.  The foreign partnerships in the 1990s as well as the 
arrival of other foreign firms in China brought new management practices, technical and 
marketing expertise, capital, and access to foreign markets.  This exposure surely affected the 
shifting ownership forms of the three largest “Chinese” semiconductor enterprises established 
in the 1990s: the first was a state owned enterprise (Huajing), then a Sino-foreign joint 
venture (Huahong-NEC), and finally a wholly foreign owned enterprise (SMIC.)  Yasheng 
Huang has argued that foreign investment in China too often did not bring leading edge 
technology, but in the emerging semiconductor industry in the 1990s, even exposure to 
foreign management and organization was valuable.763  Finally, government funded R&D and 
design projects as well as sectoral restructuring at Huajing were early tangible steps toward 
fostering the individual sectors of the semiconductor industry in the 1990s. 
These results stand in contrast to most descriptions of the semiconductor industry in 
China in the 1990s.  In industry and even scholarly sources, the industry is usually described 
only briefly, with allusions to certain problematic characteristics.  Observers say that 
enterprises in China were inefficient and state owned in the 1990s and that Chinese officials 
attempted unsuccessful state led projects (meaning Project 908 and sometimes 909 is included 
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as problematic.)  The enterprises in China are also faulted for operating on the “outdated” 
I.D.M. model.  This study has shown, however, that the so-called state owned semiconductor 
enterprises in the 1990s in China were not of the same ilk as state owned enterprises from the 
pre-1978 era.  In fact, most were Sino-foreign joint ventures, though the Chinese side was 
indeed state owned.  Also, the enterprises of Project 908 (Huajing) and 909 (Huahong-NEC) 
did advance the technological level in China and were the most advanced enterprises in China 
in their time.  These enterprises made many organizational and process improvements, and it 
was through these enterprises and others that Chinese officials learned what new policies were 
needed for the industry.  Further, to describe the enterprises in China as I.D.M.s is a stretch as 
their independent design capabilities were weak, but anyway, the I.D.M. business model was 
not outdated in the 1990s.  To label it as such is anachronistic,764 and the label implies that the 
industry in China was not attuned to the growing global trend of de-verticalization.  This 
research has shown, however, that activities in the semiconductor industry in China in the 
1990s demonstrated increasing alignment with the industry’s de-verticalization.  China lacked 
leading edge technology and innovation in the 1990s because of its history of isolation before 
1978 and because of the difficult and slow restructuring of the centrally planned, state owned 
industry from the mid 1980s.  China did not lack leading edge technology in the 1990s 
because of the character (allegedly “state owned I.D.M.s”) of its new enterprises.  Further, to 
explain China’s shift to more rapid growth after 2000, observers attribute the shift to: 1) 
Western nations’ loosening restrictions on dual-use technology to China, 2) Taiwan allowing 
semiconductor investment in China from 2002, and 3) China easing restrictions on foreign 
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investment under the W.T.O.  These descriptions of the early 2000s are not entirely inaccurate, 
but they do not capture the enterprise-level organizational changes and policy learning that 
did occur in China in the 1990s, which are important if we want to understand changes in 
China’s contemporary economy. 
 China’s Contemporary Economy and Industry Development 
What then can we conclude more generally about China’s contemporary economic 
development from this study of one high technology industry?  The most notable outcome of 
this study in terms of China’s broader economy is the effects of this particular industry on 
China’s institutional, policy, and operating environment.  Ultimately, developments in the 
semiconductor affected norms of business organization and behavior, industry-wide 
organizations, national and local trade policies, and even laws. 
From the late 1980s and in the 1990s, Chinese semiconductor leaders sought to 
acquire foreign technology and instigate operations, but this rush to use new technology was 
undertaken in a context where organizations, policies, and institutions were weak.  
“Organizational capabilities” in China were undeveloped, supportive industry organizations 
were in the formative stages, semiconductor-related university training was at low capacity, 
trade policies were inconsistent and cumbersome, and I.P. protection was weak.  Scholars 
such as Douglas North, Peter Evans, and Oliver Williamson have demonstrated the 
importance of strong institutions for economic development,765 and economists widely agree 
that technology is a primary driver of economic advance.  To these consensuses, Richard 
Nelson has added that between physical technologies and formal institutions lies a realm of 
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“social technologies,” that is, ways of doing things that do not rise to the level of formal 
institutions but that nevertheless enable physical technologies to be effectively utilized or 
advanced.766  In the case of the semiconductor industry in China, Chinese enterprises’ 
acquisition of more advanced, foreign technology was an important step, but the 
establishment and operation of Sino-foreign ventures in the 1990s led to necessary changes in 
social technologies, organizations, policies, and even formal institutions in China.  Thus the 
gradual evolution of one industry arguably prompted more general changes in China’s 
operating environment. 
Specifically, the semiconductor industry’s development prompted the following 
changes.  At the level of formal institutions, China’s State Council enacted a new law to 
protect semiconductor intellectual property in 2001 and China’s I.P. regime was expanded, 
including the establishment of I.P. “exchanges.”  In terms of policies, the Ministry of 
Information Industries – in cooperation with foreign advisors – adopted significant, industry-
wide new trade and investment policies for the semiconductor and software industries in 2000.  
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, we have seen that China’s semiconductor industry 
leaders were building new industry support organizations such as the China I.C. Design 
Center (CIDC) in Beijing from 1986, the various project funding mechanism from the late 
1980s, the China Semiconductor Industry Association from 1990, the “7+1” Design Bases 
from 2000, and the Shanghai I.C. R&D Center Consortium (ICRD) in 2002.  Also, at the 
intersection of policy and organization, new policies in 2000 encouraged semiconductor firms 
to seek domestic venture capital and foreign capital, and in furtherance of this policy, various 
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government agencies in China established new organizations to provide venture capital.  
While many of these organizations were specific to the semiconductor industry, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the process of establishing and operating such organizations likely 
resulted in learning that transcended the boundaries of this particular industry.  That is, these 
semiconductor organizations may have served as examples, whether positive or negative, of 
how to operate support organizations. 
Finally, at the level of norms, this study has shown that Chinese semiconductor 
industry leaders gradually altered the tactics they utilized over the years to foster the industry.  
At a high level, officials gradually moved from using state owned enterprises as development 
sites, to using state supported projects to foster development, to using state drafted policies to 
further development.  Throughout this transition, Chinese leaders used what Richard Nelson 
might call “routinized social technologies” that have been common in China, such as using 
state led technology transfer agreements, state organized industry delegations for overseas 
learning trips, and government officials in dual roles as enterprise leaders.  Foreign observers 
might question the top-down methods utilized in China, but Chinese leaders may have seen 
these methods as their only options.  Chinese leaders, acting in China’s context, likely did not 
have effective “social technologies” to do things differently, at least in the late 1980s and into 
the 1990s.  However, over the years, China’s semiconductor industry leaders gradually 
changed their methods.  For example, by the late 1990s, we see Chinese officials asking 
foreigners to lead projects and allowing an industry association to set industry guidelines.  In 
the terminology of evolutionary economics, these changes to “routine social technologies” 




technological.767  Here again, it seems reasonable to conclude that shifting norms in the 
critical semiconductor industry might have influenced business practices in other industries in 
China. 
The preceding discussion of the semiconductor industry’s influence on laws, policies, 
organizations, and norms suggests that the development of other industries in China might 
also affect China’s capital “I” and small “i” institutions.  This is not, of course, to deny the 
importance of Chinese officials’ direct efforts to improve China’s legal system, financial 
system, and policies.  Further research might attempt to unpack the ways in which China’s 
contemporary economic context has been influenced by the evolution of individual industries 
relative to direct efforts to reform China’s institutions. 
 China and Comparisons with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
By around 1990, the portion of global trade attributable to Asia had risen such that 
Asia was by then a third major global axis of trade, in addition to North America and 
Europe.768  At the same time, the global electronics industry was rapidly growing, and East 
and Southeast Asia were responsible for an ever-larger share of the global electronics trade 
each year.  One way to capture the growth in the global electronics trade is to look at the trade 
in “manufactured intermediate goods” (instead of “finished goods.”)  Intermediate goods 
indicate the value of all parts, components, and assemblies that move across borders.  By 
looking at intermediate goods, we can see the electronics trade value for different nations, 
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regardless of which nation gets credited with selling the finished good.769  In 1988, electronics 
and automotive parts were by far the two largest categories of intermediate goods in global 
trade, each accounting for about eight percent of such trade.  By 2006, however, electronics 
was the stand-alone largest category, accounting for almost fourteen percent.  (The second 
largest category, automotive, had just above nine percent in 2006.)  Given this increase in the 
relative importance of electronics in global trade between 1988 and 2006, we can now 
consider how much of this trade was attributable to East and Southeast Asia.  Again using 
intermediate goods, by 2006, Asia accounted for fifty-five percent of global electronics 
imports and sixty-four percent of global electronics exports.  Of these figures, China 
(including Hong Kong) accounted for one-third to one-half of Asia’s electronics imports and 
exports in 2006.770  From these measures, we can see the increasing dominance of electronics 
in global trade in the late 20th and early 21st century, and we can see Asia’s importance as a 
site of global electronics trade. 
The semiconductor industry provides a window on how the Information Revolution 
influenced East Asia’s transformation from a low-cost manufacturer to a high technology 
provider and the third axis of global trade.  When Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian 
nations became more involved in global trade in the latter half of the 20th century, they 
initially leveraged their low-wage, low-cost labor.  However, from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan each made significant inroads in the high technology 
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semiconductor industry.771  Initially, these nations seemed to not be serious players in the 
industry.  After all, their products were essentially copies, and they seemingly lacked human 
resource talent, R&D capability, brands, and marketing expertise.  Further, they were relying 
on heavy capital investments by companies and their governments, which were likely 
unsustainable.772  In hindsight, we know that Japan proved to be a major challenger to U.S. 
semiconductor dominance in the mid 1980s, and this onslaught was rapidly followed by 
Korea’s entry (late 1980s), Taiwan’s entry (early to mid 1990s), and then China’s entry 
(around 2000) as real participants in the global semiconductor industry. 
In their detailed studies of the semiconductor industries of Korea and Taiwan, John 
Mathews and Dong-sung Cho have described technological upgrading as an “overriding goal 
of public policy” in Korea and Taiwan in the latter half of the 20th century, and this was true 
in Japan as well.773  Though each nation’s political economy was unique, they had a shared 
history given Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea and Taiwan until the end of World War II.  
In the decades after World War II, each had an authoritarian state that undertook industrial 
planning which eventually included policies and investments in support of high technology 
industries.  In this same period, global electronics firms increasingly sought lower-wage 
locations, including Asia, for certain manufacturing and assembly work.  By the 1970s, Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan all had enterprises that could work with global firms in contracting 
arrangements or joint ventures.  (China began making such arrangements in the 1980s and 
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1990s.)  For the semiconductor industry, there were essentially three primary drivers of the 
industry’s development in each of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China.  These were: 1) large 
domestic enterprises, 2) global firms and global trade, and 3) government support.  Much of 
the following discussion centers on these three drivers in considering the similarities and 
differences in the history of the semiconductor industry in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China.  
0.4.1. Large Enterprises 
In each of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, large enterprises were able to acquire, adapt, and 
commercialize more advanced foreign technology, usually through relationships with global 
firms.  Because semiconductor manufacturing is a capital and scale intensive industry, it was 
by necessity large enterprises that entered the industry.  The semiconductor industry had 
developed in the U.S. from the 1950s, and by the 1970s, the U.S. and Europe already had 
leading semiconductor firms and products.  Thus, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China all 
entered the industry in “catch-up” mode, and their large would-be semiconductor enterprises 
initially made use of existing foreign technology.  Japan secured technology from the late 
1950s from IBM, AT&T, and GE.774  Korea, Taiwan, and China all proactively sought joint 
ventures and other arrangements with foreign partners to enter the semiconductor industry.  
Also, in Korea and Taiwan, the arrival of global P.A.T. facilities and P.A.T. joint ventures in 
the 1960s and 1970s were early sources of technology transfer.775 
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A few high-level observations about the nature of the large semiconductor enterprises 
in these nations merit mention.  First, the origins and character of these enterprises differed in 
each nation, and this was due in part to the state of the Information Revolution and global 
electronics trade, as well as each nation’s domestic context, at the time when each nation 
entered the semiconductor industry.  Briefly, in the U.S., recall that the early large 
semiconductor enterprises took the form of integrated device manufacturers (I.D.M.s.)  In 
Japan, however, the major semiconductor enterprises that emerged in the 1970s were Japan’s 
existing large computer-electronics enterprises.  They were Japan’s keiretsu or other existing 
large electronics-related enterprises.  With existing experience in electronics, these were the 
enterprises that were also able to develop semiconductor technology.  In Korea, the initial 
large semiconductor enterprises in the 1980s were Korea’s existing chaebol, which were 
diversified enterprises groups that were not exclusive to electronics but which eventually 
included semiconductor units.  In the 1980s, Japanese and Korean semiconductor enterprises 
competed directly with U.S. and European semiconductor enterprises, as global trade and 
competition in electronics increased in that decade.776 
Taiwan entered the electronics industry with small and medium sized electronics and 
semiconductor-related firms, and Taiwan’s first large semiconductor enterprises (UMC and 
TSMC) had to be newly formed with government assistance.  These enterprises were (almost) 
exclusive to semiconductor manufacturing, originating the “foundry model.”  Focusing on 
manufacturing in this way was possible because, by the 1990s, electronic exchange and 
standardization in the semiconductor industry had advanced to the point where the industry 
could accommodate the de-verticalization (essentially outsourcing) of manufacturing.  In 
                                                        




China, the initial large enterprises in the 1990s were Sino-foreign joint ventures that have 
been called I.D.M.s, however they were not truly developing and designing their own 
products in house but rather they were producing, often for export, existing products of their 
foreign partners.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the largest semiconductor enterprises in 
China (Huahong-NEC, SMIC, Huajing) turned explicitly to the foundry model, following 
Taiwan’s lead, as de-verticalization in the industry was, by then, in full swing.777  Thus, while 
large enterprises were important in each of the major East Asia semiconductor producing 
nations, their origins differed from the I.D.M. model (of the U.S., Europe, and ostensibly 
China), to computer-electronics enterprises (Japan), to diversified conglomerates (Korea), to 
foundries (Taiwan and China.) 
A further difference between these nations’ large semiconductor enterprises was their 
fundamental contribution to innovation in the global industry.  In the U.S. and Europe, 
leading semiconductor enterprises focused on product innovation.  When Japanese enterprises 
entered the industry, their contribution was on process innovation and improvement, leading 
to better quality, high volume manufacturing through the development of new manufacturing 
equipment and processes.778  Then, Korea attempted to catch up with Japan knowing that it 
could purchase improved manufacturing equipment on the market (thanks to Japan’s efforts), 
so Korea’s innovation was then a mix of incremental product and process improvements.  
Finally, with the West and Japan and Korea having paved the way before them and with Japan 
                                                        
777 Global firms had been outsourcing P.A.T. work to Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia since the 
1960s and 1970s, but because the P.A.T. is considered relatively low-end, nations were not really credited 
with having “entered the industry” until they had manufacturing (fabrication) capability.  
778 With Japan’s success in manufacturing processes and quality in the 1980s, U.S. companies sought to emulate 
Japanese methods.  Engineers and managers sought “process control,” “process improvement,” “continuous 




and Korea serving as two successful examples of “catching up,” Taiwan and China faced less 
uncertainty about investing in the semiconductor industry.  With the industry’s growth, 
Taiwan and China could pursue a structural innovation in the industry (the foundry model), 
and they also had the option of serving lower end product markets rather than initially 
attempting to compete head to head on state of the art products.  Thus, as the Information 
Revolution advanced in the final decades of the 20th century, the nature of innovation in 
participating nations evolved.779 
0.4.2. Government Support 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan each utilized national, government funded, collaborative 
R&D programs to assist domestic enterprises with learning and adapting highly sophisticated 
semiconductor technologies.  These collaborative programs served to diffuse knowledge 
across domestic enterprises.  Somewhat different than in the West, however, these nations’ 
collaborative R&D was not focused on leading edge products or processes.  Instead, 
“imitation” of existing technology was seen as a “viable strategy,” to use Mathews and Cho’s 
description of these national programs which, they argue, were critical sources of “knowledge 
diffusion across firms” in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.780  The R&D was focused more toward 
potential commercial applications.  To cite just the most significant programs,781 Japan 
undertook a V.L.S.I. project from 1975-1979, in which firms such as NEC, Toshiba, and 
Hitachi participated in upgrading the production technology for D.R.A.M. (memory) chips.  
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781 For more on the V.L.S.I. programs of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, see: Cho and Mathews, Tiger Technology, 
Chapters Three and Four; Chandler, Inventing the Electronic Century; and National Research Council, 




This resulted in their ability to successfully compete against Western firms by the early 1980s.  
Recall that V.L.S.I. is “very large scale integration,” which was state of the art in the late 
1970s.  Korea first achieved V.L.S.I. production in the telecomm sector in 1976, and in the 
early 1980s, an industrial reorganization resulted in Korea’s telecomm semiconductor units 
being transferred to the chaebols.  Korea’s 1981-1986 development plan included investments 
in V.L.S.I., and the government pressured the chaebols to further invest in semiconductor 
industry.  In the mid 1980s, Samsung in conjunction with the government instigated a national, 
collaborative V.L.S.I. program under Korea’s Electronic Technology Research Institute.  The 
government provided relatively little of the funding, but the program resulted in the chaebols 
becoming significantly more competitive in D.R.A.M.  Finally, in Taiwan, the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and its subsidiary the Electronics Research Service 
Organization (ERSO) served to diffuse semiconductor technology to firms.  In the mid 1980s, 
ERSO undertook a V.L.S.I. project which included the founding of TSMC, the originator of 
the global “foundry model.”782  Recall that around this same time, the U.S. formed the 
consortium SEMATECH, so these collaborative projects were not unique to Asia. 
Interestingly, in assessing the influence of these major collaborative projects, scholars 
note a decreasing degree of government influence over industry from Japan to Korea to 
Taiwan.  Mathews and Cho conclude that Korea’s collaborative V.L.S.I. project “played only 
a minor role in the companies’ efforts; in the end, they had to develop their 1M DRAMs 
themselves.”783  Hatano of the U.S. semiconductor industry described the situation in Korea in 
1985 writing “one does not sense the same powerful influence that is exerted by the elite 
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bureaucracy in Japan….[Korea’s] strategy for assailing the world export market appears to 
emanate from the private sector.”784  Then, assessing the situation in Taiwan relative to Korea 
in 1992, Denis Simon argued that there was “more distance” between government and 
business in Taiwan (relative to Korea), and that Taiwan’s many disaggregated electronics and 
semiconductor-related firms were less apt to engage with government initiatives.785  
(However, this caused Taiwan’s government to take a more direct and somewhat independent 
approach to managing technology transfer.)  Finally, China had an R&D sharing initiative via 
Project 909 that began in 2002, but it did not have an early impact on the industry’s 
competitiveness.786  The level of influence of these particular large-scale collaborative 
projects was indicative of the different political economies of the nations, but these mega 
projects were not the only government interventions in the industry. 
The governments of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China all considered the 
semiconductor industry a priority, and they took care to foster, if not protect, their domestic 
industries. The methods of supporting the industry were strikingly similar across the nations, 
and clearly as one nation followed another into the industry, they took lessons from their 
predecessor.  In the case of Japan, with a domestic market larger than that of Korea or Taiwan 
and technological assistance from the U.S. as an ally, Japan was able to initially protect its 
                                                        
784 Daryl Hatano, “The American Semiconductor Industry and the Ascendency of East Asia,” California 
Management Review, Summer of 1985. 
785 Simon, Taiwan, page 139. 
786 Project 909 with Huahong-NEC (1995-2000) was known as China’s U.L.S.I. (ultra large scale integration) 
project.  The Shanghai I.C. R&D consortium that Project 909 established in 2002 was somewhat analogous to 
the V.L.S.I. projects in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.  Hu Qili 胡启立, Chao Daguimo Jichengdianlu Gongcheng 
Jishi 超大规模集成电路工程纪实 (Ultra Large Scale Integrated Circuit: Project Records), Beijing: Dianzi 
Gongye Chubanshe电子工业出版社 (Electronics Industry Publishing House), 2006.  By the late 1990s, ultra 




infant semiconductor industry by limiting foreign investment and competition and imported 
products.  In this way, Japan allowed its semiconductor industry to first develop domestically 
in the 1970s before attempting to compete globally via exports in the 1980s.787  Japan set a 
standard for state led semiconductor industry development, but Korea, Taiwan, and China did 
not have the luxury of protecting their semiconductor industries from the start.  Already 
engaged in electronics production, Korea, Taiwan, and China were importing most of the 
semiconductors needed in their electronics products, so their semiconductor industries had to 
compete with foreign imports from the start.788  That said, in Korea and Taiwan, government 
agencies vetted and managed semiconductor-related foreign investment and joint ventures, 
most of which were Japanese or American, for the benefit of domestic development.789  In 
China, foreign investment and joint ventures had to be approved by government agencies, but 
China’s agencies seem to have been less coordinated and less selective.  Their goal seems to 
have been more foreign semiconductor-related investment as opposed to selected foreign 
investment.  Nonetheless, in all cases, the government was proactively involved in managing 
the interplay between foreign firms and the domestic industry. 
In each of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China, the government took common steps to 
create a constructive eco-system of industry, trade, investment, research, education, and 
foreign engagement.  The governments of each nation subsidized or arranged for banks to 
offer credit to important domestic semiconductor enterprises.  As well, government funding 
                                                        
787 National Research Council, Securing the Future, Part II. 
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789 Cho and Mathews, Tiger Technology, pages 50, 110-111, National Research Council, Securing the Future, 
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supported various R&D efforts in addition to the mega V.L.S.I. programs discussed above.790  
In the 1990s, each of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan adopted more venture capital-entrepreneurial 
oriented funding approaches, mimicking the U.S. market-based approach.791  Along with 
research and enterprise funding, each of the nations augmented their talent pool through 
increased spending on higher education in electronics-related fields and through programs to 
attract experienced overseas nationals back home.  In addition, government procurement 
provided a market for the nascent semiconductor industries.  Also, in each of these nations, an 
industry association was established to coordinate industry policies, goals, and collaboration, 
and to serve in many cases as a bridge between government and individual enterprises.  In 
Japan, it was the EIAJ, in Korea the EIAK, in Taiwan the TSIA, and in China the CSIA.792  
Last but certainly not least in terms of common state led development tactics, each national 
government established geographically concentrated free trade zones to foster trade and later 
electronics-semiconductor (geographic) bases to foster high technology development.793  All 
these state led policies, infrastructure, and investments enabled these late developing nations 
of East Asia to get a foothold and catch up in the capital intensive, high technology, and 
highly competitive semiconductor industry. 
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0.4.3. Foreign Investment 
Changes in the global electronics industry and the level of global trade over the last 
decades of the 20th century led to a notable difference in how the semiconductor industry 
developed in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and finally China.  Foreign investment came to play a 
larger role in earlier stages of the industry’s development.  Japan’s semiconductor industry 
was developed more independently (though admittedly with foreign patents), while Korea 
used selective foreign joint ventures and licensing agreements.794  As electronics production 
became increasingly globalized in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Taiwan had become a popular 
low wage (but relatively high skill) site for foreign firms.  The many electronics and 
semiconductor-related joint ventures and foreign firms on Taiwan in effect served as training 
sites for Taiwanese personnel into the 1980s.  By the mid 1980s, however, Taiwan’s 
government became more selective about which foreign firms could locate in Taiwan.  That 
said, Taiwan’s large semiconductor enterprises all had technology initiatives with global 
leaders such as RCA, Philips, and TI, though Taiwan’s enterprises remained under domestic 
control.795 
In comparison with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, foreign investment played an even 
larger early role in the semiconductor industry’s development in China, and foreign 
investment was also behind much of China’s huge market for semiconductors.796  After 
restructuring the semiconductor industry in the mid to late 1980s, Chinese officials decided 
that China’s key semiconductor enterprises would from the start be Sino-foreign joint 
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ventures with technology from foreign partners.  In this way, foreign investment was an early 
and leading strategy for the industry’s development.  And, with so much foreign investment in 
broader electronics manufacturing and assembly in China in the 1990s, semiconductor 
enterprises in China had a huge domestic semiconductor market that was closely tied to 
foreign investment.  As well, Chinese firms were exposed to foreign semiconductor firms that 
were investing in a presence in China to be close to the market.  In all these ways, foreign 
investment in China was influential in China’s semiconductor industry, more so than in Japan, 
Korea, or Taiwan.  As one comparison, in China, foreign direct investment as a percent of 
gross domestic product was over four percent in the late 1990s when China’s semiconductor 
industry was taking off.  In contrast, foreign direct investment in Japan and Korea when their 
semiconductor industries were growing rapidly was only around 0.5 percent of gross domestic 
product.797  So, as electronics became the most significant category of global trade and as East 
Asia became the largest global hub of electronics trade,798 foreign investment became an 
earlier and more important source for the development of the semiconductor industry, the 
later the industry’s host nation entered the industry. 
0.4.4. Catch Up Time 
Another difference in the history of the semiconductor industry in Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, and China was the time required to catch up, or at least to become a real participant 
in the global industry.  The U.S. and Japan each spent about twenty years to develop and 
                                                        
797 Dieter Ernst and Barry Naughton, China’s Emerging Industrial Economy (New York, Routledge, 2008), 
Chapter Three. 
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commercialize semiconductor technology, with the U.S. initially being about ten years ahead 
of Japan.  If we look at the timeline of Korea, Taiwan, and China from the time they began in 
earnest to develop the industry until they were achieving some commercial success, we see a 
shorter time span.  For Korea and Taiwan, it was closer to ten plus years: Korea from circa 
late 1970s to late 1980s and Taiwan from circa 1980 to 1990.  This shorter time line to 
industry participation was likely due to having predecessors as examples and to the increasing 
globalization of the electronics industry. 
China was the last of these nations to develop its semiconductor industry, and China 
faced the added complexity of emerging from decades of central planning and state ownership, 
yet in effect, China’s industry also developed in about ten years, circa 1990 to 2000.  China’s 
approach to developing the industry in the 1990s, however, was somewhat different than 
those of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, all of which made early use of national, collaborative 
research programs to foster their enterprises’ capabilities.799  By the time that China was 
entering the industry, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan already had successful, operational 
enterprises, so Chinese leaders opted to rapidly move to the operational stage via 
partnering.800  Chinese officials sought to quickly establish working enterprises in order to 
leverage foreign organizational, management, and marketing experience.  Chinese 
semiconductor personnel needed not just technological learning, although that was certainly 
important.  Given their history of working in China’s (relatively inefficient) state owned 
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enterprises and institutes, Chinese officials wanted Chinese personnel to work with foreigners 
to learn new ways to organize and manage enterprises.801 
China’s leap into manufacturing operations and adoption of the foundry model as 
early as 1997 (at Huajing) relate to China’s early recognition and embrace of de-
verticalization in the industry.  Recall that from the start of both Projects 908 (Huajing) and 
909 (Huahong-NEC), the goal of these new enterprises was to attract a diversity of firms from 
different sectors in the semiconductor industry value chain.  And, China was more integrated 
with global electronics production when its semiconductor industry took off, relative to Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan.  (Recall from above that China had significantly higher levels of foreign 
investment versus Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.)  China’s electronics and semiconductor 
industries also benefitted from global business trends in the 1990s that favored de-
verticalization including focusing on core competencies, outsourcing, and optimizing supply 
chains.  At the same time, the global semiconductor industry was increasingly relying on 
licensed e-tools for semiconductor design, further enabling de-verticalization in the industry.  
By the early 2000s, all sectors of the semiconductor industry in China were growing, and the 
global industry was beginning to ask if China might become a semiconductor leader in the 
21st century. 
 
                                                     ~~~~~~ 
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Looking back at the latter half of the 20th century, the rise of Asia as a major global 
trading axis and the growth of the electronics industry are two of the most important global 
economic phenomena.  This study has offered a view of how China and other East Asian 
nations successfully navigated to enter the global electronics industry, specifically the highly 
sophisticated and competitive semiconductor industry, as part of their thrust for overall 
economic development.  In the 21st century, East Asia’s important role in global trade 
combined with the global Information Revolution will – hopefully – continue to improve 
living standards and enhance openness, connectivity, and opportunities in East Asia and 
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Name Current Organization and Title Date Primary Interview Topics 
Xu Xiaotian Chief of Electronics, Ministry of 




Ministry of Information 
Industries; CSIA (Secretary 
General); Director Key 
Enterprise (Shanghai Belling) 
Yu Zhongyu President, CSIA (and other roles) July 2, 
2009 
CSIA; Projects 908, 909, 




Director, CSIA Shanghai June 17 
and May 
30, 2009 
CSIA; Fudan University; 
"divestiture" of state sector 




CSIA Staff; 7+1 Design Bases 
(Shenzhen) 
William Zhou Director, Foreign Investment 
Promotion Bureau, Wuxi 
Feb 28, 
2009 









7+1 Design Bases (Shenzhen); 
talent pool 
Chen Tianbao Director, Wuxi IC National 
Design Base Company 
various 7+1 Design Bases (Wuxi); 
Project 908 and Huajing; 
JCET 
Mr. Jiang Vice Director, Wuxi IC National 
Design Base Company 
various 7+1 Design Bases (Wuxi); 
intellectual property 
Yang Long Manager, Wuxi IC National 
Design Base Company 
various 7+1 Design Bases (Wuxi); 
Wuxi enterprises; foreign 
integration 





Microelectronics; Five Year 
Plans; R&D funding 
programs; talent pool 









Vice Director, Ministry of 
Science and Technology 
March 5, 
2009 
CASTED, Ministry of Science 
and Technology; scholarship 







Interviews 2008-2009, continued 
 
Name Current Organization and Title Date Primary Interview Topics 
Mao Chenglie General Manager, ETEK May 19, 
2009 
Project 908 and Huajing 
(former employee); private 
sector; talent pool 
Teng Jingxin 
藤敬信 
Chief Engineer, Huarun (CRM) April 8, 
2009 
Huajing and Project 908; 
Wuxi as "cradle" of 




CEO, Huarun (CRM) July 16, 
2009 




Chief Engineer, Huarun (CRM) July 16, 
2009 
Huajing and Project 908; 
Wuxi as "cradle" of 
semiconductor industry; 1980s 
technology transfer 
Xu Juyan Chief Engineer, Institute 58 July 22, 
2009 
Huajing and Project 908 
(former employee); Institute 








Huajing (CRM) PAT 
company; Project 908; sector 
reorganization at Huajing; 
foreign management and 





Chief Engineer, ANST (of CRM) June 19, 
2009 
Huajing (CRM) PAT 
company; Project 908; sector 
reorganization at Huajing 
(former employee); foreign 
management and technology 
transfer; talent pool; industry 
history 
Yu Xiekang CEO, JCET June 2, 
2009 
Huajing (former GM) and 
Project 908; CSIA (Vice 
Secretary); sectoral growth; 
divestiture of state sector 




Huajing (former employee) 
and Project 908; Wuxi as 
"cradle" of semiconductor 
industry; new firm formation; 




Interviews 2008-2009, continued 
 
Name Current Organization and Title Date Primary Interview Topics 
Brian Design Engineer, Huarun June 6, 
2009 
Huajing (CRM); design sector; 
global integration; talent pool 
Li Zhihong General Manager, Chipown March 
26, 2009 
Huajing (former employee); 
private sector; firm formation; 
talent pool  
Mr. Zheng Deputy, Huarun's Semico Cancelled Huajing; design sector 
Yu Xiekang CEO, JCET June 2, 
2009 
Huajing (former GM) and 
Project 908; CSIA (Vice 
Secretary); sectoral growth; 
divestiture of state sector 
Zhou Weiping CEO, ASMC July 15, 
2009 
Key Enterprises (CEO of 
ASMC and former GM of 
Shanghai Belling); new 
generation management; talent 




CEO, SMIC July 30, 
2009 
National Champions; SMIC; 
CANCELLED 
Chee Teck Engineer, SMIC July 1, 
1905 
SMIC 




"Divestiture" of state 
enterprises; Fudan University; 
firm formation; foreign 
integration; now in private 
sector 




"Divestiture" of state 
enterprises; Fudan University; 
firm formation; foreign 
integration; now in private 
sector 
SAIC SAIC May 18, 
2009 
"Divestiture" of state 
enterprises; relations between 
Wuxi and Shanghai 
Ma Peijun Credy Industries May 30, 
2009 
"Divestiture" of state 
enterprises; Fudan University; 
firm formation; foreign 





Interviews 2008-2009, continued 
 
Name Current Organization and Title Date Primary Interview Topics 




"Divestiture" of state 
enterprises; Fudan University; 
firm formation; foreign 
integration; now in private 
sector 
Ma Peijun Credy Industries July 1, 
1905 
"Divestiture" of state 
enterprises; Fudan University; 
firm formation; foreign 




Manager, ASML April 11, 
2009 
Global equipment sector; 
talent pool 




Global electronics industry 
Dr. Tsui General Manager, GEM June 11, 
2009 
Global P.A.T. sector; foreign 
integration 




Global electronics industry 




Global equipment sector; 
SMIC; foreign integration; 
talent pool 
Jeffrey Yap Manager, Samina various Global electronics industry 
Toby Chai and 
boss 








Owner, Shenzhen Saifun 




market; Chinese design houses
Chen Xushu 
陈学术 




Solar sector; foreign 
integration; firm formation 





"divestiture" of state 
enterprises; firm formation; 
talent pool; foreign integration 
Dr. Henry 
Wang 
General Manager, IDETCO May 5, 
2009 
Technical education; talent 
pool 






Interviews 2008-2009, continued 
 
Name Current Organization and Title Date Primary Interview Topics 
Jifu Wang Professor, Corporate Strategy in 




Gu Xiaofeng Professor, Jiangnan Daxue March 
18, 2009 
Huajing; Wuxi as "cradle" of 
semiconductor industry 
Chen Ling Professor, Qinghua University March 4, 
2009 
Sector growth; industry 
history 





James Tang McKinsey, Shanghai April 1, 
2009 
Foreign integration; design 
houses in China; sector growth




Staff Wuxi Museum, IC Exhibit May 1, 
2009 
Wuxi; Huajing; Wuxi as 






Figure 1: China's Largest Semiconductor Production Facilities in the 1980s 
Facility Location 
Jiangnan Semiconductor Factory Jiangsu, Wuxi 
Tianguang Electronics Factory Gansu, Qinan 
Dongguang 878 Factory Beijing 
Changzhou Semiconductor Factory Beijing 
Beijing Semiconductor #2 Zhejiang, Shaoxing 
Shaoxing Electronics Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #5 Components Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #14 Radio Factory Shanghai 
Shanghai #19 Radio Factory Shanghai 
CAS Factory #109 Beijing 
Lishan Microelectronics Corporation Xian 
Tianjin Semiconductor Factory Tianjin 






Figure 2: Gap Between China and Global Leading Technology (year attained) 
  Wafer Size in Inches (larger is more advanced)   
Year Global China 
1970 2 1.5 
1975 4 1.5 
1980 5 2 
1985 6 3-4 
1990 6-8 3-4 
1995 8 6 < Shougang-NEC 
2000 12 6-8 < Huahong-NEC and CSMC-Huajing 
2005 12 12 < SMIC 






      





Very Large Scale 
Integration 
Ultra Large Scale 
Integration  
Global 1958 1964 1966 1976 1986 
China* 1965 1972 1972 1986 1999 
The years indicated for China seem optimistic.  They may reflect technological understanding more than actual production capabilities. 
Source: Zhu Yiwei 朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji 中国集成电路产业发展:  (China’s IC Industry Development: Collected 





Figure 3: China's Electronics Industry, Circa 1986 
** Simon notes that in 1985, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry oversaw some 2600 production units and 130 research institutes. 
*   In 1988, the State Machine Building Commission and the Ministry of the Electronics Industry merged to form the Ministry of Machine Building and 
Electronics Industry. 
Source: Denis Simon, Technological Innovation, page 54, from China's Ministry of the Electronics Industry, Beijing, July 1987. 
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Figure 4: China's Five Key Semiconductor Enterprises
Five Key Enterprises Founded Prior Enterprises Joining 






Production in 1995 Staff in 2000* 
Products and 
Market* 
Huajing/CSMC           
(Project 908) 




CSMC of Hong Kong, with 
Taiwan Mgmt 
Jiangsu, Wuxi  2, 3, 5 micron           
4 inch line: 140,000 
units/yr          5 inch 






bipolar and CMOS ICs, 
primarily for TVs and 
audio equip, per IEEE 
1995 
Huayue 1988 #871 Factory 
(Gansu and 
Shaoxing branch) 




 3, 5 micron             
3 inch line: 120,000 
units/yr          4 inch 
line: 60,000 units/yr 
 a candidate for Project 
908 in 1990; analog 
devices and bipolar ICs 
for TVs and phones 











Shanghai Bell Telephone 
Equipment Mfg Co, which was a 
joint venture with Alcatel Bell of 
Belgium 
Shanghai US$82.4 m 2.4, 5 micron           







ICs for Shanghai Bell 
Telephone, the first 
switch-maker to use 
locally made circuits, 





name Shanghai Xianjin, 
formerly known as 
Shanghai-Philips. 
1988 #5 and #7 and #19 
Factories 
(Shanghai) 
Philips of the Netherlands (Also 
Nortal of Canada from appprox 
1995-2000) 
Shanghai  3 micron               




began as a foundry; 
Philips transferred 
older tech and 
producing for export 
Shougang-NEC 1991 Beijing Shougang 
Gongtie (Capital 
Steel) 
NEC (Nippon Electric Company) 
of Japan 
Beijing US$240 m 1.2, 1.5 micron          




color TVs, air 
conditioners, VCDs, IC 
cards, clocks, palm PCs
This chart is compiled from the following sources: 
1) Interview with Zhou Weiping, July 15, 2009, at ASMC headquarters in Shanghai.  Zhou is C.E.O. of ASMC and a former General Manager of Shanghai Belling. 
2) Zhu Yiwei 朱贻伟, Zhongguo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Lunshu Wenji中国集成电路产业发展:  (China’s IC Industry Development: Collected Works), Beijing: Xinshidai 新时代出版社 (New Times Press), 2006, 
pages 162 and 164. 
3) Wang Yangyuan and Wang Yongwen 王阳元 and 王永文, Wo Guo Jichengdianlu Chanye Fazhan Zhilu: cong Xiaofei Daguo Zouxiang Chanye Qiangguo我国集成电路产业发展之路：从消费大国走向产业强国 
(China’s Integrated Circuit Industry Development Path: From a Big, Consuming Nation to a Strong, Industrial Nation),  Kexue Chubanshe 科学出版社 (Science Press), 2008, page 294. 
4) iSupply, “Semiconductor Wafer Manufacturing in China: A Panacea or a Global Investment Trap?,” Q3, 2002, page 11. 





Figure 5: Estimates of Huajing-affiliated Organizations’ Revenues in US$ millions 
These estimates are based on ratios of revenues among Huajing-affiliated organizations.  Since 2008, Huajing-affiliated 




Zheng Shilong, Lu Zhixin and Tian Jingying 郑世隆, 陆志信 和 田婧瑛, ““Huajing Jingshen”:  Ji Guoying Jiangnan Wuxiandian Qicaichang 
华晶精神: 记国营江南无线电器材厂 (The Spirit of Huajing: Jiangnan State-owned Radio Equipment Factory),” Liaowang 瞭望 (Outlook), Period 22, 
1986. 
CRM (China Resources Microelectronics) annual reports. 











80 85 90 95 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
  
Figure 6: Sem
This chart is com
1) Zhu Yiwei朱
Works), Beijing:
2) Ling Chen an










piled from the fol
贻伟, Zhongguo J
 Xinshidai 新时代























es Press), 2006, pa
orks,” China and t
en and Xue, “Glob
2000 2005























ina’s IC Industry D
inese Academy of










 Social Sciences), V









Figure 7: Largest 15 Semiconductor Firms in China in 2003 by Revenue
Chinese enterprises in italics. 
Note: These are the firms with hightest revenues operating in China.  
These are not the same at the largest semiconductor suppliers to the Chinese market because most of the semiconductors that meet China's market demand are 
imported. 
Analysis:  
Of the top 15 firms' revenue in 2003, "Chinese" firms constituted 47 percent. 
The "Chinese" firms were a mix of ownership forms. 
Ran
k Headquarters Name 
Revenue in 2003 
(US$ million) 2003 Notes on "Chinese" Firms 
1 US Motorola 962   
2 China/Cayman 
Islands/International 
SMIC 350 SMIC is a WFOE registered in the Cayman Islands. 
3 Japan Renesas 195   
4 China/Japan Huahong-NEC 188 Huahong-NEC of Project 909 is a Sino-Foreign JV. 
5 China/US Leshan 149 LeShan has a JV with Motorola and provides mainly discrete devices. 
6 Switzerland Shenzhen Sai STMicroelectronics 125   
7 US Intel 109   
8 China Jianxin XinChao 108 XinChao is a state owned group. 
9 China/Netherlands ASMC 94 ASMC has a JV with Netherlands-based Philips and serves mainly as a 
foundry for Philips. 
10 China/Japan Nantong-Fujitsu 92 Nantong-Fujitsu is a Sino-foreign JV. 
11 China JCET 84 JCET is large state owned P.A.T. enterprise near Wuxi. 
12 China/Hong Kong China Resources 
Microelectronics/CSMC 
77 CRM is a member of the CR enterprise group; it includes Huajing and 
CSMC of Project 908. 
13 China Datang 75 Datang is a state owned enterprise group in electronics-related industries. 
14 Singapore ChipPAC 73   
15 China/Japan Shougang-NEC 68 Shougang-NEC is a Sino-foreign JV; Chinese partner is Beijing Shougang, 
a steel enterprise group. 
Source: PWC, "China's Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2004," data sources include CSIA, CCID, and PwC analysis. 
"Chinese" revenue: 1,285  47% 
Other revenue: 1,464  53% 
Total revenue: 2,749  100% 
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Figure 9: Largest 15 Semiconductor Firms in China in 2011 by Revenue
Chinese enterprises in italics. 
Note: These are the firms with hightest revenues operating in China.  This is not the same at the largest semiconductor suppliers to the 
Chinese market because most of the semiconductors that meet China's market demand are imported. 
Rank Headquarters Name 2011 Revenue  
US$mm 
2011 Notes on "Chinese" Firms 
1 US Intel 4,765    
2 Korea Hynix 2,452    
3 China/Cayman 
Islands/international 
SMIC 1,315  SMIC is a WFOE registered in the Cayman Islands. 
4 US Freescale 1,119    
5 China HiSilicon (formerly with 
Huawei) 
1,032  HiSilicon was formerly part of state-owned Huawei (telecomm), but is now a 
private, listed firm. 
6 China XinChao (JCET) 969  XinChao is a state owned group; it includes the large P.A.T. firm called JCET. 
7 Korea Samsung 838    
8 China Spreadtrum 684  Spreadtrum was private from its inception. 
9 China/Japan Huahong 671  Huahong includes Huahong-NEC of Project 909, which is a Sino-foreign JV. 
10 Taiwan ASE 657    
11 Japan Renesas 643    
12 China/Hong Kong China Resources 
Microelectronics 
631  CRM is a member of the CR enterprise group; it includes Huajing and CSMC of 
Project 908. 
13 US Cree Huizhou 631    
14 China Nantong Huada 620  Nantong is a state owned group. 
15 Japan Panasonic 602    
Source: PWC, "China's Impact on the Semiconductor Industry, 2012 Update," data sources include CSIA, CCID, and PwC analysis. 
"Chinese" revenue: 5,922  34%
Other revenue: 11,707  66%
Total revenue: 17,629  100%
Analysis: Of the top 15 firms' revenue in 2011, "Chinese" firms constituted 34 percent. 
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Figure 12: The Global Electronics Supply Chain: OEMs and Contract Manufacturers
Brand Name Supplier







• Sell under their own brand name.
• Outsource manufacturing to contract 
manufacturers (box at left.)
• May do final assembly.
• Will likely specify to the contract 
manufacturer (box at left) which 
semiconductors must be used in their 
products.
Example: Nokia will specify to their 
EMS in China to use certain Texas 
Instruments semiconductors in Nokia-
branded phones.  Texas Instruments may 
outsource the fabrication and P.A.T. of 
those semiconductors to a foundry and a 
P.A.T. firm in China, which will then 
send the (Texas Instruments) 
semiconductors to Nokia’s EMS.

Contract Manufacturers
-- Increasingly located in China --
(E.g., Sanmina, Foxconn,
Flextronics, Celestic, Jabil )

called: EMS or ODM
EMS (Electronics Manufacturing Services) 
firms get designs from OEMs and 
manufacture OEMs’ products.

ODMs (Original Design Manufacturers) get 
specifications from OEMs.  ODMs do both 
design and manufacturing for OEMs and will 
create their own intellectual property.

• Common from mid 1990s.
• Emerged when OEMs sold their 
assembly plants to new EMS firms.

• EMS and ODMs procure all necessary 
components from many suppliers, 
including semiconductors, which may 
have to be imported to China.
• EMS and ODMs ship products under 





Figure 13: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source 
1984 Applied Materials Began selling in China in 1984 and by 2000 had sites in Wuxi, Shanghai, Beijing 
and Tianjin. 
21 
1985 Hewlett-Packard Established assembly (P.A.T.) operations with multiple Chinese partners from 
1985. 
7 
From 1986 Fujitsu Transferred technology to Nantong Huada for assembling logic chips; 
established JVs in Nanjing (1992), Jiangsu (1994), Xian (1995), Nantong (1997), 
and another Nanjing (1999.)  Also established a research center with CAS in 
Beijing in 1994.  Also operated a semiconductor assembly (P.A.T.) plant from 
1999. 
1 
1986 Texas Instruments Established first office in Beijing in 1986. 2 
1991 Daw Technologies Chinese government signed possibly the "single largest" semiconductor 
equipment purchase from Daw for Huajing, for clean room equipment. 
3 
1992 United States (various 
companies) 
China sent three delegations to the U.S. to buy older, used semiconductor 
equipment. 
4 
1992 Motorola Established Tianjin production facility for discrete devices and ICs, a wholly 
(Motorola) owned subsidiary. 
5 
1993 AMD Opened a design office in Beijing. 7 
1993 Diodes Established production in China of discrete devices.  
1994 Toshiba Established an assembly (P.A.T.) plant near Shanghai. 1 
1994 Intel Subcontracted P.A.T. work to Huajing for 386 chips; 1995, set up operations in 
Shanghai. 
4 
1994 Northern Telecom Established joint venture with Shanghai government bodies to produce Ics; 
Norther was majority owner; the joint venture was to supply Northern's other 
China-based joint ventures.  Northern set up four agreements and had locations 






Figure 13, continued: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
1994 ITT Formed joint venture with Zhejiang Connector Factory; ITT owned 51 
percent of the joint venture. 
8 
1994  Toshiba Established JV with Haujing to produce semiconductors.  Toshiba owned 
60 percent of the JV. 
9 
1994 U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
The DOC along with three U.S. electronics-related trade associations 
established a U.S. Information Technology Office in Beijing. 
10 
1994 Microelectronic Packaging Contracted with Chinese organizations to provide technology, training, 
and equipment for manufacturing (semiconductor) ceramic packaging. 
12 
1994 National Semiconductor Signed agreement with Chinese government to provide semiconductor-
related technologies to China. 
13 
1994 IBM Supplied capital equipment and a major research contract to Beijing's 
Application Software Development Corp (associated with Qinghua 
University.) 
19 
1994 Hitachi Established first China office in 1994; established an assembly (P.A.T.) 
site for DRAM in 1999. 
20 
By 1995 Sun Microsystems Established a partnership with China-based Huasun. 19 
1995 AlphaTec Formed JV in Shanghai with Huaxu of the MEI for P.A.T.; Microchip 
Technologies (of Arizona) also participated in the venture. 
11 
1995 General Instruments Received a business licencse to establish a semiconductor wholly forieng 
owned manufacturing facility in Tianjin. 
14 
1996 AT&T-Lucent Established six JVs and two wholly foreign owned enterprises in China, 
with a total of 20,000 workers (also transferred primary technology to 
Huajing under Project 908.) 
16 
1996 Daw Technologies Sold semiconductor equipment to Huajing, Huayue, and Chinese Design 






Figure 13, continued: Examples of Global Semiconductor Firm Activity in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
Before 1997 Siemens Sold equipment to Huajing; established a production facility in Jiangsu Wuxi. 17 
1997 Hitachi Established a packing (P.A.T.) plant for DRAM. 1 
1997 Bell Labs (the R&D unit of Lucent) 
Built branches in Beijing and Shanghai and launched a joint lab with 
Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue. 16 
1997 Matsushita Provided technology to Wuxi Little Swan, a large electronics/semiconductor R&D firm. 17 
Before 2000 Fairchild Esblished manufacturing in China. 15 
Sources: 
1) Jifu Wang, "China Huajing Electronics Group Corporation," unpublished business case study, 2000. 
2) Texas Instruments, see article at http://www.ti.com/corp/docs/csr/news_community_ti_china.shtml. 
3) High Beam Research, November 1992. 
3) High Beam Research,"Daw Technologies," August 1, 1991. 
4) New York Times, "Intel to Begin China Venture," March 26, 1994. 
5) Bill Rumbler, "Motorola Building $120million Factory in China," Chicago Sun Times, March 28, 1992. 
6) PR Newswire, "Northern Telecom Announces Larege Investment Program…in China," April 22, 1994. 
7) Rebecca Smith, "China's Growing Market Lures U.S. Computer Chip Makers," Tribune Business News, April 3, 1994. 
8) PR Newswire, "ITT Unit Forms JV with China's Largest Connector Company," April 12, 1994. 
9) New York Times, "Toshiba in Chinese Deal," August 9, 1994. 
10) PR Newswire, "U.S. Departmetn of Commerce Awards First Ever Grant for U.S.-Beijing Information Technology Office," October 26, 1994. 
11) Business Wire, "Alphatec Groups Forms JV in Shanghai, China," July 18, 1995 
12) Business Wire, "Microelectronic Packaging Receives $2million Contract from Chinese Government Electronics Concern," November 23, 1994. 
13) Business Wire, "National Semiconductor and Chinese Government Sign Agreement…in China," December 22, 1994 
14) PR Newswire, "General Instrument Corp. Division Receives Business License from PRC," May 25, 1995. 
15) Business Wire, "Fairchild Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of QT Optoelectronics," May 30, 2000. 
16) Xinhua News Agency, "Lucent Technologies' Investment Exceeds 100million," January 19, 1998. 
17) Washington Post, "'Made in China' Takes Great Leap Forward," June 15, 1997. 
18) Business Wire, "Daw Technologies Inc. Receives Approximately $8billion in New Contracts," January 9, 1996. 
19) Michael Zielenziger, "Pacific Rim: China Builds 'Brainpower Center'," Tribune News Service, November 1, 1995. 
20) Hitachi, see article at http://www.hitachi.com/about/corporate/history/1980.html. 





Figure 14: Examples of Global Firms' Major Activities in China in the Early 2000s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
2000, 2001 Applied Materials Re-enforced existing science funding and training center in cooperation 
with the Shanghai Science and Technology Commission 
6 
2000 Accord Advanced 
Technologies 
Hired by Huajing-CSMC for "multi-million dollars" to refurbrish 
equipment; AAT's first project in China 
15 
2000 AMD Announced wholly owned subsidiary in Suzhou with US$108 million 
investment 
14 
2000 Philips Announced a wholly foreign owned P.A.T. operation in Dongguan 18 
2000, 2001 SMIC (foreign owned, 
though considered 
"Chinese") 
Established in 2000, began production in 2002.  
2000 Grace Established in 2000, began production in 2003.  
2000 Motorola US$1.9 billion investment in a Tianjin IC fabrication and P.A.T. facility. 18 
2001 Cirrus Logic Signed a five year agreement with CSMC for CSMC to manufacture 
semiconductors for Cirrus 
17 
2001 Ericsson Announced US$5 billion investment in China from 2001-2006 2 
2001 Nokia Invested in a US$1.2 billion project in Beijing 3 
2001 Dell Moved its Asia headquarters to China 4 
2001 Alcatel Moved its Asia Pacific headquarters to Shanghai 5 
2001 Nelco Wuxi (part of Park 
Electromechanical 
Corporation) 
Opened semiconductor materials facility in Wuxi 9 
2002 ASML Received a major order for multiple equipment products from Huajing 16 
2002 Motorola Announced US$10 billion investment in China from 2002-2012 1 





Figure 14, continued: Examples of Global Firms' Major Activities in China in the Early 2000s 
 
Year Global Firm Activity in China Source
2002 Texchem-Pack Established a wholly foreign owned subsidiary in Wuxi to supply semiconductor firms 8 
2002 Toshiba Bought the Toshiba-Huajing P.A.T. joint venture and formed a wholly owned subsidiary called Toshiba Wuxi Semiconductor Company 10 
2002 MEMSIC Established P.A.T. facility in Wuxi 11 
2002 TOWA Established an equipment facility in Shanghai for P.A.T. firms 12 
 
Sources: 
1) www.motorola.com, noted in Nasa Tsai,President of Grace Semiconductor, “China: An Emerging Centre for Semiconductor Manufacturing,” Future Fab 
International, Issue 13, July 8, 2002. 
2) China Computer News, November 22, 2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
3) People's Daily, December 21, 2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
4) www.finance.lycos.com.cn, October 10,2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
5) Shanghai Computer News, May 23, 2001, noted in Tsai, “China: An Emerging Centre…" 
6) Business Wire, "Applied Materials Pledges Additonal Funds…," May 5, 2000 and "Applied Materials Shanghai…," October 18, 2001. 
7) China Daily, "In Brief," June 25, 2002 
8) Asia Pulse News, "Malaysia's Texchem Resources to Set Up Unit in Wuxi," April 12, 2002. 
9) PR Newswire, "Park Electrochemical Announces…," November 8, 2001 
10) Asia Info Services, "Toshiba Expands Semiconductor…," July 11, 2002 
11) Sensor Business Digest, "From the Editor: Market Opportunities Abound…," June 1, 2002 
12) Asia Info Services, "TOWA Comes to Shanghai," November 26, 2002 
14) Rand (James Mulvenon), "Shanghaied? The Economic and Political Implications...," July 2004, page 109. 
15) PR Newswire, "Accord Advanced Technologies Announces…," June 21, 2000. 
16) Business Wire, ASML Increases Presence in China with Huajing…," December 3, 2002. 
17) Business Wire, "Cirrus Logic Signs Five Year Foundry….," August 30, 2001. 






Figure 15: China's Imports and Exports of Semiconductors (I.C.s and Discrete Devices) in $US
 
Imports Exports 
1995 2,000,000,000 370,000,000 
1996 2,700,000,000 600,000,000 
1997 3,500,000,000 860,000,000 
1998 4,500,000,000 940,000,000 
1999 7,533,550,000 1,889,290,000 
2001 19,900,000,000 3,700,000,000 
2002 30,300,000,000 5,500,000,000 
2003 41,700,000,000 7,700,000,000 
2004 62,000,000,000 12,400,000,000 
Sources: 
1) 1995-1998 data from China Electronics Industry Yearbook, 1997 page 147, and 1999 page 211, shown in Michael Pecht, China's Electronics Industry, 
1999, page 28. 
2) 1999 data from Xu Xiaotian, Chief of Electronics Department, China's Ministry of Information Industry, cited in Michael Pecht, China's Electronics 
Industry, 1999, page 29. 
















Figure 16: Policies Supporting the Semiconductor Industry, Circa 2000 
 
Year Title Issue Addressed Notes 






China to Eventually Join the ITA in 2003, as part of the WTO. 
January 1998 "Guiding Catalog for 




A guide of industries for which foreign investments would likely 
be approved.  Microelectronics enterprises utilizing 0.35micron 
or better technology were "encouraged." 
June 1999 (Document by 
Ministry of Science 
and Technology and 
other departments) 
 Capital Access  Semiconductor enterprises (are newly) allowed to use venture 
capital and other capital channels. 
November 1999 "U.S.-China Bilateral 
Trade Agreement" 
Various Defined issues in anticipation of China joining the WTO. 
July 2000 "Document 18: Some 
Policies to Encourage 
the Development of 
the Software and 
Integrated Circuit 
Industries" 
Various   




The 863 Plan funded research for semiconductors. 
August 2000 (updated catalog) "Encouraged 
Investments" 
The catalog encouraged investments in the design and fabrication 





Figure 16, continued: Policies Supporting the Semiconductor Industry, Circa 2000 
 
Year Title Issue Addressed Notes 




The 10th FYP included investments in critical high tech areas 
and high tech projects, including semiconductors at the nano 
technology level.  Planned for US$120billion in semiconductor 
industry investments between 2001-2005. 
April 2001 "Regulations on the 
Protection of Layout 
Designs of Integrated 
Circuits"  
IP Protection for 
Semiconductors 
Protected semiconductor designs; enforced by the State 
Intellectual Property Office. 
December 2001 WTO Entry     
January 2002 (China eliminates 
tariffs on 
semiconductors, per 
WTO and ITA) 
    




This law regulated and brought transparency to government 
purchasing in China. 





China's VAT gave domestic producers a lower VAT than foreign 
producer, making imported semiconductors more expensive than 
China-produced semiconductors. 




    










Figure 17: Semiconductor Production Revenues in China, by Sector (RMB100 million), excluding Discrete Devices 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Design 9.8 14.8 21.6 44.9 81.8 124.3
• Percent of industry 5 7 7 13 15 18
Fabrication (manufacturing) 48 27.7 33.6 60.5 180 232.9
• Percent of industry 26 14 14 17 33 33
Packaging, Assembly, Testing (P.A.T.) 128.4 161.1 213.3 246 283.5 344.9
• Percent of industry 69 79 79 70 52 49
Total 186.2 203.6 268.5 351.4 545.3 702.1
Source: National Burea of Statistics, 2001-2005, shown in Chen Ling and Xue Lan, "Global Production Networks," China and the World Economy, 
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